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ABSTRACT 
Scholars in the field of environmental and animal ethics have propounded theories that outline 
what, in their view, ought to constitute an ethical relationship between human and the 
environment and humans and nonhuman animals respectively. In the field of animal ethics, the 
contributions by Western scholars to theorize a body of animal ethics, either as an ethic in its 
own right or as a branch of the broader field of environmental ethics is clearly seen. 
Consequently, there are, notably, two main schools of thought in the field of animal ethics. 
These are the ‘welfarist’ and the ‘rightist’ approaches (Regan, 2006; Owoseni & Olatoye, 
2014). Unfortunately, a clearly concerted effort to theorize on animal ethics from an African 
perspective is at the minimal, although there is a lot written in African environmental ethics, 
broadly construed. It is within this context that this study locates an African animal ethic within 
the two main theories in the global animal ethics, using traditional Akan ontology and ethics 
particularly, those that speak to their relationship with the environment and, especially animals. 
Thus, using Akan ontological worldview and ethics as foundational sources, alongside learnt 
principles from the emerging theories in African environmental ethics, the study seeks to find 
the place of Akan animal ethics within the rightist and welfarist debates. 
 
Following qualitative research rubrics, the study collected primary data through one-on-one 
interviews and focus groups discussions from traditional Akan leaders and experts, and young 
Akan adults. The data was then analysed using the study’s theoretical framework (welfarism, 
rightism, and the ethics of interrelatedness) in comparison with the literature to find 
corresponding answers to the study’s research questions. The findings indicate that the Akan 
perspective acknowledges the existence of an interconnection between humans and the rest of 
nature, and that it is an important connection that ought to be sustained. It is also evident that 
the Akan environmental ethics is anthropocentric in approach through its conferring of 
instrumental or extrinsic values on nature, instrumental values that go to the benefit of humans. 
This notwithstanding, Akan environmental ethics is not to be considered as individualistic in 
nature because it does not seek the interests or rights of individual human agents but instead, 
the common interest of the community through its goal to ensure the continuous progress and 
survival of the human community. Ultimately, the study’s findings reveal that Akan animal 
ethics shares closer affinities with welfarism (direct) than it does with rightism.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter is the introductory chapter to the whole study. Here, the study provides the 
background and motivation for the study; the study’s research questions and objectives; the 
significance of the study; and the organisation of the chapters that make up the study. The 
chapter also provides a sneak preview of the study’s theoretical framework and the method and 
methodology adopted.  
 
1.1 Background and Motivation  
Environmental ethics is the branch of ethics that is concerned with the human moral 
relationship with the natural environment. Rolston (2003: 517) defines it as a “theory and 
practice about appropriate concern for, values in, and duties regarding the natural world.” It 
aims, among other things, to provide ethical justification and moral motivation for protecting, 
preserving, and respecting the natural environment. Animal ethics, which is generally regarded 
as an offshoot of environmental ethics, narrows its focus on providing moral justifications and 
motivations for the protection, preservation, and respecting the welfare or right of animals.  
 
Whilst it is undeniable that animals matter, African scholars have done very little in terms of 
theorizing an African animal ethic that shows how traditional African cultures would or should 
relate to animals. There are indeed some references made here and there on human-animal 
relation in the emerging field of African environmental ethics, although it could be argued that 
very little conscious effort has been made to develop a theory of African animal ethics in its 
own capacity. Western literature has, however, made clear efforts and gains in theorizing a 
body of animal ethics, either as an ethic in its own right or as a branch of the broader field of 
environmental ethics. Consequently, there are notable authorities that can be named when it 
comes to animal ethics. Peter Singer (1975) is, for example, known for his arguments for 
animal liberation, while Tom Regan (2004) is known for his defense for animal rights. 
Consequently, there are, notably, two main schools of thought in the field of animal ethics. 
These are the ‘welfarist’ and the ‘rightist’ approaches (Regan, 2006; Owoseni & Olatoye, 
2014). 
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Welfarists are usually depicted as holding utilitarian or pragmatic perspectives that 
acknowledge human’s obligations prevent avoidable harm or undue loss of liberty to animals. 
Welfarists are known to promote the humane treatment of animals (Beauchamp, 2011: 200). 
In contrast, those who take the rightist position argue that animals, like humans, have interests 
that cannot be sacrificed or traded away just because it might benefit others. Animal welfare 
advocates allow the use of animals as long as “humane” guidelines are followed. Thus, the 
clear delineating difference between welfarists and rightists is that while rightists, on one hand, 
call for the total abolishment of all the use of animals, including for food, entertainment, sports, 
clothes, medical test, among others; welfarists, on the other hand, call for a more respectable 
treatment of animals (Regan, 2006). There are, of course, more nuances to both positions than 
the perspective given above. More insights on this is discussed in chapters two and three.  
 
The African continent, as we know it, is home to a diversity of animal species. A report by 
African Guide indicated that there are over 1,100 different species of mammals in Africa, and 
over 2,600 species of birds (African Guide, 2019). Yet, many of these wild animals are 
considered endangered due to human activities of poaching, hunting for food, sports, leisure 
and entertainment and loss of natural habitat due to both natural phenomena like draughts and 
human activities that encroach their space. 
 
Many African countries keep farm animals under poor and unhealthy conditions that do not 
only threaten the health of consumers, but the welfare and life of the animals themselves. The 
conditions of other domestic animals they keep as pets in their homes are no different. In 
Ghana, for example, one can easily observe that animals kept as pets are poorly fed (usually 
with leftover food). Such animals have poor or no designated place of accommodation, and 
hardly are they provided with veterinary services when sick or hurt. Many of them are not 
vaccinated in most cases, untagged, and allowed to move around unattended to on the streets 
and vicinities, feeding on whatever they find. As a result, many of these pets, besides looking 
scrawny and famished, tend to be vulnerable to speeding motorists. Unfortunately, the ill 
treatment of these domestic animals, including pets, usually go unrecorded and no one holds 
the owners or perpetrators accountable. Furthermore, some people in Ghana consume dog and 
cat as delicacies which in other places, are considered as pets and ‘man’s best friend’. While 
there are claims that some individuals in Ghana eat dog meat, evidence has shown that the 
practice is much more rampant in the upper east and northern regions of Ghana, where there 
exists dog meat markets. In such places, dog meat is considered a cultural delicacy and served 
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at weddings and other special occasions (Brown, 2017). Nii Addokwei Moffatt (2004) reports 
that the practice of eating dog meat is spreading widely in the capital city of Ghana where it is 
believed that people who eat dog meat cannot be spiritually harmed. 
 
Mitchell (2013: 21) notes that several countries in Africa have laws that pertain to animals and 
their welfare or protection. Yet, he also acknowledges that in some African countries, there is 
no specific legislation dealing with animal welfare. Trent, Edwards, Felt, and O’Meara (2005: 
74) note that though most African countries have wildlife protection acts, the majority of them 
have no federal protection laws for companion or domestic animals. Even in places that do 
have legislations, enforcement of the laws is a problem. Mitchell (2013: 21) acknowledges the 
problem of the lack of enforcement of the few existing laws that protect animals as well and 
further adds that there is also the problem of the lack of awareness of existing laws among the 
citizens. A similar situation exists in Ghana where one can find many laws and legislatures on 
the conservation and protection of wild animals. These include but not limited to the Wild 
Animals Preservation Acts of 1961 and Act 29 of Ghana Criminal Code. Nevertheless, there is 
a gross show of ignorance of the existence of these laws and a total display of apathy in their 
enforcements.  
 
Theoretically speaking, many African scholars have attempted in recent times to capture 
indigenous African ethical responses to the environmental crises. The developing field of 
African environmental ethics now has notable names like Ojomo, Tangwa, Ogunbemi, 
Kelbessa, Ugwuanyi, Behrens, Bujo and Murove, among others. They have altogether made 
significant strides in advancing the African voice, which hitherto was missing in the global 
environmental ethics debate and discourse. Nevertheless, very few of these scholars mentioned 
above have deliberately written uniquely on African animal ethics. Most of these authors have 
tended to quickly, and some in few sentences, allude to animals in their examples of nature but 
rarely make concentrated efforts to create a theory of African animal ethics. Thus, while it is 
apparent that there is an emerging African environmental ethics, African animal ethics is not 
so much apparent.  
 
It is against these backdrops that this study strives to locate Akan animal ethics within the two 
main theories in the global animal ethics debate. Thus, using Akan ontological worldview and 
ethics as foundational sources, alongside learnt principles from the emerging theories in 
African environmental ethics, the study seeks to find the place of Akan animal ethics within 
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the rightist or a welfarists debate. The study engages with questions such as: Would Akan 
ontology, ethics, and practices align with the emerging theories in African environmental 
ethics? Would the Akan environmental/animal ethics support an anthropocentric or non-
anthropocentric worldview? Would Akan animal ethics argue for animal moral status? Is it 
possible that African environmental ethics will support the view that animals or some animals 
have moral status? Is the notion of animal rights consistent with Akan metaphysics? Does the 
Akan acknowledge animal pain? Etc. The overarching goal for this study is to provide answers 
to the question of whether Akan animal ethics takes after a welfarist approach or a rightist 
approach given Akan ontological worldview and ethics. Thus, placing Akan animal ethics in 
the global animal ethics debate and adding to the emerging literature on African animal ethics. 
The study sought answers to this and other related questions by relying principally on Akan 
ontological worldview, practices, and ethics as its first-hand sources and by also drawing from 
values, ideals and principles stemming from some of the emerging trends in African 
environmental ethics as secondary sources. It is observable from the literature accessed and 
reviewed for this study that very little has been said on African animal ethics in general, and 
much less when it comes to placing African animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist 
positions. This research fills this gap.  
 
1.2 Key research question 
What is the place of Akan animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist debate? 
 
1.3 Research sub-questions 
1. What are the main theories in the global animal ethics debate? 
2. What are the trends in the emerging theories in African environmental ethics and 
their relation to animal care and ethics? 
3. How does Akan ontology and ethics help in placing Akan animal ethics within the 
welfarist and rightist debate? 
 
1.4 Key research objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. To explore the major theories in the global animal ethics debate 
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2. To examine the trends in the emerging theories in African environmental ethics 
and their relation to animal care and ethics  
3. To determine the place of Akan animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist 
debate based on Akan ontology and ethics 
 
1.5 Preview of methodology  
To achieve its main goal of defining the place of Akan animal ethics within the animal welfarist 
and rightist debate based on Akan ontology and ethics, the study utilized the empirical research 
methodology. Following qualitative research rubrics, the study collected primary data through 
one-on-one interviews and focus groups discussions. The data was then analysed in comparison 
with the literature to find corresponding answers to the study’s research questions. Aside the 
empirical data, the study relied on information from relevant literature such as books, journals, 
and internet sources in the analyses.  
 
The study’s population is the Akan people of Ghana. The Akans are a group of closely related 
people found in West Africa. They live chiefly in Ghana and parts of neighboring Ivory Coast. 
In Ghana, they inhabit most of the southern and middle belts and account for close to half the 
national population. The study’s sample is divided into two groups. One group is labelled as 
the ‘Traditional respondents’. These are respondents regarded by members of the Akan 
community as gatekeepers of their traditions and as such are the repository of traditional Akan 
knowledge. These include Chiefs (Ahenfo), Linguists (Akyeame), Queen Mothers (Ahemaa) 
and Clan heads (Abusuapanyin). The other group is labelled as the ‘young adult respondents’. 
Respondents in this group are the younger generations of Akans between the ages of twenty-
two (22) and thirty-seven (37) years.  
 
To interpret and analyze the data, the study used the grounded theory strategy of inquiry. This 
strategy of inquiry involves the constant comparison of data with emerging categories and 
theoretical categories, and the theoretical sampling of different groups to compare the 
similarities and differences of information (Creswell, 2009: 13). The analyses and 
interpretation of data were also done thematically using pre-chosen themes that cover essential 
arears in the animal ethics debate. 
 
Chapter 4 has a more in-depth presentation of the methodology and approach of the study. 
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1.6 Preview of theoretical framework 
The study uses the two main theories in the global animal ethics debate, that is, welfarism and 
rightism as part of its theoretical framework.  The identified dominant theory in the emerging 
trends of African environmental ethics labelled ‘the ethics of interrelatedness’ is the third 
theory used. The study used these three theories as expository, evaluative and descriptive tools. 
They are also used as tools for making comparisons with the collected data from the field. 
Ultimately, all the three theories help the study reach its objective of finding the place of Akan 
environmental ethics within the welfarist and rightist debate.  
Tom Regan (2006: 208-209) identifies two possibilities of being a welfarist. The first group, 
he notes, are those who advocate for the humane treatment of animals only because it leads to 
human benefits, that is, it will make humans treat each other with kindness and with less 
cruelty. He labels this group as the indirect-duty account of the moral status of nonhuman 
animals. The study refers to this group as the indirect welfarist and their theory or approach as 
indirect welfarism. The second group are those who hold that humans owe direct duties to 
animals. According to Regan, this is the path preferred by utilitarians, starting with Jeremy 
Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, but given more force in the work of Peter Singer. Regan opines 
that those belonging to this group use utilitarian theories to criticize how animals are treated in 
contemporary industries (animal agriculture and biomedical research, for example). This 
welfarist group considers the duty not to cause animals to suffer unnecessarily as a duty owed 
directly to animals. The study subsequently refers to this group as the direct welfarist and their 
theory or approach as direct welfarism. Direct welfarism is the preferred welfarist theory in 
this study. It is however very important to note here, as Francione (2010: 5) acknowledges that 
there are many approaches to direct welfarism. Thus, it is possible to find some direct welfarist 
theories that do not agree, for example, with the utilitarian approach of Peter Singer. As such, 
in chapter 3, the study explores the different direct welfarist position of Peter Singer, Carl 
Cohen, and Robert Garner at length.  
Rightism or animal rights theory is a theory that generally agrees that humans owe direct duties 
to animals because animals have at least some basic (moral) rights in the same way as humans 
do. Sunstein argues that animal rights advocates oppose all human use of animals by invoking 
and extending the Kantian principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as 
means to include animals as well. By this, the rightists challenge a wide range of current animal 
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uses including but not limited to agriculture (food), hunting (whether for food, sport or 
entertainment), zoos, circus and scientific experimentations (Sunstein, 2004: 5). Just like 
welfarism, there are different proponents of rightism. Tom Regan, a leading authority of 
rightism, describes animal rights theory to be abolitionist in its aspirations, seeks not to reform 
how humans exploit animals or to make what people do to them more humane but to abolish 
their exploitation and end it completely (Regan, 2001:127). The rightist or animal rights 
position is also referred to as the ‘abolitionist’ position. Francione (2010) explains that this 
alternative name is appropriate because the right theory, properly understood, agitates for the 
total abolition of animal usage. The study discussed the rightist views of Tom Regan, Bernard 
Rollin, Mary Anne Warren and Gary Francione extensively in chapter 3. 
One common theme that runs through the emerging African environmental ethics is the notion 
of the interrelatedness of all things in nature and for some, even with manmade objects. Segun 
Ogungbemi calls this notion the ‘ethics of nature-relatedness’, which according to him, can be 
explained as “an ethic that leads human beings to seek to co-exist peacefully with nature and 
treat it with some reasonable concern for its worth, survival and sustainability (Ogungbemi, 
1997: 270).” Godfrey Tangwa’s (2004) theory of African environmental ethics, which he calls 
‘eco-bio-communitarian,’ underscores this ethics of interrelatedness.  By eco-bio-
communitarian, Tangwa meant that there is “recognition and acceptance of interdependence 
and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans (Tangwa, 2004: 389).” 
There are identical expressions of this principle of interrelationship in the African 
environmental ethics identified by the likes of Munyaradzi Murove; Martin H. Prozesky; 
Mogobe B. Ramose; Bénézet Bujo, and Thaddeus Metz. Murove (2009); Prozesky (2009) and 
Ramose (2009), for example, independently employ the ethical principle found in the notion 
of Ubuntu/Boto and the Shona concept of Ukama to argue for environmental ethics of care and 
the virtue of the interrelatedness of humans with the entire ecosystem. It is this dominant 
principle found in the works of these African environmental ethicists/philosophers that the 
study subsequently refers to as the ethics of interrelatedness. Further details of this ethics are 
provided in chapter 3. 
 
1.7 Significance of the study 
The study’s goal to find the place of Akan animal ethics within the global animal ethics debate 
is significant in many ways. The study hopes that its findings will excite other researchers to 
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engage with the fast-growing field of animal ethics at the local level using principles born from 
the metaphysics and belief systems of the indigenous people. It will also contribute, on a 
broader scale, to the emerging field of African environmental ethics and the much less 
developed field of African animal ethics. Outside academics, the attempt to find a body of 
ethics that brings into discussion the complex relationship between humans and animals has 
practical relevance to Ghanaians and Africans. In the light of the growing numbers of animal 
right and animal welfare activism, Africans must define the relationship they want to have with 
animals. Similarly, given the part the farming of animal plays in greenhouse emissions and 
consequently climate change, it is prudent for Africans to engage the issue of the use of animals 
as food among other relevant concerns. Finally, there is a need for stringent laws to be made 
and enforced to protect wild animal species and domesticated animals. Given the evidence of 
the poor treatment of pets and other domestic animals in Africa, there is a need for existing 
laws to be enforced and new ones made to protect animals’ interest. One can readily make a 
case for these laws when the ethics of human and animal relationship are well stipulated and 
understood. 
 
1.8 Structure of the study 
The study comprises of eight chapters described succinctly below: 
 
Chapter 1: General Introduction to the Study 
This chapter introduces the study and shows the organizational framework and overview of the 
thesis. This includes the background to the study; the study’s motivation; its objectives; the 
significance of the study; and brief descriptions of the research approach and theoretical 
framework that the study adopts. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter is an exposition of relevant literature that informs the study. It introduces the 
reader to discussions on central themes, proponents and opponents in the animal ethics debate. 
The chapter briefly traces the history of environmental ethics in general and the history of 
animal ethics in particular. It also gives a brief look into the different approaches of welfarism 
and rightism. Other themes discussed in this chapter include the moral status of animals; the 
use of animals for food and vegetarianism; the use of animals in biomedical or scientific 
research; the use of animals as pets; and the hunting and trapping of animals. The Chapter 
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further identifies the ethics of interrelatedness as the common ethical principle found in the 
emerging literature in African environmental ethics. The metaphysics of the Akan people in 
connection with their relationship with the natural environment are discussed in the latter part 
of this chapter.  
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
The chapter details the theoretical framework that guides the study. The theory of welfarism, 
rightism, and the ethics of interrelatedness are the three selected theories to help the study 
explore, describe and evaluate the data and literature. Various proponents of these three 
theories and their respective standpoints are considered. The chapter also discusses their 
strength and weaknesses and how they are employed by the study to reach its objectives. 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Framework 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology used in conducting the research, which includes the 
research design, the method of sampling, the sample size, and the type of interviews used. 
These are explained in details with explanation and justification given for the study’s choice. 
The chapter further describes the strategy of inquiry, and methods used in the data collections, 
transcription, and analysis.  
Chapter 5: Presentation of Findings 
In this chapter, the study will present the findings from the fieldwork. These findings will help 
the study achieve its main research objective, which is to identify the place Akan animal ethics 
in light of the global animal ethics debate. The presentation and discussion of the findings are 
done under predefined themes that were mainly explored in the literature review. These themes 
are the moral status of animals, the interconnectedness of nature, and vegetarianism and the 
use of animals for food. The other themes are vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical 
research, the use of animals as pets or companion animals, on the rights and interests of 
animals, and hunting and trapping of animals. These themes represent some of the main issues 
in the animal ethics debate. 
 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Interpretation of Findings 
This chapter is dedicated to the discussion and interpretation of the data generated in the light 
of the literature and the theories guiding the research. Interpretation of findings helps to 
recognize and explain the primary implication of the data gathered on the field through the 
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demonstration of how the data agree or contradict with existing theories and literature. Just as 
it was done with the data presented in chapter 5, the interpretation and discussion of findings 
in this chapter will be conducted along with similar themes based on contestable issues in the 
animal ethics debate. These themes are the interconnectedness of nature, the moral status of 
nonhuman animals, vegetarianism and the use of animals for food, the use of animals as 
pets/companion animals, the hunting and trapping of animals, and vivisection and the use of 
animals in biomedical research. The study analyses these themes using the literature and the 
three theories that constitute the study’s theoretical framework.  
Chapter 7: Akan Animal Ethics: A Progressive Relational Anthropocentric Approach and the 
Argument for Moral Status Based on Community Assimilation  
In chapter 7, the study brings together a summary of the main findings under each of the key 
areas in the animal ethics debate and use the knowledge gained to argue for what the study 
calls ‘progressive relational anthropocentric’ approach to environmental ethics and for a theory 
of moral status based on community assimilation.  
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overall summary of the study’s findings and conclusions. It 
demonstrates how the study has met its objectives and answered its research questions. 
 
1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has been the introductory chapter to the study. It outlined the study’s background 
and motivation, research questions and objectives, and the significance of the study. The 
chapter also provided a preliminary overview of what is going to be the study’s theoretical 
framework and its methodology. It also provided a concise outlook of each chapter of the study. 
The next chapter presents an extensive literature review of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter is an exposition of relevant literature that informs the study. The previous chapter 
introduced the entire study by demonstrating why this research is important and relevant to 
society. It also gave a brief look into the structure of the thesis including the research questions, 
objectives of the study, a brief account of the research methodology, theories to be employed, 
and finally, a breakdown of each chapter. This chapter traces, briefly, the history of 
environmental ethics in general and the history of animal ethics in particular. It takes a 
momentary look into the different types of welfarism and rightism as approaches to animal 
ethics. In doing so, the chapter deliberately remained brief because the study provides more 
details to these two theories in chapter three, which focuses on the theoretical frameworks of 
the study. Nevertheless, many of the thematic subheadings in this chapter contain different 
aspects of the welfarist and rights view positions. One of such subheadings is the discussions 
on the moral status of animals. Here, there is a demonstration of how the notion of moral status 
is very crucial to the animal ethics debate since it plays an all essential role in determining how 
nonhuman animals are treated by humans. The discussions indicate that a particular position 
taken on the moral status of animals, influences immensely views from both the camp of the 
welfarist and the rightist. Some major arguments given for and against the moral status of 
nonhuman animals are also briefly considered in this chapter. From the discussions on moral 
status, the chapter reviews literature in some of the practical areas in animal ethics. These are 
the debates on the use of animals as food; the use of animals in biomedical or scientific 
research; the use of animals as pets; and the ethical debate on hunting and trapping wild 
animals. 
 
In dealing with the issues in focus, the chapter dedicates two subheadings to look into these 
two questions—what are some of the emerging theories in African environmental ethics? What 
has been said so far on African animal ethics, especially in terms of the moral status of 
nonhuman animals? These two subsections help the study to identify the research gap and to 
point out what the study intends to add to the existing arguments and literature. Since the 
research is placed within the context of Akan metaphysical, ontological, and ethical beliefs and 
practices, the final subsections direct focus to the Akan people of Ghana, in determining who 
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they are; their metaphysical beliefs towards the environment and animals; as well as their 
ethical outlook. The chapter shows the inadequacies in the literature and how the study helps 
fill this gap.  
 
2.1 Defining environmental ethics  
Holmes Rolston (2003: 517) defines environmental ethics as “theory and practice about 
appropriate concern for, values in, and duties regarding the natural world”. Clare Palmer 
appreciates the fundamental difficulties that one faces in finding a definition for the word 
‘environment’. She considers the environment generally as everything that surrounds people 
in the location they find themselves. Yet, in talks about environmental problems, the word 
environment, Palmer notes, is usually used to refer to problems faced by the natural part of the 
environment such as water bodies, forestry, animals, air and the likes (Palmer, 1997: 4). This 
is not a clear cut definition as Palmer herself rightly notes. Despite the fact that talks about care 
for the environment have existed throughout history and in many cultures, environmental 
ethicists generally agree that environmental ethics became a predominant branch in philosophy 
around the1960s and 1970s. McShane (2009: 407), for example, notes that the rise of 
environmental ethics was partly as a result of the budding environmental awareness and social 
movements of the 1960s. This brought about intensification in public interest on questions 
about humans’ moral relationship with the natural world. Rolston (2003: 517) also claims that 
environmental ethics remained widely unknown until the mid-1970s. Since its inception, the 
field of environmental ethics has concerned itself with whether or not humans owe any moral 
duty to the natural world and if yes, the sort of duties that are owed them. Palmer notes that 
historically the wild (the wilderness, wild ecosystems, organisms and biodiversity) has been 
the main focus of environmental ethics, but that has soon changed in recent years with some 
environmental ethicists exploring human ethical relationships with domesticated animals and 
agricultural urban landscapes, as well as, other aspects of the environment considered less wild. 
She eventually defines environmental ethics simply as “the study of how humans should or 
ought to interact with the environment” (Palmer, 2012: 6). Tongjin Yang explains that the aim 
of environmental ethics is “to provide ethical justification and moral motivation for the cause 
of global environmental protection” (Yang, 2006: 23). Yang further identifies, what he calls, 
five distinctive features of environmental ethics. These include, the extension of the domain of 
ethics to include animals and nature; its interdisciplinary nature (it includes for example 
politics, science, economics and literature); the plurality of approaches; the global nature of the 
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issues it deals with and finally, its revolutionary nature to challenge dominant beliefs and 
methods (Yang, 2006: 23-25).    
 
One major publication that brought attention to human’s attitude to the natural environment 
was Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” in 1949 (Palmer 2012: 20; Light and Rolston 2003: 7). In 
this work, Leopold argues for the ecosystem to be included in human ethical consideration, 
stating that an action is only right if it preserves the integrity of the ecosystem. Since then, there 
have been several other theories in environmental ethics that are broadly categorized under 
anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric theories. McShane explains that anthropocentrism is 
based on the assumption that “human beings and/or their interests matter morally in their own 
right while everything else matters morally only insofar as it affects human beings and/or their 
interests” (McShane, 2009: 407). In other words, anthropocentric theories generally hold the 
view that the environment exists to serve and further human interests, and that the environment 
has no other value outside of that. Meanwhile, nonanthropocentrism states that “the natural 
world and/or its parts have value in their own right, independently of their effect on human 
beings/interests” (McShane, 2009: 408). Nonanthropocentric theories argue that the natural 
environment possesses its own intrinsic value and that the environment is purposeful whether 
humans existed or not. Nonanthropocentric theories include biocentrism and ecocentrism. 
Bryan G. Norton (1984) argues that the distinction and debate between nonanthropocentric and 
anthropocentric environmental ethics are far less important than it is assumed. He identifies 
two types of anthropocentricism namely, namely weak and strong anthropocentrism. It is his 
opinion that a weak anthropocentrism is good enough to support environmental ethics. He 
believes that it is a mistaken view to think that environmental ethics can only thrive if its 
principles are based solely on a nonanthropocentric theories, that is, on principles that 
presuppose that the natural environment has value in themselves independent of its value to 
humans. Norton states that: 
Weak anthropocentrism [instead] provides a basis for criticizing individual, 
consumptive needs and can provide the basis for adjudicating between these 
levels, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics without the 
questionable ontological commitments made by nonathropocentrists in 
attributing intrinsic value to nature (Norton, 1984: 131). 
 
Another dominant debate in environmental ethics is the debate between holism and 
individualism. The fundamental question that these two sides seek to address is which parts of 
nature are valuable in their own rights. Individualism places value in individual persons, 
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animals, plants, etc. It is of the view that these individual persons, animals or plants are valuable 
in their own right, while the larger wholes that these individuals comprise, in terms of species, 
ecosystems, the biosphere, etc., have values that are only derivative of the value of their 
individual constituents. Theories generally considered forms of individualism are biocentrism 
(the view that each living thing matters morally in its own right) and animal rights (the view 
that some or all animals have moral rights). Holism, on the other hand, claims that wholes 
(species, ecosystem, biosphere, etc.) are to be the primary bearers of value while the value of 
individuals are made to depend on the contribution that those individuals make to the good of 
the wholes. An example of holism is ecocentrism - the view that ecosystems matter in their 
own right and individuals have value in virtue of the contribution they make to the functioning 
of the ecosystem. (McShane, 2009: 411). Palmer (2012) and McShane (2009) note that other 
more recent theories in the field of environmental ethics have emerged. These include 
environmental pluralism, deep ecology, environmental pragmatism and ecofeminism. These 
theories attempts to present alternative views to the mainstream theories.  
 
2.2 Defining animal ethics 
If environmental ethics is defined as theory and practice about appropriate concern for, values 
in, and duties regarding the natural world in the manner of Rolston (2003), then animal ethics 
can be defined as the theory and practice about appropriate concern for, values in, and duties 
regarding nonhuman animals. It can also be inferably defined in the manner of Palmer (1997) 
as the study of how humans should or ought to interact with nonhuman animals. For David 
DeGrazia (1996: 1), animal ethics is simply the ethical study of animals. Light and Rolston 
(2003: 5) hold that moral issues concerning the treatment of animals have a longer standing 
than any other debates in environmental ethics. Richard Sorabji (1993: 7) claims that talks on 
the treatment of animals in ancient Greece began as early as Pythagoras in the sixth century 
BC or even Hesiod in the eighth century BC. While it is said of Pythagoras that he was as a 
vegetarian, who called for animals to be treated with respect, mainly because he thought the 
souls of dead people abide in animals, Aristotle regarded animals to exist to serve the purpose 
of humankind (Aristotle, 1959; also in Singer, 1975: 188). It is also reported of Aristotle that 
he permitted meat-eating and seemed to have been opposed to vegetarianism (Dombrowski, 
1981: 65-66). Stoic philosophers argued that animals cannot be considered as part of humans’ 
moral community because they lack reason. (Boersema, 2001: 202-203). Plutarch, a Greek 
priest at Delphi, argued that it was indeed against the nature of humans to eat meat based on 
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human physical makeup and digestive system. He disagreed with the Stoics’ position on 
animals and described the killing of animals for food as cruelty. He asked for a rethink into 
whether humans owe any justice towards animals (Regan and Singer, 1976: 112-117). Despite 
Plutarch’s position, Armstrong and Botzler (2008: 3) claim that the general attitude in ancient 
cultures was largely dependent on whether they consider nature or specific animals as helpful 
or harmful to humans. The medieval period, however, they noted, brought with it an ambivalent 
reaction towards animals.  
  
There has been a long held an established belief in Christendom that humans were created by 
God as superior entities over animals and other creations and were given the right to rule and 
use animals to their will and desire (Franklin, 1999: 11). St. Augustine, coming from the 
Christian perspective, agrees with Aristotle that animals are created to serve the needs of 
humans. He claims that animals do not have an immortal soul, they are not rational and only 
act based on instincts. Drawing on some biblical references, he concludes that it is not wrong 
for humans to make use of animals, whether for food or for any other purpose. He was, 
however, of the view that humans needed to show care and compassion to animals because 
doing so will help them show a similar disposition to other human beings. (Leahy, 1991: 80-
83). Many have argued that St. Augustine’s position and the Christian view, in general, 
influenced what has become the Western tradition of dominating nature. It is argued that this 
has led to the abuse of nature and animals by humans, and consequently leading to the many 
environmental crises the world is facing today including how animals are perceived and treated. 
(White, 2000: 19-26; Thomas 1983: 17-24). 
 
Armstrong and Botzler (2008) note that the views of the philosopher René Descartes and the 
emergence of Protestantism came with it a gloomy period for animals. With the reduction in 
the power of the church, Descartes views were considered as the best possible rational 
explanation for humans’ actual relationship with animals devoid of deification or appeal to the 
dictates of any higher being. The general view of the renaissance period was that animals were 
different from humans in terms of speech, reason, moral responsibility and immortality of the 
soul (Armstrong and Botzler, 2008: 4). Descartes claims that animals are not conscious and so 
cannot think, perceive, choose or feel. They are simply automatas, that is to say, they acted 
mechanically (Leahy, 1991: 84). Yet, as Armstrong and Botzler (2008: 4) report, there were 
some dissenting views from scholars such as Leonardo da Vinci; Michel de Montaigne; 
William Shakespeare; Martin Luther; John Calvin and Sir Isaac Newton. Regardless, Keith 
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Thomas (1983) demonstrates that the general common views held in the prevailing literature 
during this period were that man and animals were different, that animals were inferior to 
humans, and that even if animals could reason at all, they could only do so at a much lower 
level than humans. 
 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought much more positive gains for animal welfare 
and rights. Notable scholars including Voltaire, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart 
Mill, Charles Darwin, and Henry Salt individually have rejected either the claim that animals 
cannot be hurt directly or that they do not reason. Both Voltaire and Hume, for example, 
rejected Descartes claim that animals are mere brutes and machines without the capacity to feel 
or reason. Voltaire argues that the resemblance of organs of feelings in humans to that of 
animals should at least point to the fact that they can also feel as humans do. Hume also 
maintains that the behavior of animals that resembles that of humans comes from a reasoning 
that is not any different from those that are seen in humans (Regan and Singer, 1976: 67-71). 
The father of utilitarian theory, Jeremy Bentham, is also known to have given some 
consideration to the welfare of animals. In one of his famous quotes, he asserts that the question 
that should be asked is not whether animals can talk or reason, but whether or not they can 
suffer (Regan and Singer, 1976: 129-130). Bentham’s work, many years on, became one of the 
important pieces that influenced the acclaimed founder of the 21st-century animal liberation 
author and advocate, Peter Singer. Works by the English naturalist and biologist, Charles 
Darwin, concerning the anatomy and mental powers of the lower animals also brought to light 
some misconceptions about animals and also demonstrated how humans are closely related to 
animals in terms of ancestry. Darwin noted, for example, that animals also do feel pain, 
pleasure, happiness, and misery. He also demonstrated that the difference between humans and 
animals in terms of mental capacity is only one of degree and not of a kind (Regan and Singer, 
1976: 72-81).        
 
Contemporary scholars (20th and 21st centuries) such as DeGrazia disclose that there have been 
a large number of contributions on animal ethics since the mid-1970s. It is generally noted in 
the literature that it was the publication of Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation, in 1975 that 
highlighted considerations for the moral status of animals (DeGrazia, 1996: 2; Pojman & 
Pojman, 2012: 58). Leahy (1991: 2) speaks of this publication as that which stimulated modern 
enthusiasm with a sizable history. The publication of Animal Liberation generated a lot of 
discussion on the place of animals in human society, calling on humans to reconsider their 
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attitude towards nonhuman animals. Singer, in Animal Liberation, argues that there is no moral 
justification for human’s refusal to consider animals equal on the moral scale. He also argues 
against speciesism - an attitude of bias and favoritism towards members of one’s own species 
- and urged all to become vegetarians. Another significant publication that came, in some part, 
as a critique of Singer’s position is Tom Regan’s book, The Case for Animal Rights published 
in 1983. As DeGrazia (1996: 5) notes, Regan’s classic book continues to represent an important 
position in animal ethics. Regan notes in The Case for Animal Rights, that humans and animals 
are equal and all have inherent inalienable rights, thus, asking for the extension of moral 
consideration to include that of non-human animals. Other notable names in the contemporary 
animal ethics literature including but not limited to Bernard Rollin, Carl Cohen, Mary Midgley, 
Mary Anne Warren, Gary Francione, and Robert Garner. 
 
2.3 The Welfarist and Rightist positions 
Animal ethics has commonly been classified into two major types namely, Animal welfare and 
Animal rights. (Beauchamp, 2011: 200; Waldau, 2011: 95; Regan, 2006:208-209 & Sunstein, 
2004: 4). Animal welfarists, generally, are those who believe that humans have obligations to 
protect the basic welfare interests of animals. Animal rightists, on the other hand, are those 
who believe that animals have certain inherent and robust rights. Beauchamp, for instance, 
notes that animal rightists are essentially those who are portrayed as endorsing rights for 
animals such as the right to life, the right to an uncontaminated habitat, the right not to be 
constrained in cages or pens, the right to an uncontaminated habitat, the right not to be used in 
biomedical research, and many other rights enjoyed by humans. In contrasts, animal welfarists 
are those who are depicted as having utilitarian or pragmatic notions that acknowledge human 
obligations to not cause unnecessary or avoidable harm, undue suffering or loss of liberty to 
all animals (Beauchamp, 2011: 200). 
 
Animal rights mean that animals are not for us to use for food, clothing, entertainment, or 
experimentation. Animal welfare allows these uses as long as “humane” guidelines are 
followed. Elizabeth Anderson, likewise, notes that animal welfare defenders hold that the basic 
criterion for a being to be morally considerable is ‘sentiency’ or the capacity to suffer, while 
animal rights advocates argue that the fundamental requirement is ‘subjecthood’. A subject 
does not only require sentiency but the ability to have propositional attitudes, emotions, will, 
and an orientation of itself and to its future (Anderson, 2004: 277-278). Animal welfare theories 
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accept that animals have interests but would sometimes allow some of these interests to be 
traded away as long as there are some human benefits that are thought to justify that sacrifice. 
Meanwhile, animal rights theories defend the position that animals have interests that cannot 
be sacrificed or traded away just because it might benefit others. 
 
Tom Regan notes that animal welfare and animal rights are the two main alternative theories 
that have come to be recognized in the study of animal ethics. Animal welfarists, he notes, 
accept, for example, the permissibility of humane use of animals as food and in biomedical 
research, provided such use does not cause unnecessary pain and suffering to the animals. 
Animal rightists, by contrast, deny the permissibility of such use, however humanely or 
painlessly it is done. According to Regan, it is the animal rights theories that attempt to offer 
a basis for a radical reassessment of how animals are treated because it is animal rights theories 
that call for the abolition of all forms of animal exploitation by humans (Regan, 2006: 208-
209). 
 
These two main positions, welfarism and rightism, led by the two main proponents, Peter 
Singer and Tom Regan respectively, have come under some criticisms. Critics include 
Raymond G. Frey (1980), Carl Cohen (2008), and Mary Anne Warren (2012). In the process 
of challenging these two main proponents, these critics present their own versions of either 
animal welfarism or animal rights view. Their criticisms and positions, in addition to some of 
the specific details offered by Singer and Regan respectively for welfarism and rightism, 
theories are treated in-depth in chapter three where the theoretical frameworks guiding this 
research are explained. In this section, the relevant literature reviewed shows the following as 
the main approaches to the animal ethics debate: 
1. THE WELFARIST APPROACH: this approach is further divided into two subgroups.  
a. The indirect approach: the approach that denies that animals have moral rights or 
interests at all. This approach holds that animals only exist to serve the desire, needs 
and purpose of man. They advocate for the humane treatment of animals just 
because it will lead to the good of humanity. We can place the positions of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, René Descartes, and Immanuel Kant in this category. Both direct 
welfarism and rightism reject this position. This approach shall henceforth be 
referred to as the ‘indirect welfarist’ approach and their advocates as ‘indirect 
welfarists’.  
19 
 
b. The direct approach: this approach perceives animals as having moral worth in 
themselves or having some sort of interests worth protecting. Thus, for this 
approach, animals do not exist just to serve the interest of humans but can also have 
interests of their own. Those who favor this approach advocate for the humane 
treatment of animals and not necessarily for the total elimination of animal use by 
humans. They aim to seek the welfare of animals. They argue for animals to be 
better handled under better conditions that will minimize as much pain and 
suffering as possible. We can place the positions of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart 
Mill, Ingemar Nordin, Peter Singer, and Robert Garner in this category. This 
approach shall henceforth be referred to as the ‘direct welfarist’ approach and their 
advocates as ‘direct welfarists’.  
c. ANIMAL RIGHTS APPROACH: This approach to animal ethics argues that 
animals have moral worth and that this moral worth is an inherent right they have. 
They call for the total abolishing of animal usage in any form and not just for the 
humane treatment of animals to reduce their suffering and pain. Hence, they are 
sometimes referred to as ‘abolitionists’. We can place the theories of Tom Regan, 
Bernard Rollin, Mary Anne Warren, Gary Francione, and Ingrid Newkir in this 
category. This approach shall henceforth be referred to as the ‘rightist’ approach 
and their advocates as ‘Animal rightists’.  
 
Despite welfarism and rightism being the two major approaches in the animal ethics literature, 
there are, what is considered, alternative approaches to these two main theories (Palmer and 
Sandøe, 2011). Palmer and Sandøe call these approaches generally as the contextual 
approaches. One of such contextual approaches is the ethic of care. Midgley (1983), a 
proponent of the feminist theory of ethics of care, for example, suggests that the idea of social-
bondedness and the emotions associated with them are as worthy of consideration in human’s 
moral relationship with nonhuman animals. Feminist, Karen J. Warren, states that ecological 
feminism began to receive a fair amount of attention as an alternative feminist approach and 
also as an alternative environmental ethic since Franccoise d’Eaubonne introduced the term 
ecofeminism in 1974 (Warren, 2000: 213). Even though there are many types of ecofeminism, 
many of them emphasize the ethical nature of human relationships to the nonhuman natural 
world (Warren and Cheney, 1991: 180). For Warren, ecological feminism, is the position that 
there are important historical, experiential, symbolic and theoretical connections between the 
domination of women and the domination of nature (2000: 213). Thus, the centrality of 
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ecofeminist theories is first, the commitment to challenge male bias in ethics, and second, to 
develop analyses which are not male-biased (Warren and Cheney, 1991: 180).  
 
A notable challenge with ethics of care and possibly other contextual approaches is that, they 
are usually not clear in specifying whether the social relationships humans are to develop with 
nonhuman animals and its associated emotions should demand a humane use of animals 
(welfarism) or demand a complete abolition of all forms of animal usage by humans (rightism). 
 
2.4 The moral status of nonhuman animals 
According to DeGrazia (2008: 183), to have moral status is to bear direct or independent moral 
importance. A conception of moral status, according to Metz (2012: 389), is “a comprehensive 
and basic principle that purports to entail that, and explain in virtue of what things either have 
moral status or lack it.” Only a few will deny that animals matter, but it gets rather controversial 
when it comes to the reason why they matter. Thus, DeGrazia notes that the sort of mental 
capacities associated with animals plays a large role in how people believe they should be 
treated (DeGrazia 1996: 1). This is very important to the welfarist and rightist debate because, 
as will be immediately shown, the moral status of nonhuman animals plays a vital role in the 
arguments presented by both sides in the animal ethics debate. That is, how the moral status of 
nonhuman animals is valued often determines the kind of advocacy they give for animals, 
whether for their welfare or for their rights. It is also the main factor that divides the indirect 
welfarists from the direct welfarists. Do animals have any moral status or moral worth? Can 
they be given the status of a person? What do animals possess that makes them morally worthy? 
What are some of the essential things that animals lack but which humans possess that make 
animals unable to have a moral status or one that is on par with humans? These are perhaps the 
most important questions in the animal ethics debate which have led to varied conceptions of 
the moral status of nonhuman animals.  
 
As already indicated in the brief history of animal ethics above, for some (Aristotle, St. 
Augustine, Descartes, Kant), animals matter only because they serve human interest in terms 
of food, clothes and other functions. This group sees any duty humans have towards animals 
as an indirect one. Descartes, for example, argued that animals do not have consciousness or 
soul and thus, cannot possess rights. Kant, on his part, argued that only rational people can 
have a ‘will’ and have moral worth. And since, according to him, animals have no ‘will’, they 
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are not rational and cannot have any moral worth. Kant only saw any duties humans have 
towards animals as an indirect one that is only meant to benefit humans in the long run (See 
Kant’s “Duties to Animal and Spirits”, in Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1963). Those who hold such view are classified as indirect welfarists, as has 
been pointed out above. This view will fall under what Palmer (2017) regards as one of the two 
anthropocentric ways to look at animal moral status. She notes that one anthropocentric view 
is to consider only humans to have moral status such that everything else in nature matters only 
so far as it is useful to humans. The second of the two anthropocentric views on moral status, 
she points out, asserts that although humans have higher moral worth, there are at least some 
nonhuman beings or things moral significance albeit to a lower degree. These two views, which 
she notes are sometimes referred to as “strong” and “weak” anthropocentric views, are 
contrasted with a nonanthropocentric view of moral status that argues that there are that at least 
some nonhuman beings or things that have high moral significance; perhaps as high, or even 
higher, than human beings (Palmer, 2017: 194). 
 
Perhaps Singer and Regan present us with a distinction between a weak anthropocentric view 
of moral status and a nonanthropocentric view respectively. Both Singer and Regan have 
rejected the position that tends to view animals as merely automatas or as having only an 
instrumental purpose. They argue that humans have direct moral duties towards animals and 
that animals matter because they have moral worth in of themselves. Yet, whilst Peter Singer 
(1975), on the one hand, argues from a utilitarian perspective to make the argument that animals 
have moral worth because they have interests; Tom Regan (1983), on the other hand, makes a 
case for animals’ moral worth as a right animals possess. Regan holds that, even though animals 
are not moral agents, they should be considered as moral patients because they can have beliefs, 
desires and preferences in a similar manner as other human moral patients such as babies do. 
There is not a single homogeneous position concerning the moral status of animals among all 
the direct welfarists to warrant it being matched against a single or homogeneous position of 
all animal rightists. This is because even though all direct welfarists and rightists accept the 
fact that all animals or at least some of them have moral status, there are variations with, for 
example, which feature(s) make animals have moral status or the level of their moral status. 
For example, even though both Tom Regan and Mary Anne Warren are known rightists, Regan, 
on his part, holds that the moral status of animals are equal in all respect to the moral status 
possessed by humans, while Warren holds that the moral status of animals is not equal to that 
which is possessed by humans. As a result of this, instead of presenting a direct welfarist and 
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a rightist view positions on the moral status of animals as a single monolithic view, the 
succeeding paragraphs, will present some individual welfarists and rightists views on the moral 
standing of animals. 
 
To better appreciate the debate on the moral status of animals there is a need to appreciate the 
distinction usually made between moral patients, moral agents, and moral community. 
According to Tom Regan (2004: 151ff.), moral agents are individuals who are known to have 
a variety of sophisticated abilities; especially the ability to apply various moral principles 
impartially in deciding in any given situation, what morally ought to be done (Regan, 2004: 
151). They are also able to freely choose among given alternatives after considering all other 
things. Thus, moral agents can be held morally responsible for their actions because they have 
acted out of their own volition. Regan further noted that not only can moral agents do what is 
morally right and wrong but they can also be at the receiving end of other people’s right and 
wrong actions. In contrast, moral patients are those that lack the requirement or criteria that 
make them responsible for their actions. That is, they do not have or are considered not to have 
complex mental competences to formulate and apply impartially basic moral principles to 
everyday situations and then go on to decide among given alternatives the best course of action 
(Regan, 2004: 152). In effect, their actions are not morally evaluated because they cannot 
discern between what is right and what is wrong. Nevertheless, moral patients can by their 
actions bring harm upon others even though their actions will not be regarded as morally right 
or wrong. Regan notes that human infants, young children, and the mentally deranged or 
enfeebled of all ages can be included as paradigm cases for human moral patients (Regan, 2004: 
153). A more controversial example is that of human fetuses which persists in the abortion 
debate. A moral community is defined by Regan as the notion that comprises all the individuals 
who are of direct moral concern or the notion that consists of all individuals toward whom 
moral agents owe direct duties to (Regan, 2004: 153). Indirect welfarists’ position remains that 
humans owe direct duties only to moral agents. In other words, indirect welfarists only include 
moral agents in their definition of a moral community. In consequence, any individual who is 
not a moral agent is considered as not within the boundaries of direct moral concern. According 
to this view, any duty that moral agents accord to moral patients is done only as an indirect 
duty which eventually ends up benefiting moral agents. Thus, it becomes apparent that to the 
indirect welfarists, animals do not fall within the ambit of their moral community. That is, since 
animals do not have the sophistication of human rationality, they are moral patients and not 
moral agents. As such, human moral agents owe them no direct moral duty.  
23 
 
 
Peter Singer, as a direct welfarist, supports the moral status of all sentient beings, including 
animals. As Singer would have it, animals are to be included in the definition of a moral 
community even though, animals can only be regarded as moral patients and not moral agents. 
Singer argues that it is a generally held view that all humans are equal. However, to say all 
human beings are equal is not to imply that human beings have equal reasoning capacities, 
strength or any other physical or mental attributes. This, Singer notes, would be unattainable 
as well as untenable and as such, cannot be the basis for claiming and demanding the equality 
of all humans. Although, human beings are different in various mental and physical capacities, 
Singer notes that these differences have nothing to do with their race, colour or sex. This is 
because a person’s race, colour or sex, gives no guide to his or her abilities. Thus, he writes, 
“from the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about 
that person” (Singer, 1976: 151). Singer further maintains that the basic principle of equality 
is simply equality of consideration and not all the factual differences humans possess. He 
concludes that it is arguing on shaky grounds if demand is made for equal consideration for 
women, blacks, or gays, despite the many factual differences that cut across sex, race or sexual 
orientation, while denying or rejecting equal consideration to animals.  
 
Continuous denial of equal consideration to animals despite the lack of any tenable reason to 
do so only leads to the commitment of speciesism an act, which for him, needs to be 
condemned. A speciesist is anyone who allows the interests of his own species to override the 
greater interests of members of other species (Singer, 1976: 154). Singer considers a speciesist 
to have similar characteristics with a racist who violates the principle of equality by granting 
greater weight to the interests of members of his own race. Singer relies on earlier points made 
by Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, that the interests of every being 
affected by an action, are to be taken into consideration, to argue that concern for others ought 
not to be based on what they are or on the type of abilities they may or may not have. Hence, 
if being highly intelligent does not make one more human than others, then it should also not 
make human beings exploit nonhuman animals as well. Again, relying on Bentham’s futuristic 
call on humans to one day, give moral consideration to animals because they too can suffer. 
Singer places his reason for arguing for an extension of moral status to animals on the fact that 
they can also experience pain. He held that having the capacity for suffering and enjoying 
things is a pre-requisite if one is to have interests at all (Singer, 1976: 154). In other words, 
Singer holds that a being or a thing cannot have interest if that being or thing cannot enjoy or 
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suffer. It is for this reason that a stone cannot have interest but a mouse can. This is because, 
according to Singer, nothing done to the stone will affect its welfare. On the contrary, what it 
is done or not done to the mouse can affect its welfare (Singer, 1976: 154). Thus, by this, Singer 
places the condition or criterion for moral consideration on being sentient, which is, having the 
capacity to suffer pain or experience pleasure.  
 
Carl Cohen (2001) and Robert Garner (2010), both direct welfarists, will agree with Singer in 
the acknowledgment of the moral status of animals based on sentiency. Cohen argues that 
animals are not stones but are beings that can experience pain and pleasure. Garner, similarly, 
maintains that the sentiency of animals is a great deal, and that animals being sentient, should 
suffice for them to be accorded a moral status. The difference between Cohen’s view and that 
of Garner’s, however, is the implication that should follow from accepting that animals have 
moral status based on sentiency. Cohen, for example, asserts that even though calls demanding 
humans put a stop to the use of animals in various respects are justified and perhaps possible, 
the call to abolish the use of animals in biomedical research is untenable and perhaps 
impossible. This is due to numerous advancements humans have made in the field of medical 
research from using animals in scientific research. Indicatively, both Cohen and Garner 
disagree with Singer that the moral status possessed by animals are one and the same as that 
possessed by humans. Closely related to Cohen’s view are views expressed by Marry Anne 
Warren (2012) and David DeGrazia (2008), whom both hold the view that moral status is held 
in different degrees. Warren argues that ‘Subjecthood’ and sentiency come in degrees, hence 
rights of different animals vary in strength. DeGrazia, relying on what he terms as the ‘Unequal 
Consideration Model of Degrees of Moral Status’, asserts that “it is generally worse to kill 
persons because they are due full moral consideration, whereas, mice are due some, but less, 
consideration” (DeGrazia, 2008: 186). 
 
Tom Regan, as a rightist, also defends the moral status of animals and places their moral status 
on an equal scale with that of humans. He notes that individual moral agents are said to be 
equal not because of their intrinsic value but rather, because they have what he referred to as 
inherent value (Regan, 2004: 235). He defines intrinsic value as values that are attached to 
individuals’ experiences including their pleasures or preference satisfactions. These intrinsic 
values of individuals, Regan posits, are neither reducible nor commensurate to their inherent 
value, which is to be regarded as individuals having value in their own rights.  Thus, those who 
have a pleasant or happier life, for example, are not to be regarded as having greater inherent 
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value than those who have a less pleasant or happier life. For Regan, all moral agents possess 
this inherent value equally. Importantly, the inherent value of moral agents is not earned by the 
individual agent’s efforts, and as a result, it is neither lost nor gained by what the agent is able 
to do or fails to do. In addition, one’s inherent value does not reduce or increase based on his 
or her utility with respect to the interests of others. Lastly, individuals’ inherent value is 
independent of them being the object of anyone’s interest (Regan, 2004: 235-237).  
 
Regan further posits that the notion of inherent value as described above applies also to moral 
patients, which in his view, should include nonhuman animals. For him, any attempt to restrict 
inherent value to only moral agents is done arbitrarily, and rationally defective. He is of the 
view that not only do moral patients possess inherent value in the same manner as moral agents 
do, they also have it in equal respect (Regan, 2004: 239-240).  Regan maintains that any attempt 
to deny this for moral patients is arbitrary, for no physical features can be used to mark the 
relevant similarity; nor will species membership suffice or even the more general biological 
classifications, for example, being human. This is because, as Regan notes, “one characteristic 
shared by all moral agents and moral patients is that they are alive, and some thinkers evidently 
believe that it is the possession of this characteristic that marks off the class of individuals who 
have inherent value from those who do not” (Regan, 2004: 241). Regan thus employs what he 
terms, the ‘subject-of-a-life’ criterion to show why animals as well as other moral patients 
ought to have inherent value just as moral agents do. According to him, to be the subject-of-a-
life, is to be an individual who has beliefs and desires, perception, memory, and a sense of the 
future, including their own future. They also have an emotional life that comes with feelings 
of pain and pleasure; they have preference and interest in their welfare, and they have the ability 
to initiate action in an attempt to reach their goals and satisfy their desires. In addition, a 
subject-of-a-life has a psychophysical identity over time, among other features. (Regan, 2004: 
243). Thus, any being who meets the subject-of-a-life criterion has inherent value and that 
being is not to be treated as mere receptacles. Regain maintains that it is also the subject-of-a-
life criterion that recognises a similarity that is valid for both moral agents and moral patients, 
a similarity which is more relevant rather than arbitrary. Regan further stipulates that humans 
must apply what he calls the respect principle to any individual who is a subject-of-a-life. This 
respect principle enshrines that “we are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in 
ways that respect their inherent value”, whether they are moral agents or patients (Regan, 2004: 
248). This call for equal respectful treatment, from the standpoint of Regan, is not a call to 
show acts of kindness to nonhuman animals but a strict act or demand for justice. Regan, thus, 
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thinks it is sound to conclude that animals have certain basic moral rights, particularly the 
fundamental right to be treated with respect because they have inherent value (Regan, 2004: 
329).  
 
Bernard Rollin is also a rightist who argues against the attempt to use rationality (more 
especially Immanuel Kant’s approach to morality through rationality) as the basis for a 
distinction between humans and animals. Rollin believes that such an attempt is to be 
considered a major inadequacy in any moral theory since moral concern for people usually has 
nothing to do with their rationality. A great amount of human’s moral concern for the other, 
Rollin reckons, is focused towards assuaging unnecessary suffering, despite their rationality 
(Rollin, 1992: 54). Rollin’s statement may move one to think that perhaps, he is in accord with 
Jeremy Bentham or Peter Singer, in placing the criterion for moral status in sentiency, yet that 
does not seem to be the case. Even though, Rollin holds pleasure and pain to capture most of 
the human’s intuition about moral concern for others, he, like Tom Regan, rejects sentiency as 
a criterion for granting moral status, describing it as not good enough. Rollin acknowledges 
that there are some instances that humans have strong moral intuitions towards others in various 
activities that do not involve pain or pleasure. He considers self-fulfilment and freedom as 
some examples of human pursuits, of which a deliberate impediment by another, would 
constitute an immoral act and yet has nothing to do with pain or pleasure. Rollin, however, 
concedes to the fact that using pleasure and pain as an additional criterion for moral status 
would not lead to the exclusion of animals from being morally considered. This holds, more 
especially, for the higher animals who can exhibit behaviours suggestive of pain and pleasure, 
and for whom there are good, sound, neurophysiological reasons to believe that they have 
nervous systems similar to that of humans (Rollin, 1992: 55).  
 
Having found Kant and Singer’s placement of moral status in rationality and sentiency 
inadequate, Rollin attempts to find a better criterion to place moral status. He eventually 
concludes that a living thing has a moral status by virtue of it being alive and having interests 
in virtue of that life in accordance with its telos, that is, with its naturally given purpose or 
function. He asserts that a living thing’s “interests that it has by virtue of its being a living 
being, and our ability to nurture or impede the fulfilment of these interests, not the pleasure 
and pain, that make it enter the moral arena” (Rollin, 1992: 74).  For Rollin, this is what sets a 
living being apart from a stone. The living being is alive but the stone is not. It is also this that 
sets a living being apart from a machine. The living being has an intrinsic (nature-given) telos 
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but the machine has an extrinsic (man-given) telos. Another identifiable feature is that living 
things can and do have interests, whereas, a machine can have needs but not interests, according 
to Rollin. A car’s needs, for example, can include a need for gas, oil and lubricants, but as 
Rollin argues, it does not make sense to say a car has an interest in being oiled or lubricated 
(Rollin, 1992: 74-76). Interestingly, Rollin is of the view that plants, bacteria, viruses, and cells, 
even though considered alive, only have needs and not interests, because, in his view, there is 
no single proof to show that they have any awareness or consciousness. As such, it is difficult 
to say that the thwarting or fulfilment of their needs matters to them (Rollin, 1992: 78).  
 
2.5 The marginal case argument 
The marginal case argument is an argument used by many defenders of the moral status of 
animals. It is employed to question the basis for valuing humans over animals when clearly 
some animals possess some qualities more or better than some humans and also to show, among 
other things, the arbitrariness in refusing to grant animals a moral status. In this argument, it is 
usually claimed that since one would not think it right to eat or kill humans who are imbeciles 
or babies, both of whom do not have the use of their rationality like a ‘normal’ adult human, 
then it should not be right, at the same level, to eat or kill animals who also do not have such 
sophisticated rationality. In other words, some humans to whom humans are inclined to extend 
the benefits of morality (that is, include in their domain of moral community) are less qualified 
than some animals who are excluded. So the question asked is, why is it that these humans are 
accorded this moral courtesy and not these animals.  
 
Peter Singer alludes to the marginal case argument to show the absurdity or triviality in denying 
animal moral status based on some distinctive characteristics animals have with adult humans. 
He questions why similar calls are not made for human babies or infants and mentally derailed 
humans who also lack these distinctive marks that are set. Singer asserts that the attempt to find 
a characteristic that will distinguish humans from other animals without reconsidering human’s 
attitude to other animals would entail that humans have the right to use retarded humans to 
perform experiments and kill them for food or trivial reasons (Singer, 1976: 160).  
 
Jan Narveson is an indirect welfarist who is of the view that the marginal case argument 
presented by both Singer and Regan is insufficient. Narveson (1977: 174ff) argues from the 
premise of the ethical theory of egoism to show the inadequacy of the marginal case argument 
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and essentially to provide a basis or justification that will have humans exclude animals from 
their domain of a moral community and in effect, from their moral consideration. Narveson 
claims that the theory of egoism, which is a form of a contractarian1 theory, can explain why 
humans have a direct duty to a severely retarded child, babies and/or enfeebles of all ages than 
they do for a nonhuman animal. He argues that, supposing the premise of egoism – the theory 
that every rational being acts in an attempt to maximize its utilities - be it to satisfy its interests, 
desire or happiness - is accepted to hold, it would mean that such a being would rationally be 
moved to accept a morality that will protect its interest against interference form others. He 
further argues that this self-interested rational being would only accept the terms or precepts of 
this morality only because he trusts that others involved would also do the same. This, 
according to Narveson, is only possible with other rational beings who are moral agents. 
Nonrational beings, on the contrary, cannot be trusted to be signatories to such a contract 
because, for them, there are no guarantees on what their actions would be. They cannot be 
relied upon to keep to their side of the contract. It is for this reason that Narveson is of the view 
that nonhuman animals are not included in human’s moral community. Similarly, animals are 
not owed any direct moral duty because they cannot be part of a moral contract signed by 
rational beings who are egoistic.   
 
It would seem from the foregoing argument that since Narveson is excluding nonrational beings 
from the moral contract, this will also include nonrational humans namely babies, retarded 
children and enfeebles of all ages since they also cannot make self-interested claims or enter 
into moral agreements. Thus, the marginal argument expressed by Singer and Regan comes up. 
Narveson, however, attempts to avoid this problem by suggesting that the ambit of moral 
consideration is extended to that of nonrational humans because doing so, will also be in human 
beings’ interest as rational egoistic beings. He claims that there is a desire to extend the ambit 
of moral consideration to children, for example, because “most of us want to have our own 
children protected, etc., and have really nothing to gain from being permitted to invade the 
children of others” (Narveson, 199: 177). He continues that moral consideration is also 
extended to the enfeebled because “we ourselves might become so, as well as, out of respect 
for their rational relatives who have a sentimental interest in these cases” (Narveson, 1997: 
177). Thus, it is apparent here that Narveson accords a sort of indirect duties (whether 
                                                          
1 Any of the various theories that justify ethical principles and political choices because they are based upon a 
social contract involving certain ideal and hypothetical conditions. 
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consciously or otherwise) to nonrational human beings. Surprisingly, he employs similar lines 
of reasoning in excluding animals from humans’ moral purview. Going by his egoism and his 
contractarian theory, animals will be excluded from human moral consideration. He was, 
however, of the view that respecting and treating animals well would make humans better 
people (Narveson, 1977: 178).   
 
Regan rejects Narveson’s attempts to show why human moral patients are to be included in 
human’s moral community and not animals, in Narveson’s attempt to get around the marginal 
case problem. Regan argues that Narveson is wrong to claim that humans who are mentally 
enfeebled are not to be treated like animals only because very human may become mentally 
enfeebled or that human babies are not to be treated as animals are treated because their human 
owners have sentimental interests in their being treated well. According to Regan, only rational 
adult humans can make rational decisions based on their interests and this will automatically 
exclude babies. Secondly, should a human owner of a baby or a mentally enfeebled person lose 
the sentimental interest in their baby or in a mentally enfeebled person, the implication will be 
that the baby or mentally enfeebled person will lose its moral worth and there will be no 
compelling argument to prevent the owner from using the baby or the enfeebled person for 
whatsoever he or she pleases (Regan, 2004: 160). This problem, Regan notes, arises because 
of Narveson’s attempt to reduce morality to the dictates of rational egoism. As a result, Regan 
rejects both Kant’s and Narveson’s positions that animals exist merely as a means to serve 
humans’ end. Regan posits that “animals have life of their own that fares better or worse for 
them, logically independently of their utility value for others” (Regan, 2004: 178).  
 
For Carl Cohen, the objection raised by the marginal case argument is predicated in the 
misunderstanding of what it means to argue that morality is rooted only in the domain of 
humans. According Cohen, if what it means to argue that morality belongs to humans is 
properly understood, then it should apply to babies, toddlers and the mentally enfeebled or 
senile because they are humans. He held that rights are universally human and as such, are not 
doled out to individual human beings based on the presence or absence of some special 
capacity. They are applied to humans generally irrespective of their age and mental capacity. 
On the other hand, animals are exempted because they are simply not humans. They are of such 
a kind that rights do not pertain to them (Cohen, 2001: 37). 
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Robert Garner, in his response to the marginal case argument, firstly, agrees with Cohen that 
the marginal case argument underestimates the capacity of humans considered as marginal 
because, he was of the conviction that the capacities of even a severely damaged human being 
are still greater than the most mentally developed nonhuman (Garner, 2010: 115).  Secondly, 
Garner agrees with DeGrazia’s view that human lives are more important than that of animals 
because loss of life causes more harm to humans than it does to animals. A loss of human life 
means a loss of experiences which include, among other things, a loss of beliefs, desires, goals 
and projects. These lost experiences are qualitatively different from those that would be lost by 
animals should their lives be cut short (Garner, 2010: 116). Nevertheless, Garner maintains that 
the arguments above are not meant to say that animals do not lose anything at death, instead it 
is to argue that although it is wrong to kill animals, it is not as great a wrong as killing a human 
being (Garner, 2010: 117). Garner’s conclusion, therefore, is that all things being equal, if there 
is a choice between saving the life of an animal and the life a human being, the life of the 
human being should be the best choice. 
 
2.6 Vegetarianism and the use of animals as food 
The use of animals as food is a controversial issue within the animal ethics debate. Should 
animals be removed from human diet? Answers to this question also brings to bear the division 
among the welfarists and rightists views. Nicholas Dixon notes that even though supporters of 
vegetarianism are many with varying arguments, two groups can be distinguished. The first 
group are made up of utilitarians such as Singer, whose argument is based on the suffering that 
factory farming brings to animals. This suffering, Singer argues, should override any human 
interest. This group is generally included in the broader direct welfarist position in this 
research. The second group is the animal rights view, as articulated by Regan who includes 
animals in his extension of Kant's principle of respect for persons to argue that killing animals 
for food is wrong because the act treats animals merely as means (Dixon, 1995: 90). Dixon 
identifies a third group; a group he tagged as ‘human supremacists’ whose position is that, 
humans may use animals as they wish in order to benefit from them, but they should not bring 
upon them needless suffering and pain. Whether or not, the human supremacist position grants 
animals a moral status will determine whether they are placed under direct welfarists or indirect 
welfarists.  
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Raymond Frey (1983) also differentiates between two types of vegetarianism namely moral 
and non-moral vegetarianism. According to him if vegetarianism is to be defined as the boycott 
of meat, then moral vegetarianism is the boycott of meat on the basis that it is wrong to eat 
meat (Frey, 1983: 6). Thus, without the moral justification, not eating meat for any other reason 
should not qualify as vegetarianism. People may choose to avoid meat in their diet for several 
reasons including aesthetics, religious, economic, and even on health grounds. Boycotting meat 
on any of these grounds does not make one a vegetarian (Frey, 1983: 6-14). Even if children 
are forced or trained to grow up not having a taste for meat, these children cannot be said to be 
vegetarians, for to be a vegetarian, Frey has in mind, a boycotting or abstinence from meat and 
the making of a conscious choice or deliberate policy with respect to one’s diet” (Frey, 1983: 
6). Thus, without a moral conviction that it is wrong to eat animals, all other justifications 
would not make one a vegetarian. Another word used sometimes interchangeably with moral 
vegetarianism is veganism. Frey (1983: 7) thinks that the term veganism is, in some sense, 
stricter than the term moral vegetarianism and vegans are noted to abstain from animal products 
such as cheese and eggs in addition to meat.  
 
Frey (1983) identifies three main arguments that are employed to indicate that eating meat is 
wrong. These are the argument from moral rights, the argument from killing, and the argument 
from pain and suffering. He believes that all three arguments fail to make a good case for 
vegetarianism mainly because they attempt to show that it is wrong to eat meat by pointing that 
something else, instead of the meat eating in question, is wrong. For example, the argument 
from moral rights claims that it is wrong to eat meat because it violates the animal’s alleged 
moral rights to life.  
 
Peter Singer’s general position on killing animals for food is that humans owe it as a moral 
duty to be vegetarians. Thus, for him, rearing animals for food is immoral when utility is not 
maximized for all sentient beings concerned including animals. He writes that “the utilitarian 
vegetarian is on strong ground in arguing that factory farming and the other cruelties involved 
in large-scale commercial animal production should end” (Singer, 1980: 334). Singer argues 
that killing animals for food is wrong since doing so subjects animals to pain and suffering, 
more so, in the way and manner animals are reared on large scale in modern farms. The amount 
of pleasure humans derive from eating meat cannot surpass the pain and suffering that animals 
are subjected to. It is also against the interest of animals to have their preference or desire to 
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continue living cut short, Singer opines. Thus, for Singer, it serves a better utilitarian purpose 
if all should aspire to become vegetarians. 
 
A careful reading of Singer (1993; 1990), however, shows that even though Singer advocates 
for vegetarianism, he is not to be considered an abolitionist. Despite Singer’s desire for all to 
become vegetarians, he asks that people draw their own line as to the limit of their vegetarian 
attitude. He recommends, for example, a rejection of meat from animals that have been reared 
in modern factory farms since, as argued by him, the animals go through lots of suffering and 
pain before they end up on food plates. Singer urges meat consumers to, instead consider meat 
from organic or free-range animals and buy from meat producers who are able to demonstrate 
that the animals were treated humanely and given a less painful or painless death. In addition, 
going by his own preference utilitarianism, Singer acknowledges that there is the possibility of 
justifying a killing of a being because other preferences outweigh that of the being. He also 
acknowledges that preference utilitarianism can imply that taking the life of a person will 
normally be worse than taking the life of some other being, since persons are highly future-
oriented in their preferences.  In other words, persons have more complex and varied desires 
and preferences compared to other beings. According to Singer, “to kill a person is therefore, 
normally, to violate not just one, but a wide range of the most central and significant 
preferences a being can have. Very often, it will make nonsense of everything that the victim 
has been trying to do in the past days, months, or even years.” (Singer, 1993: 95).  
 
Thus, for Singer, it is not wrong for an animal to be killed for food provided, the animal has 
lived a pleasant life and provided after killing, it would be replaced by another animal, who 
hitherto may not have existed if not for the death of the other animal (Claire Palmer and Peter 
Sandøe, 2011: 4). Frey also correctly notes that Singer’s argument based on the suffering and 
pain of the animal will only demand that humans refrain from consuming meat from animals 
who have had or lived a miserable life. This, Frey notes, will not mean large-scale, technology-
intensive, commercial farming should cease but only improve. Secondly, Singer’s argument 
leads to what Frey calls ‘the amelioration argument’, which calls for the enhancement of the 
life of animals (Frey, 1983: 176).  Thus, it is shown that Singer’s utilitarian approach will 
sometimes allow the use of some animals for food in as much the animal is given a humane 
treatment during its life and during the process that leads to its death, and also if it is to serve 
a greater preference. James Rachels (2008), however, supports most of Singer’s argument, 
especially Singer’s position that it is wrong to cause pain unless there is a good enough reason.  
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Regan’s (2004; 1980) position is that humans have a moral obligation to be vegetarians. His 
position is derived mainly from his conclusion that animals have inalienable rights that cannot 
be traded away irrespective of their utility. He challenges the basis for Singer’s advocacy for 
vegetarianism, claiming that Singer’s theory, devoid of an appeal to rights, fails to demonstrate 
a moral obligation to be vegetarian (Regan, 1980: 308). Furthermore, Regan believes Singer 
fails to demonstrate fully why the interests, desires and satisfactions humans derive in eating 
meat are to be considered trivial compared to the interests or preference (to avoid pain, 
preference to continue living, etc.) of animals. Considering how humans go through great 
lengths to prepare and eat tasty meals made from animals shows how important these meals 
are to them (Regan, 1980: 309). Similarly, Regan holds that Singer’s preference utilitarian 
position makes it unclear how Singer supports vegetarianism. Considering how big the animal 
industry is, Regan argues that it is not obvious how being a vegetarian can maximise utility 
over pain. The industry players, apart from the farmer, include the wholesalers, retailers, the 
feed producers, cage makers and all the way down to the many families who rely on the meat 
product as food. The economic implication of a sudden or gradual shift to vegetarianism on 
any society is enormous. Thus, Regan believes that Singer again fails to demonstrate how a 
utilitarian approach can lead him to argue for vegetarianism as a moral duty for all. 
 
Regan believes that the best available option to avoid these difficulties faced by Singer in 
defending vegetarianism as a moral duty is to argue from the premise of animal rights. Thus, 
he reiterates that, “it is only if [animals] have rights that we can give a sufficiently firm 
theoretical basis for [vegetarianism] the conviction in question” (Regan, 1980: 323). Regan 
identifies that some people who defend the use of animals for food may justify their position 
by appealing to the liberty principle, the principle that allows a person to do whatever is 
necessary to advance his or her welfare as far as it is subject to the same moral constraints that 
apply to all moral agents. Among these justifications are the claims that animal meat is tasty, 
eating a particular meat is part of one’s habit or cultural tradition, and that meat is nutritious 
and healthy. Other reasons offered are that farming animals for meat has economic benefits, 
that animals are their owner’s legal properties, among others. Regan rejects all these 
justifications claiming that an appeal to the liberty principle would in no way justify support 
for using animals for food (Regan, 2004: 330-349). Stuart Rachels (2011) expresses nearly 
similar position. He relies on statistics from industrial farming to argue that industrial farming 
has produced more pain and suffering than that which the Holocaust caused. Hence, for him, 
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animals should not be killed for food given the uncertainty about which creature possesses a 
right to life.   
 
David DeGrazia (2009), on his part, challenges what he believes is the ‘standard mapping’ of 
views concerning the moral status of animals based on equal consideration (attributed to Singer 
and other utilitarians) and on rights of animal (associated with Regan and other rightists). This 
standard mapping, he argues, has led to a narrowing of the moral basis for certain appropriate 
reforms. This is because practical issues in the animal ethics debate such as vegetarianism is, 
for DeGrazia, defensible without appealing to equal moral consideration for both humans and 
nonhuman animals. DeGrazia’s position is that moral vegetarianism is defensible from a basis 
considerably broader than equal consideration. Thus, it is possible to argue for vegetarianism 
whether one subscribes to the equal consideration view or to the unequal consideration view 
(the view that accords animals some moral status but considers it of a lesser moral weight than 
persons or humans). DeGrazia, as a result, defends what he calls, both a weak and strong thesis 
for moral vegetarianism as follows: “The weak thesis is that all people with ready access to 
healthful alternatives are morally obligated to make every reasonable effort not to purchase 
meat, eggs, or dairy products from factory farms” (DeGrazia, 2009: 148). His strong thesis 
speaks of not only factory farms, but also the inclusion of ‘family farms’ to the moral obligation 
as dictated in his weak thesis. This moral obligation, DeGrazia believes, includes an effort not 
to provide financial support to institutions or practices that bring about undue suffering on 
animals (DeGrazia, 2009: 159).  
 
2.7 Vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research 
Vivisection comes from the combination of two Latin words vivus which means ‘alive’ and 
secure which means ‘to cut’. Vivisection is thus, defined as the practice of cutting and/or 
operating on live animals for the purpose of experimentation or scientific research (Regan, 
2004: 363). While the use of animals for food and for clothes have been going on for many 
thousands of years, using animals for scientific purposes is relatively a recent development 
(Regan, 2001: 142). Regan reports that this practice was given serious attention, first by Galen 
in the second century B.C.E. Galen was well respected in the Rome of his time and for his 
theories of human disease based partly on the cutting of animals. Regan notes that it was the 
nineteenth-century French physiologist, Claude Bernard, who fervently promoted what is 
known in scientific research as the ‘animal model’ (Regan, 2001: 142).  The use of animals as 
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models occurs in science when animals (model species) are used to test possibilities that would 
be difficult or impossible to test using human beings (the target species). Humans use animals 
as model because the two species have strong similarities in many particular ways (The Royal 
Society, 2004: 4). Furthermore, in using animals as models, humans frequently use animals in 
what is known in the scientific community as toxicity tests, a process where the likely 
toxicological (poisonous) harm a product meant for human use or consumption is first tried on 
animals. (Regan 2004: 369ff; 2001:145ff).  
 
The use of animals in science has its benefits for humans. Many of the cures for numerous 
human diseases would not have been possible if not for this practice. The use of animal in 
science has led to developments in the treatment of many ailments such as diabetes, leukaemia 
and heart surgery transplants, amongst others (The Royal Society, 2004: 1). Reportedly, 
animals that are used in these scientific tests include mice, fishes, rats, birds, ungulates (hoofed 
animals that include horses, pigs, and cattle). 75% of these tests are done on mice while 82% 
of all procedures involves rodent species (Dempsey, 2016: 6). The many scientific and health 
gains made in the use of animals in biomedical research have not prevented the raising of many 
red flags in relation to the ethical dilemmas the use of animals in scientific research poses, 
regardless of the recognition of the moral status of animals. Thus, just as it was seen in the use 
of animals for food, the kind of moral status one ascribes to animals greatly influences the type 
of advocacy either for or against the use of animals in biomedical research. The delineating 
views of the direct welfarists and rightists are also highly observed here. Regan explains that, 
for utilitarians to determine whether the harm done to animals in scientific research is justified, 
depends on the balance of the overall aggregate of positive gains (happiness/pleasure) and 
negative gains (pain/suffering) for all sentient beings affected by the outcome. If it can be 
shown that the outcome of the use of animals in science produces greater positive gains than 
negative gains, then the act is considered a justifiable act and is encouraged. If it does not, then 
it is discouraged since the practice becomes unjustified (Regan, 2004: 392).  
 
Carl Cohen (2001) is one of such utilitarian and direct welfarist who hold this view. He argues 
that even though he will support the cessation of animal use for many human ends, he would 
not support an abolition of their use in medical research due to the many benefits it provides 
for the advancement of science and consequently for humans. Some of these benefits as he 
highlights, include advancement in the study of heart failure, Alzheimer and other 
neurodegenerative diseases; advancement in the study of obesity, sleep disorders, organ 
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transplant, diabetes, development of vaccines including vaccines for polio and AIDS, and many 
other progress in the health sciences. (Cohen, 2001: 86-113). Cohen further emphasizes that 
the interests that animals have, should not be translated as rights they possess since rights qua 
rights are essentially human. For him, even though animals are sentient and their pain is worthy 
of moral consideration, it does not mean that their experiences are morally equivalent to the 
experiences of humans (Cohen, 2001: 63). Cohen believes that should experimentation with 
animals be forbidden, nearly all the opportunities of medical research openings would close 
and most could not be undertaken because “we certainly may not do with humans what we may 
do with animals” (Cohen, 2001: 86).  
 
According to Regan, the rights view takes an opposite stance. For him, using animals in 
experimentation is treating animals as if they were mere receptacles or as if their value is 
reducible to their utility (Regan, 2004: 393).  He further states that because the rightist finds 
the practice of harming an individual merely because doing so may bring about the best 
aggregate effect unacceptable, it is equally unacceptable for humans to abuse animals because 
it leads to some good outcome for humans and in some cases for the animals as well. “The 
benefits these tests [experimentations on animals] have for others are irrelevant, according to 
the rights view, since the tests violate the rights of the individual animals… it is morally 
irrelevant to appeal to how much others have benefitted” (Regan, 2004: 381).  
 
Furthermore, Regan states that the rights view is not be considered antiscientific but instead to 
be seen as calling for the development and use of other alternatives that do not rely on the use 
of animals, that is, alternatives that do not involve animal models or toxicity tests. On this 
score, The Royal Society (2014) notes that some alternative methods that employ the use of 
computer models are available to science and these do not involve animals. These, as they note, 
may include the use of cell cultures when a specific mechanism can be identified. It also 
includes the use of molecular sensors to test the biological activity of certain particular 
substances. In situations where there is enough known about a complex system found in intact 
animals, computer simulations can be used in understanding the intricacies of that system. 
Nevertheless, even with these available options, The Royal Society notes that these alternative 
methods in general, suggest and demand further work on whole animals and do not completely 
replace experiments on animals. “Alternatives to whole animals are clearly versatile, but are as 
yet incapable of capturing the complexity of the living mammalian body” (The Royal Society, 
2004: 16). This reflects the position of Cohen who strongly rejects the idea that there could be 
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alternatives available to science that can lead to the total abolition of animals in biomedical 
research as suggested by Regan and other abolitionists. He posits that, “Animals cannot be 
adequately replaced. Substituting non animal methods for testing in medical research is 
possible in a few limited contexts, but in most medical research it is wishful fantasy” (Cohen, 
2001: 71). He, however, advocates for the use of alternatives animals where it is applicable.   
 
Meanwhile, Animal Aid’s, Andrew Tyler, reports that there are scientific arguments against 
the use of animal models for disease research and drug development and testing because the 
method is not reliably predictive. This is because of the following four fundamental factors: 
 There are key differences between species, as expressed in anatomy, 
organ structure and function, metabolism, chemical absorption, 
genetics, mechanism of DNA repair, behaviour and lifespan; 
 A homogenous group of animals living in controlled experimental 
settings cannot predict the response of varied human patients living in 
natural conditions; 
 Artificially created diseases in animals in laboratories do not reflect 
naturally occurring human illness; 
 Some of the most common adverse reactions to drugs are not 
outwardly visible and therefore cannot be detected in animal tests. 
These include nausea, mental disturbance, dizziness, fatigue, 
depression, confusion and double vision. (Tyler, 2015: 4). 
Tyler, as a result, calls on the scientific communities to embrace the numerous 
animal-free research alternatives currently available to help do away with “a waste 
of high-level human resources and needless animal suffering (Tyler, 2015: 11). 
 
Regan, again, notes that the rights view does not entirely oppose the use of knowledge gained 
from what he calls “conscientious efforts to treat a sick animal (or human) to facilitate and 
improve the treatment tendered other animals” (Regan, 2004: 387). Regan agrees in so far as 
far as there is no intentional cause of harm on the animals. Rebecca Tuvel, on the other hand, 
argues against the permissibility of the use of knowledge gained from animal experimentation 
because, for her, it does not only disrespect the animal victims but also sustains the continuous 
use of animals in scientific experimentations. She, thus, considers the use of such knowledge 
morally wrong (Tuvel, 2015: 221).  
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2.8 The use of animals as pets/companion animals 
Hilary Bok defines a pet as a nonhuman animal which is taken into a human’s home and 
accepted as a member of the human’s household (Bok, 2011:7 69). “A companion animal is 
any animal that shares a living environment and relationship with humans” (The New Zealand 
Companion Animal Council Inc., 2016: 4). In most of the literature, pets and companion 
animals are often used interchangeably. Nevertheless, The New Zealand Companion Animal 
Council Inc. reports that the use of the word ‘pet’ is gradually being replaced by the more 
preferable expression, ‘companion animals’. Similarly, they note that the use of the term ‘pet 
owner’ is also being replaced by the use of ‘carer’ or ‘guardian’ since it is believed that these 
new terms depict the duty of care people have towards animals they keep (The New Zealand 
Companion Animal Council Inc., 2016: 8). Examples of some of the first-recorded animals for 
pets are the cats that were kept by some Egyptian pharaohs. These cats, however, were kept for 
their religious significance rather than being primarily considered as companion animal 
(Spencer, Decoyer, Aerts & De 2006: 17).  
 
Spencer et al. disclose that companion animals were largely the prerogative of rulers. They also 
note that evidence show some infrequent references to rulers and nobles having horses or dogs 
they regarded as favourites, but there is very little clue to point to the fact that these animals 
were given similar treatment and affection as pets are given today. This perhaps remained the 
case until probably in the 18th century when companion animals such as dogs started appearing 
in paintings commissioned by rich folks or members in the upper class of society. Furthermore, 
the large numbers of companion animals that exist in the world, according to the report by 
Spencer et al., is quite a recent occurrence that seems to have followed the course of 
industrialization. Even so, much of the practice is largely to be found in the developed world 
(Spencer et al., 2006: 17-19). New Zealand has well over 4.6 million companion animals. This 
means they have more companion animals than humans (The New Zealand Companion Animal 
Council Inc., 2016: 9). The pet population in the United Kingdom, as of 2017, is estimated to 
be around 54 million (Statista, 2017). Australia with a population of 23.77 million reports of 
more than 24 million companion animals (Animal Medicine Australia, 2016). The types of 
companion animals owned worldwide include animals such as dogs, cats, fishes, birds, small 
reptiles, horses, rodents, among others, with dogs and cats being the most preferred species 
across board. Spencer et al. (2006: 18) note that the increase in the number of pets has brought 
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with a concomitant increase in concern over their welfare. The challenge in their welfare can 
perhaps be attributed to the unequal relationship that exists between the pets and their human 
owners. Hilary Bok (2011) identifies some of these unequal relationships. She notes, for 
example, that adult humans are generally physically stronger than all cats and many dogs. 
Humans can also use many ways to put animals in control including the use of cages and 
leashes. Pet animals cannot sue for the enforcement or implementation of laws for their welfare. 
Moreover, pets are highly dependent on their owners for their basic needs to survive including 
their need for water and food, shelter and health care. Bok’s argument is that the fact that there 
exists an unequal relationship between humans and pets should not automatically mean that 
the act of keeping animals as pets is morally wrong. For her, proper laws can be enacted to 
address the problem while pet owners are encouraged to go beyond the minimum requirement 
of the law. (Bok, 2011: 769-782). 
 
Abolitionist, Gary Francione (2010; 2000) argues against the use of animals as pets. He claims 
that the current state whereby animals are considered personal legal properties afford their 
human owners the freedom to use these animals as they like, in the same manner they do to 
their inanimate properties. Spencer et al. expressed similar sentiments. They stated that “it is 
interesting that we refer to those who have companion animals as “pet owners”; this makes the 
pets into a commodity in the same way as a car is a commodity we own” (Spencer et al., 2006: 
21). The name ‘pet owners,’ as used to describe those who keep pets, is considered to not depict 
companionship or equal status between the animals and their human hosts, but it is, instead, 
akin to slavery or perhaps domination by their human hosts  
(Spencer et al., 2006: 21).  Hillary Bok demurs the conclusion derived from the property status 
argument. She considers it a mistake on the part of Francione to have concluded on the basis 
that because pets are considered as legal properties of their owners, it is wrong to keep a pet. 
Bok holds that if the existing laws protecting pets are inadequate then means should be found 
to change them instead of a total abolishment of pet keeping. (Bok, 2011: 769-782).  
 
Spencer et al, believe that the use of animals as pets is wrong since the practice shares similar 
challenges with the use of animals in factory farming. For them, both practices use the animals 
for instrumental ends to the benefits of humans. They identified that some of the commonest 
reasons people have for keeping pets are “companionship, a conduit for giving affection (or a 
substitute source of affection lover substitutes), or as a token or statement of personal” (Spencer 
et al., 2006: 20). Paul Shepard also claims that pets are used in casual or institutionalized “pet-
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facilitated therapy” to reduce human suffering. He calls this a medical miracle of which humans 
should be kind and grateful for (Shepard, 2008: 552). He describes pets as “civilized 
paraphernalia”, “deficient animals in whom we have invested the momentum of two million 
years of love of the Others,” and as “compensations for something desperately missing, 
minimal replacements for friendship in all of its meanings” (Shepard, 2008: 552-553). Spencer 
et al. believe that in all of these provided reasons for keeping pets, it is apparent that the animals 
are only used to project their owners’ view of themselves. If that is the case, then it is their 
conviction that the same bases used to reject factory farming should be applied to argue against 
the use of animals as pets. Keeping animals as pet in a confined home, they argue, infringes on 
the animals telos (natural purpose). Dogs, for example, naturally like to hunt in a pack and 
keeping them alone at home is contrary to their true nature. The infringement of animals’ 
natural behaviour, Spencer et al. observe, is no different from that which pertains to farmed 
animals (Spencer et al., 2006: 21).    
 
2.9 Hunting and trap setting  
Before Homo sapiens appeared on earth, that is, as far back as 40,000 BC, cave dwellers likely 
used foot traps, pitfall traps, and snares to catch animals. There is some proof of this from cave 
drawing examined by archaeologists. Trapping was cave dwellers’ means of survival. Not only 
did it bring in food such as mammals, birds, insects, and fish, but it also aided in protecting 
them against dangerous animals and pests. Stone Age Cro-Magnon people, armed with their 
unpolished chipped stone tools, may have perhaps used branches, plant fibres, and animal parts 
to creatively design and produce their snares and foot traps (Lemaigre, 2000: 3). From then, 
tools and traps gradually improved along the ages. Some of the traps currently in use include 
the mousetraps, snares, cage traps, killing box traps, the techniques of hiding and baiting a trap, 
leg-hold, and Conibear traps. There is also the more recently designed state-of-the-art 
technology such as the C120 Magnum and the Bionic traps (Lemaigre, 2000).  
 
Nelson and Millenbah (2009: 33) believe that the moral aspect of hunting remains the topic of 
one of the most tenacious debates within the conservation community. Hunting and trapping 
are generally used to maintain animal wildlife population at a lower level than it would have 
naturally been. This is done by state and federal wildlife agencies to manage wildlife 
populations according to goals set by society. These goals may be to preserve a wildlife 
population at a level that: 1) creates the largest wildlife population; 2) is stable and immune to 
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periodic population crashes; 3) produces the maximum sustained yield; 4) maximizes 
environmental benefits for other valuable species; 5) reduces spread of infectious disease or 
parasites within the population; or 6) reduces wildlife damage to acceptable levels (Conover 
2001:521). Conover observes that some reasons given in support of hunting and trapping 
include the claim that these acts are able to remove depredating (preying) animals or decrease 
wildlife populations below the levels that would otherwise occur or modify the conduct of 
animals in the wild. In addition, hunting and trapping happen to be at the moment, one of the 
cost-effective ways to manage the population of wild animals (Conover, 2001: 522). It also 
brings some amount of revenue to the state since those who practice hunting and trapping either 
for sports or recreational purposes, pay to get license to do so. Some of the animals that are 
hunted and trapped include deer, woodchucks, raccoons, coyotes, rabbits, beaver, foxes, 
skunks, waterfowl, prairie dogs, bears, and elk. For Conover, effective hunting and trapping 
should be encouraged because should they be stopped, “some wildlife populations would 
increase, animals would become more habituated to humans, wildlife damage would increase, 
landowner tolerance for wildlife habitat would be lost, and some rural property values would 
fail (Conover, 2001: 529). These negative effects, Conover posits, would eventually cause 
wildlife habitats to be lost since land owners would be confronted with greater wildlife risks 
which would in turn lead to a major loss of incentives on the part of the landowners to maintain 
wildlife habitats (Conover, 2001: 529).   
 
Regan, although a rightist, did not entirely write off the hunting and trapping of animals. He 
writes, “Since animals can pose innocent threats and because we are sometimes justified in 
overriding their rights when they do, one cannot assume that all hunting or trapping must be 
wrong” (Regan, 2004: 353). What Regan is against, is the use of hunting and trapping for 
commercial profits, recreational purposes and for sport. For him and in accordance with his 
general position on the moral standing of sentient animals, such uses of hunting and trapping 
treats animals as mere receptacles and are used as means to an end. Animals have moral rights 
and as such must not be used to satisfy human needs and pleasures. In this regard, Regan rejects 
all the common arguments that are used as justifications in support of these practices, including 
the argument that those who practice hunting and trapping get to exercise; enjoy the 
communion with nature; enjoy the companionship of their friends; or the argument that the 
practice is an old age tradition. Regan will also reject the argument and reasoning provided by 
Conover that if some animals are not hunted or trapped, there will be too many of them in a 
given habitat, which will in turn pose a threat to humans. The practice of hunting and trapping, 
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according to Conover (2001), saves the animals from a possible starvation due to lack of 
enough food to feed their resulting large numbers if left unchecked. Regan believes such 
reasoning assumes that death by hunting and trapping is always better for the animals than 
death by starvation. He, consequently, highlights some of the slow and agonizing death 
experiences some animals go through from the activities of hunters and trappers.  
 
Baird Callicott, on the other hand, believes an interpretation of Aldo Leopold's ‘land ethic’ 
(which Callicott considers to be “the paradigm of environmental ethics in general”) points to 
the fact that a regulated and disciplined sport hunting is not inconsistent with the land ethic 
(Callicott, 1980: 315). Relying on the main principle of Leopold’s land ethic which states that 
“a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community, and wrong when it tends to do otherwise”, Callicott argues that the principle is in 
line with the purpose of hunting and trapping. Callicott writes:  
Thus, to hunt and kill a white-tailed deer in certain districts may not only be 
ethically permissible, it might actually be a moral requirement, necessary to 
protect the local environment, taken as a whole, from the disintegrating effects 
of a cervid population explosion… In every case the effect upon ecological 
systems is the decisive factor in the determination of the ethical quality of 
actions. (Callicott, 1980: 320). 
 
In agreement with the Callicott’s view, The Wildlife Society calls for a properly regulated 
hunting and trapping instead of a blanket abolition of these acts. Part of their standing position 
reads: 
The Wildlife Society supports regulated hunting, trapping, and fishing, and the 
right of people to pursue either consumptive or non-consumptive use of wildlife. 
The Wildlife Society is concerned that foundational elements of the animal rights 
philosophy contradict the principles that have led to the recognized successes of 
wildlife management in North America. (The Wildlife Society, n.d.) 
 
As a result, the Wildlife Society claims to support an animal welfare approach when it comes 
to hunting and trapping. They state that:  
[The Wildlife Society] Support an animal welfare philosophy, which holds that 
animals can be studied and managed through science-based methods and that 
human use of wildlife, including regulated hunting, trapping, and lethal control 
for the benefit of populations, species, and human society is acceptable, provided 
the practice is sustainable and individual animals are treated ethically and 
humanely (The Wildlife Society, n.d.). 
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Leopold himself, in a 1932 reply to one Mr. McCabe, identified himself as an intergrade who 
shares the goals of both protectionists and sportsmen (Leopold, 2008). As a result, Leopold 
advocates for the putting in place mechanisms that will ensure that hunting is done in a 
controlled manner instead of free hunting. Nelson and Millenbah share similar view. They 
believe that the argument between those who seriously oppose hunting and those who actively 
support it has been polarized with both sides taking intransigent positions. They argue that there 
is a middle ground alternative to the impasse. The alternative is when both sides of the debate 
recognize that, contrary to what has been generally assumed, the idea of animals having a moral 
status is not irreconcilable with hunting (Nelson & Millenbah, 2009: 33).   
 
 2.10 Emerging trends in African environmental ethics 
For a little over a decade, there has been a growing interest in the study of African 
environmental ethics by African scholars. The agenda has been to formulate an environmental 
ethic which is essentially born out of indigenous African experiences. These scholars are 
perhaps of the view that such a home grown ethic can resonate well with the people and be 
more easily assimilated by the African people and hopefully impact the global environmental 
ethics at large. Notable names in the emerging African environmental ethics literature include 
among others, Godfrey Tangwa, Segun Ogunbemi, Workineh Kelbessa, Munyaradzi Felix 
Murove, Magobe Ramose, Bénézet Bujo, Kevin Behrens, Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi, and 
Martin Prozesky.  
 
Godfrey Tangwa, for example, thinks the traditional African metaphysical outlook can be 
described as ‘eco-bio-communitarian’ in character. For him, this should be taken to mean a 
“recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, 
plants, animals and humans (Tangwa, 2004: 389).” Tangwa believes that the Western theories 
on the ethics of the environment are anthropocentric and individualistic in nature and have 
driven them to explore, subdue, exploit and dominate nature for their profit. Tangwa held his 
eco-bio-communitarian metaphysical outlook (he describes of precolonial Africa), as 
nonanthropocentric in nature and in approach. This is because, Tangwa notes, human beings 
within the African traditional outlook tend to be more cosmically humble, more respectful of 
other people and also more cautious in their attitude to plants, animals, and inanimate things 
and to the various invincible forces in the world. Thus, according to him, traditional Africans 
are more disposed to what he calls “an attitude of live and let live (Tangwa, 2004: 389).” Within 
44 
 
the African traditional word-view, he maintains, there is a slim and flexible distinction between 
plants and animals, and inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and the 
spirit, the communal and the individual. Tangwa’s project, as can be observed, was not to argue 
for an African animal ethics but rather present an African outlook of environmental ethics at 
large. He cannot therefore be faulted for not narrowing down on humans and animals relation 
in the African outlook and only mentioning animals as passing examples.  
 
For Segun Ogungbemi (1997: 266-270), how natural resources such as land, water and air are 
used currently conflicts with the traditional practice of environment conservation in Africa. 
Ogungbemi argues that traditional African communities believed in the ethics of not taking 
more than you need from nature. This he labelled, the ‘ethics of care’. In a bid to make this 
‘ethics of care’ appropriate to present-day African condition, Ogungbemi develops the ethics 
of care to “ethics of nature-relatedness” To explain further, he posits that the ethics of nature-
relatedness can be regarded as “an ethics that leads human beings to seek to co-exist peacefully 
with nature and treat it with some reasonable concern for its worth, survival and sustainability 
(Ogungbemi, 1997: 270)”. In his view, there is no need to ascribe spiritual connotations to this 
ethics of care and ethics of nature-relatedness since they are naturally explainable. He points 
out that, “The ethics of nature-relatedness does not imply that natural resources actually have 
a spiritual nature. It does not attribute the creation of the natural resources to a Supreme Being” 
(Ogungbemi, 1997: 270). Philomena Ojomo thinks Ogungbemi’s ethics of nature-relatedness 
is neither a preservationist approach nor a nonanthropocentric approach. She believes that 
Ogungbemi’s ethics simply recognizes that humans necessarily depend upon the natural 
environment for existence and survival. According to her, the ethics of nature relatedness as 
explained by Ogungbemi, is not a reflection of traditional African metaphysics (Ojomo, 2011: 
110). Even though there is no direct specific reference to animals in Ogunbemi’s discussion of 
ethics of care or ethics of nature-relatedness, it is possible to infer from his ethics of nature-
relatedness some principles that involve nonhuman animals. However, a central question he 
failed to answer or explore is the question of whether the ethics of care or ethics of nature-
relatedness should lead to a humane use of animals or an abolition of animal usage in its 
entirety.  
 
Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi, on his part, claims to have identified two ways environmental 
ethics can be derived from the Africa worldview. The first derivation, he calls ‘secular 
environmental ethics’, which he claims finds its origin from the point of view of nature without 
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any supernatural influence (Ugwuanyi, 2011: 110-111). He identifies that Africans have great 
respect for life and celebrates life in all of it stages including after death in the recognition of 
ancestors. This respect for life, he noted, is not only about human life but also the natural 
environment that harbors life and makes human life possible (Ugwuanyi, 2011: 111). On this 
premise, he postulates that the environment has more than economic worth to the African 
person since it is the embodiment of life. Taking a cue from Kwame Gyekye, Ugwuanyi asserts 
that shared identity and good will are the basic principles which African morality tends to 
defend, and that what is moral is what connects lives together. He hold this to be a justification 
for his humanistic environmental ethics.  
 
Ugwuanyi (2011:110) calls his second derivation of environmental ethics from the African 
worldview a ‘religious humanistic ethics’. This, he claims, is born out of the religious attitude 
of the traditional African people. He identifies religion in traditional African societies to be a 
shared religion in which the entire community is expected to partake. He also identifies the 
acknowledgement of various spirits, ancestors and divinities as part of the African people’s 
religious beliefs. These spirits, he notes, dwell in various aspects of the natural environment 
including hills, forests, rocks, trees, mountains and animals, and that whatever people 
considered to be home of the spirit is usually set apart as sacred places where the people offer 
worship to that particular spirit (Ugwuanyi, 2011: 112-113). Ugwuanyi identifies from his 
secular humanistic ethics, values of good will and identity for the environment. This, he holds, 
should lead to some form of reciprocity which African moral world demands. These values of 
good will and identity, and the terms of reciprocity Ugwuanyi projects, share some close 
affinity with the eco-bio-communitarian ethics or that of nature relatedness or the ethics of live 
and let live as posited by Tangwa and Ogunbembi. Ugwuanyi, like the others, sparingly 
directed the implications of their findings specifically to animals. Nevertheless, it is highly 
conceivable to extend Ugwuanyi’s identification of the value of respect for life or the 
sacredness of life identified in the African worldview to the discussion of an African animal 
ethics. 
 
Workineh Kelbessa (2005) speaks of the indigenous environmental practices of Oromo people 
in Ethiopia of whom he demonstrates that the religious beliefs they have towards the 
environment can offer valuable insights for redirecting the use of science and technology. 
Kelbessa draws examples mainly from the beliefs and cultural practices of peasant farmers and 
pastoralists, and other African cultures to urge an environmental ethics that respect nature for 
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what it is and not just to serve the purpose of humanity (a utilitarian end). He also held that 
nature is perceived by the Oromo people to have its own inherent value given to it by God 
(Waaqa) who is seen to be the guardian of all things. Thus, nobody is free to destroy nature 
just to satisfy his or her own needs. Here, it will be interesting to find out how Kelbessa’s 
revelations of the traditional beliefs of the Oromo people concerning nature (more especially 
their view that nature has inherent value and as such a moral value) share affinity with that of 
the inherent values as used by Regan and other rightist theorists for animals. Would or should 
the Oromo’s view of inherent value of nature and moral status of nature lead to welfarist or 
rightist approach, is a question worth exploring.  
 
Other African scholars have made similar contributions toward African environmental ethics. 
Munyaradzi Felix Murove, Martin Prozesky and Mogobe Ramose have separately employed 
an amalgamation of Southern African ethical principle of Ubuntu/Boto and the Shona concept 
of Ukama from Zimbabwe to argue for an environmental ethics of care and virtue of 
interrelatedness of humans with the entire ecosystem (Murove, 2009; Prozesky, 2009; Ramose, 
2009). Bénézet Bujo (2009: 283) also alluded to the value of human peaceful coexistence or 
interrelationship with nature, arguing that it is by doing so that humans reach total realization 
of the self. This interrelationship, Bujo asserts, is a network made up by the entire cosmos and 
God himself (Bujo, 2009: 285). He, in addition, claims that animals, plants and minerals and 
other inanimates are the forces that God has made available for human use. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that human beings are allowed to treat the lesser from of beings arbitrarily (2009: 
286). Martin Prozesky’s believed that the ethic of relationality can be deduced from the Shona 
concept of Ukama which asserts that ‘a person can only be a person ‘a person can only be a 
person in, with and through not just other people but also in, with and through the natural 
environment’ (Prozesky, 2009: 302). For Prozesky, this will in practical terms involve the 
acceptance that “all things have both some element of intrinsic value, because all things possess 
some spark at least, of experience and creativity, and some element of instrumental value, by 
virtue of the interrelatedness of all things whereby each serves all and all serve each” (Prozesky, 
2009: 303).  According to Murove, when the two concepts of Ukama and Ubuntu are 
synthetized, they produce an ethical outlook that suggests that human wellbeing is 
indispensable from their dependence on, and interdependence with all that exists (Murove, 
2009: 315). Finally, Mogobe Ramose suggests the concept of Botho or Ubuntu is best translated 
as ‘humanness’ instead of ‘humanism’ for it is, to him, humanness that best describes the 
African condition. “The dignity and importance of the individual human being can best be 
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understood in terms of relations with other human beings as well as relations with physical 
nature” (Ramose, 2009: 312).  
 
2.11 African animal ethics 
From the review of literature above, there is an indication that animal ethics on its own has not 
been the primary focus within the emerging African environmental ethics, more especially in 
terms of placing animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist debate.  However, the many 
African values and principles coming out from the emerging trends of African environmental 
ethics, which in turn is born out of the traditional African people’s worldview and ethics, 
provide more than enough to build a theory of animal ethics on. A few authors have also made 
direct reference to an African consideration of moral status. 
 
In addressing the moral status of animals, Bujo (2009) rejects the Western view of according 
duties to animals based on the fact that they are sensitive to pain or the view of defending a 
being for its own sake because of an inalienable rights it is assumed to possess. He also rejects 
the Western view of sociability used in defending human’s duty to other beings. According to 
Bujo, Africans have a rather holistic understanding of the environment; “according to the 
understanding that is basic to the African community spirit, the human being is conceivable 
only in cosmic interwovenness. Minerals, plants, animals, and human beings form a whole and 
depend on one another (Bujo, 2009: 295)”. Bujo continues that such a holistic understanding 
does not defend a being for its own sake or for any Western sense of sociability, but it instead 
defends for the sake of unity, and also because in the African worldview, a being can 
simultaneously be an animal, a plant, and a mineral (Bujo, 2009: 295-296). How this plays out 
is a matter worthy of consideration in determining the place of an African animal ethics in 
terms of animal welfarism and rightism. Bujo nevertheless concludes by placing an urgent call 
on African scholars to continue dialoguing with Western rationality which he acknowledges, 
has the tendency to minimize or ignore African positions (Bujo, 2009: 296). Kevin Behrens, 
similarly argued that traditional African thoughts conception of moral considerability extends 
to all things that are part of the interconnected web of life, that is, all individual living things 
and groups of living things such as families, species, and ecosystems, including inanimate 
objects such as rivers and mountains (Behrens, 2014: 66). This interrelated relationship with 
all things nature and even non-nature is considered by Behrens as a nonanthropocentric 
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approach contrary to the accusation that African environmental ethics is deeply 
anthropocentric.  
 
Chemhuru (2019) held that nature as a whole, including nonhuman animals, has moral status. 
He came to this conclusion by relying on African ontological conceptions of being and some 
teleological arguments for existence. According to him, “the teleological conceptions of 
existence in African ontology could credibly support the recognition of the inherent value and 
moral status of the natural world as a whole” (Chemhuru, 2019: 31). His teleological argument 
for moral status of nature takes a pluralist approach by relying on several teleological factors 
such as African biocentrism or vitalism, sentience, subject of a life, well-being, and degree of 
vital force to ground his position. Essentially, since nature, including animals, has a purpose of 
a sort, is interconnected with each other, sentient, has a vital force, and subject of life, among 
others then it must has a moral status and humans have a moral obligation towards it. In 
reference specifically to the moral status of nonhuman animals, Chemhuru claims that: 
Within the African ontological hierarchy, nonhuman animals and plants are 
vital forces by virtue of possession of life. Despite being commonly referred 
to as ‘lower forces’ these nonhuman animals and plants that possess life 
have their own vital force such that they complement the teleological 
dimension of existence. These are beings that also live their own 
independent lives to those of human beings. Some of these beings such as 
animals could also even have independent goals, hopes and desires to those 
of human beings that human beings themselves may not necessarily be 
aware of (Chemhuru, 2019: 35-36) 
It is for this reason that Chemhuru believes that animals should possess a moral status. But 
should this moral status identified in animals be equaled to that of humans? To this question 
Chemhuru held that although humans and nonhuman animals cannot be held to be equally 
morally accountable or assume to have similar purposive goals for existing, they are however 
“somewhat ‘moral counterparts’ in so far as these components have life and moral status just 
as human beings” (Chemhuru, 2019: 36). Furthermore, he considers animals and humans as 
‘teleological counterparts’ because “all nonhuman living beings have been made in such a way 
that they are disposed to attain some purpose for existence” (Chemhuru, 2019: 36). 
 
Thaddeus Metz (2012), on his part, explains that the dominant Western conception of moral 
status broadly divided into either a holist account or an individualist account is, for him, done 
arbitrary and does not account well for what he believes to be a widespread judgment of moral 
status; the judgment that even though animals and humans both have the same moral status 
animals’ moral status differs in degree. Metz argues that there is an underexplored modal-
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relational perspective which does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. He, 
thus, argued for what he calls “a modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral 
views”. In his opinion, this approach is far better able to account for the moral status of those 
things that are intuitively considered to have it than the other approaches. On the backdrop of 
traditional African account of placing personhood in an individual’s community participation, 
coupled with the traditional African conception of morality in terms of community, Metz 
proposes that “a being has moral status roughly insofar as  it is capable of being part of a 
communal relationship of a certain kind” (Metz, 2012 :393). Thus, his preferred conception of 
moral status is that “the more a being is capable of being part of a friendly or loving relationship 
with normal humans, the greater its moral status” (Metz, 2012: 394). In other words, the greater 
a being’s capacity for communal relationship, the greater that being’s moral status. Such a 
conception of moral status, according to Metz, leads to two to implications: Firstly, it 
demonstrates that moral status comes in degrees based on a being’s ability to participate in 
shared communal life and secondly, a being, capable of being both subject and object of a 
communal relationship, constitutes a higher status than merely one that is only the object. 
Applying this criterion of moral status to nonhuman animals, Metz asserts that “if by virtue of 
the nature of human beings, dogs and mice, humans were much more able to identify with and 
exhibit solidarity with dogs than with mice (upon full empirical information about both), then 
dogs would have a greater moral status than mice” (Metz, 2012: 394-395).   
 
Kai Horsthemke (2015) is a key critic of the assumed nonanthropocentric nature of African 
ethics in general and African environmental ethics specifically. He argues that the usual and 
frequent interpretation of ethics of ubuntu and ukama to mean that African environmental 
ethics is relational and hence nonanthropocentric in approach is mistaken. According to 
Horsthemke, African environmental ethicists usually employed phrase ‘I am because we are, 
and since we are, therefore I am’ is entirely human centered and speaks very little or nothing 
at all about the intrinsic nature of the environment or its moral worth. He writes that: 
It would appear that the envisaged concern for nonhuman nature and the 
environment could be fostered on only the basis of human benefits and would 
therefore not amount to any acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of nature or 
the environment. Nor could the principle in question constitute a basis for 
‘respect’ or a ‘harmonious relationship’ with members of nonhuman species 
(Horsthemke, 2015: 82).   
 
For Horsthemke, the principle one can best gather from this relational ethics postulated by the 
likes of Ramose, Murove, Bujo, Behrens, and Metz is that of an ‘indirect-duty view’. That is, 
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a moral duty account that presents an indirect concern for nonhuman animals. In order words, 
African ethics interest in animal welfare is not for sake of the animal but because of how it will 
impact on human relationships (Horsthemke, 2015: 83).  Horsthemke is also particularly 
critical of Metz’s conception of the moral status of nonhuman animals as being of the same 
kind with humans but of different degrees determined by the capacity to participate in 
community. Among Horsthemke’s challenge is his claim that, going by Metz’s degree of moral 
status argument makes the idea of ‘full moral status’ an illusion since there could be a sense of 
a moral hierarchy even within the realm of those considered ‘normal adults’. Horsthemke also 
demurs Metz’s claim that his African modal-relationalism is neither anthropocentric nor 
speciesist. Horsthemke believes that inasmuch as Metz’s theory justifies the sacrificing of 
animals for human benefits, then it remains anthropocentric, especially when the relational 
difference among individuals and species depends on human valuation (Horsthemke, 2015: 91-
92).     
 
Masaka (2019) attempts to find a compromise of a sort between the anthropocentric and 
nonanthropocentric polarity. He argues that African environmental ethics is neither decisively 
anthropocentric nor decisively nonanthropocentric in nature but instead can best be described 
as moderate anthropocentric in nature. He defines moderate anthropocentricism as:  
An ethic that is significantly focused on promoting human interests but at 
the same time concerned about some interests and rights of non-human 
animals and the environment in general. In such an ethic, human interests 
are given preferential consideration while those of the rest of the 
environmental are albeit respected but may be set aside in pursuit of human 
interests. Indeed, the interests and rights of non-human animals and the 
environment are respected but may not necessarily be equated to human 
interests and rights (Masaka, 2019: 231) 
 
Thus, for Masaka, African environmental ethics does not think only humans have intrinsic 
value to be respected but animals do. Nevertheless humans hold a higher moral status than that 
of animals. It is for this reason that he considers African environmental ethics and African 
notion of human relation with nonhuman animals as neither decisively anthropocentric nor 
decisively nonanthropocentric in nature. 
 
By far, it is Oweseni and Olatoye (2014) who have made some direct attempt to produce an 
understanding of an African animal ethic in light of the welfarist and rightist debate, albeit their 
focus was on Yoruba ethico-cultural perspectives. The pair rightly noted that little 
consideration has been accorded to non-western framings of animal ethics within the welfarist 
51 
 
and rightist debate. Therefore, through a critical survey of wise sayings, proverbs, practices, 
adages, and relational attitudes found in Yoruba ethno-cultural settings, they sought to place 
Yoruba animal ethics within this debate. Owoseni and Olatoye concluded that Yoruba 
traditions do not display in clear terms the sphere of its ethical viewpoint regarding human-to-
animal relationships. This is because they found out that some aphorisms, proverbs, and beliefs 
of the Yorubas appear rightist in pattern, or tend to represent a shift from a welfarist to a rightist 
concern for animals (Owoseni & Olatoye 2014: 108, 111-112). In the end, they settled that 
Yoruba understanding appears to occupy a ‘synthetic’ position between the rightist and 
welfarist positions, but also acknowledged that the Yoruba brings something extra to the fore 
- what they termed as ‘superstitious relational attitude’ (Owoseni & Olatoye, 2014: 112). This 
superstitious relational attitude, they maintained, stems from the people’s religious or 
metaphysical (mythical) perception and explanation of animals expressed in taboos, rituals, 
legends, worship practices and so on (Owoseni & Olatoye, 2014: 105). 
 
This work considers Owoseni and Olatoye’s attempt as a laudable one. It represents, what can 
be considered, a bold attempt to couch an African animal ethics in its own right and place it 
within the rightist and welfarist debates of the West. Yet, it is unclear what they meant by their 
conclusion that Yoruba understanding of animal ethics occupies a synthetic position between 
the rightist and welfarist positions. It becomes difficult to tell, as Owoseni and Olatoye made 
no indication of this, whether it should lead to an advocacy for the humane use of animals for 
the advancement of human good or an abolition of animal use entirely. Secondly, and related 
to the first point, they were inconclusive as to how the ‘superstitious relational attitude’ (which 
they argue the Yoruba perspective added to the discussion) is to be interpreted in relation to 
some practical issues in the animal ethics debate such as vegetarianism, keeping animals as 
pets, hunting and trapping and the use of animals in biomedical research. It is perhaps in 
acknowledgement of this deficiency that the authors themselves called for further engagement 
on the subject matter (Oweseni & Olatoye, 2014: 112-113). 
 
2.12 The ontology and ethics of the Akan people of Ghana 
The word ‘Akan’ refers both to a group of intimately related languages found in West Africa 
and to the people who speak them. This ethnic group lives predominantly in Ghana and in parts 
of adjoining Cote d’Ivoire. In Ghana, they inhabit most of the southern and middle belts and 
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account for close to half the national population of over twenty four million2. There are many 
Akan subgroups but the well-known ones among them include the Ashantis (most popular and 
largest), Denkyiras, Akims, Akuapims, Fantes, Kwahus, Wassa, Brongs, and Nzemas. All these 
groups share similar cultural traits in many details. Although the cultural affinities of the 
various Akan subgroups with the other ethnic groups of Ghana are not on the same scale as 
among themselves, any divergences affect only details. (Wiredu, 1996: 157). In substantiating 
his claims, Wiredu held that when compared with the distant cultures of the East and West, 
Akan culture can be seen to have some essential similarities with other African cultures as to 
be considered under the broader label of “African culture” as a general cultural type. 
 
Traditional Akan people of Ghana may not have yet developed a concerted ethics of the 
environment or an animal ethics yet, they have a rich metaphysical belief of nature which has 
led them to develop a rich traditional set of practices that include a relationship with the natural 
environment. They also have a rich sense of moral rules and dictates that ensure peaceful 
coexistence with one another, thereby ensuring the social cohesion of all its members. This 
research hopes to tap from these metaphysical conceptions of nature and human existence, as 
well as, from their sources of moral principles to couch a theory of an animal ethics born out 
of the Akan experience in lieu of the welfarist and rightist debate. Below is a presentation of 
some Akan metaphysical beliefs and practices that relates to the environment and a look into 
the source of their moral code. 
 
2.12.1 Akan metaphysical beliefs and practices concerning the natural environment 
Kwame Gyekye (1995) reports that Akan ontology is clearly pluralistic (the belief in the 
existence of many beings) and panpsychist (the belief that everything is or contains a spirit) in 
nature. Gyekye claims that the Akan universe is regarded as being ‘essentially spiritual’ and 
endowed with varying degrees of force or power (Gyekye 1995: 72; Hagan, 1964: 59). In 
addition, Gyekye (1995: 69) contends that at least part of nature or the physical world is 
considered animated. He adds that in this [Akan] metaphysics, all created things, that is, natural 
objects have or contain sunsum (Akan word for spirit. In saying that the natural objects contain 
sunsum [spirit] or power, Akan thinkers mean to attribute to these natural objects, some 
intrinsic property, namely, the property of activity or an activating principle (Gyekye, 1995: 
75). Whether this idea of intrinsic property should lead to a non-anthropocentric approach to 
                                                          
2 The population of Ghana since the last official national population census in 2010. 
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nature, is something worth considering. Akans believe also in smaller gods or deities (abosom), 
and Gyekye asserts that deities are known to reside in natural objects such as trees, plants, 
rocks, mountains and hills, rivers and brooks (Gyekye, 995: 73). J. A. Busia (1954 as cited in 
Gyekye, 1995: 73) collaborates this account. It becomes evident from Gyekye’s accounts that 
Akan ontology is deeply rooted in metaphysics. How this metaphysical perception of nature 
affects the people’s everyday attitude to the environment and which part of the physical world 
are considered animated, is worthy of investigation. Are there significant differences in 
treatment meted out to the parts of nature considered animated and those that are not? And how 
does this belief in an animated nature contribute towards a duty towards animals? These 
questions require to be addressed. 
 
Furthermore, Gyekye holds African ontology to be hierarchical in nature, where humans are 
placed third on the hierarchy while the physical world of natural objects and phenomena are 
placed at the bottom. “Akan universe is conceived as a hierarchy of beings with Onyame 
[Supreme Being] at the apex, then the deities, ancestors, humans, and the world of natural 
objects and phenomena, in that order” (Gyekye, 1995: 75).  Should one view this hierarchy as 
a hierarchy of importance in terms of value? Would this naturally or necessarily lead to a kind 
of anthropocentric theory towards nature or perhaps there is more to it than this? Gyekye argues 
that there are categorical distinctions among the entities on the hierarchy such that these entities 
are not considered to be on the same level (Gyekye, 1995: 69). This made Gyekye reject 
Parrinder’s attempt to give a triangular relationship among the categories of beings. Parrinder 
places the Supreme Being atop the triangle and puts nature-gods (spirits that dwell in nature) 
and ancestors at the two sides of the triangle. He placed the lower magical powers at the base 
of the triangle (Parrinder, 1951 in Gyekye, 1995: 75). For Gyekye, Parrinder’s triangular 
account is wrong because a look at the religious practices and attitudes of the Akans points to 
the fact that deities are considered more powerful than ancestors. Gyekye, therefore, believes 
a vertical line, instead of a triangle is a more appropriate figure to use in showing the ordered 
relations between the different entities within the Akan hierarchy of beings (Gyekye, 1995: 
75). George Hagan, in corroborating the hierarchical structure of the Akan universe asserts that 
“with the good of man as the standard, the whole of nature forms a hierarchical structure 
according to the extent to which things can influence the life of man” (Hagan, 1964: 16). This 
appears to be an anthropocentric approach to nature, as well as, an inclination towards an 
indirect duty principle of the environment. To further show the difference in potency in the 
hierarchy of beings, Hagan asserts that “any existence or entity can influence and destroy any 
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other entity below it in the hierarchy of vital potencies (Hagan, 1964: 63).” Resultantly, spirits, 
belonging to the spiritual realm, can kill humans because of their higher potency; humans can 
also kill or destroy plants and animals because they possess a higher potency.  
 
Hagan hints of the principle of interrelation existing in Akan metaphysics. He posits that in 
traditional Akan belief, there exists the notion that the destruction of relationship, which is 
considered necessary, between any two persons in a family, destroys the fabric of the family. 
In other words, there exists this “fabric of interweaving blood relationship” which when cut, 
leads to the disintegration of the fabric. Just as this is true of family relationships, Hagan 
believes that this is also true of individual entities in the universe. Thus, the relation of things 
in the universe are such that without these relationships the universe would not be as it is 
(Hagan, 1964: 50-51). An example of the interrelationship between animals and humans is that 
in many Akan homes, there is a belief that it is good to keep domestic animals because disasters 
or deaths may be diverted to these animals instead of coming onto members of the household. 
Through the behavior of a cat kept at home, it is possible to tell whether a sick person in the 
house will die or live (Hagan, 1964: 51). Hagan explains that there are many more examples 
that “show that between man and man, man and animal, spirit and matter, and man and plants, 
there are relations which pass into their beings” (Hagan, 1964: 51). Nevertheless, Hagan 
intimates that the Akan considers the whole world as a “plenum of mutually influencing 
existence”, making the Akan to think of the whole of nature as moral because they could 
interfere with man (Hagan, 1964: 16).  
 
The Akans hold the belief that humans emerged out of the bowels of the earth. As such, the 
earth is considered as a deity and is given the name Asase Yaa3. Asase means ‘earth’, and Yaa 
is an Akan day name given to females born on Thursdays, for it is believed the earth deity was 
born on a Thursday. Thus, for traditional Akans Thursdays are sacred days for the earth goddess 
and no farming is to be done (Eshun, 2011: 30-31). Clare Macre (2001) prefers to describe 
Asase Yaa as the earth spirit rather than the earth goddess because, according to her, the Asase 
Yaa has no cult and no priests which is atypical for a divinity. Macre, however, notes that the 
earth spirit is considered important by the farmers and by the chiefs and elders (Macre, 2001: 
24). The Akans also believe other spirits inhabits all aspects of nature including trees, animals, 
                                                          
3 The Fante Subgroup of Akans refer to it as Asase Efua. Efua is a Fante day name for females born on Friday 
(Macre, 2001: 24). 
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water bodies, mountains and every aspects of nature. This indeed affects how they relate with 
nature in many ways, and the roles different aspects of nature play in their lives (Gyekye, 1995; 
Hagan, 1964). One way the Akans relate with nature is through their totems. The word ‘totem’ 
is believed to come from a North American Indian language which refers to vegetables or 
animals which particular individuals, groups or a tribe regard as sacred and are accorded 
reverence (Lumor, 2009: 19). Totems are believed to have a certain ancestral link with a 
particular tribe, clan or family, and can be an animal, a plant or any other natural object. These 
totems act as tutelary spirits, protecting the group and shielding off any harm as well as, 
bringing to the group good fortunes. In return, the group respects and refrains from eating, 
killing or trapping their animal totems. At the death of an animal totem, the group mourns and 
buries it as they would a human being (Lumor, 2009: 19-20). The Akan word for totem is 
Akyeneboa or Atweneboa, which literally means ‘an animal that one leans upon or relies upon 
for spiritual inspiration (Eshun, 2011: 34; Lumor, 2009: 21). The Akans have eight clans and 
each of these clans has its own unique animal that it has adopted and of which they relate to as 
totem animals. Below is a list of the eight Akan clans, their totem animals, and what each totem 
depicts. 
 
Table 2.12.1 Akan Clans and their totem animals4  
Name of clan Totem  Characteristics/Depiction 
1. Aduana  Dog, Frog Hardworking, clever, brave, friendliness, 
humility 
2. Agona Parrot Eloquence, frankness  
3. Asakyiri  Vulture, Eagle Beauty, stamina, intelligence 
4. Asenie Bat Bravery, diplomacy 
5. Asona Crow, Wild boar Wisdom, purity of heart, eloquence 
6. Bretuo Leopard Aggressiveness, exceptional bravery 
7. Ekuona Buffalo Uprightness 
8. Oyoko Falcon, hawk Patience, self-confidence 
 
Apart from the belief in totems, the Akans also believe in ntoro. As part of the Akan conception 
of person, the Akans believe that ntoro and mogya (blood) is part of the physical make-up of a 
                                                          
4 Put together from http://www.thekingdomofasante.com/clans-of-the-akan-people/ [Accessed 04 December 
2017] and Lumor, 2009:22. 
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person. The mogya is given to person by the mother while the ntoro is inherited from the father. 
The ntoro is explained to be the sperm-transmitted characteristics that allow the father to pass 
on certain behavioural and possibly genetic features to the child. The ntoro also determines the 
buildup of a person, his personal magnetism, character personality, and power. This is 
expressed in various Akan proverbs one of which translates thus, ‘a crab does not give birth to 
a bird’ (Gyekye, 1995: 94). Akan ntoro has four major divisions with each having certain 
restrictions or taboos, which include the avoidance of certain animal foods. Below is the list of 
the four major Akan ntoro with their respective taboos: 
 
Table 2.12.2 Akan ntoro and their taboo animals5  
Ntoro Divisions Taboos 
1. Bosommuru              Python, Cow, Monkey, Wild dog 
2. Bosomtwe                     Monkey, Snail, tortoise, bush bug 
3. Bosompra                         White fowl, Water yam, Monkey, Snail, Tortoise, dead 
animal  
4. Nkatia-Adomakode Dog, Wild dog 
 
 
2.12.2 Akan ethics 
Gyekye notes that there is some difficulty in finding an equivalent word in Akan for ethics. He 
claims that J. B. Danquah’s use of obra does not quite capture the meaning of the word ethics 
since obra which translates as ‘life’ or ‘manner of life’ is to him a much wider concept than 
ethics. For Gyekye, Akans generally use the word suban which means ‘character’ when 
referring to the ethical aspects of life. Thus, when the Akan want to say that ‘one has no morals’ 
they will say onni suban, which literally translates ‘he has no character’ (Geykye, 1995: 147). 
Despite the embeddedness of traditional Akan beliefs in metaphysics, Wiredu and Gyekye 
argue that even though the Akan is highly religious, he does not find his or her source of 
morality in religion but rather in a humanistic attitude. Wiredu maintains that what is 
considered good in general is what promotes human interest, and not what conforms to the will 
of the gods (Wiredu, 1992: 194). For Wiredu, this ethics of humanism is clearly demonstrated 
in an Akan popular expression onipa na ohia. Wiredu explains that the English translation of 
                                                          
5 Put together from http://www.thekingdomofasante.com/clans-of-the-akan-people/ [Accessed 04 December 
2017]. 
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this statement has a double connotation which are both important: Firstly, onipa na ohia implies 
that it is the human being which is valued, and secondly, it connotes that it is the fellowship 
with human being which is needed. Wiredu writes, “Through the first meaning the message is 
imparted that all value derive from human interests and through the second that human 
fellowship is the most important of human needs” (Wiredu, 1992: 194). Based on the above 
point, the Akan conception of the morally good, is argued to be what promotes human interests 
and that which is conducive to the harmonization of those interests (Wiredu, 1992: 194). 
Morality, for the Akans, is considered as intellectual, passionate, personal, and importantly 
social. “Morality is neither purely intellectual, for it has an irreducible passional ingredient, nor 
purely personal, for it is quintessentially social” (Wiredu, 1992: 195). Gyekye also corroborates 
this humanistic ethics of the Akan people. He asserts that the sole criterion for determining the 
moral good in Akan moral thought is the welfare or well-being of the community (Gyekye, 
1995: 132). The good is that which brings about human well-being or that which can evolve a 
common and harmonious social life (Gyekye, 1996: 57). This work will find out if this notion 
of human well-being can encompass the natural environment as well. Thus, this work will look 
into the humanistic moral attitude of the Akans to see if this humanistic attitude can be extended 
from person-to-person to person-to-animal as well.  
 
In his discussion of the nature of Akan ethics, Hagan notes the following features; firstly, that 
the notion of the integrity of the human individual is paramount in such a way that no matter 
how closely an individual is connected with another, they should not do to each other things 
that can lead to pain or that can diminish the each other’s life. This is depicted by the Adinkra6 
symbol obi nka obi7 which translates to ‘no one bites another’. Secondly, humans are held to 
be end in themselves and must not be used as means to any end (see also Gyekye, 1995: 20). 
This principle is found in an Akan proverb that says wo tiatia obi die so hwehwe wo die a 
wonhu which means ‘trampling on another’s right to seek your own ends in disappointment’. 
Thirdly, the Akans hold that the good of each is the condition of the good of all (Hagan, 1964: 
118). Tellingly, Hagan adds that it is not the human society alone that is considered moral but 
the entirety of the Akan ontological order is also, as a matter of fact, moral, due to, what he 
calls, “the mutual vital influence exerted by all things”. He continues that the Akan metaphysics 
                                                          
6 Adinkra symbols are traditional symbols of the Akan people used to express thoughts, ideas, values and beliefs 
of the people. These symbols are artistically displayed in textiles, pottery, carved works, stools, umbrella tops, 
linguist staffs, gold weights, jewelleries, swords, architecture and many more (Agbo, 2011:  ix). The symbols 
have different geometric designs and has proverbial meanings to them (Labi, 2009: 49). 
7 The symbol has two fishes with each having the tail of the other in its mouth.  
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shows all entities existing in nature “as a plurality of coordinated potencies in which human 
society has a place”. He believes the world order, as the Akans will have it, is the essential 
condition of the wholeness of everything, including the wholeness of every human being 
(Hagan, 1964: 119).” Resultantly, Hagan asserts that any human behavior, attitude and customs 
which work against the increase of the hierarchy of vital potency, is to be considered morally 
bad. Inferably, any useless destruction of the beings that are found lower on the hierarchy of 
beings would constitute evil. Thus, for Hagan, “Akans consider the killing of animals and 
destruction of plants for no use at all as evil. So also is dishonor to spirits which are high in the 
scale” (Hagan, 1964: 119).   
 
The notion of interdependency also resonates loudly in the communalistic attitude of traditional 
Akan societies. This communalistic character emphasizes on such communal values as shared 
social life, a high rate of interdependency and mutual aid and the maintenance of clan or kinship 
ties. On this, Gyekye (1997: 41) remarks that the Akan is never an isolated person but instead 
‘inherently’ a communal being who is deeply rooted in social relationships and 
interdependence. He asserts that: 
It is true, of course, that an individual human being is born into an existing 
human society and, therefore, into a human culture, the latter being a product 
of the former. As the proverb of the Akan people states, “When human being 
descends from heaven, he [or she] descends into a human society”. The fact 
that the individual human being is born into an existing community must, it 
seems to me, suggests a conception of the person as a communal being by 
nature. This communitarian conception of the person implies that, since the 
human being does not voluntarily choose to enter into a human community, 
community life is not optional for the individual. It also suggests that he 
cannot - perhaps should not - live in isolation from other persons, that he is 
naturally oriented toward other persons and must have relationships with 
them. It suggests, further, that the person is constituted, at least partly, by 
social relationships in which he necessarily finds himself. (Gyekye, 1997: 
38).  
 
Thus, it appears from the above quote that even the attainment of personhood in Akan tradition 
is based on how one can share in the communal life, which is attained through social interaction 
with others and being part of the whole. Closely attached to this social or communal status of 
the person, is the idea of the ‘common good’ which Gyekye understands to mean a good that 
is common to, or shared by individual human beings within a particular community, which is 
essential for the basic functioning of the individual in a particular community (Gyekye, 1997: 
45). 
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Taboos and proverbs also form part of the sources of Akan moral codes (Gyekye, 1995). 
Taboos are known in the Akan language as musuo (uncommon evil or extraordinary evil) or 
akyiwadea (evils that are extremely abhorred, abominations or prohibitions). Some Akans 
believe that musuo can bring great suffering or misfortune to not only the perpetuator, but to 
an entire family, clan or even an entire community. Taboos in Akan communities include acts 
like suicide, incest, having sexual intercourse in the bush, rape, murder, stealing things 
dedicated to the deities or ancestral spirits, among others (Gyekye, 1995: 133). Gyekye notes 
that even though some of these taboos come with religious and supernatural connotations and 
explanations, they are not the ultimate reason for these taboos. The real underlying reason for 
regarding some of these acts as taboos is “simply because of the gravity of their consequences 
for human society” (Gyekye, 1995: 135).  
 
With regards to proverbs, it is noted that one cannot come to an appreciation of the philosophy 
and beliefs of the Akan people without having to study their proverbs. From one short proverb, 
whole pages of philosophical discussion could be opened, (Appiah, Appiah & Agyeman-Duah, 
2007: xii). Agbo also notes that proverbs contain lessons for moral and religious teachings, 
much of which deals with practical everyday concerns, of common sense and of good manners 
(Agbo, 2011: vii). Appiah et al. (2007: xiii) point out that proverbs are used by Akans when 
they do not want to be immediately and directly understood, or when a double meaning or a 
prevarication is required. Proverbs are also used to emphasize a statement or argument 
especially when there is a desire to show precedent of action. The Akan word for proverb is 
abe, and Gyekye notes that the etymology of this name is from the Akan word for palm tree 
which is also abe. As such, both abe as proverb and abe as palm tree, Gyekye notes, share 
similar characteristics. The palm tree has several uses for the Akan. From it, they get products 
like palm oil, palm wine, broom, palm-kernel oil, and soap. Similarly proverbs can be used in 
many ways and from it can be derived many philosophical and metaphysical ontology of the 
Akan people. Gyekye notes that one difference between Akan proverbs and Western maxims, 
is that authors of Akan proverbs are usually not readily known. He also notes that Akan 
proverbs are situational, which means they arise out of reflections of their experiences in the 
world. They also have metaphorical use and properties. (Gyekye, 1995: 13-24).   
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2.13 The Research Gap 
Benjamin Nneji (2010) believes that the issue at hand when discussing the cogency of an 
environmental ethics in Africa is not whether or not humans can intervene in nature, but rather 
to what extent humans are both ethically and morally justified in intervening (Nneji, 2010: 39-
40). Thus, Nneji is suggesting responsibility on the part of humans in the use of the environment 
and by extension, perhaps, suggesting a welfarist approach when it comes to animal ethics in 
Africa (he did not draw this conclusion). But would Akan ontology and ethics and the emerging 
theories in African environmental ethics agree with this view? Is it possible that Akan 
environmental ethics will support the view that animals or some animals have moral status? If 
yes, what will be the nature of this moral status? Would it be placed at par with the moral status 
of humans? Should the African (Akan) view of the moral status of animal vis-à-vis its other 
metaphysical and ontological worldview, and their ethics, ultimately call for a humane 
treatments of animals (welfarist approach) or call for a total abolition of animal usage (rightist 
approach)? It is the aim of this research to find answers to these and other related questions, by 
relying on the Akan ontological worldview, practices, and ethics as first-hand sources, as well 
as, draw from values, ideals and principles stemming from some of the emerging trends in 
African environmental ethics as secondary sources.  
 
From the literature above, it is observable that little has been said about African animal ethics 
in general and much more less when it comes to placing African animal ethics within the 
welfarist and rightist positions. It is this gap that the research wants to fill. The ultimate aim is 
to answer the question, given the emerging trend in African environmental ethics and what is 
known of Akan ontological worldview and ethics, would an African animal ethics take after a 
welfarist approach or a rightist approach. Thus, placing Akan animal ethics within the global 
animal ethics debate and adding to the emerging literature on African animal ethics. Does the 
ethics of interrelatedness which dominates in the emerging literature in African environmental 
ethics require human beings to absolutely abstain from the use of animals? Should this 
subsequently lead to the embracement of an absolutist position? Surely, if humans and nature 
(including animals) are interconnected, then it implies that humans and nature rely on each 
other for survival. Is this to be translated to mean that this dominant ethics in in the emerging 
literature in African environmental ethics, which for the purpose of this study will be referred 
to as the ethics of interrelatedness8, will endorse a prudent use of animals? Thus, without going 
                                                          
8 This designation is used in order to avoid the use of a particular author’s label of this identified dominant 
ethics in the emerging African environmental ethical theories.  
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further to suggest how the ethics of interrelatedness mandate or expect humans to relate with 
nonhuman animals, the theory falls short.  
 
Kevin Behrens theory faces similar shortcomings. After an explanation of how his theory of 
African relational environmentalism either relates with or differs from holism, he moves to 
show how his theory applies in some practical environmental ethical cases, that is, human’s 
responsibility towards endangered species and the over-population of elephants in the Kruger 
National Park in South Africa. Yet, he also fails to state in clear terms, the implication his view 
will have on some persistent issues in animal ethics such as the use of animals for food, animal 
as pets, animal in laboratory tests and mass production of animals in factories and closed pens 
other than open range farming. 
Philomena Ojomo clearly identified and expressed the failure by these scholars to address the 
above questions fully in their theories of African environmental ethics in the following words: 
In the accounts of both Ogungbemi and Tangwa, [including many other African 
environmental ethicists] some fundamental questions, which are critically 
essential to a plausible African orientation in environmental ethics, are left un-
raised let alone discussed: what should be the nature of African obligation and 
role of the relationship between Africans (non-Africans in Africa inclusive) 
towards the future generation in Africa, sentient beings, non-human animals, 
African environment in particular and nature in general? What is the need for an 
environmental ethics that is African in orientation? And much such be 
exclusionary of the existing known environmental theories from the West? 
(Ojomo, 2011: 111). [Emphasis mine]. 
Thus, the burden of this work, among other things, essentially, is to address the question 
of the sort of ethical relationship that should exist between humans and nonhuman 
animals, given the metaphysics and ethics of the traditional Akan people, in view of 
the prevailing debate between the two major theories in animal ethics namely, animal 
welfarism and rightism.  
 
2.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed relevant literature that informs this study under some major thematic 
arears. It started with a brief introduction to environmental ethics where major theories and 
approaches in environmental ethics were explained. This was followed by an overview of 
animal ethics which highlighted some historical beginnings of animal ethics and how this 
branch of ethics developed along the way up to contemporary times. Major proponents and 
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arguments that prevailed during different eras were emphasized. After this was the introduction 
to the theories of animal welfarism and rightism which were presented as the two major 
approaches to animal ethics in the Western literature. It was mentioned here that there are two 
approaches to welfarism, i.e. direct welfarism and indirect welfarism. Rightism, as was shown, 
opposes both types of welfarism. It was shown that indirect welfarism does not recognize 
animals as having any moral status hence the theory argues that any human treatment that are 
accorded animals are done to benefit their human owners and not for the sake of the animal 
itself based on some intrinsic properties the animal may have. Direct welfarists, on the other 
hand, acknowledges the moral status of animals and believe we can morally wrong animals 
mainly because animals are sentient and as such experience pain and pleasure. Thus, humans 
owe direct duties to animals not just because of their human owners but for the animal’s own 
sake, yet not because of a right that these animals possess. Here, it was shown that there are 
variations in viewpoints among the various proponents of direct welfarism, that is, while Peter 
Singer, for example, holds that animals are equal with humans in terms of their moral status, 
Cohen and Garner argue that moral status comes in degrees. Rightism argues that any animal 
ethics that does is not based on the rights of animals is inadequate. The theory holds that it is 
not enough to only argue for a humane use of animals. Animals possess inherent values like 
humans that needs to be respected.  
 
The Chapter considered the controversial issue of the moral status of animals in some further 
details. Here, views from welfarists including, Singer, Cohen, Garner, and Frey were opposed 
with those of Rightists such as Regan, Francione, Rollin and Warren. It was noted that while 
indirect welfarists reject the idea of moral status all together, direct welfarists and rightists 
make a case for the moral status of animals. Nevertheless, there are disagreements among both 
direct welfarists and rightists in terms of whether the moral status of animals are to be 
considered equal with humans or to be regarded lower than that possessed by humans. This led 
to the section that brought out the debate on what is known as the marginal case argument.  
 
Having shown the divergent arguments concerning the moral status of animals, the chapter 
applied the various positions in some practical issues in animal ethics namely, the use of animal 
as food/vegetarianism, vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research, hunting and 
trapping of animals in the wild, and the use of animals as pets/companion animals. The next 
three sections focused on the African experience in terms of the emerging trend in African 
environmental ethics. Here, it was noted that the ethics that emphasizes on an interrelationship 
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between humans and nature permeated through the literature from authors such as Tangwa, 
Ogungbemi, Behrens, Murove, Bujo, Ramose, Kelbessa, among others. The chapter noted that 
even though direct reference to animals was minimally mentioned, there are many principles 
therein that could be employed in the placement of an Akan animal ethics within the welfarists 
and rightists debate. Authors who have made contributions towards an African theory of a 
moral status including Bujo, Chemhuru, Masaka and Metz were mentioned. Horsthemke’s 
criticism of the alleged nonanthropocentric nature of African environmental ethics and his 
rejection of Metz modal-relationalism were also looked at.  
 
The metaphysics of the Akan people concerning the natural environment and human beings 
role in the universe were discussed. It was shown, among many others that the Akan universe 
is highly spiritual and believed in a hierarchy of beings. The Akans believed also in totems and 
taboos that required abstinence from the use of certain animals as food. Sources of Akan ethics 
were also highlighted. The literature showed that Akans have their ethics embedded in 
humanism were the sought for the welfare of others is the acceptable moral code. Proverbs and 
taboos were also seen as sources of moral codes that governs the everyday moral behavior of 
the Akan people. Finally, the research gap that is the focus of this study was stated. It was 
shown that the literature fails to demonstrate clearly the place of an African animal ethics 
within the main Western approaches to animal ethics and how this African animal ethics can 
be applicable to practical areas as vegetarianism, the use of animals in biomedical research, 
hunting and trapping and the use of animals as pets. Thus, this work intends to place African 
animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist debates while relying on the principles from the 
emerging trend in African environmental ethics as secondary sources and on the traditional 
beliefs and practices of the Akan people of Ghana. 
 
In chapter three, the three theories that will guide the research both in evaluation and in 
exposition will be discussed in depth. These three theories are animal welfarism, rightism and 
the African ethics of interrelatedness. Major proponents and arguments for each of these 
theories will be presented alongside their major opponents.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The study explored and explicated on important literature related to the research in the previous 
chapter. Major disagreements that existed in the literature were also highlighted. The previous 
chapter brought to bear important themes related to this work including the moral status of 
nonhuman animals, the marginal case argument, the use of animals as pets, the use of animals 
for food, and the use of animals in scientific research. The chapter also looked at the emerging 
trend in African environmental ethics as well as a look into some features of Akan ontology, 
ethics, and metaphysics. In this chapter, the theoretical frameworks that will guide the study 
are detailed. Creswell (2009: 51) defines a theory in research as an argument, discussion, or 
reasoning that helps to explicate or forecast phenomena that occur in the world. The theoretical 
framework of research is a model of the framework of reference that researchers use to help 
them organise their observations and lines of thought (Delport, Fouché & Schurink, 2011: 297).  
The three theoretical frameworks that will guide this research are welfarism, rightism and the 
ethics of interrelatedness. 
In line with the main objective of this research to find the place of Akan animal ethics within 
the two main theories in the global animal ethics debate, that is, welfarism and rightism, the 
two are used as part of the theoretical framework for the research. The identified dominant 
theory in the emerging trends of African environmental ethics labelled ‘the ethics of 
interrelatedness’ is the third theory used. The study used these three theories as expository, 
evaluative, and descriptive tools. They are also used as tools for making comparisons with the 
collected data from the field. Ultimately, all three theories are going to help the study reach its 
objective of finding the place of Akan environmental ethics within the welfarist and rightist 
debate.  
 
3.1 Welfarism Defined 
The term animal welfare is widely used by many people in their attempt to argue for the 
protection of animals. Many of these people appear to be probably unaware of the many 
intricacies of the term. Animal welfare has a scientific usage where it tends to refer to the actual 
state of an animal rather than to the ethical duty to care or treat it well (Keeling, Rushen & 
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Duncan, 2011: 13). Keeling, et al. further mention that the term ‘welfare’ in the scientific sense, 
is considered as a feature of an animal rather than something that ought to be given to animals, 
as it is in the case of the ethical meaning of the word. With the scientific usage of the term, an 
animal in the wild is said to have poor welfare if it has no place to keep warm or is malnourished 
without people necessarily being responsible for it. Three questions come up when considering 
the scientific meaning of animal welfare, namely: is the animal happy or suffering from pain 
or other undesirable emotions; is the animal healthy and producing well; and is the animal able 
to perform its normal behavior and live a reasonable natural life. Keeling, et al. note that these 
three questions on the physical and psychological welfare of animals are part of official 
definitions of animal welfare including that of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
(2011: 13-14). They note that this is what veterinary or agricultural extension officers will be 
looking out for in animals in terms of animals’ welfare.      
In this work, the ethical meaning of the term animal welfare will be the focus of attention rather 
than the scientific meaning, although answers from the three questions raised above concerning 
the scientific usage of the term, inform animal ethicists in determining how humans ought to 
treat animals. Thus, DeGrazia rightly notes that the kind of mental capacities human beings 
associate with animals, play a very important role in how they believe they should be treated 
(1996: 1). In effect, if animals are considered to be merely made up of matter and nerves, people 
are less likely to think animals are owed any overly special responsibilities. However, if 
animals or some animals are regarded as self-conscious, rational, having emotions and beliefs, 
then people are more likely to reevaluate their attitudes towards them. The difference between 
the scientific and ethical use of animal welfare now becomes apparent; while in the scientific 
sense, animal welfare means a concern for the physical and psychological wellness of the 
animal, the ethical sense of the term deals with how humans ought to treat animals.   
Tom Regan (2006: 208-209), in his contribution to animal ethics in the second edition of the 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, identifies two possibilities of being a welfarist. The first group, 
he notes, are those who advocate for the humane treatment of animals only because it leads to 
human benefits, that is, it will make humans treat each other with kindness and with less 
cruelty. He labels this group as the indirect-duty account of the moral status of nonhuman 
animals. This study refers to this group as indirect welfarist and their theory or approach as 
indirect welfarism. The second group is made up of those who hold that humans owe direct 
duties to animals. According to Regan, this is the path preferred by utilitarians, starting with 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and given more force in the work of Peter Singer. Regan 
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opines that those belonging to this group use utilitarian theories to criticize how animals are 
treated in contemporary industries (for example, in animal agriculture and biomedical 
research). This group considers the duty not to cause animals to suffer unnecessarily as a duty 
owed directly to animals. The study subsequently refers to this second group as the direct 
welfarist and their theory or approach as direct welfarism.  
Direct welfarism, (the theory that holds that animals are owed direct duties) will be the 
preferred welfarist theory in this research over indirect welfarism. This is because, as it will 
subsequently be shown, traditional Akan ethics and beliefs concerning the treatment of animals 
align more with the tenets of direct welfarism the than it does with those of indirect welfarism. 
It is however very important to note here, and as acknowledged by Francione (2010: 5), that 
there are many approaches even to direct welfarism. Thus, study will present some different 
proponents of direct welfarism below after the discussion on indirect welfarism. Even though 
indirect welfarism is not the study’s preferred version of welfarism, it is necessary to briefly 
consider what its thesis is and why it is not preferable.  
 
3.2 Indirect Welfarism 
The indirect welfarist position is viewed as an indirect response to those who have argued that 
humans owe or have no moral duty towards animals. The likes of Aristotle and the 17th-century 
philosopher, René Descartes, as noted in the previous chapter, had denied any moral duty to 
animals mainly because they considered animals to lack reasoning or rational capabilities. 
Descartes, for example, had described animals as automata or mere machines. As Mary 
Midgley (1983: 53) notes, to say humans have no duty to animals, in general understanding, is 
to say that it does not matter how humans treat them. However, the indirect welfarist will argue 
that how animals are treated matter only because the interests of their human owners matter or 
that because it can affect how humans treat each other. Even though this remains an 
anthropocentric position, it can be considered as a ‘softened’ position from those who claim 
humans owe animals no moral duty at all. 
Regan best captures the position of indirect welfarists in the following statement: “We have no 
duties towards animals; rather, animals are a sort of medium through which we may either 
succeed or fail to discharge those direct duties we owe to nonanimals, either ourselves; other 
human beings; or, as on some others views, God.” (Regan, 2004: 150). Regan asserts that when 
indirect welfarists advocate for the preservation of endangered animal species they do so not 
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because of a duty owed to the animal species or for the respect of an inalienable right of the 
animal. Indirect welfarists, instead, advocates for the preservation of endangered animal 
species because they believe humans owe it to the present and future generations, to do what 
they can to ensure that animals that are currently regarded as endangered species continue to 
exist. This is to make it possible for future generations also to enjoy the benefits of these 
animals either through sightseeing or other beneficial uses the particular animal may provide.   
Immanuel Kant (2012: 60-62) is well accredited as one of those who hold this softened position 
called indirect welfarism. Kant holds that only rational beings have absolute worth. According 
to Kant, for or a being to have an absolute worth, means that the being exists not as a means to 
an end but as an end in itself. In contrast, a nonrational being does not have an absolute worth 
and only exists as a means to an end. He refers to rational beings as persons and nonrational 
beings as things. It is from this hypothesis that Kant derives his famous categorical or practical 
moral imperative as follows: ‘so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in 
that of any other, in every case as an end-withal, never as means only.’  
According to Kant, animals are not rational beings, and so by inference, do not have absolute 
worth. They are therefore in the category of things. Thus, Kant sees animals as properties that 
humans use to meet their ends. Commenting directly on humans’ duties to animals, Kant 
claims, “Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity.” He further 
maintains that “our animal nature is analogous to human nature, and by doing our duties to 
animals in respect of manifestations of human nature, we indirectly do our duty towards 
humanity” (Kant, 2012: 61). By this, Kant means that humans only ought to seek the welfare 
or good of animals not because animals have any moral worth in themselves to make humans 
obligated in granting them any moral considerations, but rather because doing so will make 
humans behave morally towards their fellow humans. In Kant’s own words, “Such action helps 
to support us in in our duties towards humans where there are bounden human beings” (Kant, 
2012: 61). 
Kant further shows that animals cannot be wronged. In his analogy, he claims that if a man 
should shoot his dog for the fact that the dog is no longer able to serve, the man is not judged 
to have failed in his duty to the dog because the dog cannot judge. The man’s action would, 
however, be considered as inhuman and damaging to his own humanity, which is his duty to 
show towards humankind. Thus, we can judge the heart of a person by the way he or she treats 
animals. If an individual wants to be kind to his or her fellow human being, then that individual 
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must be kind to animals. In summary, our duties towards animals are indirect duties. Thus, the 
welfare of animals is sought just because doing so leads to the welfare of humanity. Regan 
calls this “duties involving animals rather than duties to animals” (Regan, 2004: 150).   
There have been expressions of similar views even before Kant. The Judaeo-Christian tradition 
has in several times been accused of holding an anthropocentric view that puts humans at the 
centre of the universe and for giving humans absolute dominion over all of God’s creation9. It 
is generally argued that this anthropocentric view is part of what has informed the Western 
tradition of exploiting nature to further the needs and wants of humanity10. St. Aquinas, who 
attempts, in his Summa Theologica, to explain Christian theology, maintains that humans 
cannot sin against animals because God has subjected all things to man’s power. He considered 
animals as irrational beings of which humans owe no such obligation to seek their welfare 
except for that welfare that benefits humans themselves. He wrote, “If a man practised a 
profitable affection for animals, he is all more disposed to take pity on his fellow man.” This 
was his interpretation of the book of Proverb 12:10 (NIV), part of which says “the righteous 
care for the needs of their animals” (see Singer, 1990:1 93-196). 
Thus, it can be seen here that St. Aquinas holds the position that the Christian has no direct 
regard for the welfare of animals. The Christian, in St. Aquinas theology, does not consider the 
good of animals because animals have rights that need to be respected or that animals have 
interests or experience pain and emotions that need to be considered. In the view of St. Aquinas 
and Kant, human consideration for the welfare of animals is done solely for the good of 
humanity. Being kind to animals makes humans beings kind to one another or at least, shows 
that particular human being as a kind person. 
Jan Narveson (1977: 161-178) is another philosopher who expresses an indirect welfarist 
approach. Though he describes himself as a utilitarian, Narveson rejects the absolute 
conclusion of fellow utilitarian, Peter Singer and animal rights advocate, Tom Regan on the 
claim that there is no substantive argument to prevent the inclusion of animals in our moral 
considerations (moral community). Narveson agrees at some level with Singer and Regan that 
some of the arguments put forward by way of rejecting the moral status of animals are 
superficial and lack merits. The argument, for example, that animals are stupid, or that animals 
                                                          
9 See, for example, Lynn Whyte’s ‘The historical roots of our ecological crisis in James P. Sterba (ed.), 2000, 
pp.  
   19-26. 
10 Whyte, Singer, and Regan held this position.  
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do not feel pain, or the argument that since [some] animals kill each other, humans can also do 
it to them, are immediately rejected by Narveson. He further posited that “we would be better 
people if we did respect animals, or that animals are really quite lovable and we would do better 
to treat them as pets than as potential meals, and so on. But none of this will get us to animal 
rights, as part of the fundamental apparatus of morality” (Narveson, 1977: 178). His view here 
represents the crust of his indirect welfarist approach. Narveson seems to be arguing that 
humans’ duty to nonhuman animals is that of an indirect one, mainly because nonhuman 
animals are not and cannot be a party to the moral agreement that seeks to protect self-interests 
and ensure others do the same. Because of this, when humans do show some form of moral 
courtesy to animals, they do so because they would be better people and not because the 
suffering of animals is of any [primary] importance (Narveson, 1977: 178). 
  
3.3 Critique of Indirect Welfarism 
Arguments by indirect welfarists are generally refuted by arguments that are able to 
demonstrate that animals or at least some of them do behave rationally and can employ nearly 
similar sophistication of their reasoning capabilities as humans do. This is because many of the 
arguments propounded by welfarists draw conclusions from the premise or assumption that 
animals are not rational beings or that they do not experience emotions. However, many years 
of scientific studies of the brain and nervous system of animals and the psychology and 
behaviours of animals have produced convincing data to show that some animals exhibit 
sophisticated rationality and emotions close to that of humans.   
Mary Midgley explains that part of the reason the likes of Aristotle and Descartes deny 
rationality to animals is that they consider a person to be essentially his reason or intellect. That 
is, they hold that humans’ rationality is what differentiates them from other beings. This 
Midgley notes, made for a startling position that nothing non-intellectual mattered (Midgley, 
1983: 11). Midgley is sceptical of this position. She asks whether reasoning, as an attribute, is 
really a single faculty in humans that is unshared by any animal (Midgley, 1983: 45). She 
concludes that the rationalist tradition to dismiss animals from the moral scene was done on 
the grounds that are obviously not acceptable today (Midgley, 183: 12). Voltaire also 
challenged Descartes’ claim that animals are mere machines. He claims that by observing the 
behaviour of animals, humans can identify similarities with the behaviour of animals that 
should make humans believe that animals do reason (Regan & Singer, 1976: 67). David Hume 
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echoes Voltaire’s position. Hume argues that should the resemblance of the external actions of 
animals to those of humans be considered and should the internal organs of animals be judged 
to resemble that of humans, the only conclusion that could be reached will be the view that 
since humans and animals share these similarities then animals do reason like humans. Hume 
strongly believes that there is no truth that appears to be more evident than the truth that animals 
are endowed with thought and reason like humans (Regan & Singer, 1976: 69-70).  The 
renowned naturalist and biologist, Charles Darwin, also notes that only a few people would 
dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. He believes that animals can pause, 
deliberate, and resolve. He argues that the more animals are studied, the more it becomes 
evident of their capacity to reason (Regan & Singer, 1976:75). Even though Darwin admits that 
there are some differences in the reasoning capacities of humans and nonhumans animals 
(humans are, for example, able to engage in abstract thinking and self-consciousness) yet, this 
is only a matter of degree and not of a kind. He writes: 
Of all the faculties of the human mind, it will, I presume, be admitted that reason 
stands at the summit… Nevertheless, the difference in mind between man and 
the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind… If 
it could be proved that certain high mental powers, such as the formation of 
general concepts, self-consciousness, etc., were absolutely peculiar to man, 
which seems extremely doubtful, it is not improbable that these qualities are 
merely the incidental results of other highly-advanced intellectual faculties 
(Regan & Singer, 1976: 75-80).   
Apart from the argument bearing on animal rationality, another basis for denying direct moral 
duty to animals, as expressed by some indirect welfarists, is the claim that animals are not 
conscious beings, in the sense that they do not have emotions or desires. However, even with 
the absence of hard scientific evidence, it is possible to infer from the observation of the overt 
behaviours of animals that animals do express pain, joy and other emotions. Jeffrey Masson 
and Susan McCarthy (1994: 42) believe that humans presumed, animals lack feelings to get an 
excuse for treating them badly. That is, if animals have no feelings, then there is nothing in 
them for humans to respect. They state, “It has always been comforting to the dominant to 
assume that those in subservient positions do not suffer or feel pain as keenly or at all, so they 
can be abused or exploited without guilt and with impunity” (Masson & McCarthy, 1994: 43). 
Masson and McCarthy further note that in science, the two things that serve as great obstacles 
in studying or acknowledging animal emotion are anthropomorphism (the ascribing of human 
characteristics such as thoughts, feelings, consciousness, and motivation to nonhuman animals) 
and anthropocentrism (the assumption that everything else matters morally only insofar as it 
71 
 
affects human beings and/or their interests). They continued that anthropomorphism was 
viewed with such negativity that it was considered a grave mistake and even a sin. This negative 
attitude made scientists avoid talking about the emotional lives of animals to avoid ridicule and 
to be taken seriously. Masson and McCarthy argued that animals do indeed express emotions 
in many ways; “Animals cry. At least, they vocalise pain or distress and perhaps call for help” 
(Masson & McCarthy, 1994: 11), they maintain. Similarly, Midgley, through the observation 
of animal behaviour and reports from ethologists, argues that human beings “are not just rather 
like animals; [they] are animals” (Midgley, 1973: 113). 
Again, Charles Darwin, many years earlier, was of the conviction that young animals such as 
puppies, kittens, and lambs exhibit happiness when playing together just as human children do. 
Darwin, with many other instances, showed that animals demonstrate a variety of emotions 
including love, jealousy, fear, courage, pain, excitement, and sympathy (Regan & Singer, 1976: 
72-81).  
Specifically on Kant’s indirect welfarist position, Regan argues that even if Kant’s assertion 
that animals are not self-conscious or rational is interpreted to mean that animals cannot make 
moral judgment, it will not only be true for animals but also true for all other moral patients 
including human moral patients like babies (Regan, 2004:178). Thus, the marginal case 
argument comes up once again. That is, unless humans are ready to extend the same argument 
to human babies and to all other moral patients then there really is no justification in excluding 
animals from those to whom a moral duty is owed. This is because even though human babies 
cannot make moral judgment, they are generally not considered as things or objects without 
rights.    
Peter Singer likewise rejects attempts by indirect welfarists to find a distinctive attribute that 
makes humans superior to nonhuman animals. He argues along similar lines of Jeremy 
Bentham to show that various arguments made by indirect welfarists to show why direct moral 
duty is owed to humans and not to animals are indefensible. He maintains that even if some of 
the distinctive marks that indirect welfarists allude to as those which set humans apart from 
animals are acknowledged, they are, to him, not relevant to the question of how animals ought 
to be treated unless they can be linked to the question of whether or not animals suffer. Pain or 
suffering, according to Singer (Singer, 1994: 68), is more primitive and seems to have nothing 
to do with language or any of these purported distinctive marks.  
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What have all these objections shown? As Regan noted, there appears to be some sort of 
arbitrariness on the part of indirect welfarists as to their reasons for excluding all animals or at 
least some animals in their definition of a moral community. These objections have shown that 
the criteria used as bases for refusing to accord nonhuman animals direct moral duties are 
flawed. The attempt to exclude animals based on their lack of rationality or lack of self-
consciousness is refuted by showing through the study of animals’ mental state and through 
ethological studies that some animals are rational and can have similar sophisticated mental 
states as humans. Similar studies have disproved the arguments that animals do not have 
emotions and therefore cannot suffer pain or experience joy. Through much scientific research, 
the emotional lives of animals have been made known and there have been studies that show 
that animals experience a wide array of emotions as well. Thus, animals also suffer pain, are 
self-conscious, have desires, hope, and preferences. The argument, therefore, is that if animals 
or some animals have similar mental and emotional experiences as humans, it can be argued 
therefore that there is no justification for denying a direct duty to them. There remains no viable 
reason except that of arbitrariness to continue to place animals outside the definition of a moral 
community. It is the only way to avoid the challenge posed by the marginal case argument, that 
is, to consider animals as not only purposeful to serve human interests but as beings with their 
own worth.  
 
3.4 Direct Welfarism 
Unlike indirect welfarism, which argues that humans have no direct duties to animals, direct 
welfarism position argues that there are good enough reasons to accord direct duties to animals. 
Singer reports that Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, denounced humans’ dominion 
over animals by describing it as a tyranny instead of legitimate government (Singer, 1990: 
204). Bentham envisaged a time when humans would have no good reason to exclude animals 
from their moral calculations; the number of legs a being has, the villosity of the skin, the 
termination of the os sacrum, or the ability to reason or to discourse. All of these, according to 
Bentham, are not good enough reasons to exclude animals from being accorded some moral 
considerations (Regan & Singer, 1976: 130). This assertion by Bentham highlights the position 
of direct welfarists, who generally acknowledge the moral status of at least some animals, if 
not all. Direct welfarists generally hold that animals have interests that need to be respected. In 
other words, humans have some duties towards animals, not because doing so furthers humans’ 
interests as such, but because animals have interests that need to be respected. Thus, direct 
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welfarists acknowledge direct duties to animals. Despite this acknowledgement of animals’ 
interests, direct welfarists are, in certain circumstances, willing to trade away, or override, or 
negotiate these interests or at least some of them. Tom Regan, a staunch critic of direct 
welfarism, explains direct welfarist position as the position that recognizes at least some direct 
duties to moral patients. According to Regan (2004:195), the difference between the direct 
welfarist position and the rightist view is that direct welfarists hold that humans can give a 
good account of their duties to animals without necessarily appealing to rights of animals. Thus, 
direct welfarists do away with any talk of animal rights in the strict meaning of the word. 
Stephen R. L. Clark (1997: 9) was therefore mistaken to say that moralists who deny that 
nonhuman animals have rights generally mean that there is no moral reason to consider the 
feelings or wishes of those creatures. His claim may perhaps hold true for indirect welfarists 
but not for direct welfarists. This is because even though direct welfarists deny the claim that 
animals have rights, they accept that there are moral reasons to consider the interests of 
nonhuman animals. There are however different perspectives to direct welfarism. This is 
because advocates do not agree on which interest in animals is worth protecting and do not 
agree on when and how it is justified to override these or some of these interests. The direct 
welfarist positions of Peter Singer, Carl Cohen, and Robert Garner are presented below. The 
study purposely avoids choosing one over the rest because it wants to compare the data from 
the Akan respondents and knowledge from the Akan literature to see where and how traditional 
Akan viewpoints agree with and differ from the these versions of direct welfarism.        
 
3.4.1 The Direct Welfarist View of Peter Singer 
Peter Singer’s position is often referred to as the animal liberation position. Coming from a 
utilitarian tradition himself, Singer relied on the utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham (where 
the good is defined as pleasure and bad or evil as pain) to expand his theory of direct moral 
consideration of all sentient beings. Due to the popularity and strides Singer’s utilitarian 
position has made in the animal ethics debate and in the animal rights movement all over the 
world, many in the animal ethics literature generally refer to the direct welfarist position as a 
utilitarian position which they usually contrast with Tom Regan’s rightist position.  
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral theory. And as with all consequentialist moral 
theories, it focuses on the end result as the ultimate decider of right and wrong. Utilitarianism, 
therefore, requires human actions to always aim at bringing about the best possible 
74 
 
consequences, all other alternatives considered. Jeremy Bentham explained that the best 
possible consequences should be measured in terms of maximizing pleasures and minimizing 
pain. As already indicated, Bentham had entertained the future likelihood of including animals 
in the moral calculation of utility in his widely quoted claim: “The day may come when the 
rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden 
from them but by the hand of tyranny. The question is not, can they reason nor Can they or 
talk? but, Can they or suffer?” (Regan & Singer, 1976: 130). Thus, Bentham was envisaging 
the possibility of including all sentient beings in the moral calculation of utility rather than the 
inclusions of only human beings. Peter Singer follows Bentham’s line of reasoning to advocate 
strongly for animal ethics that takes into account the interests of all sentient animals.  
Singer (1976: 148ff.) brings to the fore the gains made by many past liberation movements in 
their fights against discrimination of different sorts; from the Black Liberation Movement 
against the discrimination and prejudice of blacks to the liberation movements for Spanish-
Americans, gay people, and other minority groups. Singer also speaks of the liberation 
movements made by women to demand a stop to biases based on sex. According to him, the 
goal of any liberation movement is to see an expansion of prevailing moral purview and 
distension or the given of a different meaning to the basic moral principle of equality. Thus, 
Singer sees his own project as an advocacy for the inclusion of nonhuman animal species into 
our current existing moral purview. He states, “I am arguing that we extend to other species 
the basic principles of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of 
our own species” (Singer, 1976: 149). Singer, perhaps, saw this as the next important step in 
the ever-continuous expansion of the boundaries of moral status and the moral principle of 
equality.  
Singer, being a utilitarian, argues that when reference is made to all sentient beings that likely 
stand to be affected by the actions of moral agents, they should include animals, that is, animals 
should be included in any moral calculation. Singer’s direct welfarist position becomes 
apparent when his claims on the use of animals for food, killing of animals, and experimenting 
on animals are considered. As observed from the literature review, Singer’s position is not 
entirely an abolitionist stance since he would, given certain conditions, allow for some sort of 
use of animals to further other greater interests at the time.  
Singer identifies himself as a preference utilitarian. He explains the position of preference 
utilitarianism as follows:  
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According to preference utilitarianism, an action contrary to the preference of 
any being is, unless this preference is outweighed by contrary preferences, 
wrong. Killing a person who prefers to continue living is therefore wrong, other 
things being equal. That the victims are not around after the act to lament the 
fact that their preferences have been disregarded is irrelevant. The wrong is done 
when the preference is thwarted (Singer, 1993: 94). 
 
Peter Wenz also notes that the aim of a preference utilitarian’s action is to maximize the 
satisfaction of preferences rather than the maximization of pleasure or happiness. Wenz 
maintains that one good thing about preference utilitarianism over it hedonistic counterparts is 
that instead of universally defining the good in terms of pleasure or happiness, it allows 
individuals to define for themselves what they deem to be good. Preference utilitarianism will 
then call for actions that promote the maximum satisfaction of the various preferences that 
individuals happen to have (Wenz, 2001: 100). Singer himself explains that going with the 
hedonistic approach, makes sentient beings to be regarded as mere receptacles of something 
valuable. When regarded this way, it will not matter if the receptacle gets broken, so long as 
there is another receptacle to which the contents can be transferred without any getting spilt 
(Singer, 1993: 121). The meaning of this metaphor is that since hedonistic utilitarians are 
mostly concerned with maximization of pleasure over pain, it seems that the recipients of these 
pain and pleasure have no value in themselves so far as the balancing of pleasure over pain is 
achieved. Thus, hedonistic utilitarianism approach would make it acceptable to have secret 
killings of animals if that will minimize pain or make it acceptable to kill one animal and 
replace it with another animal which has more possibility of a pleasurable life. This is because, 
by the hedonistic utilitarian approach, the subject has no value as such. What matters more is 
the pleasure or pain it experiences or can produce. So that by going for preference 
utilitarianism, Singer attempts to make killing a direct wrong done to the subject killed because 
it is something contrary to the subject’s preference.  
 
Tom Regan notes that Singer favoured preference utilitarianism over hedonistic or classical 
utilitarianism because, Singer perceived that the position of hedonistic utilitarianism, by 
placing moral status on the mere fact of being sentient, made moral agents and moral patients 
mere receptacles of positive values or negative values (Regan, 2004: 205). However, he argues 
that Singer falls into a similar problem faced by hedonistic utilitarianism of which he was 
trying to avoid. He asserts that going by Singer’s line of argument will make it possible for the 
preference (interests) of animals to be traded off or disregarded if there are higher or stronger 
preferences (Regan, 2004: 210). 
76 
 
 
3.4.2 The Direct Welfarist View of Carl Cohen 
Carl Cohen’s direct welfarist position is more apparent than that of Singer’s. He writes that: 
Animals are not stones. They live and they may suffer. Every honest person will 
agree that treating animals in some ways is inhumane and unjustified. But the 
good that has been done by medical investigations that could not have been 
undertaken without animal subjects is so very great as to be beyond calculation; 
this, also every honest person must acknowledge (Cohen, 2001: 3). 
Going by the above statement, Cohen demonstrates clearly his direct welfarist position. By 
asserting that animals are not stones and that they suffer, Cohen shows that he agrees with 
Singer in acknowledging a value in animals that need to be taking into account in the way they 
are treated. Nevertheless, Cohen does not hold the view that animals have intrinsic rights that 
should call for the total abolition of their use. He acknowledges humans’ many uses of animals 
including for food, clothes, companionship, and transportation. However, his chief concern 
among all the various animal uses is their use in medical research. Cohen claims that the use 
of animals in medical research is more profound than their other uses because “investigators 
cannot do without animal subjects” (Cohen, 2001: 4). According to him, humans, however, can 
survive without animal food products or without companion animals or the use of animal skins 
for clothes, or the use of animals for transportation, but in the field of medical research, the use 
of animals cannot be avoided. It is based on the need to use animals in medical research that 
Cohen develops his argument on the moral status of animals. 
Cohen agrees with Singer that animals are sentient, and that sentient animals must be treated 
with the consideration that they can suffer pain and experience pleasure. He notes that humans 
have an obligation to act humanely and to do that implies that humans refrain from treating 
animals in ways that can bring unnecessary distress upon them. He is however against the 
insistence on animals having rights as humans do and the categorical objection to any use of 
animals, more especially for medical research. He describes the defence of animal rights as “a 
gigantic mistake” (Cohen, 1997: 94). 
Cohen’s argument is that even though it is true that all rights entail obligation, the reverse of 
the statement is not true. Thus, not all obligations entail a right. He notes that many of the moral 
obligations humans owe to each other are not because the other person has a right to demand 
such an obligation. Obligations may arise from commitments that are freely made or from 
special relations (Cohen, 1997: 4). Obligations may also arise from the possession of authority, 
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faithful service, family connections, duties of care and an act of spontaneous kindness and 
many other circumstances (Cohen, 2001: 28-29). For example, should a son someday wish to 
become a veterinary doctor, it will be the parents’ obligation to help him to achieve that wish 
[the parents are so obliged because of family connection] but Cohen opines that the son “has 
not the authority to demand such help as a matter of right.” In the same light, humans may have 
certain obligations to animals but it does not in any way imply that animals have rights (Cohen, 
2001: 94).  
Despite Cohen’s rejection of animals bearing rights, he emphasizes constantly that their lack 
of rights does not mean they should be treated without any consideration. It is silly, he says, to 
think of rats as the holders of moral rights, but this shouldn’t mean it is silly to recognize that 
rats can feel pain, and that humans have an obligation to refrain from torturing them. He 
continues that humans owe to animals the obligation to act humanely towards them even 
though the concept of right cannot possibly apply to them (Cohen, 2001: 29). Based on this 
thought, Cohen believes there is no moral harm done in the use of animals in medical research 
to advance human knowledge and to find cure and vaccines for pertinent human ailments. For 
him, it will be justifiable to do so while the welfare of animals is considered.  
 
3.4.3 The Direct Welfarist View of Robert Garner 
Robert Garner presents himself as a staunch critic of Gary Francione’s (2010) and any other 
radical abolitionist views on animal ethics. Garner’s position offers a practical solution to the 
impasse that exists in the animal ethics debate between welfarists and rightists. Francione refers 
to Garner’s welfarist position as ‘new welfarism’ (Francione & Garner, 2010: 25), while Garner 
himself would rather prefer to call his position as ‘animal protectionism’ (Francione & Garner, 
2010: 104). It is Garner’s hope that his animal protectionist position will either bridge the gap 
between welfarism and abolitionism or be seen as the necessary step or approach that can lead 
to attaining the ideals of the abolitionists. Thus, Garner claims that his theory will support 
whichever measures adopted that can lead to the protection of animal interests, irrespective of 
how the measure is labelled, be it animal welfare or animal rights (Francione & Garner, 2010: 
104). It is for this same reason that he prefers his theory to be called ‘animal protectionism’ 
rather than ‘new welfarism’. 
Garner rejects claims by animal rights theorists (specifically those who label themselves as 
abolitionist) that the total abolition of the use of animals by humans is both ethically appropriate 
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and politically probable. He describes them as fundamentalists, not only because they hold 
strongly to a particular set of beliefs, but also because they are unwilling to compromise their 
beliefs even if to achieve incremental short-term goals that fall short of the ideal end they seek 
(Francione & Garner, 2010: 103). For Garner, it is important to distinguish between what is 
prescribed by ethics and what is politically or strategically achievable. This distinction, 
according to him, will help to avoid confounding ethical pronouncements concerning what the 
treatment of animals suggests to be done, with pronouncements concerning what is politically 
feasible at any given time. Thus, he sees his animal protectionism position to offer what is 
politically feasible now based on what is currently prevalent in societies.  
Garner, just as the other direct welfarists considered, acknowledges the moral status of animals. 
Again, just as the other direct welfarists have posited, Garner believes the sentiency of animals 
is something of a big deal that needs to be weighed when considering how to treat or use 
animals. He writes that, “the mere fact that animals are sentient ought to result in animals being 
accorded a higher moral status” (Francione & Garner, 2010: 115). The contention though, for 
Garner, is whether the acknowledgement of the moral status of animals should compel humans 
to regard the interests of animals at par with humans, and as such, give animals similar moral 
considerations as humans at all times. Here, Garner agrees with Cohen in challenging Singer 
on the view that animal interests ought to be considered equally with that of human interests 
(Francione & Garner, 2010: 112).  
Garner asserts that merely pursuing a moral campaign on animal rights may not get the 
expected results unless it is backed by a political strategy (2010: 147-154).  He claims that he 
is arguing for an animal right ethics based on the principle that animals have the right not to 
suffer. Welfare reforms, for him, can minimize animal suffering to a high degree without 
necessarily abolishing a particular practice of the use of animals. “Using animals per se, 
therefore, is not the problem. It is what they are used for that is the key”, according to Garner. 
He also maintains that goal of abolitionists to bring about a cessation of all kinds of animal use 
are highly unachievable looking at what currently pertains in societies today. Garner thinks that 
no country in the world has absolutely prohibited the use of animals in medical research or 
their use as a source of food rather, the industry continues to profit and consumers continue to 
rely on meat and use drugs that were developed and tested on animals. People also consistently 
rely on animals for entertainment and for clothing. With these said, Garner believes a 
movement (referring to the abolitionist’s movement) that appears to be promoting a cause that 
will, either rightly or wrongly, impact negatively on some human interests, could face some 
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serious problems. He held that because animals are unable to liberate themselves and must rely 
on humans and because humans benefit from animal exploitation, the animal protection 
movement must spend more time focusing on the question of agency. By this, he meant that 
more focus should be channelled by animal advocacy groups on who is to do what rather than 
what must be done (Francione & Garner, 2010: 126). Thus, Garner calls for reforms, 
regulations and incremental changes that can gradually take humans towards the ideals of 
animal rights in consonance with human needs.  
 
3.5 Critique of Direct Welfarism 
Regan is a major critic of direct welfarism. The main target of his criticism has been Peter 
Singer’s animal liberation view. Regan generally believes that any animal ethical theory that 
does not acknowledge the moral rights of animals is inadequate. It is on this basis that he 
challenges Singer’s utilitarian approach, fearing that such a consequentialist method will 
sometimes allow the rights of animals to be negotiated or traded off to further other utility that 
may seem prudent at a time. In Regan’s view, “utilitarianism would sanction recognizable 
forms of sexism and racism, if the facts happened to turn out a certain way” (Regan, 2004: 227-
228). Regan demonstrates that Singer fails in his attempt to avoid the challenge of hedonistic 
utilitarianism that made individuals of direct moral concern mere receptacles of value instead 
of valuing the individuals themselves. Regan holds that Singer’s choice for preference 
utilitarianism commits a similar problem. To him, Singer’s position does not avoid the problem 
of regarding individuals as replaceable receptacles because “self-conscious individuals are just 
as much replaceable receptacles given preference utilitarianism as they are given hedonistic 
utilitarianism” (Regan, 2004: 210). The only difference between Singer’s position and that of 
hedonistic utilitarians, according to Regan, is that while individuals are replaceable receptacles 
with preferences in Singer’s case, they are replaceable receptacles with pleasures and pains in 
the other. Thus, Regan sees no improvement made by Singer in going for preference 
utilitarianism.  
Regan further attacks Singer’s ‘basic moral principle of equality’. Singer in Practical Ethics 
(1993) claimed that the basic moral principle of equality prescribes that the interests of every 
being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like 
interests of any other being. According to Regan, Singer saw this principle to be prescriptive, 
basic, moral, concerns the range of interests to be considered, and prescribes that equal interests 
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be counted equally. Regan’s argument is that if Singer’s basic moral principle of equality is 
taken to mean a fundamental moral principle upon which he makes his claim for equal 
consideration for all sentient beings then Singer appears to be inconsistent and defying his 
utilitarian principle. This is because, according to Regan, rather than making the basic moral 
principle of equality dependant on utility (per utilitarian approach), Singer makes the principle 
of utility dependant on a more basic moral principle of equality (Regan 2004:212-214). 
Singer’s allusion to the basic moral principle of equality, according to Regan, is inconsistent 
with utilitarian views and can find no place within utilitarianism.  
Raymond G. Frey (1980) is one prominent critic of both Peter Singer and Tom Regan’s 
positions. Frey challenges Singer’s claim that animals can or do have interests like humans. 
Frey rejects this by pointing to two logically distinctive types of interests. He claims that 
animals can have interests in one but rather banal sense of the word interest, as in, for example, 
to say that it is in the interest of the dog to be fed hygienic food. However, animals cannot have 
interest in a second and a more important sense of the word interest, as in, for example, to say 
that the dog has the interest to be fed hygienic food. This, Frey notes is because the second 
sense of the word interest, will require that animals have desires. To have desires will further 
require that animals have beliefs. Frey continues that to say animals have beliefs implies that 
they are able to distinguish between true and false beliefs. This, he argues, requires language 
to make possible. As a result, since animals do not have a language, they do not have beliefs 
or desires and consequently, do not have interests.  
Frey, in addition, challenges Singer’s view of placing moral status in sentiency. Frey’s asserts 
that if sentiency is taken to mean the ‘capacity to feel pain’, as Singer maintains, it would, 
among other implications, compel the exclusion of, for example, fetuses, individuals suffering 
certain types of brain damage, and individuals in a coma (comatose). Frey believes that the 
exclusion of this group of individuals is going to be highly objectionable to many people (Frey, 
1980: 34). He also thought that the attempt to remove the discrimination of animals by 
appealing to sentiency is in itself discriminatory in character. This is because such a move 
condemns the entirety of non-sentient creatures, including the ‘lower’ animals, at best, to an 
inferior moral status or at worst, to a status entirely outside the purview of morality. So that, 
instead of the sentiency criterion removing discrimination, what it rather does, according to 
Frey, is to expand the category of people who can practice discrimination.  
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Frey furthermore demurs Singer’s condition for ascribing interest to animals, that is, the 
condition of having the capacity to feel pain. To Frey, Singer fails to establish the truth of his 
condition for ascribing interests to animals, that is, the condition of being able to feel pain. 
Frey’s view is that being able to feel pain is not a necessary condition or prerequisite for the 
possession of interests (Frey, 1980: 144-145). In his opinion, “Singer’s prerequisite for having 
interests is dubious, if not false, since we can, and do speak of interests in cases where the 
capacity for feeling pain is muted in non-trivial ways and where this capacity is entirely absent” 
(Frey, 1980: 145). To demonstrate with an example, Frey refers to a soldier friend of his, who, 
while serving in Vietnam, encountered grave and extensive head, spinal and nervous injuries 
to such a degree that though he was conscious, he was no longer able to feel pain. Frey argues 
that it will be an error to think that since this soldier at that moment of injury did not feel pain 
meant that he did not have interests.  
Frey, therefore, concludes that animals do not have mental state experiences and “in the 
absence of experiences or mental states, they are not themselves the bearers or repositories of 
value in their own right, they have, in one word, no value in themselves” (Frey, 1980: 45). He 
was of the conviction that animals lack that reflective awareness which enables humans, unlike 
animals, to see their experiences and act as their own, and as a result, be responsible for their 
acts (Frey, 1980: 109). Frey, however, did not deny the fact that animals do suffer. He rejects 
the position that they should be treated without any consideration for their suffering. To him, 
animals suffer because they are conscious, but they do not have interests because they are not 
self-conscious, an act that requires reflective awareness of once experiences (Frey, 1980: 109).  
Carl Cohen (2001), although a direct welfarist himself, challenges the seemingly abolitionist 
position of Singer; seemingly because of the way Singer advocates strongly for vegetarianism 
and veganism, and for the cessation of the use of animals in medical research, even though he 
is arguing from a utilitarian point of view. Cohen’s challenge on Singer’s position is that Singer 
and other liberationists assume mistakenly that when calculating the balance of pains and 
pleasures on which to decide the best line of action, all sentient beings including animals ought 
to be considered as equal. In other words, when the interests of humans and animals differ, 
there is no reason to favour human interests over that of the animals. Cohen’s position is that 
it is not the case that all species are equal. In his view, the fact that animals are also sentient 
does not imply, in any way, that the experiences of animals are morally equivalent to the 
experiences of human beings (Cohen, 2001: 63).  
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One can perceive from Cohen’s position a discrimination against members of nonhuman 
species and can thus be accused of committing speciesism. However, Cohen believes that 
speciesism needs not be a bad thing after all. To him, speciesism cannot be equated to racism 
or sexism because in the instances of both racism and sexism, there exist discrimination against 
individuals who are humans. He states, “Racism is evil because humans really are equal, and 
the assumption that some races are superior to others is false and groundless” (Cohen, 2001: 
62). Nevertheless, there is no instance of speciesism since the human species and the animal 
species are not in the same category. Humans, according to Cohen, are morally autonomous 
and can be part of a moral community yet, animals are not. Thus, Cohen maintains, “speciesism 
may be taken as one way of expressing the recognition of these differences.” In that regard, he 
considered speciesism a correct moral perspective which is by no means an error or corruption 
(Cohen, 2001: 62). 
The new welfarist approach by Cohen has also received some criticisms. It is described, for 
instance, as “a bizarre and confusing hodgepodge of traditional welfarism and animal liberation 
philosophy” (Uvearchives, 2007). The main crust of the criticism here is that as far as humans 
continue to regard animals as properties and as commodities, it will highly be impossible to 
balance animal interests fairly against human interests. The critics are of the view that 
regulations over the years have not helped and will not help the proper recognition of the moral 
status of animals. The new welfarist position, they argue, only endorses the continuous 
exploitation of animals and makes human feel good about it.11  
 
3.6 Rightism defined  
It is important to state here at the beginning that the term animal right is often used loosely by 
many animal advocates, even when they are only calling for the humane treatment of animals. 
In the strict sense of the word, however, such advocates will be more correctly labelled as 
animal welfarists (in the manner described in the previous section) rather than animal rights 
advocates. Animal rights theory or rightism, as used in this study, holds a more technical or 
restrictive connotation. To argue that someone or a being has a moral right, is to make a very 
strong entitlement that those rights ought to be safeguarded or upheld (Palmer & Sandøe, 2011: 
5). Often, rights are discussed only in the domain of humans and the most controversial has 
always been the question of whether or not human foetuses have rights to life. However, animal 
                                                          
11 Also, see arguments by Gary Francione (2010) as discussed in section 3.6.3 below. 
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rights advocates want to extend the notion of rights to nonhuman animals as well. As Cohen 
notes, if indeed animals have rights, it follows that those rights deserve protection and laws and 
regulations must be enacted to preserve those rights whether it is convenient or otherwise 
(Cohen, 2001: 4; Cohen, 1997: 91). 
Rightism or animal rights theory is a theory that generally agrees that humans owe direct duties 
to animals because animals have at least some basic (moral) rights in the same way as humans 
do. Sunstein argues that animal rights advocates oppose all human use of animals by invoking 
and extending the Kantian principle, that human beings should be treated as ends rather than 
means, to include animals as well. By this, the rightists challenge a wide range of current animal 
use including but not limited to agriculture (food), hunting (whether for food, sport or 
entertainment), zoos, circus and scientific experimentations (Sunstein, 2004: 5).  
Just as welfarism, there are different versions of rightism. Tom Regan, a leading authority of 
rightism, describes rightism to be abolitionist in its aspirations. As a result, it seeks not to 
reform how animals are exploited or to make what people do to them more humane but to 
abolish their exploitation and end it completely (Regan, 2001: 127). The rightist or animal 
rights position, is sometimes referred to as the ‘abolitionist’ position. Francione (2010) explains 
that this alternative usage is appropriate because the right theory properly understood, agitates 
for the total abolition of animal usage. Yet, even though Francione admits to being a rightist, 
he maintains that his position is not the same as that of Regan (2004) and Rollin (1992). Thus, 
even though, Francione will support the call to bring an end to institutionalized exploitation of 
animals as well as the cessation of the breeding of domesticated animals and the killing of 
animals in general, he averts that his position is more radical than that of Regan or Rollin. 
Francione believes his position does not allow the use of sentient animals irrespective of how 
humane our treatment of them may be, neither does he make an exception for special cases as 
Regan and Rollin do (Francione, 2010: 1).  
Below are expositions of the rightist views of Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin, and Gary Francione. 
The study, again, deliberately avoids choosing one version of rightism over the rest to allow it 
compare the information gathered from the key Akan respondents and knowledge from the 
Akan literature to see where and how traditional Akan viewpoints agree with and differ from 
the these versions of rightism.   
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3.6.1 The Rightist view of Tom Regan 
Often regarded as the father of animal rights, Tom Regan is well known for his deontological 
arguments for animal rights. His book, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), since its 
publication, has influenced a considerable number of animal rights movements and advocacy 
groups all over America and the rest of the world. He is known to be a strong critic of Peter 
Singer’s animal liberation arguments. Regan’s main argument is that animals’ lives matter 
because they have rights and because they have rights, animals are not to be used to further any 
human needs. As a result, he calls for the abolition of all animal uses. Regan argues that while 
the welfarist calls for the humane treatment of animals because they are sentient (direct 
welfarism) or because doing so will appease their human owners, or make humans better people 
(indirect welfarism), his position calls for the total abolition of the use of animals not only 
because animals are sentient but because they are subject-of-a-life. He further states that the 
animal rights movement are committed to three goals, namely the total abolition of the use of 
animals in science, the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture, and the total 
elimination of commercial and sports hunting and trapping (Regan, 1985: 13).  
Regan refers to the distinction made between moral agents and moral patients. As noted earlier 
in this section, moral agents are viewed as individuals who can determine, among alternatives, 
what morally ought to be done, and are freely able to choose which moral action to take, all 
options considered. They are, thus, regarded as agents of moral actions and as a result, 
considered morally responsible for their actions. Moral patients, in contrast, are considered to 
lack what is required to make them determine or control what actions. They cannot consider 
what moral action to take in any situation and hence cannot be held morally responsible for 
their actions since they have no sense of morality. Nevertheless, moral patients, even though 
cannot be agents of moral actions, can be affected by people’s moral actions and thus can be 
morally harmed. Moral patients include babies, toddlers and the mentally enfeebled.   
Regan argues that both moral agents and moral patients have inherent values that cannot be 
traded away. For him, the inherent value possessed by moral agents and moral patients is not 
considered valuable based on how the agent or patient is valued instrumentally. Both moral 
patients and moral agents possess this inherent value not because of their size, colour, race, age 
or even species they belong to but only because they are subject-of-a-life. To be a subject-of-
a-life, according to Regan, is to have beliefs and desires, perception, memory and a sense of 
the future, and to also have an emotional life, at least the experience of pain and pleasure 
(Regan, 2004: 241-243). Regan notes that all beings who are subject-of-a-life do not only have 
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inherent values but they have it equally. Animals are moral patients and also subject-of-a-life 
hence, they also have an inherent value that is valid not because of how valuable or useful 
humans find them. They have their own aspirations, desires, memory, and experience 
emotional life as well. In view of this, Regan holds that animals are covered by the respect 
principle, which enjoins that all beings with inherent value are treated in ways that respect their 
inherent value, whether they are moral agents or patients (Regan, 2004: 248). 
The implication of this, as Regan emphasizes, is that the animal rights view is categorically 
abolitionist. It is not just calling for refinement or reduction in the use of animals for biomedical 
testing or calling for larger and cleaner cages or a more generous use of anaesthetic or the 
elimination of multiple surgeries. The demand is not just to tidy up the system, but for a 
complete replacement. The rights view is not agitating for better ways to ameliorate the pain 
and suffering of animals or to give credence to their desires and preferences. The rights view 
position, according to Regan, is that our duty to animals is not to use them at all (Regan, 1985: 
25-26).  This is because, animals, even though are moral patients, have similar inherent values 
like human moral agents, due to the fact both animals and human moral agents are subject-of-
a-life. This inherent value existing equally in both humans and animals implies that animals 
have rights which need to be respected, and if they have rights, then humans are not justified 
in using animals to further their own needs.  
 
3.6.2 Bernard Rollin 
Like other rightists and direct welfarists, Bernard Rollin’s (1992) position is that it is 
impossible to draw a neat line between human beings and animals on the bases of language 
and reason, and many other bases that are regularly employed by animal rights deniers. He 
claims that it is not enough to simply cite some metaphysical or physical differences between 
animals and humans as a strategy to exempt animals from moral concern. According to Rollin, 
the important thing is that these differences identified between animals and humans must be 
shown to be a morally important difference that can be rationally defended. This is because 
there are also many differences among humans yet, individuals are not excluded from moral 
considerations due to these differences (Rollin, 1992: 29). Similarly, Rollin’s view is that even 
if the religious position that God gave humans dominion over animals is accepted, it does not 
necessarily translate that animals are to be treated in whatsoever ways humans see fit (Rollin, 
1992: 30). Rollin also rejects the claim of indirect welfarists that humans owe only indirect 
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duties to animals, such that unnecessary cruelty to animals is wrong not because animals are 
part of the definition of a moral community but because such cruelty to animals can affect their 
human owners psychologically and behaviourally (Rollin, 1992: 32ff).  
Rollin’s animal rights position is that there are not rationally defensible grounds to deny animal 
moral status. A criterion for determining moral status is not to be placed in rationality or 
sentiency but instead, ought to be placed on the fact that a thing is alive and has interests by 
virtue of their life’s telos, interests that can be helped or harmed by a moral agent. Rollin thus 
believed that all animals have a basic right which is “the right to be dealt with or considered as 
moral objects by any person who has moral principles, regardless of what those moral 
principles may be” (Rollin, 1992: 83). The implication of this, as Rollin puts it, is that 
“regardless of what moral theories one holds, regardless of one’s principles of right and wrong, 
one is logically compelled to apply these theories and principles to animals” (Rollin, 1992: 83). 
Further implication of Rollin’s position on animal ethics is that if humans are believed to have 
rights to life, then animals also have rights to life. Again, if it is argued that it is wrong to use 
humans as food then a similar conclusion should hold for animals. Furthermore, Rollin states 
that after establishing the moral right of animals, there is the need to go further by granting 
animals legal rights. This, to him, will institutionalise their claim to moral status, and force 
humans to take their needs seriously (Rollin, 1992: 132). Rollin defines animal rights as “the 
demand for legal protection for fundamental aspects of animal need and nature in the face of 
high technology-based loss of husbandry in agriculture and infliction of suffering in research, 
neither of which counts as deliberate cruelty” (Rollin, 2002). Going by this perspective, Rollin 
may not be considered a strict abolitionist. In the use of animals for research, for example, he 
argues that humans may be justified in employing a utilitarian principle backed with what he 
calls the right principle which enjoins humans to conduct research on or with animals in such 
way that maximizes the animal’s potential for living its life in accordance with its telos (Rollin, 
1992: 140).  
 
3.6.3 Gary Francione 
Gary Francione describes his animal rights position as a stricter version than that of Tom Regan 
or Bernard Rollin. Even though like Regan, Francione also argues from a deontology position, 
he places moral status in sentiency rather than in Regan’s subject-of-a-life criterion. 
Francione’s position calls for a total abolition and cessation of all animal use. In his view, the 
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rights theory, if properly understood, calls for the abolishment of all humans’ use of animals. 
This is how the theory, according to him, is distinguishable from the welfarist position, which 
primary focus is on the regulation of animal exploitations. He views the welfarist and rightist 
positions as theoretically and practically irreconcilable (Francione, 2010: 5). He claims that by 
animal rights, he speaks of only one right, i.e., the right possessed by animals not to be treated 
by humans as property. Recognizing this right in animals, Francione believes, would put an 
end to the institutionalized exploitation of animals, end human breeding of domesticated 
animals, and bring to an end the killing of non-domesticated animals and the destruction of 
their place of habitat (Francione, 2010: 1).  
Francione argues that contrary to the position of the welfarist, who would want to consider the 
life of animals as less valuable to that of humans, all sentient beings are equal. Consequently, 
animals are not to be treated as resources to further any interests (Francione, 2010: 5). 
Francione, however, does not want to be interpreted as saying animals and humans ought to 
have the same rights because he believes many human rights will not even apply to animals 
(Francione, 2010:1). The rightist or abolitionist position, according to Francione, rejects the 
notion that differences that may exist between the minds of animals and humans are to be taken 
to mean that the sentient experiences of animals are less weighty than those of humans or that 
animals do not lose anything in death. Francione agrees with Regan in saying that all the 
distinctive marks employed by the welfarist in their attempt to show why human interests ought 
to be regarded above that of animals are, upon scrutiny, only arbitrary. As a result, there is no 
rational justification for the continuous denial of the rights of sentient nonhumans irrespective 
of how humanely they are treated. He writes that “as long as animals are property, they can 
never be members of the moral community” (Francione, 2010: 22). This, he argues, is because 
the interests of animals regarded as properties will always count for less when juxtaposed with 
the interests of their human owners (Francione, 2010: 22). 
Francione conclusions are that firstly, the new welfarists aim to secure animals’ interests 
through regulations, is for the most part, very limited. This is because, regulations, According 
to Francione, do not decrease animals’ suffering in any important way. Secondly, consumers’ 
demands for animal products are also not reduced by the making of animal exploitation more 
expensive (Francione, 2010: 26). Thirdly, the new welfarist reform approach will only tend to 
make humans feel more comfortable about using animals to further their own needs rather than 
make them seek the interests of animals as such. Finally, Francione maintains that reform 
campaigns do nothing to move animals away from the ‘property paradigm’ or to give value to 
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animal interests that goes beyond their value as human resources or commodities (Francione, 
2010: 30). Given these, Francione believes strongly that: 
If we took animals seriously and recognized our obligation not to treat them as 
things, we would stop producing and facilitating the production of domestic 
animals altogether. We would care for the ones whom we have here now; but we 
would stop breeding more for human consumption, and we would leave non-
domesticated animals alone. We would stop eating, wearing, or using animal 
products, and we would regard veganism as a clear and unequivocal moral 
baseline (Francione, 2010: 22). 
Francione posits that it is only a strict abolitionist position, the type of which he is advocating 
for, that can properly lead to the securing of the interests of animals and not a welfarist position 
of any kind. To him, this is the best way to reduce animal use and animal suffering in both the 
short and long term rather than an incremental abolitionist approach through welfare reforms 
that Robert Garner may be suggesting (Francione, 2010: 85).   
 
3.7 Critique of Rightism 
Cohen is a critic of the rightist view. He defines rights as “a valid claim, or potential claim that 
may be made by a moral agent, under principles that govern both the claimant and the target 
of the claim” (Cohen, 2001: 17). He also describes rights as legitimate demands made within 
a moral system and are objective and commonly enduring (Cohen, 2001: 18). Cohen holds that 
every genuine right has a possessor, a target and some content. In other words, for every claim 
of a right, there is the need to know who holds it, what it is, and against whom it is held (Cohen, 
2001: 17). He asserts that animals cannot have rights because “the concept of right is essentially 
human, rooted in the human; it is rooted in the human moral world and has the force and 
applicability only within that world” (Cohen, 2001: 30). Cohen claims that one commits a 
‘category confusion’ when one attempts to apply to the animal world a moral category that can 
have content solely in the human world. He believes this is why people are inclined to help 
prevent the death of a human baby than they are inclined to do so for a baby zebra, for example. 
He also believes that it is for the same reason that a person could commit a hit and run on a 
squirrel without any qualms but would feel guilty should it turn out to be a human toddler.  
Carl Cohen rejects Regan’s position that animals have rights because they are subject-of-a-life. 
A subject-of-a-life, to recall, is to Regan, a being who is “believed to have some subjective 
awareness of their own lives, and for whom, as a result, it may be said that things ‘fare well or 
badly’” (Cohen, 2008: 26). Cohen notes that it wrong to simply infer from the fact that things 
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fare well or badly for animals that they have the capacity to express it or to come to terms with 
it understanding in some “sub-linguistic way.” This does not form part of animals’ reflection, 
Cohen posits. He further claims that Regan erred in his thinking that animals, having an interest 
in the sense of avoiding pain, should translate into animals having rights. For Cohen, this has 
no moral foundation (2008:27-28). Regarding Regan’s argument on inherent value, Cohen 
believes Regan got it wrong in claiming that because it can be said of animals to have inherent 
value, it follows that they have moral value. Cohen argues that there are two senses of inherent 
value which Regan failed to take into account: there is the one sense which applies to animals 
and a second sense which does not. Inherent value, Cohen explains, when used to mean that 
“every unique life, not replaceable by other lives or things, has some worth in itself” certainly 
applies to animals. Yet, Cohen believes this sense of inherent value has no “awesome moral 
content.” He averts that the second sense of inherent value that has moral content “arises from 
the capacity to make moral judgments, the value of beings with duties and the consequences 
of duties.” Furthermore, he adds that it is the possession of this sense of inherent value that 
entitles the possessor to be treated as means in themselves and not as ends. Consequently, 
because it is only humans who have inherent value in the sense so explained, it is only humans 
who have rights (Cohen, 2008: 27).  
Raymond Frey (1980) also challenges the rightists’ claim that a being with interest has moral 
rights. Frey notes that there are two different senses of having interests. He explains that to say 
that good health is in John’s interest, for example, is not entirely the same as saying John has 
an interest in good health. Frey believes the first sense of the statement means that good health 
is beneficial to John whether John knows it, wills it, or believes it. The word interest, as used 
in the second statement, however, means that John wants good health and believes good health 
is beneficial to him. Frey believes animals can have an interest in the first sense but not in the 
second sense. There are, indeed, some things that are in the interest of animals, which if present 
would make animals fare better than they would be in their absence. It is in the interest of a 
dog, for example, to be given regular exercise. Yet, it is erroneous, Frey will argue, to interpret 
animals having interests to mean they have wants that can be satisfied or left unsatisfied. Thus, 
for Frey, animals do not have wants that arise out of desires. His reason for holding this belief 
lies in his denial that animals can have beliefs. He denies this because he thinks that belief is 
not compatible with the absence of language and linguistic ability, both of which he believed 
animals lacked (Frey, 1980: 62-100). 
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Mary Anne Warren is a rightist who is a critic of Regan and, by extension, others who hold 
strict abolitionist positions. Warren asserts that Regan’s claim that all mammals over the age 
of one have the same basic moral right is flawed and contains consequences that cannot be 
accepted (Warren, 2012: 89). She proposes instead, what she calls, a ‘weak animal rights 
theory’. Warren does not deny that animals have rights. She extends the scope of rights to all 
sentient animals and includes in her definition of sentiency, the experiences of pleasure or 
satisfaction and pain, suffering or frustration. Yet, she contradicts Regan in her claim that the 
moral rights of most nonhuman animals are not identical in strength to those of persons. She 
states that “the rights of most non-human animals may be overridden in circumstances which 
would not justify overriding the rights of persons” (Warren, 2012: 90).  
Like Cohen, Warren contests Regan’s use of inherent value to argue a case for animal rights. 
Warren holds that Regan only succeeded in showing what inherent value is not (negative 
account) but failed to show what it is (positive account). She argues that the absence of a 
positive account of inherent value makes it difficult to come to terms with how being inherently 
valuable and having moral rights link. It appears to Warren that values differ from rights, and 
that some things can have inherent value but have no rights (Warren, 2012: 91). Warren finds 
Regan’s position on inherent value and subject-of-a-life problematic. She believes that if 
Regan’s inherent value is based on some natural property an individual is to have then Regan 
should have identified that property and explained its moral significance without appealing to 
the notion of inherent value (Warren, 2012: 91). 
Furthermore, Warren believes that Regan’s position points to the fact that Regan would want 
a sharp line drawn between beings with a subject-of-a-life and beings without or a sharp line 
between beings with inherent value and beings without. From Warren’s point of view, drawing 
of such delineating line may be impossible or even if impossible, done arbitrarily. This is 
because it appears ‘subjecthood’ or subjective experiences come in degrees. That is, some 
creatures have little self-awareness and ability to anticipate the future while some have more 
ability to do so (Warren, 2012: 92). Warren argues that it will be difficult to tell, for example, 
the exact amount of self-awareness of fishes or insects, spiders or even octopi. It is also difficult 
to tell whether some of these creatures can feel pain or have emotions, memories, beliefs, 
desires or a sense of the future.  
In conclusion, Warren asserts that animals may possess rights but a weaker one compared to 
the rights of humans. This, as she explains, is because although both animals and humans 
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possess rational capabilities, “people are moved to action or inaction by the force of reasoned 
argument” (Warren, 2012: 93). Thus, Warren holds that humans’ ability to listen to reason to 
settle conflicts and cooperate in shared projects is that which sets them apart. This ability she 
believes, require human language (Warren, 2012: 93). 
 
3.8 Ethics of Interrelatedness 
As indicated in the literature review, several works have been done on environmental ethics 
from the African perspective by many scholars in recent times. Although quite little has been 
said on African animal ethics, more especially, in terms of placing it between the two main 
theories and showing how the African version relates or deviates from them. One popular 
theme that runs through the emerging African environmental ethics literature is the notion of 
the interrelatedness of all things in nature and for some, even with manmade objects. Segun 
Ogungbemi calls this notion, the ‘ethics of nature-relatedness’, which according to him, can be 
explained as “an ethic that leads human beings to seek to co-exist peacefully with nature and 
treat it with some reasonable concern for its worth, survival and sustainability (Ogungbemi, 
1997: 270).” Godfrey Tangwa’s theory of African environmental ethics, which he calls ‘eco-
bio-communitarian,’ underscores this ethics of interrelatedness. By eco-bio-communitarian, 
Tangwa means that there is “recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful 
coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans” (Tangwa, 2004: 389). 
Similar expression of this ethics of interrelatedness resonates in the African environmental 
ethics identified by the likes of Munyaradzi Murove, Martin H. Prozesky, Mogobe B. Ramose, 
Bénézet Bujo, and Thaddeus Metz. Murove (2009), Prozesky (2009), and Ramose (2009) 
independently employ the ethical principle found in the notion of Ubuntu/Boto and the Shona 
concept of Ukama to argue for environmental ethics of care and virtue of interrelatedness of 
humans with the entire ecosystem. Bujo also alludes to the value of human peaceful coexistence 
or interrelationship with nature, arguing that it is by so doing that humans reach the total 
realization of the self (Bujo, 2009: 281). Similarly, Behrens, in his attempt to reject the tag that 
African thinking is predominantly anthropocentric in nature, identifies the interrelatedness or 
interconnectedness of everything in nature within traditional African belief. He uses this 
identified interconnectedness of nature to propose what in his view is a non-anthropocentric 
environmental philosophy of the African people. He terms this non-anthropocentric 
environmental philosophy as ‘African relational anthropocentrism’ (Behrens, 2014; 2010). 
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Below are some further details of the dominant ethics of interrelatedness theory found in the 
emerging literature in African environmental ethics. 
According to Godfrey Tangwa, traditional African metaphysical outlook can be described as 
‘eco-bio-communitarian’ in character. By this he means, there is “recognition and acceptance 
of interdependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans 
(Tangwa, 2004: 389).” Tangwa observes that the eco-bio-communitarian metaphysical 
outlook, he describes of precolonial Africa, is in contrast with the Western outlook of which 
he thinks can be described as anthropocentric and individualistic in character. This 
individualistic character, he argues, has driven the West to explore, subdue, exploit and 
dominate nature for their profit. Tangwa maintains that human beings within the African 
traditional outlook instead, tend to be more cosmically humble, more respectful of other people 
and more cautious in their attitude to plants, animals, and inanimate things, and to the various 
invincible forces in the world. Thus, he believes traditional Africans are more disposed to what 
he calls “an attitude of live and let live” (Tangwa, 2004: 389). Furthermore, he posits that 
within the African traditional word-view there is a slim and flexible distinction between plants 
and animals, and inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and the spirit, 
the communal, and the individual. 
Segun Ogungbemi also holds that the how natural resources such as land, water and air are 
currently being used in Africa goes contrary to the traditional practice of environment 
conservation in Africa. He notes that in traditional African communities, there is the ethics of 
not taking more than you need from nature. He calls this the ‘ethics of care’ (Ogungbemi, 1997:  
266-270). To make this ‘ethics of care’ applicable to contemporary African situation, 
Ogungbemi reformulated it to what he calls “ethics of nature-relatedness” (Ogungbemi, 1997: 
270). The ethics of nature-relatedness, according to Ogungbemi, can be stated as, “an ethics 
that leads human beings to seek to co-exist peacefully with nature and treat it with some 
reasonable concern for its worth, survival and sustainability” (Ogungbemi, 1997: 270). He 
believed that the ethics of care and ethics of nature-relatedness are not to be given spiritual 
connotations because they can be naturally explainable.  
Kevin Behrens (2010), on his part, presents what he deems, an African environmental ethic 
that emphasises the interrelatedness or interconnectedness of everything in nature.  He argues 
that contrary to what some may think, the African position is best seen as a rejection of 
anthropocentrism. He labels his position or theory as ‘African Relational Environmentalism' 
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and considers it as something similar in conception to, and yet distinct from holist perspectives. 
Behrens defines holism as “theories that locate moral value in groups, such as species, 
ecosystems or the biosphere” (Behrens, 2010: 466). He notes that such positions are marked 
differently from individualist positions, where value is placed in individual animals or 
organisms, usually by virtue of some property they may inherently possess such as sentience, 
reason, or the possessing of a life. They are also to be distinguished from anthropocentric views, 
where nature is only given instrumental value based on its usefulness or otherwise to humans. 
It is in these differences that Behrens believes that his African relational environmentalism 
theory shares some similarities with holism. Yet he claims his theory somewhat differs from 
holism in the sense that his African relational environmentalism position is relational in its 
approach. 
Behrens explains that despite the many evidence that may suggest that African environmental 
ethics is anthropocentric in character, such a conclusion does not fully represent the entirety of 
African worldview. He points out that many African theorists do often claim that everything in 
nature is interrelated. This interrelation with nature calls for respect for nature. Behrens 
believes that this is best interpreted as humans having a harmonious relationship with other 
living things rather than using nature only to further human needs. His view is that the call to 
value the harmonious relationship with other living things is analogous with African 
communitarian family ties and community values, where there is neither the prioritisation of 
the interests of individuals nor that of communities over the other. There is also the 
understanding that individuals’ potentials are fully realised only through community 
relationships. 
There are strains of the ethics of interrelatedness resonating through the theories of Munyaradzi 
Felix Murove, Magobe Ramose, Martin Prozesky, and Bénézet Bujo. Murove (2009) for 
instance, argues that using the concepts of Ukama (Shona) and Ubuntu/Botho (Zulu, Xhosa, 
Sotho, and Tswana). He mentions that there exist, within Africa, an ethic of the 
interdependence of individuals in the broader community and of the environment on which the 
people depend. He emphasises that when these two concepts, Ukama and Ubuntu, synthetize, 
they produce an ethical outlook that suggests that human wellbeing is indispensable from  their 
dependence on, and interdependence with all that exists (Murove, 2009: 315). Murove further 
held that human beings interrelation with their natural environment should be seen as part of 
the reason for the strong dimension in African ethics (Murove, 2009: 330). Bénézet Bujo, 
likewise, argues along similar lines. In describing the African thinking as holistic in nature, he 
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points out that within African traditional thoughts, the total actualization of the human self 
cannot be possible without peaceful coexistence with minerals, plants and animals (Bujo, 2004: 
281). In his view, the African person can clearly be understood as being characterised by 
interrelationship (Bujo, 2004: 285).  
 
3.9 Critique of ethics of interrelatedness 
Philomena A. Ojomo (2011) describes Ogungbemi’s ethics of nature-relatedness as being 
neither a preservationist approach nor in any way a non-anthropocentric approach. Ojomo, 
instead, thinks that Ogungbemi’s approach is rather an approach that simply recognizes that 
humans necessarily depend on the natural environment for existence and survival. Thus, Ojomo 
holds that Ogungbemi’s call on humans to treat the natural world with respect is only to 
preserve the natural world for the sake of current and future human wellbeing (Ojomo, 2011: 
110). Ojomo again, considers Ogungbemi’s ethics of nature-relatedness as not grounded in the 
metaphysics of African cultural belief system. According to Ojomo, Ogungbemi’s ethic of 
nature-relatedness shares little similarity or similitude with that of African cultural experiences 
and ontology, hence describing it as an “alienation of the African spirit and peculiar 
experiences” (Ojomo, 2011: 110). 
Ogungbemi, perhaps, notes the inadequacies of his ethics of care, and poses the following 
questions: How do we know how much we need given the nature of human greed? Who judges 
whether we have been taking more than we need from the natural resources? If we have been 
taking more than we need, what are the penalties and how fair are they? (Ogungbemi, 1997: 
270). The main problem here is that the acknowledgement of human and nature relatedness or 
interconnectedness is not enough, as it does not necessarily make clear how humans’ 
relationship with nature ought to be. Thus, Behrens rightly noted, “It is quite possible to 
acknowledge the essential interdependence of nature and still to value it only instrumentally” 
(Behrens, 2010: 470). In other words, Behrens is asking that giving human relatedness to nature 
and consequently to nonhuman animals, what ought to be the proper relationship between 
humans and nonhuman animals. It is possible to respond that the relationship should be that of 
mutual respect or one that ensures mutual coexistence or as Behrens will prefer, one that leads 
to a harmonious relationship. However, doing so does not make clear what it means to have 
mutual respect for nature or to coexist mutually with nature, or to live in a harmonious 
relationship with animals or nature. Does it require an acknowledgement that animals have 
95 
 
rights or that there should be a consideration of their interests in moral decision-making? What 
appears to be apparent from the discussions by these scholars though is the suggestion that 
humans need to consider the interests of animals and not live their lives as if they are the 
masters of the earth since human survival depends a lot on the survival of the natural 
environment of which animals are included. Nevertheless, the question that is yet to be 
adequately answered is the question of the extent humans ought to regard the interests of 
nonhuman animals. This will be one of the preoccupations of the study.   
 
3.10 Alternative theories to the welfarists and rightist theories 
There has been the emergence of some alternative theories to the mainstream welfarist and 
rightist theories. Palmer and Sandøe, for instance, note the rise of alternative positions to the 
welfarist and rightist views. One of this alternative position is what they call the ‘contextual 
approaches’. They note that although there are various kinds of contextual approaches, all of 
them generally share the view that the welfarist and rightist approaches are narrow and not 
enough. They believe this is because the theories of welfarism and rightism focus on 
consequences and rights, respectively, but fail to appreciate the different relations that humans 
have with animals and the importance of such human emotions as empathy, sympathy, and 
care. The contextual approaches position is that although the consideration of animal capacities 
is important in the framing of an animal ethic, these animal capacities are solely not enough. 
Some of these contextual approaches, Palmer and Sandøe note, emphasize the role of moral 
emotions such as sympathy, empathy and care in human interactions with others, including 
nonhumans. (Palmer & Sandøe, 2011: 7). Mary Midgley for example, suggests the idea of 
social-bondedness and the emotions associated with them as worthy of consideration in our 
moral relationship with nonhuman animals. She argues that an emotional, rather than a rational 
preference, for members of our own species is part of our social nature as humans. Humans are 
bond-forming creatures (Midgley, 1983: 98-104).  
Another alternative theory not related to the contextual approaches is environmental virtue 
ethics. Like virtue ethics, environmental virtue ethics emphasizes the making of a good 
character instead of what makes for a good or bad moral action. In the instance of 
environmental virtue ethics, the emphasis is on how to inculcate in people good character 
towards the preservation of the environment (Hourdequin, 2015: 53). In its application to the 
nonsentient environment, Thomas Hill Jr. notes that people’s “indifference to non-sentient 
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nature typically reveals absence of either aesthetic sensibility or a disposition to cherish what 
has enriched one’s life and that these, though not themselves moral virtues, are a natural basis 
for appreciation of the good in others and of gratitude” (Hill, 1983: 216). In its application to 
sentient beings or nonhuman animals, Ronald Sandler (2005) observes that there are some 
attempts to extend certain human interpersonal values to include nonhuman animals. He notes 
that some environmental virtue ethicists may argue that if compassion, for instance, is a good 
moral character for humans to have towards the suffering of their fellow human beings and if 
it is agreed there is no relevant difference between human suffering and that of nonhuman 
animals then humans ought to be compassionate to animals as well (Sandler, 2005: 4).  
Advocates of the contextual approaches are usually inconclusive on whether the social 
relationships of bondedness humans develop with animals and its associated emotions require 
humans to either seek the welfare of animals or for the total elimination of all forms of animal 
uses. A similar critique can be raised against environmental virtue ethics. Rolston challenges 
environmental virtue ethics on the basis that it is too much agent-centered. He claims that “you 
cannot become virtuous by putting this human concern first; you get such virtue by only by 
putting first, a respect for life’s intrinsic value, which preceded, envelops, and surrounds us…” 
(Rolston, 2005: 73).   
 
3.11 Justification for selected theories 
The goal of this research is to locate the place of Akan environmental ethics within the two 
main theories of animal ethics, namely welfarism and rightism. It is, therefore, necessary to 
begin the search for the goal by using the theoretical frameworks of welfarism and rightism. 
The aim is to explore what the Akan position is or should be, given its ontological worldview 
and attitudes toward the environment. As noted in the explication of the welfarist and rightist 
theories, depending on which proponent one is looking at, there are different interpretations 
given to them. As a result, the study uses the theories of welfarsim and rightism as descriptive, 
evaluative, and prescriptive tools to help attain its objective. 
The ethics of interrelatedness is identified as the dominant theory in the emerging literature on 
African environmental ethics. The study will compare this theory with the data from the Akan 
respondents to find out whether the Akans subscribe to the dominant theory in the emerging 
African environmental ethics literature. Consequently, the study also uses the ethics of 
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interrelatedness as descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive tools to help attain its objective of 
finding the place of Akan animal ethics.  
 
3.12 Conclusion  
This chapter has identified three theories that will guide this research, namely, welfarism, 
rightism, and the ethics of interrelatedness. The chapter showed that there are differences in 
terms of approach to each of these three theories and subsequently, different implications the 
adoption of each of these theories will lead to. Again, even though proponents of welfarism 
and rightism may be generally classified as welfarists and rightists respectively, individual 
proponents have come up with different analyses, as delineated in the foregoing, thus making 
it possible for two proponents of, for example, rightism, to disagree on the degree of moral 
status animals should have. The chapter also presented some criticisms raised against each of 
these theories.  
Under welfarism, the chapter explained that there are two main types, namely, direct welfarism 
and indirect welfarism. Indirect welfarism does not ascribe moral status to animals since it 
holds that animals cannot be harmed directly. Views expressed by scholars such as St. Aquinas, 
Immanuel Kant, and Jan Narveson, were presented as examples of proponents of indirect 
welfarism. Direct welfarism, on the other hand, admits and accepts that animals are directly 
harmed and admits animals into the definition of a moral community. This is because they hold 
animals to be sentient beings that can experience pain and pleasure. The direct welfarist views 
of Peter Singer, Carl Cohen, and Robert Garner were presented. The chapter also highlighted 
the similarities and differences shared by these proponents of direct welfarism. What became 
apparent is that despite their minor variances, direct welfarists, in general, agree that animals 
have moral status. Their aim is to seek the welfare of animals and to advocate for the humane 
treatment of animals rather than to demand the total elimination of animal use. They, therefore, 
argue for animals to be better handled in a way that will minimize as much pain and suffering 
as possible.  
Under the rightist position, this chapter presented three different positions held by three 
separate proponents, namely Tom Regan; Bernard Rollin; and ending with Gary Francione. 
Despite their differences, rightists, broadly speaking, argue that animals have moral status, and 
that this moral status can be translated to mean a right they possess.  They are, generally, of the 
view that the moral status of animals is at par with the moral status of humans and as a result, 
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call for the total elimination of animal use in any form, and not just for the humane treatment 
of animals to reduce their suffering and pain. Thus, rightists are sometimes referred to as 
abolitionists. However, the chapter pointed out that there are different levels of strictness to the 
abolitionists’ claim with Francione considering himself as holding the strictest view when 
compared to that of Regan and Rollin. A fourth rightist position was seen in Marry Anne 
Warren, who calls her position a ‘weak rightist position’, claiming that moral status comes in 
degrees and that the rights of animals are not to be equated to the rights of human beings. 
Finally, the chapter presented the ethics of interrelatedness as the common underlying theory 
within the emerging African environmental ethics. It presented views from Kevin Behrens, 
who refers to his position as African relational environmentalism; from Godfrey Tangwa, who 
calls his ethics, eco-bio-communitarianism; and from Segun Ogungbemi, who labels his theory 
as the ethics of nature-relatedness. There are similar expressions of the ethics of 
interrelatedness in the works of Murove, Ramose, and Bujo. The chapter explained that the 
idea behind the ethics of interrelatedness is that humans and nature are interconnected in a way, 
that makes humans and nature depend on each other for survival. This concatenation of humans 
and nature should move human beings to coexist peacefully with nature in a way that leads to 
both the sustainability of humans and nature.  
The next chapter (chapter four) presents the research methodology of the study. This chapter 
provides details of the study’s research design, method of sampling and sample size, type of 
research questions, and interviews and focus groups choices. The strategy of inquiry that is 
used in the data analyses is also explained with justifications.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK 
 
4.0 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the study gave fuller and detailed explanations for the three theories 
guiding the research. It was explained that the study will use the animal welfare theory, animal 
rights theory, and the ethics of interrelatedness as the expository and evaluative theoretical 
frameworks in discussing and assessing the data.  
 
This current chapter presents an in-depth presentation of the research methodology and design 
used in this study with reasons and justifications. Research methods are the tools and 
techniques needed for conducting research (Walliman, 2011: 1). Research mostly includes the 
collection of data, the analyses of such data, and an interpretation of the data in order to 
understand a particular phenomenon or find a solution to a specified problem. As such, the 
researcher needs some kind of roadmap to help guide him or her through the process. Thus, 
Carrie Williams (2007: 65) rightly observed that a research design is that framework or plan 
for a study that serves as a guide in the gathering and the evaluating of the data. It is also 
considered as a blueprint that a researcher abides by in completing a study: a sort of a map that 
is usually worked out to guide the research (Pandey & Pandey, 2015: 18). The research 
procedure is systematic in such a way that, outlining the research objective, organising the data, 
and communicating the findings occur within established frameworks and according to existing 
guidelines. The frameworks and guidelines help the researcher to know what to include in the 
research, how to conduct the research, and the kind of inferences that are more plausible based 
on the data and findings (Williams, 2007: 65). In addition, Pandey and Pandey (2015: 18-20) 
note that apart from the research design providing a blueprint and a map for the researcher, it 
helps the researcher to reduce the cost of expenditure, to collect the relevant data, and to save 
time.   
 
In view of these, this chapter presents the methodology used in conducting the research, which 
includes the utilized research design, the method of sampling used, the sample size, and the 
kind of interview process adopted, with explanations and justifications. The chapter also 
contains the strategy of inquiry used in the data analysis. In addition, the research questions for 
the one-on-one interviews and focus group interviews are clearly spelt out.   
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4.1 Nature and Scope of the Study 
As pointed out earlier in chapter one, the central purpose of this research is to identify and 
define the place of Akan animal ethics within the animal welfarist and rightist debate based on 
Akan ontology and ethics. To help achieve this, the study relied on empirical research 
methodology, which involves, partly, the collection of primary data through one-on-one 
interviews and focus groups discussions. The data was then analysed in comparison with the 
literature in order to find a corresponding answer to the main research question, i.e. how does 
Akan ontology and ethics help in placing Akan animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist 
debate.  The study supplemented the empirical approach with a theoretical approach where it 
critically reviewed relevant literature such as books, journals and internet sources, coupled with 
the appropriate theoretical frameworks to underpin the study.   
 
In effect, this study deals with the questions of what, how, who, and why in both theoretical 
and empirical aspects. Such questions includes: what are the theories of welfarism, rightism 
and the ethics of interrelatedness? Who are some of the main proponents and opponents of 
these theories? How is the moral status of animals assessed by these three theories, and why 
welfarists and rightists accept or reject animals as persons? Questions addressing aspects of 
Akan traditional ontology, ethical beliefs, and traditional practices are the main concerns of the 
empirical data collected through one-on-one interviews and focus group discussions. The 
collection of primary data through interviews and focus group discussions was further divided 
into two parts. There was first, the one-on-one interviews and one focus group discussion with 
participants who are regarded by members of the Akan community as experts and as such, 
repository of traditional Akan knowledge. The objective here was to gain from them an 
understanding of Akan traditional perspectives on animals, their traditional uses, and their 
views on some ethical consideration for animals in relation to animal pain and the possibility 
of an animal right given the Akan beliefs, ethics and traditions. Their views were supplemented 
with a one-on-one interview with a professional academic who is an expert in Akan language 
and traditions. Secondly, there were two focused group discussions with the younger 
generations of Akans between the ages of twenty-two (22) and thirty-seven (37) years. This 
was done with the aim of getting the views of the younger generations concerning such issues 
as human uses of animals for food, clothes, medical research, among others. Their views were 
also sought on the moral issue of vegetarianism, what they make of animal pain, and whether 
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they will consider extending the notion of rights to animals. The viewpoints from the younger 
generations of Akans will be juxtaposed with those gathered from the Akan traditional experts 
in the final analysis, where a theory of an Akan animal ethics will be suggested. Overall, 
twenty-four (24) people were contacted in both the one-on-one interviews and the focus group 
discussions.  
   
The study is qualitative in approach because it seeks to come to some understanding of the 
participants' experiences. The study, thus, adopts an open-ended inquiry method instead of one 
that seeks measurable and observable data where the research questions are specific and 
narrow, as it is done in the quantitative method. The study does not only narrate, describe or 
report on what pertains in traditional Akan communities but, it is also analytical such that facts 
or information gathered in the field are assessed to make a critical evaluation of the material 
(Kothari, 2004: 3).  
 
4.2 Research Method/Approach 
The type of research design that is used in this study is the qualitative approach. There are two 
main approaches to research, namely the qualitative and the quantitative approaches (Fouché, 
and Delport 2005: 73; Kothari, 2004:5). Fouche and Delport note that these two methodological 
approaches differ strongly from each other. Williams (2007: 65) and Moksha (2013: 23) 
identify a third approach known as the mixed method approach that employs features of both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. According to Creswell (2009: 173), qualitative 
research shows, among other things, different perspectives ranging from social justice thinking 
to different ideological perspectives, as well as, to diverse philosophical positions. Qualitative 
research is also regarded as an approach that is concerned with developing explanations for 
social phenomena. In other words, its main goal is to help with an understanding of the social 
world of which we are a part of and helps to explain why things are the way they are. 
Consequentially, qualitative research method deals more with the social aspects of our world, 
and seeks to answer questions about why people behave the way they do, and the formation of 
opinions and attitudes. It is also deals with how people are affected by the events that go on 
around them, and how and why cultures and practices have developed in the way they have 
(Hancock, Ockleford & Windridge, 2009: 7). John Creswell (2007: 40) explains that qualitative 
research is conducted when there is a need for an intricate and detailed understanding of an 
issue. Such details, he notes, can only be demonstrated by talking directly with the people 
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involved, going to their place of abode or even where they work, in order to listen to them, tell 
the stories unrestricted by what we expect to find or what we have read in the literature. 
Creswell adds that qualitative research is conducted to understand the contexts or settings in 
which participants in a study address a problem or issue.  
  
Since the study’s aim is to identify an Akan theory of animal ethics based on the ontology and 
ethics of the Akan people, which require a study of the indigenous beliefs and practices of the 
Akan people, using a qualitative method will better help the study attain this goal than would 
a quantitative method. Thus, with the qualitative method, the study is able to go to individuals 
considered proficient in Akan traditions, to solicit their views on matters of Akan traditional 
beliefs and practices. Auerbach and Silverstein (2003: 25) explain further that qualitative 
research’s advantage over its quantitative counterpart is that, qualitative research is able to 
circumvent interpreting difference because it presumes the existence of that difference, instead 
of assuming the existence of uniformity of behaviour as the norm. The qualitative approach, 
they argue, starts with naturalistic observation, that is, a detailed description of the phenomenon 
being studied. They also note that naturalistic observation is relevant, not only to recognize the 
lived experiences of the people under study, but also to understand the significant contexts 
(social, racial, economic, etc.) of the experiences. In addition, from the qualitative standpoint, 
scientific laws that can be universalized, if found to exist at all, can only be advanced after 
taking into consideration the diversity caused by dissimilarities in context. Thus, these 
descriptions resonate very well with the agenda and modus operandi of this work, which is to 
study and understand the lived experiences of the Akan people, traditional and contemporary, 
in view of how they relate and perceive nature and animals and the important role nature and 
animals play in their everyday lives. The use of qualitative approach also enables the researcher 
to give a critical evaluation of his findings rather than only noting similarities and differences 
that exist within the sample population chosen.  
 
4.2.1 Strategies of inquiry 
The use of the qualitative method provides the researcher with a plethora of methods or 
strategies to choose from, depending on researcher’s criteria of classification. Fouché (2005: 
269) notes that Tesch’s (1990) mode of classification led him to identify twenty-eight (28) 
methods, while Miller and Crabtree (1992) identify eighteen (18) of them, using a different 
system of classification. Nevertheless, Fouché (2005) and Creswell (2007) identify five 
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research strategies they regard as the most important for any research in the human sciences 
namely biography, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study.  
 
This study uses grounded theory strategy developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The theory 
is based on two concepts i.e., constant comparison and theoretical sampling (Fouché & 
Schurink, 2011: 318). Creswell (2009: 13) explains grounded theory as “a strategy of inquiry 
in which the researcher derives a general, abstract theory of a process, action or interaction 
grounded in the views of participants.”  He also notes that two main features of the grounded 
theory design are the constant comparison of data with emerging categories and theoretical 
categories, and the theoretical sampling of different groups to compare the similarities and 
differences of information. This strategy is apt for this research, since this research seeks to 
generalize and abstract from the information gathered on indigenous Akan practices, traditions, 
and ethics and compare them with the existing theories in animal ethics.  This is to bring out 
the similarities and differences between the Akan perspectives and the ethics of interrelatedness 
as well as with the welfarist and rightist views. This is in accord with Mark (1996: 214) and 
Flick’s (2014: 40) observations that the grounded theory approach highly involves the 
generation of a theory, rather than the testing of a theory. Thomas Schwandt (2000) notes that 
grounded theory uses the skills of induction, deduction and verification or validation as part of 
its strategy. These skills of induction and deduction are going to help this research in doing a 
critical and analytical evaluation of data presented to me by my interlocutors.   
 
4.2.2 Study Area  
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Fig.1 Map of Ghana, and part of La Cote D’voire and Togo showing the distribution of Akan (Twi –Fante) 
Language and some of its major dialects and Tano Language spoken by Akan ethnic group 
(Adapted from Dolphyne 1988:195,196 in Bosiwah, 2012: 166) 
 
The empirical aspect of this work focuses on Akan people of Ghana. The Akans are a group of 
closely related people found in West Africa. They live mainly in Ghana and in parts of 
neighboring Ivory Coast (As seen in Figure 1 above). In Ghana, they inhabit most of the 
southern and middle belts and account for close to half the national population (see figure 2 
below). Although the Akan subgroups are many, the well-known ones are the Ashantis (most 
popular and largest), Denkyiras, Akims, Akuapims, Fantes, Kwahus, Wassa, Brongs, and 
Nzemas. These groups, more or less, share similar culture both fundamentally, as well as, in 
details. They also speak a different dialect of the same Akan language that belongs to the 
Central Comoé language group. Every Akan belongs to one of the eight matrilineal clans 
(abusua) mainly because it is believed that all the Akan clans descended from a common 
ancestry, and is therefore bound together by a common tie. Thus, members of a particular Akan 
clan consider each other as relatives, making intermarriage within the clan a forbidden act. 
Although the cultural affinities of the various Akan subgroups with the other ethnic groups of 
Ghana are not on the same scale, as among themselves, any divergences affect only details. 
When compared with the distant cultures of the East and West, Akan culture can be seen to 
have some essential similarities with other African cultures as to be considered under the 
broader label of “African culture” as a general cultural type (Wiredu, 1996: 157; Labi, 2009: 
43).  
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Fig. 2 Map of Ghana showing the five major ethnic groups. (From Trading African Roots, n.d) 
 
In present-day Ghana12, the Akans mainly occupy five of the ten regions of the country namely 
Brong-Ahafo Region, Ashanti Region, Western Region, Central Region, and Eastern Region. 
A small portion of Akans is also found in part of the Volta Region (see figure 3 below). 
Nevertheless, due to internal migration, Akans are found almost throughout all the ten regions 
of Ghana. Accra, the capital city of Ghana in the Greater Accra Region, is a cosmopolitan city 
where many Akans from the five major Akan regions have now settled. As a result, one need 
not travel to all the five ‘Akan regions’ to find Akans since they are easily found in the capital 
city. Akans currently make up 47% of the total population of Ghana and it is estimated that 
there are four million Akans living in Accra, the capital city of Ghana (World Population 
Review, 2019).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 The research was conducted before Ghana’s ten regions were further divided to make sixteen regions in 
February 2019. As such, the study uses and refers to the old map of Ghana with ten regions. 
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Fig. 3 Map showing the ten regions of Ghana 
 
The study chose Akans of Ghana for the study because firstly, they constitute a greater part of 
the Ghanaian population. This makes reaching target participants for the study very easy. 
Secondly, Akans are known for their rich oral traditions. There also exists a vast written 
literature on the history and traditions of the Akan people. Finally, the researcher belongs to 
the Akan ethnic group and as such, makes communication with the research participants very 
convenient hence, no need for an interpreter. The study (that is, both one-on-one interviews 
and focused group discussions) involved Akan participants who are originally from the five 
main Akan dominated regions of Ghana namely Eastern Region, Central Region, Western 
Region, Ashanti Region, and Brong-Ahafo Region. These participants were sampled from 
three regions of Ghana, namely Greater Accra Region, Central Region, and Eastern Region. 
The participants also covered five of the Akan major subgroups, namely Akuapem, Akyem, 
Fanti, Denkyira, and Ashanti.  
 
4.2.3 Study Population/Subject  
A study population in research refers to a collective term that is used to designate the entire 
number of things or cases of the type that are the subject of your study. To this regard, a study 
population can be made up of certain types of objects, organizations, people or even events 
(Walliman, 2011: 94). 
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The population for this study is in two categories. One category is made of individuals from 
whom the study obtained information on traditional Akan beliefs, practices and ethics about 
animals and the environment. These included participants known to be holders and experts of 
Akan traditions and knowledge. These are the Akan Chiefs (ahenfo), queen mothers (Ahemaa), 
linguists (akyeame), and heads of clans (abusuapanyin). These groups, based on their positions, 
are recognised as the repository of the traditions and history of their people, which are believed 
to have been passed down to them by their predecessors and ancestors. This category also 
included one Akan academic expert on Akan language and tradition. An academic expert on 
Akan language and tradition was included to give further insight into the information reviewed 
in the literature. This proved to be very helpful as it gave further pointers on the most important 
questions to direct to the Akan traditional leaders. It is from this first category that the study 
accessed indigenous knowledge on beliefs, practices, and ethics of the Akan people. The 
second category provided the study with views and perspectives from the younger Akan 
generation in terms of how they consider the use and preservation of nature including animals 
were collected.   
 
4.2.4 Sample and Sampling technique 
Sampling involves the general process of selecting just a small group of cases or examples out 
of a large group called the population (Walliman, 2011: 94; Flick, 2014: 167). Sampling in 
research is important because usually, a thorough coverage of the whole population is quite 
impossible and even if possible, sampling saves time and cost of conducting the research 
(Strydom, 2005: 194). There are mainly two types of sampling methods, that is, 
random/probability sampling and non-random/non-probability sampling (Strydom, 2005; 
Walliman, 2011; Pandey & Pandey, 2015). Ranjit Kumar (2011) identifies a third type he calls 
the mixed sampling design that employs the use of both probability and non-probability 
designs. With probability samples, each element has a known probability of being included in 
the sample but the non-probability samples do not allow the researcher to determine this 
probability (Kothari, 2004: 15). Strydom (2005: 198) also notes that probability sampling 
usually relies on randomisation in the sample selection while non-probability sampling is done 
without randomisation.  
 
In this study, the type of sampling used to identify the participants for both the one-on-one 
interviews and focused group discussions was a non-probability sampling. In a non-probability 
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sampling, the researcher identifies individuals or groups and settings where the specific process 
being studied is most likely to occur (Strydom & Delport, 2011: 391). In the opinion of Kumar 
(2011), qualitative research is designed, either to have in-depth knowledge about a situation, 
event, or episode, or to learn as much as can be learnt about different features of an individual 
on the supposition that the individual is typical of the group and as a result will provide insight 
into the group. This applies directly to what was done in this study. Part of the goal of the study 
is to seek specific and in-depth knowledge on Akan indigenous practices and beliefs in 
reference to the natural environment and their human-animal relations and as such, some 
individuals who are considered authorities on the subject were the target of the study’s sample. 
This is because even though many ordinary Akans may have some fair knowledge of what their 
beliefs and practices are, they may not be in the position to explain the reasons and historicity 
of these beliefs and practices. In the focus group discussion, the study selectively targeted a 
younger generations of Akans so as to contrast their views with that of what is held 
traditionally. 
 
Strydom and Delport (2005: 328-330) identify six different types of non-probability sampling 
when it comes to qualitative research. These are theoretical sampling, purposive samples, and 
deviant case sampling. The others are sequential sampling, snowball sampling, and volunteer 
sampling. For the one-one-interviews and focus group discussions done to access information 
on Akan traditional practices, ethics and ontology of the natural environment, the study adopted 
purposive sampling method to identify the participants to be included. Purposive sample is 
explained to be a type of sample which is based wholly on the judgement of the researcher, in 
that, the sample is made up of elements that have the most attributes, the most representative 
or typical features of the population under study (Singleton et al. as cited in Strydom 2005: 
111). In accessing information on the traditional practices, beliefs and ethics of the Akans, the 
study followed the method of purposive sampling by deliberately choosing individual 
participants who are best placed, based on their traditional positions in the Akan communities, 
to provide the comprehensive information needed to reach the study’s objectives. Resultantly, 
the targeted participants were Akan chiefs, clan heads, queen mothers, and traditional linguists. 
The same method was used in selecting the expert professional academics in Akan language 
and traditions. Snowball sampling method was also utilized to reach some of the chiefs, clan 
heads, linguists and queen mothers, based on the recommendations of some of the chiefs. 
Snowball sampling, as noted by Strydom and Delport (2011: 393) is directed at identifying 
individual experts who may be hard to reach through referrals by other expert participants to 
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get to individuals who may have certain specific information that is not so much well known 
by the general population.   
 
For the focus group discussions with young Akan participants, the study, again, used the 
purposive sample method. Since the target participants were young Akans between the ages of 
twenty-two and thirty-seven years of age, the study purposely targeted known Akan friends 
and former students and colleagues at different stages in their career and at different stages of 
their lives. However, all the participants had received some form of formal education. Again, 
this was intentionally done to assess the extent to which formal education may have influenced 
their perception and convictions.  
 
The sample size for the entire study was twenty-four (24). This sample size, arguable, is 
representative of the population under study, namely the Akan people of Ghana. This is due to 
the homogeneity of the various Akan subgroups and the exclusive nature of the information 
that was sought. As indicated earlier, the various Akan groups, more or less, share similar 
culture both fundamentally as well as in details. They also speak different dialects of the Akan 
language which belongs to the Central Comoé language group (Wiredu, 1996: 157; Labi, 2009: 
43). Thus, the study does not need a very large sample size in order to arrive at a conclusion 
that is generalizable, especially when dealing with information known by specific authorities. 
Hancock, Ockleford & Windridge (2009: 7) note that if the population under study is very 
homogeneous then a small sample will give a representative view of the whole. Patton (2002: 
244 in Strydom & Delport, 2005: 328) likewise pinpoints that in qualitative research, there are 
no hard and fast rules for sample size. Sample size depends on what you want to know, the 
purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and 
what can be done with available time and resources.  
 
4.3 Data Collection 
A researcher using the qualitative approach employs the use of what Uwe Flicks (2014: 195) 
calls ‘Verbal Data’, which is the umbrella term that covers a wide range of data that largely 
consist of words. A researcher using the qualitative method, has many options when it comes 
to the method of gathering his or her verbal data. Some of these data collections methods are 
interviews, focus groups, observation, a collection of documented material such as letters, 
diaries, and photographs, a collection of narratives and open-ended questions in questionnaires 
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(Hancock, Ockleford & Windridge, 2009: 16). This study utilises the methods of interviews 
and focus group discussions. The study chose to utilize interview as part of its methods of data 
collection because, interview makes room for flexibility and adaptability. As Harding (2013: 
22) rightly asserts, by using qualitative interview approach, the researcher gets the opportunity 
to listen to views or experiences of a particular respondent for a prolonged period, and to ask 
probing questions to explore ideas further. The study also opted for the focus group as part of 
its data collection method because, as noted by Greeff (2005: 286), some important information 
that is not likely to come out in the course of the one-to-one interview is more likely to surface 
in focus groups. This is because group dynamics, Greeff observes, can facilitate and accelerate 
the bringing of new information to the fore.  
 
4.3.1 Interviews 
Tim Rapley (2007: 16) regards interviews as social encounters where speakers collaborate in 
producing retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of their past (or future) actions, 
experiences, feelings and thoughts. Part of the features of an interview is that, it provides rich 
and detailed information rather than a yes-or-no, agree-or-disagree response. Secondly, 
answers are not pre-provided in categories and thirdly, questions are open-ended. Thus, this 
makes the interview a predominant method of getting data in qualitative research approach 
(Greeff, 2005: 287). There are two types of interviews namely one-on-one interview and focus 
group interview (Greeff, 2005). Both were used in this study. The interviews were audio 
recorded with the signed permission of the participants. Field notes were also taken where 
necessary. Interviews were chosen to attain direct first-hand information from the study’s 
population sample. 
 
   4.4.1.1 One-on-one Interview  
One-on-one interview in a qualitative study can be either unstructured or semi-structured. In 
an unstructured one-on-one interview, it is conducted without the use of the researcher’s 
already gathered information, experience or opinions in a particular area. Meanwhile, the semi-
structured one-on-one interview is conducted around areas of particular interest, while still 
allowing considerable flexibility in scope and in-depth (Greeff, 2005: 292). This study 
conducted six (6) semi-structured one-on-one interviews to acquire information on Akan 
traditional beliefs, practices and ethics. The study decided on a semi-structured interview 
because this type of interview allows the researcher to prepare his or her own open-ended 
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questions ahead of the interview to guide the conversation. Since it is only semi-structured and 
not structured, it gives the researcher the flexibility to ask follow up questions. This helps the 
participant to present a fuller picture on the topic and helps the researcher to gain a detailed 
understanding of the participant’s beliefs, perceptions or accounts on the topic (Greeff, 2011: 
351-352).  
 
The make-up of the six participants involved in the one-on-one interviews included one chief 
from the Eastern Region (Akuapem Clan), one clan head from the Central Region (Denkyira 
Clan), and one traditional Linguist from the Eastern Region (Akuapem Clan). The others were 
one Queen Mother from the Eastern Region (Akuapem Clan), one Clan head from the Eastern 
Region (Akyem Clan), and one Akan academic expert on Akan language and traditions (Asante 
Clan).  
 
According to what the participants preferred, the language for the one-on-one interview was 
either Akan or English. In some instances, there was the use of both languages. All six 
participants were conversant in both the English and the Akan languages. This made 
communication very easy for both the researcher and the participants. The interviews lasted 
between thirty-two (32) minutes and sixty-eight (68) minutes.  
 
   4.4.1.2 Focus Group Interview 
A focus group interview is simply a group interview. It is a research technique that gathers data 
by the use of group discussion on a topic determined by the researcher (Morgan, 1997: 6). 
Greeff (2011: 360) explains that focus groups interviews are used to better understand how 
people feel or think about an issue. It is called ‘focus’ because the participants share in common 
certain characteristics that relate to the research goals. Flick (2014: 198) notes that the 
expectation of using a focus group is the hope that the information acquired will go beyond 
what a succession of single interviews would produce. Apart from it being used to supplement 
other primary data, a focus group is valuable when several viewpoints or responses are wanted 
on an exact issue in a shorter period of time (Greeff, 2005: 300). 
 
This study conducted three separate focus groups interviews for two different purposes. Firstly, 
one focus group interview was conducted to supplement the data received from the one-on-one 
interview on Akan traditional knowledge on their beliefs, practices and ethics towards nature 
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and animals. This was done with four (4) participants made up of three chiefs from the Central 
Region, and one queen mother from the Central Region. This took place at the Cape Coast 
Palace in the Central Region of Ghana. Secondly, two focus group interviews were conducted 
to gather data on the perspectives of the younger generations of Akans. Each of these two focus 
groups was made up of Seven (7) participants, made up of four (4) men and three (3) women. 
The aim here was to compare and contrast views that are considered traditional (collected from 
the traditional Akan experts) with the views from the younger Akan generations, whose 
worldviews arguably have been largely influenced by their exposure to globalization and 
formal education. Both Focus group interviews took place in Accra in the Greater Accra Region 
of Ghana.   
 
The focus group interviews were also semi-structured which allowed for further probing where 
needed. The language used here was Akan and English. Again, participants were conversant in 
both the English and Akan languages making communication very easy for both the researcher 
and participants. The focus group interviews lasted between sixty-two (62) to ninety-two (92) 
minutes.  
 
4.4 Data presentation and analyses 
De Vos (2005: 333) defines data analyses as “the process of bringing order, structure and 
meaning to the mass of collected data.” Data analyses can also be described as the interpretation 
and classification of linguistic or visual material (Flick, 2014: 370). Flick (2014: 375) again, 
considers this as the core of qualitative research that helps for elaborating, understanding or 
explaining what is in the data, both explicitly and implicitly. 
 
To make analyses and interpretation of the data easy, the first or initial stages involved the 
literal transcription of the data (interviews) from audio to text. Interviews that the researcher 
conducted were first transcribed into the used language, that is, the Akan language, before they 
were translated into the English language for the sake of accuracy. A paid language expert did 
the transcription and translation. This led to the summarization of each interviewees’ responses 
to bring out the key points. According to Jamie Harding (2013: 56-57), summarising the 
transcript augments the validity of the study by making it more possible for the findings of the 
study to truly reflect the original data. In addition, because it is easy to get lost in the multitude 
of details from the transcribed data, summarising also helps to focus on the main issues raised 
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by the respondent and helps the researcher to identify similarities and differences in the 
interviews (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 51 in Harding, 2013: 57).  Flicks (2014: 317-372) and 
De Vos (2005: 336) regard the initial processes of transcribing and paraphrasing or 
summarizing of the data as data management.  
 
The study uses the constructivist/interpretivist paradigm approach. This is because it includes, 
in part, the interviewing of participants to get to know their worldviews. Shramaatit Moksha 
(2013: 28) notes that qualitative research is the approach usually associated with the social 
constructivist paradigm where there is emphasis on the socially constructed nature of reality. 
Moksha further notes that social constructivism is essentially about recording, analysing and 
the struggle to unearth the proper meaning and significance of human behaviour and 
experience, which includes their contradictory beliefs, behaviours and emotions. Creswell 
(2007: 20-21) explains that the aim of research in the constructivist paradigm is to depend 
mostly on the participants’ understanding of the situation. In most instances, these personal 
views are negotiated socially and historically. That is to say, they are not only imprinted on 
individuals but are formed through interaction with others and through historical and cultural 
norms that operate in individuals' lives. Fouché and Schurink (Creswell, 2011: 309-310) 
likewise, highlight the fact that interpretivism comes with the assumption that reality should 
be given an interpretation through the meaning that research participants give to their own 
world. These described features of constructivism/interpretivism are in line with the study’s 
objective, which seeks to conceptualize an Akan theory of animal ethics, from an understanding 
of how the Akans view animals, and their natural environment in terms of their ethics and 
traditional ontology.  
 
The constant comparative method was also used in the analyses. This method, according to 
Harding (2013: 66), is a facilitatory approach that helps the researcher to identify similarities 
and variances between cases in a dataset, and can be used alongside summaries. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) are reputed to be the first to refer to the constant comparative approach as part 
of their grounded theory approach. They are reported to have considered the constant 
comparative approach as an integral part of qualitative data analysis (Harding, 2013: 66). The 
use of the comparative analysis method, according to Harding, is advantageous because apart 
from helping to identify similarities and differences between interviews, it also helps to identify 
research findings once all the cases have been included in the analysis. Another related method 
that was used in the analysis of the data is memo writing or memoing. This is also an essential 
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feature in grounded theory method of data analysis. In memo writing method, references are 
made to the literature, diagrams, and even quotes from participants in interviews as evidence 
in linking, structuring, and contextualizing concepts. This helps to make the analysis more 
explicit and transparent for the researcher and other assessors (Flicks, 2014: 402-403). 
 
4.5 Validity, reliability and Rigour 
Validity is regarded as the extent to which a concept is accurately measured, while reliability 
relates to the consistency of a measure (Heale & Twycross, 2015: 66). Validity is also defined 
by Jupp (2006a: 311 in Harding, 2013: 5) as “the extent to which conclusions drawn from 
research provide an accurate description of what happened or a correct explanation of what 
happens and why.” Auerbach and Silverstein (2003: 32) argue that since qualitative research 
usually includes some element of subjectivity, one should not expect to find a single right way 
in data analysis. However, researchers need to be guided by key principles of validity (Harding, 
2013: 5).  
 
To ensure the validity and trustworthiness of the information gathered, the study relied on 
participants who are considered by the Akan societies as experts and authorities (gatekeepers) 
of Akan traditions. These are the chiefs, queen mothers, traditional linguists and clan heads. 
To supplement their claims, the study sought the view of a professional academic in the field 
of Akan language and tradition. The similarities and agreements in their accounts assure of 
reliability. In places where there appears to be irreconcilable accounts, both accounts were 
presented and the different possible implications are accounted for. In addition, interview 
questions were given to target participants ahead of meetings to afford them time to think 
through their responses and gather all the relevant facts before the agreed interview day. This 
allowed the participants to recheck their facts and even consult others on questions in which 
they may have lacked confidence.   
 
To be sure my analysis of the data is reliable, with the consent of my respondents, all the 
interviewees’ responses were audio recorded and later transcribed first into the Akan language 
(for those interviews conducted in Akan) before translating it into the English language. This 
was done by a paid expert who is familiar with the Akan names for animals and other aspects 
of the natural environment the participants used during the interview. The audio-recorded 
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interview was played while following the transcribed text provided by the expert transcriber to 
ensure that nothing was lost in transcription or translation. 
  
To ensure confidentiality and anonymity of participants, their actual names were not used. 
Instead the study referred to the first group of respondents as Traditional Respondent (TR) 
while using numbers from 1 to 10 represent each of them separately. Pseudo names were used 
for the young adult respondents. All participants, both for the one-on-one interviews and for 
the focus group discussions, signed consent forms written in the Akan and English languages.  
 
4.6 Study limitations 
One major challenge the study faced was the problem of the lack of exact vocabulary to capture 
accurately the essence of some of the terminologies in the research in the Akan language. Even 
though the researcher is a native Akan speaker, there were some difficulties in how to capture 
accurately some of the important research variables into the local language, especially where 
there were no direct local words for them. Irrespective of how one breaks these words down to 
the discussants in the local language, there was always the suspicion that the true essence of 
some of the words in English as used, may have been lost in translation. Words like moral 
status, intrinsic or inherent value, dignity, moral agent, moral patient, and animal rights are 
typical examples. To get around this, the researcher asked one question in a variety of ways to 
juxtapose the responses so as to judge the consistency of their responses.  
 
Secondly, it was sometimes difficult, especially with the traditional respondents, to tell if they 
were responding according to known traditional views of the Akans as passed down to them or 
giving their own views on some of the issues. Similarly, many of the respondents in some 
instances, referred to biblical accounts as a response to some of the research questions making 
the researcher question how much of their Christian religion may have influenced their 
traditional worldview accounts. Thirdly, time and resource constraints did not allow the 
researcher to reach Akan traditional experts in all the five native Akan speaking regions in 
Ghana, whose views would have enriched the data. Nevertheless, the study is confident that 
the views gathered will not be entirely different from the views from other Akan speaking 
places due to the high commonality of values and traditions among the Akan speaking people 
of Ghana.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a detailed report and explanation of the research methodology and 
design used in this research with justifications. The chapter has shown that the study involved 
both theoretical and empirical research approaches, whereas, in the theoretical approach, 
important literature was critically reviewed, and their bearings on the study shown. The 
empirical aspect included both one-on-one interviews and focus groups discussions that 
provided primary data on aspects of Akan traditional ontology, ethical beliefs, and traditional 
practices towards the natural environment and animals. It also included focus group discussions 
with young Akans to solicit their perceptions on human to animal relationship in comparison 
with the tradition views. The research design for the empirical aspect, as shown in the chapter, 
was qualitative in nature rather than quantitative because, qualitative method allows for the 
identification of specific individuals with expert knowledge on the subject of inquiry.  
 
The population for the study was the Akan people of Ghana. The participants were attained 
from the three regions of Ghana namely the Greater Accra Region, Central Region and the 
Eastern Region. The participants also covered five of the Akan major subgroups viz. Akuapem, 
Akyem, Fanti, Denkyira, and Ashanti. The category made up of experts of Akan traditional 
beliefs, practices, and ethics was made up of Akan Chiefs (ahenfo), Queen Mothers (Ahemaa), 
linguists (akyeame), and heads of clans (abusuapanyin). The chapter explained that these 
constitute the traditional authorities of the Akan people as such are acknowledged to be the 
depository of their traditions and history believed to have been handed down to them by their 
predecessors and ancestors. This category of Akan traditional experts also included one 
academic expert on Akan language and traditions who gave further insights on the information 
reviewed in the literature. The second category of participants, the chapter mentioned, was 
made up of a younger generations of Akans between the ages of twenty-two (22) and thirty-
seven (37). They gave insight on views and perspectives from the younger Akan generation in 
terms of their take on the use and preservation of the natural environment in general and their 
position on human-animal relation. 
   
In the next chapter, the study presents the findings from the field under specific themes. This 
will pave the way for the discussion and analyses of the findings in subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a detailed presentation of the research methodology and design used 
in acquiring primary data for the purpose of this research were provided. The choice of 
sampling style and the sample size as well as the kind of interview adopted with explanation 
and justification given were also included. In addition, the chapter expounded on the strategy 
of inquiry used in the data analysis.  
In this current chapter, the study presents the findings from the field, which will pave way for 
the discussion of the findings in subsequent chapters. The purpose of going into the field, again, 
was to gather primary data through the direct interactions with traditional Akan authorities and 
with young Akan adults. This was to gain immediate information on traditional Akan 
metaphysics and belief concerning animals and the natural environment. The information 
gained is compared with those gathered from the younger Akan generation.  These findings 
will help the study achieve its main research objective, which is to place African animal ethics 
in light of the welfarist and rightist debate in animal ethics based on Akan ontology, ethics, and 
practices.  
As indicated in chapter four, the presentation and discussion of the findings in this chapter 
(five), has been grouped under predefined themes that were discussed in the literature review. 
These themes are the moral status of nonhuman animals, the interconnectedness of nature, and 
vegetarianism and the use of animals as food. The other themes are vivisection and the use of 
animals in biomedical research, the use of animals as pets or companion animals, on the rights 
and interests of animals, and hunting and trapping of animals. These themes were chosen 
because they represent the breakdown of some of the main themes that welfarists and rightists 
generally disagree on in the animal ethics debate. Thus, it is important to consider the 
perception of Akans under these themes in identifying the place of Akan animal ethics within 
the broader global debate.  
5.1 Study’s respondents 
5.1.1 The traditional respondents 
The number of interactions with the traditional respondents, altogether, involved ten (10) 
participants. Of this number, six (6) participated in a one-on-one interview while the rest of the 
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four (4) were part of a focus group discussion. The breakdown of the six participants involved 
in the one-on-one interview included one chief, one queen mother, one linguist, two clan heads 
and one academic. The four participants who partook in the focus group discussion involved 
one queen-mother and three (3) chiefs. The language used for the interactions was 
predominantly the Akan language, with a mix of the English language in some places. The 
exception was with the interview with the academic which was rather predominantly English 
with the use of the Akan language in some few places. These respondents were given the 
interview instruments ahead of the interview date. This was to afford them time to cross check 
their facts to ensure they gave informed responses to the questions. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, the study referred to this group of respondents as Traditional Respondent (TR) while 
using numbers from 1 to 10 represent each of them separately. 
 
5.1.2 The young adult respondents 
In total, the study interacted with fourteen (14) participants in two separate focus group 
discussions. Thus, each focus group-meeting was made up of Seven (7) participants. The initial 
intention was to have eight participants in each focus group-meeting to consist of four males 
and four females. However, in each of the cases, one female participant could not show up in 
the final minute. As a result, each of the two focus group-meeting ended up having four males 
and three females. All the participants from both focus groups live in different suburbs of the 
Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The language used for both group discussions was 
predominantly English with a little mix of Akan. The first focus group discussion was held at 
the campus of the University of Ghana in Accra. Going forward, this group will be referred to 
as the ‘Campus Focus Group’. The second focus group discussion took place in Nungua, a 
suburb in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. This second group will henceforth be referred to 
as the ‘Nungua Focus group’. The meeting with the Campus Focus Group lasted for about 
ninety one minutes while that of the Nungua Focus Group went on for about seventy seven 
minutes. It is worth mentioning here that participants for both focus groups were not given the 
interview questions ahead of the interview. This was done to ensure that they gave their true 
opinions on the issues and topics instead of researched answers which may not really reflect 
their true opinions. It was also to learn how much of their own Akan traditions they were abreast 
with without having to recheck their facts. Pseudo names are used to refer to participants of 
both groups. 
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5.2 Theme 1: The interrelatedness of nature 
The notion that everything in nature is interconnected with each other was pointed out both in 
chapter two (literature review) and mainly in chapter three (theoretical framework) as an idea 
that stands out in the emerging literature in African environmental ethics. This interconnection 
of all things in nature, has led to a theory of ethics of which Ogungbemi, for example, calls ‘an 
ethics of nature-relatedness’. The study has, however, referred to this theory as the ‘ethics of 
interrelatedness’. This ethic of interrelatedness claims that a close examination of traditional 
African beliefs and practices will readily reveal the embeddedness of mutual dependency 
between humans, animals, plants, rivers, and other inanimate beings. This, the proponents have 
argued, should lead to an [African] environmental ethic where there exists, in the words of 
Tangwa (2004: 389), a “recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful 
coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans.” Below is the presentation of the 
findings on this theme. 
5.2.1 The traditional respondents’ views 
Arguably, many of the interview questions for the traditional respondents had a remote 
connection to this theme, nevertheless, the following questions were directly asked towards the 
theme: Do the Akans believe in the preservation of nature and what are their reasons or 
motivation? Which aspects of nature are considered more important and are given more 
reverence and why? And in what ways are humans, animals, and the rest of nature connected 
or related? 
All the participants classified under traditional respondents independently agreed that 
traditionally, Akans believe in the interconnection of nature. Traditional Respondent 1, a chief 
in the Eastern Region of Ghana, for example, in the following words explained the ways the 
Akans believe that nature is interrelated:  
…man takes care of the rivers and other things so the animals in the forest provide meat and 
food for mankind. When the animals multiply in the forest they help the land to be fertile. Again, 
when the rivers flow through the land they help the crops to grow well and the animals get 
water to drink. Again, the droppings of the animals serve as manure to make the soil fertile. 
This enables the land to regain its fertility. So, I think there is always a sort of relationship 
between man and animals.  
Traditional Respondent 3, a chief linguist from the Eastern Region of Ghana, also expressed 
his understanding of the interconnection of nature as follows:  
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…based on the dependency on one another, the forest facilitates rainfall. When you conserve 
the forest, it aids rainfall. When it rains and the rivers get flooded, it promotes farming. If we 
embark on reckless lumbering, it leads to deforestation and desertification. Again, when the 
animals in the forest have enough food to eat, they multiply. Then we are also able to get some 
for food. And there are some plants with medicinal value which when preserved can be raw 
materials for the manufacturing of drugs. The cocoa and other plants provide us with food. If 
we do not preserve coffee, plantain and others, it can affect our lives one way or the other. 
Traditional Respondent 4, a Clan head from the Central Region of Ghana, was very emphatic 
in his claim that there is a definite interconnection among the constituents of nature. He stated 
that ….oh, definitely, we are interconnected, we are interdependent, he said. We cannot, man 
cannot exist when there is nothing, no forest, no trees, zoos and so on animals and so on. We 
are interconnected so we men, all to the benefit of man. But whatever it is the connection is 
there, we are in an interrelationship, he added. Traditional Respondent 5, a Clan Head also 
from the Eastern Region of Ghana, was also of the view that there are all kinds of 
interrelationship with the constituents of nature such that it is even impossible to separate them. 
However, he was of the view that the relationship is of a kind that is beneficial to humans in 
such a way that if that relationship had not been in existence it would have affected negatively 
on humans. He mentioned that: For instance, there are certain animals, like a species of catfish 
that prevents our streams from drying out at the upper course. Through them the water will 
spring up so that water is available all year round.  So in sum, anything that was created is 
useful in a particular way. One would realize that had they not been created, life would not be 
complete. 
Despite this general agreement among the traditional respondents on the issue of 
interconnectedness of nature, the result of the findings also indicates a widely held position 
among them, which is that there is a hierarchy of beings in terms of importance. All the 
respondents believed that humans are on top of the hierarchy of beings, when it comes to the 
phenomenon of physical beings. That is, if you take out the Supreme God, the smaller gods 
and other spirits including the spirits of ancestors, human beings have been given a special 
position among the other beings. These include animal and plant lives, as well as, inanimate 
aspect of nature such as rivers and mountains. To this point, Traditional Respondent 4 
mentioned that, without human beings, rivers would not play any role, and so human beings, I 
mean, in God’s own creation, human beings are superior to all.  We were given authority to 
dominate, so nothing is above human beings.  So they are all for our good.  They all exist for 
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the good of man.  Yes, so man, human beings are superior to any other, any other thing in the 
ecosystem. According to Traditional Respondent 5, man is superior to all these things (that is 
nature) and all are beneficial to us [humans].  
Traditional Respondent 2, a Queen Mother from the Eastern Region of Ghana, was also very 
clear about this. For her, if one observes things carefully, one will find that human beings are 
higher than all other things. Her reason was that: when God created all things He created man 
to be in charge of all other things. Human beings were made the overseers of all God’s creation 
so human beings are superior to all the things created by God. She agreed that one can 
therefore say all other things are beneath human beings. Her position was also affirmed by 
Traditional Respondent 1, who was of the view that, with a close examination of nature, one 
will notice that human beings are ranked higher than all other things.  
Again, despite the acknowledgement of human beings’ special position at the top of ‘physical 
nature’, all the traditional respondents believed strongly that human beings’ position does not 
give them a free pass to use nature in any manner that they deem fit, without some kind of 
circumspection, and the exercise of restraints and caution. Traditional Respondent 5 hinted that 
the protection of the natural environment is very dear to the heart of the Akan people, and so, 
they take a lot of measures to ensure this. He said:  
…we protect and observe it, within our culture and tradition, we have certain norms that help 
us to do this, for instance, there are certain forests that the people are not allowed to clear for 
farming, or there are certain days that the people are prohibited from fetching water from 
particular rivers and streams; there are certain types of food that the people are not permitted 
to eat; the hunting for certain types of animals is prohibited at a period that we believe they 
are procreating. At that time, birds may have laid their eggs and brooding. Again, during 
certain particular seasons, such as the dry season… Because we are protecting the natural 
environment during the dry season, people are not allowed to burn the bush and the forest or 
hunt for animals.  
The reasons given for this need and responsibility to preserve nature, as seen in their responses, 
are firstly, the fact that they are part of the creation of God, and secondly, because preserving 
them will be beneficial to human beings. Thus, they all agreed there was a need to preserve 
nature and it was part of the duty of humans for having to occupy such a special position at the 
top. To this, Traditional Respondent 3 opined that, Akans have to follow the traditions 
bequeathed to them by their ancestors, and to preserve what their ancestors left for them in 
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order to progress. Attaining this, he said, involves the preservation of the natural resources. He 
added that, if we are unable to preserve what our ancestors have bequeathed to us, then what 
will become of our lives? He asked. So it is important that we preserve biodiversity.  
In addition, Traditional Respondent 4, pointed out that:  
The Akans believe in preservation of nature because there is always this common saying that 
everybody knows when the last tree dies the last man dies, so our ancestors believe in that, 
hence the use of these environmental symbols, trees, as their totems, to preserve the 
environment. In some areas a whole village, a certain portion of the forest is declared a holy 
sacred forest to prevent people from farming, from depleting the land, including its resources, 
animals and so on.  So as Akans, we attach a great deal of importance to that aspect of human 
existence. God said we should take dominance over it and at the same time we have to protect 
these items in our environment. We have dominion, but you could destroy everything, to your 
own disadvantage. So, you sustain them. You maintain them, to make sure you have something 
left for the next generation. So the fact that, it is at your disposal does not mean you should use 
it anyhow. We have to make sure our rivers are always up and coming, including the ecosystem. 
Everything, the forests are preserved as I was saying. All these things are for the sustenance 
of the environment. 
Traditional Respondent 2 indicated that there are indeed rules governing the use of the natural 
resources. Explaining further she said:  
For instance, we cannot do anything without water. Mountains are there to give us fresh air. 
We have animals.  Mountains are the sources of rivers and streams.  So as human beings we 
do not have to use machines to raze down our mountains flat. No we cannot do that. We should 
preserve the animals and use some of them for food and keep others to protect us. We do not 
also have to engage in reckless lumbering to degrade our trees. We have to preserve some trees 
to protect us.  
In sum, she was of the conviction that human beings do not have to handle the natural resources 
around them recklessly because they have been put in charge of them. Everything has its own 
use and usefulness. Our duty is just to keep them well, she added. 
The second set of the traditional respondents are the four traditional leaders who took part in 
the focus group discussion, and the Akan academic expert. The four traditional leaders who 
partook in the focus group discussion expressed similar convictions on this theme of the 
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interconnectedness of nature, but did provide some more details, reasons and further 
understandings. Responding directly to the question of interconnectedness of nature, 
Traditional Respondent 9, a Queen mother from the Central Region of Ghana, believed there 
was definitely an interconnection of nature. According to her, nature is interconnected because 
if one should take a cue from the biblical story of creation one notes that after God created 
everything He created man and told man to take dominion over all creation. Linking her point 
to science, the Queen-mother went on to demonstrate how the interconnection goes:  
…but you see science, even science tells us that even chlorophyll in the tree, the sun draws the 
chlorophyll from the plants, the leaves and prepares the food for the plants, stores some under. 
We take some of the leaves, vegetables, we take some of the roots as medicine, for food and we 
also, the animals also eat some of these things. And we humans eat some of these animals so it 
is, we are interconnected.  
Similarly, all the four participants in the focus group agreed with the rest of the traditional 
respondents that despite the interconnectedness of nature, human beings are regarded higher 
than the rest of nature. Traditional Respondent 7, a chief in the Central Region of Ghana, 
succinct response to this was: obviously, the most ranked nature is human beings.  
The four respondents in the focus group, likewise, agreed with the rest of the traditional 
respondents that being highly ranked did not warrant an abuse of nature. They unanimously 
agreed that the Akans believed in the preservation of nature. Again, Traditional Respondent 7 
gave this response to explain why this is the case: 
The reason for preservation is that nature, by definition in our sense, is something that cannot 
be made by man. Human being is nature, the atmosphere is nature, the stars, the moon, the 
seas, the trees–all these are nature. And indeed from time immemorial, from the practices of 
our elders, from the proverbs, from the taboos, you will see that one way or the other, they 
preserve nature. From their way of life, everything that they do is to preserve nature, because 
they had been aware, we know currently that it is something that cannot be made by man. 
Therefore, the motivation to keep it for future people, yet unborn is higher than anything else. 
Traditional Respondent 9 explained some of the things their people in the past did to preserve 
or conserve nature. She mentioned that they had a period when they did not fish in the local 
rivers and even in the sea. Every week, she continued, there was a day set aside for no fishing. 
There was also some sacred rules that prevented people from farming or clearing around the 
water bodies. According to her, the elders of the land strongly believed in that. In their own 
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sense, even though they did not explain to the younger ones why they conserved or preserved 
nature, they did it by way of taboos. According to Traditional Respondent 9, If you do it, the 
gods will go against you, so people were afraid to do it, and because of that people never 
ventured to farm around the water bodies. Furthermore, she hinted, there was a period during 
the festivals that, for a month or two, the people never fished in the water bodies around. All 
these, for her, were done as a way of letting the fish multiply and have time to mature for 
harvest. In addition, she mentioned that it was believed that by weeding around water bodies, 
one is exposing the nakedness of the water bodies, and in effect, exposing the nakedness of the 
gods of those water bodies. Adding to this Traditional Respondent 8, another chief from the 
Central Region of Ghana, also mentioned that in the past and even now, their ancestors 
considered some places, especially the source of a river, as sacred places and no one was 
allowed to cut trees or do anything there. According to him, those places were such that one 
could not even go. There were very quiet and considered sacred, unlike these days where you 
will find people washing and throwing things indiscriminately into them. Furthermore, 
Traditional Respondent 7 brought in a scientific explanation underlying their belief as stated 
by Traditional Respondent 9. According to the sub-chief, these things that their forefathers said 
were taboos with regard to nature have been proven scientifically to be a fact of life. He said 
he has done some personal research by talking to some of the elders of his people and came to 
the realization that majority of the things that their forefathers said were taboos have indeed 
some scientific bases. For instance, he exemplified, scientifically, if humans should degrade 
the source of rivers or degrade the rivers, if they should cut down the trees, the rays of the sun 
will dry the water. So it is better for humans to allow the trees to thrive. This will allow the 
trees to provide shade to the water bodies to prevent the water bodies from quickly drying up. 
This will in turn make water available all year round for the benefit of the people.  
Also, on this theme, Traditional Respondent 6, an Akan academic expert from the Ashanti 
Region of Ghana, gave an account from his own experience as a born and bred Akan and as a 
trained and experienced academic in Akan language and traditions. He presented some very 
similar views and also interesting additional information for the study. On the question relating 
to the interconnectedness of nature, Traditional Respondent 6 responded in the affirmative that 
there is indeed some interconnection to be seen in nature. He stated that: …they [that is the 
Akans] understand fully well that there is a strong connection between man and nature and the 
motivation is to make sure that that connection exist.  So any attempt to do away with them, 
that is, nature and environment, implies causing some harm to mankind. He held the belief that 
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humans are interconnected to nature because, human beings are born into the natural 
environment which is made up of the flora and fauna including the rivers and even the 
landscape. He added that nature is meant to satisfy the need of human beings. He consented to 
the view that what happens to each aspect of nature, in a way, affects human beings too. To 
demonstrate how this interconnection works out, Traditional Respondent 6 mentioned that it is 
this interconnection that explains why human beings are seriously affected when there is land 
degradation or soil erosion. This, for him, is part of the reason why the Akan people may want 
to preserve the land.  
Addressing the question on the hierarchy of beings of nature, Traditional Respondent 6’s initial 
response was: I don’t think they rank. But they feel that all aspect of nature are very important 
to their life. Nevertheless, he agreed that the Akans would rank human beings first before plants 
and animals. He added that: …they [that is the Akans] think that human beings can only exist 
if these things [natural resources] are there to satisfy their needs. Traditional Respondent 6 
also agreed that irrespective of where the Akans place humans on the hierarchy of beings, the 
Akans believed strongly in the preservation of nature. In his informed view, the Akans will, for 
instance, not destroy the forest in order to preserve the animals, they will not pollute the water 
so that they can get fishes out of it for consumption. They also want to live in a greenish 
atmosphere, an atmosphere that they constantly have something to eat, both in terms of crops 
and animals, including fish. He also indicated that: …they [the Akan people] cherish the forest, 
they cherish the trees; they want to keep them; they want to keep the plants for food, because 
they eat some of the leaves. They want to keep it for medicinal purpose. They believe in herbs. 
Until orthodox medicine, they were relying on barks of trees, roots of trees, leaves of trees for 
their health. So why will they destroy the forest? 
 
5.2.2 The young adult respondents’ views 
Views from the young adult respondents were solicited through the use of two separate focus 
group discussions, that is, the Campus Focus Group and the Nungua Focus Group, with each 
made up of seven randomly selected young Akans. In this instance, although nearly all the 
questions asked, had some bearings on the theme of interconnectedness of nature, only one 
question was asked directly towards the theme namely: is there any relationship shared by the 
constituent of nature?  
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Majority of the participants classified under the young adult respondents independently agreed 
that there is, or there should be some relationship shared by all things considered part of the 
natural environment. In the Campus Focus Group, for instance, one of the participants 
identified as Shadrack, mentioned that the interdependency of nature exists because humans, 
depends on plants and animals and some animals also depend on humans for survival. This 
sentiment was generally shared by all in the Campus Focus Group. The general perception in 
the Nungua Focus Group was not that different. A participant identified as Obed, stated that 
there is some form of relationship among the constituents of nature in the ecosystem. He held 
that humans and the rest of nature live in an interrelated community such that there is an 
interdependency from humans to animals and to water bodies as well. Humans also use nature 
for several things to make their lives easy. In his view, we [in reference to humans and nature] 
share a common focus. The animals feed on humans and humans feed on animals... Human 
beings have been made stewards over these elements and we also feed from both the animals 
and the sea as well. Likewise, we provide animals food.  
The rest of the participants in the Nungua Focus Group appeared to share similar view with the 
exception of one participant identified as Claudia. Claudia, initially, was of opinion that there 
is no such relationship between humans and the rest of nature. According to her, it is rather 
accurate to say that there are some differences between humans and nature. Rebutting Obed’s 
position, she posited that: Yes, sometimes they feed on us and we feed on them. Yes, but I don’t 
think there is a relationship. I mean there is a difference, like the difference between we humans 
and animals. Seriously, I personally, I do not really like pets, and other things. The way I will 
care for a human being is different from the way I will care for my pet. It appeared this 
respondent may have confused the use of the words ‘relationship’ and ‘interconnection’ 
because when she was asked further if she thought humans are interconnected with nature her 
reply was: Yes, yes, there is a connection alright, but when it comes to relationship and for me, 
I don’t think… Upon further engagement with Obed, she came to accept that there may be some 
relationship in terms of interconnection between humans and the rest of nature after all.   
 
5.3 Theme 2: The moral status of nonhuman animals 
The theme of the moral status of nonhuman animals is to determine whether animals or at least, 
some of them have moral worth, that is, whether they are worthy of moral consideration as 
humans. As was indicated in the literature review (chapter 2), the kind of perception or 
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conviction about the moral status of nonhuman animals often plays a big role in determining 
the kind of support in terms of treatment and advocacy animals receive. It also plays a large 
role in whether one argues for a welfarist position or for a rights view position. As such, this 
theme remains one of the most important themes to the study. Some of the salient questions 
surrounding the issue of moral status of nonhuman animals as revealed by the literature include: 
Do animals have or should they be given a moral status? What do animals possess that should 
make them morally worthy? Are there any distinctive and morally relevant marks that can be 
used to differentiate animals from humans to deny them a moral status? Can animals be given 
the status of a person? Even if animals can be considered morally worthy, is or should their 
moral status be made equal to that of humans? If not, why not?  
What follows is a summary of the relevant findings from data generated through one-on-one 
interviews and focus group discussions, first from the traditional respondents and second from 
the young adult respondents concerning this theme of the moral status of nonhuman animals.   
 
5.3.1 The traditional respondents’ views 
Just like the first theme, almost all of the interview questions posed to the respondents, in one 
way or the other, had a connection to the theme of the moral status of nonhuman animals.  
However some of the direct questions that were asked towards the theme included: Where 
would you place the position of human beings and animals in nature? What makes an animal 
different from human being? What are some of the traditional customs and practices that 
include the use of animals? What are the beliefs, practices and importance of taboos, ntoro and 
totems in relation to animals? Other more related questions were: Do the Akans believe that 
animals can be wronged, why or why not? Do the Akans believe that animals can have pain 
and pleasure? Do the Akans believe that animals have souls or spirits and what happens to them 
when they die? To what extent does personal relationship with animals affect how Akans treat 
animals?  
 
5.3.1.1 The place of humans and animals. 
As already reported on the theme of interconnection of nature above, all the participants 
classified under traditional respondents independently agreed that in traditional Akan belief 
system, human beings are higher on the hierarchy of physical beings in nature. On the specific 
question of whether humans and specifically animals are ranked equally, the response was not 
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any different. All the respondents categorized under traditional respondents, without exception, 
were of the view that traditional Akans held human beings to be ‘definitely’ superior to 
nonhuman animals. Secondly, they held that animals exist for the use and purpose of humans. 
Traditional Respondent 4 said: …so we (that is humans) are different [from animals], we were 
asked [by God] to use them when it comes to procreation. Animals procreate for us to 
consume… They are complementary to us. Yeah, they are there for us. To further find out if 
nature could be appreciated for its own sake, a follow up question was made to one of the 
respondents asking whether nature would be any useful without the existence of the human 
species. His reply intimated a negative answer. Traditional Respondent 1 response was: They 
are useful to man. Let us take the fish in the rivers that we consume. We hunt animals in the 
bush, we use the forest in farming, we use the timber to build houses… so everything that God 
created is useful to humankind.  
In a related response, Traditional Respondent 4 also gave a response which suggests that nature 
does not exist or is preserved for its own sake but for humans’ purpose and fulfilment. He 
asserted that: Oh, no, [nature is preserved] for the sake of human beings. Nature can go extinct 
but it will not affect it. When in Sahara areas real vegetation turns out to be, you know, the 
encroachment came and is still coming. It is, I mean, it is to the detriment of men or of man. 
So nature has nothing to lose, but we have something to lose, yes.  
To explain why human beings are more important than animals, the respondents listed some of 
the things that set humans and animals apart. In some of their responses, there was a lot of 
reference to the biblical account of creation to the effect that God created the world and 
everything in it then placed man in the center of it to take dominance and control. Traditional 
Respondent 1, for example, stated that:  
What makes mankind different from animals is that although God created us alike, it is God 
who created mankind, animals and the rest. According to historical account or the Bible, we 
are made to understand that God created all things before He created man, man came to meet 
all things in existence, and it is man who gave all of the names. For examples, trees and all 
others. But the difference between them is that man has certain senses that enable him to do 
certain things, and to control animals and change certain things to suit himself.  
A similar claim was made by Traditional Respondent 2. According to her: in all things, human 
beings are superior to every creation. Besides God, human beings take precedence over 
everything God created. God created man to be the overseer for all other creation. Traditional 
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Respondent 4 also made an allusion to such biblical creation story while Traditional 
Respondent 3, went as far as citing the bible book of Genesis 1:28 to support his claim that all 
other things including animals, are inferior to humans in accordance with the will and purpose 
of God. Traditional Respondent 7 was the only respondents who gave this unique reason to 
explain why humans are placed higher than animals. He opined that: “Obviously, the most 
ranked nature are human beings because human beings are human beings, we cannot be 
replaced”.  
Apart from these reasons provided above, there were, in addition, many other features 
mentioned by the traditional respondents as those which distinguish human beings from 
animals hence, making the former superior to the later. Among them included the following 
underlisted: 
 The claim that human beings are created in the image of God and animals are not. To 
this, one respondent replied that: …human beings, according to our elders, are closer 
to God. They have resemblance of God. This response or something in relation to this 
was given by a minimum of five respondents.  
 The claim that human beings can reason and have wisdom and intelligence that enable 
them to build towns, establish a university and conduct research, preserve things and 
manufacture items, and to become pilots and astrologers. They are able to attain great 
progress, achievement and advancement. Meanwhile, animals are not equipped with 
such wisdom and intelligence and so are unable to attain these feats. Animals do not 
reason before they do anything, claimed one respondent. This response or something 
in relation to this was given by a minimum of five respondents.  
 The claim that human beings can talk or are endowed with the gift of speech while 
animals are not. In the words of one respondent on this: Animals lack language. Another 
respondent stated that: when human beings talk some animals can understand it, but 
human beings cannot understand what animals say. This response or something in 
relation to this was given by a minimum of two respondents.  
 The claim that humans put on clothes while animals do not. This response or something 
in relation to this was given by a minimum of two respondents.   
 The clam that humans can do whatever they choose to do but animals are limited in 
what they do. 
 The claim that humans can care for others while animals cannot. 
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 The claim that humans are able to cook the food they eat and do chores such as fetching 
of water while animals do not cook their food or fetch water.  
 The claim that humans have two legs with which they walk while animals do not. 
 The claims that humans and animals see things differently.  
 The claim that although some animals swim in rivers and in streams they do not use 
sponge and soap to bath but humans do.  
 The claim that human beings have a purpose for whatever they do as their responsibility 
but animals do not.   
 The claim that humans can do certain things in secret while animals cannot be discreet. 
 The claim that humans are able to determine what is wrong and right, that is, they have 
a sense of morality but animals only do that through their actions. This response or 
something in relation to this was given by a minimum of three respondents. 
 The claim that humans are able to control their feelings while animals cannot control 
their instincts. This response or something in relation to this was given by a minimum 
of two respondents. 
 The claim that humans’ behaviour is different from that of animals.  
 The claim that humans can keep and rear animals but animals cannot keep or rear 
humans. 
 The claim that human societies are guided by laws unlike the animal kingdom which 
only law is the survival of the fittest.  
 The claim that human beings have spirit and soul different from that of the animals 
which may or may not have. To this, one respondent asserted that: actually since human 
beings possess the spirit and soul they are superior to animals and all other things, 
living and non-living. 
 The claim that humans have a conscience but animals do not. One respondent pointed 
this out by saying that: I think naturally, from our indigenous knowledge they [that is 
the Akans] know that human beings have conscience. Animals do not.  
 The claim that humans, unlike animals, know who gave birth to them and know who 
their relatives are no matter their age or level.  
 The claim that humans have higher comprehension level than animals do. 
 The claim that humans, unlike animals have a culture and live a social life including 
observing marriage ceremonies and ceremonies for the dead. A respondent pointed to 
this saying: That is why we even spend money to perform rites for the dead. So we spend 
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money to perform marriages, we spend money for naming ceremonies we spend on 
things in life that… on rites of passage, rites of passage, yes rites of passages. 
 
5.3.1.2 Traditional and non-traditional use of animals 
For the purpose of the theme on the moral status of nonhuman animals, the study sought from 
the participants, some of the Akan traditional or cultural uses of animals or practices that 
involved animals. The under listed are some of the responses given by the traditional 
respondents: 
 Some animals are used in the making of rituals and sacrifices to the gods, sacrifice to 
pacify the gods for wrong doing and sacrifice to cleanse, purify and pacify a member 
of the community for defiling nature or going against a traditional norm or to purify the 
entire community against a curse or a calamity. According to one respondent, each case 
or situation determines the type of animals to use and this can even include the use of 
eggs. Animals are killed for other rituals and sacrifices to mark occasions such as child 
birth, calamities such as death, festivals, and the enstoolment and destoolment of chiefs. 
Each occasion and activity demand certain specified type of animals to be used and 
sometimes even the colour of the animal to be used. Traditional Respondent 3, 
mentioned that in the olden days when someone in the community committed a crime 
or did something ominous, incarnations were recited on a goat and the goat will be led 
deep into the forest and set free. This, when done, signifies that the goat has carried the 
evil or impending evil away from the community.   
 Some animals are used as pets or companion animals. 
 Dogs are used for hunting. 
 Cats are kept at home to drive away mice. 
 Some animals are kept at home to redirect an impending (spiritual) harm including 
illnesses and death. To this point, Traditional Respondent 6 pointed out that sometimes 
animals such as cats and fowls are kept at home to take away an impending death or 
harm. So that when a cat or a fowl dies out of the blue and without a cause the household 
is not so much worried because there is an Akan saying that translates that the cat or 
fowl may have died because someone was to die in that household. Thus, the animal 
has sacrificed its life for the intended person.  
 Some animals are used as appeasements, that is, fines for wrong doing in terms of 
conflict among individuals in the community. Pointing to this, Traditional Respondent 
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6 asserted that: Because the sheep symbolizes peace… So after an arbitration, if you 
have a very serious case and you are found guilty you are asked to pay some fine. 
Sometimes you are asked to bring a whole live sheep meant to satisfy or calm down the 
nerves of the offended and this will normally happen at the palace. Traditional 
Respondent 5 independently corroborated this by adding that the sheep is also to the 
people a symbol of victory and true humility. Thus, in times of victory the sheep is the 
preferred animal of choice for rituals and sacrifices. According to him, cattle may be 
used at times depending on the situation. Traditional Respondent 6 also pointed out that 
if the conflict is only based in the family a fowl or their eggs are used for appeasement. 
Sometimes a man offends the wife or the reverse, a wife offends the husband or so, they 
settle the case amicably and to make sure that we all understand that there has been a 
settlement they will say why not bring a fowl. Sometimes if it is not grievous, they end 
up bringing some eggs, either six or twelve.   
 Some animals are hunted for their game. 
 Some animals are consumed for food. 
 Some animals, through their cries, help them to tell the time of the day. 
 Some animals such as the chameleon are used for sorcery. 
 The skins of some animals are used for clothing, especially footwear and in the making 
of the paraphernalia of Chiefs. 
 Horns and skin of some of the animals were used in the making of traditional 
instruments, such as traditional horns and drums found in the palace.  
 At the palace, the Chief’s stool is placed on the skin of some animals, especially that of 
the sheep. Similarly, the dried skin of the sheep is used as a form of carpet for the chief 
even if there is already a woolen carpet.   
 In the past, wars were fought with animal skins. 
 
The table below shows examples of animals that are used by the different sub-divisions of 
Akans for various traditional and non-traditional purposes.  
Table 5.4.1.2 Animals used by Akans and their purposes 
Type of Animal Purpose  
Sheep  Food, sacrifices and rituals including 
pacification (white ones), clothes, hide 
placed on the stool of the chief, used as 
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carpet for the chief, and possibly for chief’s 
paraphernalia. 
Fowls (cock, hen, including their eggs) Food, sacrifices and rituals including 
pacification, kept in households to ward off 
evil including death. 
Some types of fishes example mudfish food 
Duiker/Antelope/Deer  Food (game), sacrifices and rituals on 
special festive occasions, hide for sandals 
and possibly for chief’s paraphernalia, to 
make traditional drums and in the past used 
in wars. 
Elephant Food (game) 
Lion Food (game) 
Buffalo  Food (game), horn for instrument. 
Goat  Food, used in some cases for rituals to ward 
off bad omen and evil.  
Grasscutter (Greater cane rat) Food 
Dog  Food, sacrifices and rituals (regarded by 
some as a ‘union meat’ and in the past only 
eaten by royals by some Akans), pet or 
companion animals, for hunting. 
Woodpidgeon, cock Helps in telling the time of day. 
Cattle  Food, sometimes used for sacrifices and 
rituals during festivals for some Akans 
Chameleon  For medicine and sorcery  
Cats Pets or companion animals, to ward off 
mice and evil including death.  
 
5.3.1.3 Taboos, totems and ntoro 
The study sought information concerning the use of some animals by the various Akan clans 
as totems and what sort of animals are considered by them as taboo animals, why  those animals 
are considered as taboos, and what it meant or done traditionally for these taboo animals.  
The Akan word for taboo is akyiwadea. Traditional Respondent 6 stated that taboos are meant 
to bring about harmony in the society because they are more or less like the ‘constitution’ that 
we have in the modern society. Most of these taboos, he added, are based on the experiences 
of the people, it is what they have gone through, the predicaments and the unpleasant situations 
they have gone through. The taboos are their way of saying enough is enough, never again 
should this happen in the land or to the people. Children are, therefore, taught these taboos so 
that as they grow up, to avoid them. Traditional Respondent 4 held that taboos are used by the 
Akan people to primarily preserve nature and also to keep certain animal species alive. He 
further stated that: Our ancestors were also wise like we were saying, they were also conscious 
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of the environment. Even at certain times, they will prevent people from hunting all in the cause 
of preserving nature, so with time they become taboo to the people of that given area. 
Traditional Respondent 6 revealed that there are two categories of taboos, namely behavioural 
taboos and verbal taboos. The verbal taboos are those taboos that relate to things that should 
not be said. These also come in other sub-categories. For instance, we have what we call ntam, 
that is, the oath of the people. These oaths are based on some past unpleasant situation or 
epidemic or death of a king or warrior or of the people, which they do not want to be reminded 
of. Behaviourial taboos, he explained, are those category of taboos that point to unacceptable 
behaviours in the community. Some of these, he said, are also in practice in other societies 
beyond Ghana. For instance, incest or having sexual relationship with a close family relation 
is a widely held taboo. However, for the Akans, behavioural taboos may include eating habits, 
such as not walking on the street while eating. A chief is also not allowed to play the game of 
draught because of the insults that comes with the game, among many others. According to 
Traditional Respondent 1, sometimes if one should break a taboo, it is the person alone who 
suffers the repercussions, and other times, depending on the weight of the taboo, the entire 
community suffers the ramifications. He mentioned incest or when someone defiles the 
community’s rivers or shrine as some instances of a taboo which when broken can bring harm 
on the entire community.   
The information obtained on the totem animals of the eight Akan Clans was not different from 
that which was discussed in the literature review. As such, table 2.12.1 from Chapter two is 
repeated below to show the different animal totems of the eight Akan Clans with the 
characteristics associated with the animals. All these animals named as a totem for each of the 
clans, are considered taboo animals by that particular clan, and that particular clan only. Thus, 
a totem animal of the Asona Clan may not be considered a taboo by the Agona Clan and vice 
versa. The study, for example, discovered that even though the dog is a totem and therefore 
considered a taboo to be killed or eaten by the Aduana Clan, it is regarded as a delicacy by the 
Akyem group of Akans who consider the dog meat as a ‘union meat’ or meat for the royals. As 
Traditional Respondent 1 noted: there are some people who eat the bat, but those who have the 
bat as their totem do not eat it.  
The Akan name for totem is either Agyinahyede, Akyeneboa, akraboa or Ahyensodze. 
According to Traditional Respondent 7, these totems are not only used as a mere emblem of 
the Clan but they represent “the soul of the Clan.” Traditional Respondent 1 noted that the 
totems were regarded as the soul and guardian spirits of the Clan and as a result, each clan has 
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to revere its totem animal as a symbol of the Clan. He thought this was very important because 
he believed that if each of the eight Akan Clans is protecting their totem animal, it will mean 
that these animals will live long and will in turn help the community and the environment. 
Traditional Respondent 1, again, mentioned that the Akans believe their totem animals protect 
the Clan because the power possessed by the animals will be on the Clan. As a consequence, if 
a member of a clan kills a totem animal, it would be regarded as a broken taboo. Such a person 
was required to perform some rituals to cleanse him or herself of the curse. The chief observed 
further that there is some sort of relationship between the clan and their totem animals, the kind 
of relationship that will not make for the members of the Clan to kill or hurt their totem animals. 
Traditional Respondent 6 reemphasized this point while intimating that there could be some 
sort of punishment on a member of a clan who knowingly kill his or her totem.  
However, if the act was done mistakenly, the person needs to inform the adults of the Clan for 
some purification and prayers to the gods for forgiveness. Nothing will happen to someone 
from a different Clan who kills another Clans totems, he said. He restated the point that there 
is a strong a link between the totem animal and the Clan that it spirit protects. According to 
Traditional Respondent 6, the Asona Clan which has the reddish snake as one of their totems, 
held a believe that should a Clan member meet a red snake, the implication may be that his or 
her relative may be dead or will die in the very near future. Thus, there was some kind of 
‘supernatural’ connection between the totem animal and the Clan. This means that no one will 
kill their totem animals because doing so is tantamount to killing yourself or a member of your 
family, he added. For Traditional Respondent 5, sometimes some Clans can organize a funeral 
for their totem animal should it be killed mistakenly or intentionally. A panel will also be set 
up to try the perpetuator of the killing. He added that should a member of a particular Clan find 
its totem animal in an unsafe place, it was incumbent on the individual to guide the animal to 
safety.   
The respondents reported that each Clan has a symbol of its animal totem on their traditional 
staff and umbrellas so that their Clans are easily identified. To this, Traditional Respondent 9 
pointed out that the totem animals are considered by the Clan members as a brother or a sister 
and so, they will not do any harm to it. Rituals will be made should a Clan member mistakenly 
kill a totem animal. Traditional Respondent 7 added that in the past, this question will not even 
be asked because no one will even think of killing or eating their totem animal. Killing a totem 
animal is likened to killing a fellow human being and thus, a taboo, he emphasized.   
136 
 
Concerning the Akan totems, the study discovered that the exact history behind how these 
animals became the totems of the Clans was not well known by many of the respondents. The 
study gathered from the traditional respondents that that some of these totems were perhaps 
chosen to reflect the characteristics of the Clan or how the Clan wanted to be perceived. 
According to Traditional Respondent 3, the ancestors of the Akans observed certain lifestyle 
of some animals, and felt that if they should adopt these animals as their totem, people will 
associate with the character of these animals. Some of the factors they considered were the 
intelligence and behavior of the animals. Traditional Respondent 6, further explained that the 
Asakyiri Clan has the vulture as one of its totems. The vulture, to them, is a symbol to live lfe 
carefully and to preserve one’s life. This is because the vulture is an animal that is known to 
live very long and is believed to always say “Mede me kwasea repɛ nyinkyɛ”, that is to say, ‘I 
am using my foolishness to gain long life’. So that, even though it looks dirty, it is calm and 
lives long. Another clan, he continued, uses the bald headed bird as a symbol to express longer 
life, maturity and wisdom. The Asona Clan has the crow as its totem to symbolize beauty just 
like the beauty of the crow bird. More so, the Asonas will usually boast that even the back of 
their head is more beautiful than the face of somebody. He added that the leopard as a totem 
for the Bretuo Clan is used to depict its characteristics. The leopard is known to be very 
ferocious, strong and smart in terms of running, bold, and not easily frightened by anything. 
Similarly, the Agona Clan uses the parrot as their totem to show how eloquent they are in 
communication and the Asakyiri Clan has the eagle as their totem to show intelligence and 
stamina of character. Traditional Respondent 5 hinted that totems are a Clan’s identity that 
depict the character of the Clan, and are the spirit and backbone of the Clan.  
The history of the totem of the Aduana Clan was, however, very well known by almost all of 
the traditional respondents, nevertheless, it was Traditional Respondent 3 who gave a more 
detailed account. Generally, the Aduana Clan chose the dog because it said that it was the dog 
that first brought fire to the world through their ancestor. According to Traditional Respondent 
3, the patriarch of the Aduana, Ansa Sasraku, was a hunter who used to go to the jungle with 
his dog. One day he wanted to make fire but there was no fire to lighten the firewood. So the 
dog left him for a while and returned with fire in its mouth. Then they adopted the dog as their 
totem. Traditional Respondent 4 gave an account of the history behind the use of the buffalo 
as the totem of the Ekuona Clan as follows: 
During the days of the tribal wars, the [buffalo] for instance, which is the totem of Ekuona 
Clan according to history, when our fathers were fighting, our great great fathers were fighting 
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at Ashanti at a certain point they had to cross a river. A head of [buffalo] transformed 
themselves like a bridge, they followed each other so the people walked over them to the other 
side of the river. That is how it became the totem. So no Ekuona citizen of sound mind should 
eat a [buffalo] as a delicacy. Not at all.  
Traditional Respondent 6 narrated the history behind the Agona Clan’s use of a parrot as their 
totem animal as follows:  
Because you see, the parrot, there is a history about a hunter who went to the forest to hunt, 
and was being attacked by some other people and they asked whether he was alone in the 
forest. He said ‘no’ he came with some people. They asked, where are they? Then he heard the 
parrot speaking, because we believe that the parrot speaks. Then he said oh yes, is it true, and 
then one parrot started speaking. Then after some time that parrot was joined by other parrots. 
And then these assailants were now scared that oh they are many. So they say that “wohunu 
awidi koro a mmɛnto no boɔ ebia na ɔfiri tutuom mu.” Meaning if you see one parrot don’t 
throw a stone at it, it might be coming from a multitude. 
Traditional Respondent 7 had two different versions of the history behind the choice of a parrot 
as the totem animal of the Ekuona Clan. In his first account, he stated that history has it that a 
group of people call the Dishena, always travelled with host of animals. On one of these travels, 
when they got to a certain place, the parrot went ahead of them and noticed that there were 
some assailants on the path the people were travelling waiting to ambush them. The parrot used 
its ability to speak to scare the assailants to flee and ended up saving the people from the hands 
of the assailants. As the people went farther in their travel, the parrot, whose favorite food is 
the palm kernel, noticed a palm tree and went to perch on it to eat from it. As it was eaten, it 
noticed a pot inside the branches of the trees and made talking sounds which forced the people 
to climb the palm tree to find the pot. The realized that the pot was filled with gold dust. The 
gold dust made the people wealthy and as a result they decided to make the parrot their totem 
for protecting them and leading them to wealth. The second account, according to Traditional 
Respondent 7 is that anytime a member of the Clan had an issue with the law, the parrot will 
come to the person on a tree or on a building and tell the person the details of the issue or how 
he or she should defend himself or herself when called to answer. Hence, the people chose the 
parrot as their totem animal. 
Aside the totems, other animals considered as taboos are snakes, monkeys, tortoise, and some 
species of snails. Others are ducks, whales, nightjars, and the chameleon. Traditional 
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Respondent 5 revealed that big animals such as the buffalos and whales were taboos because 
the people considered them to be kings in their own right. Traditional Respondent 3, also 
pointed out that some animals are not eaten or used for any rituals because they are considered 
unclean due to their lifestyle and place of feeding. These include rats, bats, owl, wagtail, 
sparrow, and other scavenger birds.  
 Table 5.4.1.3 Akan Clans and their totem animals  
Name of clans Totem  Characteristics/Depictions 
9. Aduana  Dog, Frog Hardworking; clever; brave; friendliness; 
humility 
10. Agona Parrot Eloquence; frankness  
11. Asakyiri  Vulture, Eagle Beauty; stamina; intelligence 
12. Asenie Bat, bald headed bird Bravery; diplomacy 
13. Asona Crow, Wild boar, red 
snake 
Wisdom; purity of heart; eloquence 
14. Bretuo Leopard Aggressiveness; exceptional bravery 
15. Ekuona Buffalo Uprightness 
16. Oyoko Falcon, hawk Patience; self-confidence 
 
On the topic of ntorɔ, the study received some divergent views from the traditional respondents. 
Some thought the ntorɔ is the same as the ntɔn (family/clan) others thought the two were 
different Traditional Respondent 6, on his part, explained that the Akans believe in a kind of 
tripartite make-up of a person, made up of the spirit, soul and blood. The soul is believed to be 
given by God, the blood by the mother and the spirit by the father. The spirit shows the person’s 
character, whether wise or foolish. He mentioned that there are about twelve of these ntorɔ 
with the prefix of ‘bosom’ (smaller god) such as Bosomtwe, Bosoma and Bosompra. 
Bosompra, for example, comes from the River Pra. He added that names of some Akans are 
based on these ntorɔ because it is the father who gives the name. Thus, it is likely to find people 
who share similar ntorɔ having similar names. Members of a particular ntorɔ are noted for not 
eating certain animals. For example, members of the Bosommuru ntorɔ are not to eat meat 
from a python, monkey and wild dog, while Bosomtwe people are to avoid meat from monkeys, 
snails, and tortoise.  
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For Traditional Respondent 5, the ntorɔ is something like a nickname, an honorific for the Clan. 
He saw it as a praise name, accolade or special appellation that depicts the position, the 
behavior and the character of the family or Clan. For him, the ntorɔ is just another name for 
Clan. Traditional Respondent 3, spoke of the ntorɔ as that which determines a Clans special 
abilities and characteristics. Again, there are some people among the Asantes who are believed 
to be offspring of the fetish shrines. They are children of the abosom (fetish shrines) so they 
observe certain taboos. Traditional Respondent 4 admitted that it was the first time he was 
hearing of the term ntorɔ and that he was only aware of the ntɔn. The ntɔn, he mentioned, is 
the same as the Clan symbol. In addition, he stated that the Ashantis, especially the Akyem 
people, call the clan the ntɔn and they explain that it comes from the father, that is, the spirit of 
your father given to you at birth.  
The ntorɔ, for Traditional Respondent 1, is a type of family or clan that goes through the 
paternal line and it refers to the spirit that dwells in the human body. Every human being 
comprises three active parts, namely the visible human body and the intangible spirit and soul. 
As a result, the ntorɔ is the spirit that is derived from the father. Furthermore, he stated that it 
is the blood that is regarded as the clan and the ntorɔ is from the father which makes a spiritual 
being. The ntorɔ, he noted, are twelve, and each of them has a special water body, such as a 
river or lake, such as the River Pra and Lake Bosomtwe or a river such as Ankobra and the rest 
are all among the rivers, meaning that they bath in them. Thus, the Akans usually ask the 
question, ‘what is your clan or which ‘ntorɔ’ do you bath in?’ This means, what river do you 
bath with or what clan do you hail from? So the ntorɔ is like your clan from your father’s side. 
They have certain rivers they do not have to defile and taboos they need to adhere to. In Cape 
Coast, the four traditional respondents in the focus group discussion agreed unanimously that 
the ntorɔ is the same as the ntɔn. According to Traditional Respondent 7, these ntorɔ names 
are given to people as a way of showing gratitude to the oracle that helped the family to give 
birth. Traditional Respondent 9 reiterated that the ntorɔ or ntɔn is the spirit from the father 
given to the child at birth, as the blood is from the mother. Without it, the father would not 
have any stake in the child since the Akans are matrilineal. They also indicated that there are 
certain taboo animals that are to be avoided by each ntorɔ.   
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5.3.1.4 Animal Pain and Doing Animals Wrong 
All the traditional respondents agreed that animals can be wronged in one way or the other. 
They gave some instances in which they believe animals can be wronged. Traditional 
Respondent 1 opined that there are times where a hunter will aim a gun at an animal, only to 
shoot and miss, but ends up shooting a smaller animal instead. Since the hunter has no use for 
the smaller animal he will leave it there to die of its wounds, he said. Similarly, he added, a 
hunter may want to kill a big animal such as ‘ɔtwe’ (antelope) or ‘ɔdabɔ’ (duker) but the mother 
may escape and the hunter will end up with a small one which he cannot bring home, so he 
would leave it in the bush. In his view, these acts bring harm to the animal because this young 
animal could have grown up and produced more offspring to replace the older ones. He 
continued by stating that, at times, an animal would be shot but it may escape with its gunshot 
wounds. At other times, traps are set to catch an animal but the traps end up cutting only the 
animal’s limb. According to Traditional Respondent 1, there is a type of trap called ‘dadefidie’ 
which can cut the hand of the animal while it escapes. For him, if the trap set is too strong, it 
ends up cutting the arm of the animal while it escapes from the trap and the hunter cannot bring 
the small arm home for anything except that it only makes the animal deformed. The animal 
may escape to a secluded place and may eventually die. Likewise, sometimes, a trap may be 
intended to catch a grasscutter but it ends up catching a snake instead. The owner of the trap 
will eventually kill the snake. He additionally explained that animals in the home are also 
harmed in a variety of ways. To this he said:  
We rear animals such as the cat, the dog, fowls and others at home. Sometimes, you would be 
feeding your fowls and a stronger hen would come to consume the feed and you be tempted to 
throw something at it. Sometimes too, we can starve some of the animals. You may keep the 
dog in a pen and you will forget to give it food or water or because the animal is wild, we 
confine it and make it endure some suffering. It may feel hungry and has to struggle before it 
gets food to eat… In the olden days, sometimes when a sheep comes to someone’s house, they 
would throw something at it. Then the animal will run to its owner’s home. They make the 
animal feel pains. Sometimes, they would intentionally inflict pain on the animal and may 
confess that they had hit the animal or may deny it.  
Traditional Respondent 1 explained that on the other hand, when one is good to animals, it is 
common to see such animals voluntarily gather around when one brings in their feed. 
According to him, a dog, for example, will come at your beckon and will outwardly show 
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affection towards you. However, if it is hit, it is aware that you are the one that caused it pain 
or harm. Thus, he said: 
The animals have feelings, he asserted. Their scent and the way they look at you with their eyes, 
spiritually they are able to see certain things. A cat, for example, if it is regularly close to you, 
some spirits cannot reach you. If it happens that someone is about to die in the household the 
cat will leave the house because it does not like to be tainted with filth. So yes, humans can 
cause animals pain. Even sometimes they can be very sad, especially when they are hit with 
something. It shows. It shows that they really felt the pain.  
Furthermore, Traditional Respondent 1 was of the view that how humans treat animals can 
affect humans’ relationship with these animals. For him, it is possible for the animal, if it is a 
dog, to stop protecting its owner. It can also affect the animals by destroying their ability to 
give birth or break their bones.     
Traditional Respondent 4 pointed out that animals are wronged when they are unjustifiably 
maltreated. According to him, the Akan people held a belief that spiritually, if one should 
continually mistreat animals, the animals have a way of getting back at the person. To this, he 
narrated a personal experience that occurred as follows: 
Let me tell you a story that I saw when I was growing up.  There was this hunter in our village 
who was always after monkeys and this man was attacked one day during his hunting 
expedition in the forest. He was attacked by a team of or hoard of monkeys and beaten 
mercilessly. He didn’t learn from it. After recovery, he continued because at least every, week 
he has to kill one, sometimes twice in a week.  Eventually, he gave birth to a girl who was an 
exact replica of a monkey. This is a true story, I know it, I saw it, and I’m talking about it. It is 
not hearsay. The child, girl child was just a replica of a monkey. The claws, the hand, 
everything, the face. She grew up to about her 20’s and she died. She was called Amma Awua. 
I remember it vividly, Amma Awua, no boy will ever talk to this girl. What are you, aren’t you 
afraid. So these are some of the things. This is an indication that animals can be wronged but 
they take their pound of flesh.  
Traditional Respondent 3 stated that it is possible to offend animals but because humans have 
authority over them, they overlook it when they offend the animals. According to him, the 
tethering of animals, preventing animals from grazing and refusal to feed them in good time or 
starving them are some of the things that are done to wrong animals. Traditional Respondent 5 
asserted that: If for no just cause you kill the animal or you kill it not because you want to use 
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it for food, it means you are subjecting the animal to an unjustified harm. Yes, you are causing 
unjustifiable harm to it, this should not be the case…. He also averred that treating animals 
badly can have some negative effect on the person, such as in the instance of the cat which is 
believed to have some special instincts, such that when treated cruelly, it could do something 
harmful to the person. He maintained that it was possible for the spirits to get hold of such a 
person, and he or she, as a consequence, could give birth to an animal as a form of punishment. 
He told of a personal story to this effect thus:  
I remember, there was a story that a certain man used to catch catfish from a river very often. 
Sometime later his wife gave birth to a catfish. A real catfish that resembled a human being. It 
happened twice. I saw one. The shape of the head of one of them was just like that of the catfish. 
What happened in this town has confirmed that it was the river that caused that. 
Traditional Respondent 6, on his part, claimed that Akans believe animals can be wronged: to 
this he said: 
Yes, I think is true. They [the Akans] believe that even for some dogs, sometimes they will be 
in the house and they could be a little bit moody. So when you hit a dog and it is coming back, 
it comes in a very moody manner then you have offended it. So those are true. Yes, the behavior 
and even the wild animals, especially if you misfire them. You want to kill but you were no able 
to or you didn’t succeed. When it is bouncing back. It comes to pounce on you…  
When asked to explain why the Akans support the killing of animals for various activities 
despite the fact that they hold the belief that animals can be wronged, Traditional Respondent 
6 responded that:  
Okay, you see, even in the Bible if you go to the Bible, it says God said that I have given 
dominion over all the animals. So, even though they are created just like human beings by our 
nature we have dominion over them. We can use them to satisfy our needs. So killing them is 
nothing wrong. But you don’t kill the one that is closely connected with you in terms of totem. 
The four traditional respondents from the focus group discussion in Cape Coast likewise agreed 
that animals do feel pain. According to Traditional Respondent 7, a kind of mercy killing 
approach is adopted by the people because they believe animals feel pain. He explained that: 
Before animals are killed, he explained, you must first give it water. Secondly, you must cover 
the throat so that no sound of pain comes out. The third thing you do is that the knife or cutting 
material you are using must be sharp enough to go through completely. That is the essence of 
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using a live animal for rituals. If you about killing the animal and you put a knife to the neck 
and it cries, the animal has become bad for the sacrifice… We are in the animal kingdom that 
is why we have transferred the notion of mercy killing from humans to animals. Even at home 
if they are slaughtering a chicken, they remove the feathers around the neck so that they can 
easily get to the skin so that the knife can easily go through. So we are not cruel to animals. 
Traditional Respondent 9 also added that apart from the killing that can bring about pain to the 
animal, sometimes there is the belief among the traditional people that if you do something bad 
to the animal, it can turn on you. She offered a story she was told about someone who caused 
unnecessary pain to a goat as follows:  
There was this story of somebody. It was said that there was this goat that frequently came to 
eat his stuff. One day, he caught it and inserted hot pepper into its anus and then turned it away 
after giving it multiple maltreatment. The animal continuously cried in agony for a long time 
because it was unable to pass feces and it eventually died. It is a true story somebody told me. 
They said it was not long after the death of the goat that the man became sick. He was also 
unable to pass feces or do anything. Eventually, he had to confess before he died. So we have 
this saying or belief that animals are not to be wronged. No cruelty to animals. 
On the topic of animal pain, all the traditional respondents agreed that animals can experience 
pain. Traditional Respondent 6 was of the view that animals can experience both pain and 
pleasure. Traditional Respondent 5 maintained that animals are believed to experience grief. 
He asserted that: Yes, you see it is just like what happened to the river. I have some belief that, 
that catfish was the offspring of the river. It is allowed to ask for permission to harvest some 
of the fish for food. But the use of DDT in killing her offspring is prohibited. Yes, it means you 
have killed its offspring. Do you understand it? Traditional Respondent 4 was of the view that 
animals can experience both pain and pleasure. For him, it is because they can experience pain 
and pleasure that is why sometimes, in some areas after they plant and harvest corn and 
plantain, they leave some of the ripe ones for the animals because they also must eat. He stated 
that, we have that pain, that feeling for the animals, he said. He continued that, they (the 
animals) should be happy and when they are happy they multiply. And for your own good for 
the good of man, when the time comes to go for them, you have to go for them, you have them 
all over. Traditional Respondent 2 also reacted to the topic of animal pain as follows: An animal 
can feel pain. If you harm an animal such as a goat, it can stand at a distance and stare at you. 
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Hmm, they feel the pains. You may think you are punishing the owner of the animal but the 
animal also feels the pain. 
Upon the study’s enquiry to know if animals can be made happy, Traditional Respondent 3 
responded by narrating his personal experience with some birds that have made the front of his 
house their home: 
You know, there are some birds that come to make their nests in front of my house. They lay 
their eggs in the nests and hatch their chicks. They remain here till the chicks grow feathers 
and learn to fly, and if they fall in their early attempts, I pick them up. When they grow and 
they are leaving I bid them good-bye. They return during their next laying season because they 
have studied the situation to assure themselves that I will not do them any harm. Now I regard 
them as my companions so when they are leaving, I tell them that I would pray for them so that 
no child shoots a catapult at them and they keep coming year after year. A dove has made its 
nest in front of my house and it will lay its eggs at the appropriate time and hatch the eggs and 
they would live here till the chicks grow feathers and they will fly to and fro. When some of 
them come to my room, I pick them and send them to their ‘mothers’. Now I can show you 
where some of them are. They study the situation and they are sure that I will not do them any 
harm. When I speak they understand it, they know when I am pounding ‘fufu’, when I turn on 
my radio, and do other things. Still they have a belief in me that… I do not do them any harm, 
so I have a catapult. Some of the birds fly far away so I refrained from shooting them with my 
catapult. Then I repented so I have desisted from killing birds with a catapult. It is a big 
problem. 
Traditional Respondent 2 reacted that truly animals can feel happiness if they are treated well. 
According to her:  
For instance, when you treat the dog and the cat well by feeding them regularly and playing 
with them, they feel your absence and become miserable when you are not around. As soon as 
you approach them, they feel happy, for instance fowls and sheep and others, if you treat them 
well and kindly. When you are not around, they realize it.  So as soon as you come back they 
realize that their keeper is around. And they feel happy and excited. 
The study further inquired from the traditional respondents whether all the aforementioned 
instances of pain that are caused on animals constitute a harm done directly to the animals or 
their human owners. To this, Traditional Respondent 7 was quick to answer that yes, the harm 
is directly to the animal. Traditional Respondent 9, on her part, thought it depended on the 
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situation. She stated that: sometimes you may hit the animal out of spite for the owner but the 
hurt goes directly to the animal. Indirectly, it affects the owner because when the animal breaks 
a leg or a bone it is the owner that will be troubled. So yes we wrong the animal. Traditional 
Respondent 3 also replied that:  
No, if an animal is owned by somebody and you offend it, you indeed offend the owner. You 
know, if I offend you, I have equally offended your father. Hence, if you offend me, I have to 
report to your father. I need not retaliate unexpectedly. So, in the olden days it was a regulation 
that if somebody’s sheep destroys your crops… It is stated in the Laws in Deuteronomy that 
the sheep would be arrested and sent to the owner and explain to him the damage it has caused 
for the owner to pay for the damage. It is not right to kill the animal… Since animals are unable 
to talk, sometimes we encroach on their rights. 
Traditional Respondent 5 replied saying: Yes, you have harmed the animal. You cannot 
mercilessly strike a fowl that you do not intend killing for food and cause it to writhe in pain. 
As a result of hitting it mercilessly, you have subjected it to pain. You see that you have caused 
harm to it. Traditional Respondent 4 responded that: 
Well, the domestic ones are not considered as being any spiritual significant like the wild ones. 
Well like you rightly said, when I hurt your goat, I come to you and I pay any fine, we sit down, 
we discuss then I pay for it. We don’t care about the pain or the agony that the animal is going 
through. In some places they are healed. When you break the legs, they heal them, even chicken 
and so on, they heal them, they do them, that is, they protect them. Someone uses them as real 
pets, they don’t kill them. You know, such a person, if you hit his pet you will be in trouble. But 
the wild ones we consider their health for their own sake, anything, any laws to preserve or to 
do anything is for the sake of the animals because we don’t even know them, unless we luckily 
or by chance pounce on them in your expedition.  
According to Traditional Respondent 1, hurting animals or causing them pain does not always 
constitute wrong doing on the part of the human perpetuator. He thought it depends on the 
reason that got the person to hit the animal in the first place. For example, he narrated, if a cat 
should come for your meat, it may have to be punished to stop it from stealing meat. Other 
times, the cat may hide under the bed and defecate and so must be punished. 
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5.3.1.5 Animals having spirits and/or souls 
From the focus group discussion with the four traditional respondents in Cape Coast, it was 
found out that animals do not possess a soul. Traditional Respondent 8 stated that it is not 
mentioned anywhere in their tradition or belief that animals possess a soul. The Traditional 
Respondent 9, responded saying: No as for animals they do not have souls. When they die, they 
die. She believed that it was one of the differences between animals and humans. She went on 
further that: None of the animals have souls. We do not know but we presume that once they 
are animals and we can kill them and eat them and you cannot kill a human being they do not 
have souls. On whether animals have spirits, Traditional Respondent 8 was of the view that if 
animals do not have souls, then they cannot have spirits. However, some of the participants 
were also of the view that some animals can be possessed by spirits even though that is not for 
everyone to see except for people with ‘special’ eyes.  
Traditional Respondent 1, on his part, believed that animals have souls. His position was that 
animals and humans share certain attributes such as growth, procreation, death, and the ability 
to walk. As a result of these similarities, animals too have spirits just as humans do. Below is 
an excerpt of his response:  
Animals have spirits just as humans also do. Not all animals have spirits. The animals with 
spirits are divided into two... It is the life that gives the soul. The large animals such as lions, 
elephants, etc., the large ones in the forest have spirits. So that if a hunter goes to the forest 
and kills an elephant or kills a large animal such as a lion and he comes back to report to the 
elders of his kill, he is told there is a spirit behind him. If certain rituals are not done for him 
the spirit will continue to torment him. If this ritual is not done for the hunter the hunter goes 
to the forest fearing that the spirit of the animal he has killed still lingers there and as result a 
bad omen may befall him. So animals have spirits, especially the large ones. It is the smaller 
ones that do not have spirits… The meat of the elephant, for example, is eaten but in the past, 
if a hunter kills it, there was a ritual called ‘Abofosi’ that was done for him to glorify him. All 
those who will attend are made to bath a special water that is meant to sack the spirit of the 
animal… That is why some animals are buried when they die… When they die we do not know 
where their spirits go even though we know where the human soul goes to. 
Traditional Respondent 2 held that animals can possess both spirit and soul. They also possess 
spirit. They have soul. You know that we sometimes refer to both human beings and animals as 
“animals” (mammals) but each of us have different characteristics. So they also possess spirit, 
she offered. On the question of what happens to the animals’ soul after death, the Queen Mother 
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replied saying: Theirs perish. They do not go anywhere. We ourselves kill them for food. 
According to Traditional Respondent 4, animals only have spirits but not souls. He answered 
saying: No, no, no, animals have spirit, they don’t have souls. They do not have souls because 
the soul… our soul goes back to the owner, God our creator… the Bible says we should pour… 
don’t eat the blood of the animal, it is the spirit of the animal.  It is life, the life in the animal 
is the spirit, not the soul. The soul accounts to the creator, but the spirit hovers.  You 
understand? …So, that is why God warned the Israelites not to eat the carcass of the dead 
animal. The blood is still there. Traditional Respondent 3 claimed that animals have both spirits 
and souls. He stated that: “Yes, animals have spirit just as God endowed them with it. They 
have their way of life by which they study things and they can be more intelligent than human 
beings… Animals have soul, so if the soul leaves the body the animal dies. He held that when 
the animal dies, the soul goes back to where it came from, that is, to God who created it. God 
provided the animal with it. For him, all things came from the Lord so it would go back, but I 
do not know whether there is judgment for them.  
Furthermore, Traditional Respondent 5 also claimed that animals only have some ‘God-given 
spirit’ but not a soul. He believed that it is this spirit that made it possible for them to be tamed 
and trained to follow certain instructions. He also stated that when animals die, that is the end 
of it, their soul does not go anywhere. He held this to be true for both small and large animals 
alike. In contrast, Traditional Respondent 6 held that the larger wild animals in the bush or 
forest possess a soul and not the smaller ones. He asserted that:  
When it comes to the bush, looking at the wild ones, we can group them into smaller ones such 
as the rat, okusie, grasscutter, adowa and those smaller ones, antelope on one side… And 
others, the wild big ones, such as the buffalo, the duiker and of course, the topmost will be the 
elephant. We call them ‘sasaboa’. Sa-sa-boa: boa, ‘aboa’ is an animal because the Akans 
believe that they also have souls and spirit just like human beings.  
Concerning the smaller animals, Traditional Respondent 6 stated that: you just kill them and 
you are free”. Traditional Respondent 2 indicated that the Akans believe that some wild 
animals possess spirits hence, killing them require special skills. According to her, an animal 
like the buffalo is one of such animals. There is a saying, she continued, among the Akans that 
to kill this buffalo or after killing it, the hunter must bath the saasa (ghost or spirit) medicine. 
If this is not done, the saasa of the animal will haunt the hunter all the time. This, she said, is 
captured in a popular saying which in English means that to kill a buffalo which will require a 
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bath with the saasa medicine then let it go away. Sometimes, she added, some people say, they 
kill an animal in the forest but before they approach and examine the animal they killed, the 
animal metamorphoses into a human being. Hence, for her, so many things are involved and it 
takes courage to kill animals. This view is made to reinforce their beliefs and convictions that 
certain animals possess a spirit in them. 
 
5.3.1.6 How human-animal relationship affects how animals are treated 
Concerning how the human-animal-relationship affect human treatment of animals, Traditional 
Respondent 6 mentioned that a close relationship with animals changes one’s outlook towards 
the animal. He said:  
Your outlook towards the animal will change, I mean you become so closer to the animal. That 
is why some people have dogs who have stayed in the house… Any time a dog dies, it is just 
like a funeral. Everybody, especially kids in the house, everybody becomes so gloomy and they 
are of themselves. So the longer you become associated with the animal the more friendly the 
relationship becomes. And sometimes some people treat them as human beings. 
He believed this to be also valid for wild animals which have been domesticated. Thus, he said: 
…the moment you bring it home. You domesticate it and it becomes like any domestic wild one 
and becomes as a pet. Traditional Respondent 5 also responded that a good close relationship 
with animals establishes a bond-like that of siblings between animals and humans. He held 
that: You see that when you establish a relationship with it and allow it to do what you also do 
then you become like a sibling. You are no more enemies. No one fears the other anymore, so 
definitely... Yes, it has become part of the owner. …their presence in your house means you 
have some service to render for them. He was also of the belief that a close relationship with 
an animal makes it difficult and painful for the owner to kill it. Traditional Respondent 2 also 
expressed similar sentiments saying: …When there is an occasion that you should kill your 
own animal for food, you feel reluctant to do that. So, sometimes you have to engage a neutral 
person to kill it for you. But at any rate, you have to kill it for food. Traditional Respondent 2 
indicated that it is those animals that are kept at home particularly, those that that are kept as 
pets that the human relationship with them makes it difficult to kill. She said: Someone may 
have reared a fowl or goat, it is very difficult or painful or hurts for them to kill the said animal. 
Because the way they relate to the animals, it is very difficult for the animals to be killed. 
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5.3.2 The young adult respondents 
On the theme of the moral status of nonhuman animals, the study similarly engaged the young 
adult respondents. The young adult respondents, as indicated, comprised two focus groups 
namely, the Campus Focus Group, and the Nungua Focus Group. Again, while almost all the 
questions asked of the respondents in this group had some implications on the theme at hand, 
the following are the questions asked directly towards the theme - What Clan do you belong to 
and what are their animal totem and taboos? Explain why you may or may not believe that 
some aspects of nature including animals can be or have spirits? Do you thinks animals have 
souls, why or why not? In what ways do you think animals can be wronged? Do you think 
animals can feel pain and pleasure, why or why not? How are animals treated or not treated 
well in Ghana?  
What follows in this section are the responses from the young adult respondents based on the 
above questions.  
 
5.3.2.1 The place of humans and animals 
Under the theme of the interrelatedness of nature, it was reported that the young adult 
respondents acknowledged the fact that humans, and the rest of nature including animals, are 
interconnected and depended on one another for survival. They also intimated that despite the 
interconnection, humans are to be regarded superior to other living things in nature. The study 
sought to find out more in terms of what, in the view of the young adult respondents, 
distinguishes humans from nonhuman animals that should make humans merit the top position 
in nature.  
Starting with the Campus Focus Group, there was no agreement regarding what should 
constitute the distinctive mark between humans and animals. The participants from the Nungua 
Focus Group were also faced with similar situation. Some of the suggested attributes that 
participants from the Campus Focus Group thought set humans apart from animals are as 
follows: One participant identified as Kwame thought, it was ‘communication barrier’. To this 
view however, another respondent by name Benjamin raised doubt. He contemplated that what 
if animals can actually communicate, but humans have not yet developed the capabilities to 
comprehend. Relatedly, Shadrack thought it is the inability to enter into some sort of social or 
moral contract with animals that sets animals apart from humans. He stated that: You know for 
the sake of survival we humans have made laws not to kill each other, that is, for survival, but 
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we cannot have that laws with animals. Because if the animal gets me, it can eat me. When 
pressed further with the point that similar laws cannot be made with babies, yet it is considered 
morally wrong to eat babies, Shadrack retorted that babies are considered to be part of human 
species. He added that: even if we can’t make laws with them [babies] directly, we still have 
laws with their parents, their families, so it covers them. Aboraa agreed with him on this point. 
Shadrack, again, suggested that another mark of difference is that humans have higher 
rationality than animals.  
The participants from the Nungua Focus Group also made the following submissions: Obed 
identified ‘intuition’ as a key distinctive mark between animals and humans. Explaining what 
he meant he said: Our capacity to think is like vast, like wider, as compared to the animals. 
Majority of the participants agreed with him on this score. Obed, later on in the discussion, 
described humans as ‘super animals’ and that nature has been fashioned such that humans are 
made to eat animals. His exact words were: …but a human being is a super animal. What he 
can do as compared to the whole animals, it takes individual animals to do a number of things 
but one human can do a combination of work…that is how we are made. We are made to feed 
on animals; that is how we are created. Osei, however, suggested that it was the fact that 
humans had souls and animals do not. For him, animals and humans are equal in every respect 
except for this fact. Thus, he stated: Animals do not have souls but humans have souls. Apart 
from that everything is the same. Some animals are fast, they think faster than humans. So I 
believe only the soul. When they die there is no soul, everything remains on earth. 
  
5.3.2.3 Taboos and totems 
The study gathered that participants from the two focus groups were not familiar with the 
specific details under this theme. Many of them did not know or were unsure the Akan Clan 
they belonged to, not to mention their affiliated totem animals, the taboos, and reverence 
traditionally required for their totem animals. Aborowa, a participant from the Campus Focus 
Group, for example, when asked about her totem mentioned that: I think I have heard but I am 
not so sure. Biretuo or Asakyiri. I don’t know. I think Biretuo or Asona, One of them. I’m not 
so sure. Shadrack replied: the last time I asked I believe I was told Oyokuo. Benjy’s response 
was: I think the Ashantis call it, the Twi call it Asona and in Fante it is Agona. 
The situation was not any different with the Nungua Focus Group participants. Although, few 
of them such as Obed, Opambour and Osei were confident of the Clan they belonged to, the 
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other four participants did not share that confidence. Pius, for example, claimed he had 
forgotten. Priscilla, on her part, mentioned that she belongs to the Bretuo Clan but admitted she 
didn’t know the totem. I think it’s a lion or so, she said. However, almost all of them were 
aware that traditionally, they were not supposed to harm, kill or consume their totem animal as 
food.  
 
5.3.2.4 Animal Pain and the wronging of Animals 
Generally, the young adult respondents believed that animals can be wronged in a variety of 
ways. They accepted that anything that brings about unnecessary pain to the animal can be 
classified as a wrong to the animals. This, they mentioned, include throwing stones at them; 
beating them; hitting or running them over with a car; among others. Claudia, for example, 
stated that: I think we can always wrong them, of course, even humans wrong humans, so how 
much more animals? Pius thought animals can be wronged but not all killings of animals 
constitute wrong doing. For him, it depends on the purpose of killing. Benjamin, on his part, 
queried if asking whether animals can be wronged, is not stretching morality to cover animals. 
For him, he was not sure about the possibility of that. He, however, agreed that animals can be 
wronged if they are harmed for no reason. Aboraa, on her part, stated that:  
Yeah, I think they can be wronged, like I feel even our everyday attitude towards animals such 
as killing, we are wronging them but just that we cannot feel what they are feeling, we just 
ignore them. But I think they can be wronged, like the instance Shadrach gave that somebody 
deliberately throws a stone at a pregnant goat just to be happy.  In that instance you are 
wronging the animal.  
They also generally accepted that animals can experience pain. Nevertheless, for many of them, 
the fact that animals experience pain does not suggest a total abolishment of their use whether 
for food, pets or for biomedical research. They will, instead, support a more humane way of 
killing them or giving them better treatment to reduce their pain. Shadrach, for example, 
mentioned that:  
I think that with this new information or with we knowing or bearing in mind that animals feel 
pain, the only thing we can do for them because we have higher rationality we cannot act as 
they will, so we know what pain is or we can actually understand what pain is, so the only thing 
we can do to them is to try to decrease or reduce the pain we take them through but for the 
eating we still have to. 
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Osei, who did not support the use of animals for human consumption said, he has always had 
the pain of the animals in mind. For Pius, even though he agrees animals experience pain, he 
only considers the animal pain if the animal is his pet. If not, then he does not think about the 
animal’s pain so much. He claimed that: I think we think about the pain when the animal is 
your pet. Unless it is my pet, if it is not my pet then no, no, no, no, if I am using it for something 
that I will benefit. To this end, he believed, it was only pets that can be wronged. Opambour 
held that animal pain does not really matter if a human life is at stake or if it will serve a greater 
purpose.  
The respondents identified some other practices and treatment of animals that they thought 
brought undue or unjustified pain to animals. These included trophy hunting and killing 
animals for the mere fun of it; indiscriminate killings of wild animals for their horns and ivory; 
having sexual intercourse with animals; making animals fight each other as a game; and using 
animals for farmland labour (example, to plough the land). Others are the starving of animals; 
hitting animals for no apparent reason and the way and manner some animals are killed.   
 
5.3.2.5 Animals’ inhabitation of a soul or a spirit 
On this theme, views were divided. Participants were not sure if animals have souls or spirits 
or if they have souls and not spirits or the other way around. Opambour thought animals have 
spirits but they do not have souls. Obed thought that if we are associating soul with life then 
animals can be said to have souls, but they do not have spirits. The respondents, however, 
agreed that animals can be possessed by spirits. Generally, most of the participants were more 
inclined to believe that animals have spirits than souls. Kwame, for instance, noted that: I don’t 
know animals have spirits but spirits inhabit them. That is my belief. I believe in the creator, I 
don’t think the creator made them with spirits but spirits can possess them to use them because 
spirits are not embodied, they don’t have body, you know, so they can use them. I don’t think 
animals have spirits. Despite this view, participants were however of the view that with the 
exception of their totem animals, they did not think the fact that animals have spirits or can be 
possessed by spirits should affect how humans threat them.  
 
5.4 Theme 3: Vegetarianism and the use of animals as food 
Questions on whether animals have rights or interests, and about whether it is morally right or 
wrong to hunt and trap animals, bear some affinity to the theme of vegetarianism. However, 
153 
 
the more direct questions asked towards this theme were: Is there anything wrong with the 
eating of animals, why or why not? Is becoming a vegetarian the ethical thing to do? What are 
some of the animals used as food (delicacies) and for sacrifices and rituals? Is it permitted or 
conceivable that an Akan should become a vegetarian? First, the study presents the responses 
from the traditional respondents followed by the young adult respondents. 
 
5.4.1 The traditional respondents’ views 
From every indication, the use of animals as food forms part of the daily diet of the traditional 
Akans. Table 5.4.1.2 above indicates some of the animals that are regularly used for their meat 
and other food products such as eggs. In the interactions with the traditional respondents, the 
researcher discovered that there is no Akan word for a vegetarian or vegetarianism unless one 
explains it in a sentence as ‘someone who does not eat meat or animal products’. It was evident 
that one of the major reason why animals are important to the Akans is for their food. 
Traditional Respondent 2, for example, stated emphatically that we should preserve the animals 
and use some of them for food and keep others to protect us. However, many of the traditional 
respondents indicated that it is possible for one to find individual Akans who abstain from meat 
and animals product, even though it is likely they do so for health and other personal reasons, 
rather than for a moral reason that considers the interests of animals. Traditional Respondent 2 
metioned that such people are not considered strange at all. She indicated further that there 
some people who are of the belief that eating meat can cause some illness. Such people perceive 
animals as potential carriers of diseases or germs. Such individuals, as a result, avoid meat in 
their diets and do not eat eggs either. These individuals may make it a point to eat only 
vegetables such as cabbage, carrot, onion, and tomatoes all the time. She, however, indicated 
that there are some who may regard animals as human beings and as such do not want to kill 
them. 
The Chief linguist of Aburi traditional area, Traditional Respondent 3, also stated that it was 
possible to find individuals who have made it a personal decision to consume only fruits and 
vegetables. He however indicated that the abstinence from meat product entirely may make 
one lack some essential nutrients and fall sick as a result of the likelihood of an unbalanced 
diet. Nevertheless, there was no law or taboo against anyone who decides to follow that path. 
For Traditional Respondent 5, the Akan customs do not really say anything specific on 
vegetarians or vegetarianism. He stated that: There is no specific rule in our culture; however, 
traditionally, if you look carefully, we use both the vegetables and meat together. But there is 
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no specificity here. For some traditional rituals, one has no choice but to use meat to fulfil the 
demands of culture. Furthermore, he indicated that the Akan customs do not prevent anyone 
from abstaining from meat. He, however, mentioned that it will be difficult for a chief to decide 
to use only vegetables and fruits for rituals in place of the animals that are used. Traditional 
Respondent 1 mentioned that he had not come across any chief who has stated that he does not 
eat meat. Meat, he claimed, forms part of the chiefs rituals and certain portion of the animal 
are reserved only for the chief, and others for specific individuals occupying specific traditional 
positions. In addition, there are men called osodofoɔ (male cooks) who cook for the chief and 
treat his meat as tradition requires. Again, the chief of every town had a particular animal that 
was used as food for him for his spiritual upliftment. As such, if a chief does not eat meat it 
may only be known by close members of his household and not publicly. Despite this, he agreed 
there was nothing in the Akan culture barring an ordinary person from deciding to abstain from 
meat.   
According to Traditional Respondent 4, not until recently, it was almost impossible to hear of 
an Akan who was a vegetarian. He stated that:  
Seriously, because meat and fish is what we live on. Your trap catches a game, fresh, you come 
and you try to prepare it, cut it into pieces, put hot pepper and so on, and you are on your way 
going, and what are you talking about – vegetarianism? The probability of the Akan in those 
days to come and tell you he is a vegetarian is very, very, limited, seriously. From my 
experience, I do not think so, if there were some of that maybe under the instructions from the 
gods, not voluntarily wanting to be a vegetarian. That will never be possible, yeah.  
For Traditional Respondent 6, traditionally, it is impossible to find someone who does not eat 
any meat at all. One may find individuals who may detest one particular meat or the other for 
various personal reasons, but not one, who does not eat meat entirely. He mentioned that some 
hunters may not eat blooded animals because of their experiences, but may eat fish, crabs and 
snails. Others naturally were born not liking certain foods.  
The position of the four traditional leaders who partook in the focus group discussion in Cape 
Coast was that traditionally, no one was prevented from becoming a vegetarian, although meat 
eating formed an essential part of the Akan custom. Traditional Respondent 9 stated that:  
There are some people who do not like meat right from birth. For instance, I do not eat fufuo. 
I have not eaten some before. Therefore, I can't eat it. Some people too when they eat meat, it 
is not good for them; it is not good for the person's body constitution. However, these days, 
155 
 
due to civilization and enlightenment we are admonished not to eat meat, otherwise, for meat, 
we eat. Because we eat game and sometimes kill domestic animals for food.  
She added that this was also true for a chief since eating meat is not part of the requirement of 
becoming a chief. She said: …so if you're a king today, and you were once a child, what you 
didn't like back then you can't be forced to like it today. What can stop you from becoming a 
king is when you are physically challenged but apart from deformity, no one can force you to 
eat something you do not like. 
 
5.4.2 The young adult respondents’ views 
All the seven participants in the Campus Focus Group did not have any problem with the killing 
and using of animals as food. It was only one person out of the seven, who identified himself 
as a partial vegetarian, and seem to sympathize somewhat with the killing and using of animals 
as food even though, he thought it was a personal decision to be made. There were two 
participants in the Nungua Focus Group who identified as vegetarians. Osei claims he became 
a vegetarian first, upon doctor’s advice (health reasons), but later developed love for animals. 
He, as a result, claims to be a vegetarian now on moral grounds. Priscilla, the second person in 
the Nungua Focus Group to identify herself as a vegetarian, said she is a vegetarian not on 
moral or health grounds but just a decision that she made. She personally never really liked 
eating meat, she said.  
Obed claimed he sees nothing wrong with eating animals as food, because it is for human 
sustainability. He also thought it is a subjective decision to be made. To this he said:  
I think all these things boil down to subjectivity. Is more of individual perception whether to 
feed on this [animal] or not, whether to have a mixed diet or not. For example, since birth 
nobody told you what to eat and what not to eat, but as you are growing up and learning and 
observing your environment, and also as you said moral and health reasons you choose to eat 
this or that. But on the normal grounds, I will go back to the ecosystem and say it is a cycle, 
they have to feed on each other.  
Pius believed there was nothing wrong with eating animals because God has cleansed all 
animals for human beings. For him, notwithstanding the fact that animals have life, their life is 
meant for a specific life span. According to Clara, there is nothing wrong with eating animals 
because animal food is nice and are a major source of protein. Efua as well, did not did not see 
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anything wrong done with the consumption of meat because for her, everything in nature, 
depends on each other for survival.  
Kwame, who was the only one in the Campus Focus Group who believed using animals for 
food is wrong, and identified himself as a ‘partial vegetarian’, did not agree with Clara that it 
is justifiable to eat animals because they are a source of protein. His reason for not supporting 
this is that he believes animals have their own way of communicating, and because they have 
life just like humans. Shadrack did not agree that animals are consumed only for their protein. 
He thought they are eaten also for their taste and aroma. Aboraa mentioned that some animals 
such as the hen are meant to be eaten, that is their purpose. She stated that:  
I disagree. Everything has a purpose to serve and you cannot tell me not to pluck a mango 
to eat because it is a living thing, but its purpose is for me to eat and feel free. Some animals 
are meant to be killed and eaten, like the hen. They are purposed in our tradition setting…We 
rear chicken for people to come and buy, to go and kill and then eat. Nobody will say I’m 
rearing this flock or chicken for a very long time without touching them. So, their purpose 
for us is to eat them. So, you can’t tell me that nobody should kill animals and eat because 
it is a living thing. 
She further thought that it was up to individuals to determine the purpose for which they 
want to keep an animal, whether for food or as pet.  
Benjamin thought that for the purpose of survival and sustenance it was ok to consume animals. 
He said:  
I think in the cycle of life, the few examples you mentioned, human beings, animals and trees 
depend on each other for sustenance and survival. Animals and trees depend on each other 
for sustenance and survival. Now, people eat plants and animals to sustain themselves. When 
animals and human beings die they go back to the soil and restore the trees to grow. So 
within nature’s own mechanism, it is these three elements that sustain themselves. But now 
with regards to whether it is right or wrong to eat animals, I think again for the purposes of 
sustenance, so far as the animals we are eating is not hazardous to your health and is not 
illegal, and for survival or sustenance why not. 
Osei also did not think eating animals was the right thing to do. He explained that:  
When I see an animal slaughtered, it hurts and goes to down to my heart for some time now, 
every animal. Yes, even the wild ones because there is a way you can get closer to wild animals 
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so, personally I wish we can keep them and not eat them. The vegetables are there, the fruits… 
Animals have blood. There is blood flowing in humans as well as animals.  
He also believed God created animals so that they coexist with humans but not for 
consumption. His comments attracted a lot of laughter from the other participants who mainly 
shared a different view.  
Priscilla, even though a vegetarian by choice, claimed she did not see anything wrong with 
other people using animals for food. Her major concern, however, was what she described as 
the brutal way they are killed before they are eaten. Thus, she said:  
Yes, I don’t see anything wrong with it but it shouldn’t be so brutal… Sometimes it is sad, 
like they will just kill the animal, especially the way they kill the cat, it is just sad. I have 
actually experienced one. They put the cat in a sack and just be hitting it on the ground or 
something and it will be striking and all of that, I mean it is quite pitiful. And how they kill 
hens and cocks, they will struggle before they die, it just bad… I won’t eat, but I’m cool with 
those who eat it. 
On the question of why we cannot eat human beings, some respondents argued that it was 
because humans can understand each other but they cannot understand animals. Others were 
of the view that it is because humans can make laws with each other and not with animals. 
Some respondents also pointed out that it was because humans belong to the same species. For 
Obed, eating humans is cannibalism, it is just not the way because humans were brought up. 
Pius, Efua and Opambour insisted that humans cannot eat humans because, if you observe the 
natural order of things in the animal kingdom, a tiger, for example, does not eat a fellow tiger, 
a chicken will not eat a chicken either. Consequently, they held that there is no way humans 
should be allowed to eat their fellow humans.  
Again, when asked whether any of them foresees themselves ever becoming vegetarians or if 
becoming a vegetarian is the moral way to go, almost all the participants responded in a way 
that suggested such scenario is close to an impossibility. Benjamin, for example, said not in 
this lifetime. He could not imagine life without pork and beef. For Efua and Pius, it is a big no. 
Pius pointed out that: if we all are vegetarians, the leaves and all those things, they will all die. 
We will not get enough oxygen… So, it is not possible for us to become vegetarians. (Obed, 
Efua and Claudia agreed with him). According to Clara, to be given food without meat an 
insult. She does not only eat the meat for the protein but it because she just loves it. Claudia 
believed becoming a vegetarian is a bad choice because, “we must eat and enjoy.” Priscilla’s 
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position was that so far as God has given humans the permission to eat animals, she did not see 
anything wrong with doing so. Becoming a vegetarian, for her, should be a personal decision. 
Edwin retorted that he can only become a vegetarian for medical reasons but not consciously. 
According to Shadrack, if he can get access to variety of food that are very tasty he can become 
a vegetarian. For him, so many factors must be considered before he can become a vegetarian, 
such as taste, affordability and health. For Aboraa, although she does not see herself becoming 
a vegetarian now, she wishes to become one in the future mainly for health reasons (to lose 
weight) and not on moral grounds. Kwame, however, thought it was possible to become a 
vegetarian because there are many vegetarians surviving. For him, it all has to do with how one 
“programs” the mind.  
 
5.5 Theme 4: Vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research 
Under this theme, the study sought to find out from the target respondents, their position on 
using animals for biomedical research. The study only directed this theme to the young adult 
respondents since the practice was not a traditional act.  
 
5.5.1 The young adult respondents 
With the exception of one, all the young adult respondents held that there was nothing morally 
appalling with the use of animals in biomedical research. The general positions were firstly, 
that humans are superior to animals. Secondly, God has given humans the authority to use and 
subdue animals for human’s good and then thirdly, the use of animals in research serves a 
greater utilitarian purpose. Efua, for instance, thought that it is ok to use animals for research 
for the safety of humans. She said:  
I think looking at the safety of us the human beings, I think it is good. Yeah, we don’t give so 
much respect to animals, as you said, we feed on them. …the medicine we try on them is to be 
sure that if we put it on we the human beings it will be good for us. Because human beings, I 
mean, you can’t go and take someone’s daughter or son to go and experiment on that person, 
it is unlawful. Okay, so using animals for experiment, for me, I don’t see anything wrong with 
it. That is my take on it.  
Obed also believed it was all right to use animals in biomedical research because ‘obviously’ 
everything was created for human’s use. Pius and Opambour supported this position. Pius 
added that: the Bible even said when God created the world, He said we should subdue the 
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earth, meaning everything is under us. You don’t expect me to go and use a living being for 
test, it is not possible. So I have to go and take the monkeys. He thought it was perhaps because 
monkeys are closely related to humans genetically that is why God created them, such that 
when there is any experimentation to be done, animals can be used instead of humans. On this 
score, Benjamin emphasized that humans are, at the moment, on top of the food chain, and that 
position gives humans the prerogative to exploit things below them for their sustenance and 
survival, and that for him include using animals for biomedical research. Thus, he said:  
I think, look, the point of the argument is this; there is always something or somebody who 
will be on top of the food chain. And the person or the thing on top of the food chain will 
decide, will always exploit the other thing to make sure that thing sustains itself. At the 
moment human beings sit on top of the food chain and no matter how human rights or animal 
rights people think, we still need people to exploit the things around us to make sure that we 
survive, to make sure that society goes on. 
Obed, additionally, thought that for the furtherance of research, it was acceptable to experiment 
on animals. According to him, we can’t do trial and error on the human beings, but rather we 
can do trial and error on animals and plants, he said. Opambour, on his part, commented that: 
when it comes to a test that is to be carried out for the purpose and the benefit of human beings, 
I think that if animals are being used it is line with God’s own purpose of creation. 
For Priscilla, using animals for biomedical research “is not something bad.” Her concern was 
that the practice needed to be regulated so that people do not do it indiscriminately. She stated 
that: I think that it is not something bad but then there should be a regulation for such thing, 
for I know that for some countries they are very particular about their animals. We can’t just 
go about using animals for our research. There has to be a regulation for that so that people 
don’t just use animals for any other purpose. So for me, there should be a regulation. When 
asked why she thought regulations were important, she intimated that it was due to the pain the 
animals go through, which in turn is mainly due to the fact that some biomedical research 
requires several testing on animals before a solution is found. I feel for them as well, she added. 
Shadrack suggested that using animals instead of humans constitutes a lesser harm, unless it is 
argued that animals and humans are equal. He added that:  
Some research about medicine you don’t actually know the effect. If you give it to a person, the 
person might die, so it’s better for animal, like a mouse to die than human being… even in the 
real life experiences, sometimes when it comes between choosing between two humans, 
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sometimes we choose one and let one die. Even to our fellow humans we do it to them when we 
have to. So, for the animals it is the same. When we have to we even do it to our fellow humans. 
It was only Osei who stated that the use of animals for biomedical research was wrong. He 
didn’t agree with all the reasons and justifications provided by the other participants. He was 
convinced that there are other means and ways to conduct these biomedical tests without using 
animals. He stated that:  
There are many other means, there are many other ways. For the plants I don’t have a problem. 
Since we can’t use humans, I don’t think we can also use animals… Animals also have their 
rights just as humans, so I believe they should take their rights also into consideration. So, I 
believe it is about time we found our way of doing our research without hurting these animals. 
When asked why he thought using animals in biomedical research was wrong, he responded 
saying: For me, only the killing, the pain, I think about the pain more, yeah. 
 
5.6 Theme 5: The use of animals as pets/companion animals 
On this theme, the study sought to find out from the participants their perception on the use of 
animals as companion animals. From the traditional respondents, the study sought to know the 
historical and cutural position of traditional Akan beliefs and practices on the use of animals 
as pets. From the young adult respondents, the study’s goal was to find out from them whether 
they consider anything ethically wrong with the keeping of animals as pets. Below is a 
presentation of what the study gathered first, from the traditional respondents followed by that 
of the young adult respondents. 
 
5.6.1 The traditional respondents’ views 
It was discovered from the traditional respondents that the Akans do not have a specific name 
for pet. Pets are classified under domesticated animals, as the Akans used the same term, efie 
mmoa (household animals) or ayjnboa (reared animals). This places pets as part of animals kept 
at home which includes animals that are reared or kept at home for their meat rather than 
comapnionship. According to Traditional Respondent 2, pets are called by the same name as 
Akans use for all domesticated animals. She mentioned that some examples of animals usually 
kept as pets are dogs, cats, and parrots. For her, people keep these animals as pets simply 
because they like them or have interest in them.  
161 
 
Traditional Respondent 5 mentioned that pets are all part of animals the Akans referred to as 
domestic animals. For him though, God in his own wisdom created some animals to be in the 
forest or bush and others to be at home, He said:  
…the domestic animals have counterparts in the bush…, the domestic cow for instance, you can 
find its counterpart in the bush. We have the counterpart of the dog.  It is called ‘Odompo’. It 
lives in the bush. There is also the counterpart of the cat in the bush. It is not as if humans 
converted them to be domesticated animals. That is how God Himself created them. He created 
some to be wild animals and others domestic animals. That is how it is. It is the nature of things.  
Some examples of domestic animals he mentioned include hen, sheep, goats, cats, cattle, birds 
such as the dove, and many others. He also did not see anything wrong in keeping animals as 
pets and killing them later for food. He thought it was up to the individual to decide what to do 
with the animal. He gave an instance of a friend who finds it difficult to kill his own animals 
and has resorted to selling them instead. Again, for him, one of the differences between the 
wild animals and those at home, is in their behavior towards humans. Those kept at home have 
been influenced by humans, and have become fond of humans while those in the wild will run 
away at the sight of a human.  
Traditional Respondent 1, on his part, claimed that, it is the ‘Whiteman’ that differentiates 
between pets and reared animals but among the Akans, pets are part of the animals generally 
referred to as reared animals. According to his account, humans came to meet these animals at 
home as per God’s creation and order of things. He stated that:  
When you look at God creations, those who are in the forest stayed in the forest. So if you take 
a look, when God created the universe, those animals at home were at home and others went 
to stay in the wild. Humans came to meet those at home at home and built their own place of 
abode. Based on their character the wild ones went away and the others stayed at home. 
Traditional Respondent 1, examples of animals kept as reared animals or pets include - cattle, 
sheep, dogs, goats, hen, guinea fowls, turkey, dove and the likes. For him, these reared animals 
or pets are more important to humans than those that are in the wild because ‘they are close to 
us, and we take care of their needs’. He added that: “The belief, I think, is that, the domesticated 
animals live with us. They are very important to us than those in the wild. For the domesticated 
animals, we live with them and anything that affects them affects us. Hence, we don't allow 
someone to come and kill them indiscriminately. For Traditional Respondent 6, a pet is known 
as efie aboa (household animal), a term used generally for all domesticated animals. He 
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explained that, these have existed with humans been for a long time. They include the dogs, 
cats and even the hen, which can also be killed for food. He added that it is only the dogs that 
are sometimes given names. These names, he notes, are usually proverbial or insinuating. To 
him, the act of giving names to cats is a recent thing. On the history behind domesticated 
animals, the four traditional leaders from Cape Coast in the focus group discussion agreed with 
Traditional Respondent 7 that: there are several histories because firstly, the domestication of 
animals- initially, they were in the wild and they had one time or the other assisted hunters in 
one way or the other in their trade and they send them home. So that is the history. They listed 
dogs, fowls, cats, parrots, monkeys, and rabbits as examples of animals that are kept as pets. 
On the killing of animals kept as pets for food, Traditional Respondent 9 mentioned that: 
initially we were told to kill them and eat. So there is no problem in that regard. But the 
relationship sometimes makes it difficult. 
 
5.6.2 The young adult respondents’ views 
Generally, most of the young adult respondents did not find any moral problem with the use of 
animals as companion animals. There were a few respondents who said they did not like 
animals, so would not like to have animals as pets, but they nevertheless, did not see anything 
wrong with others keeping animals as pets.  
Claudia, Priscilla, Shadrack, and Dorcas claimed they do not like pets or animals as 
companions, but did not find anything morally wrong with others keeping them for pets. 
Priscilla, for example, held that even though she does not like animals around her, she does not 
mind if others decide to keep them around. For her, people should only use tame animals as 
pets so that the animals are not dangerous to others. Her view was echoed by Abora who stated 
that:  
I think it’s okay to have animals as pets, I mean like the very tamed ones and there should be 
no possibility of them harming its host or its owners in any point in time. Because there are 
some pets that at a point in time they become very dangerous to their host. So if like you have 
a cat or a parrot, these things are at a point in time very calm and tame so you can always 
have them. 
For Opambour, there is nothing wrong in keeping animals as pets because he has been told that 
keeping animals around the house can help divert some misfortunes away from their owners. 
He explained that this is because, some of these animals can perceive misfortunes such as death 
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and ailment even before they come. Thus, he said: Sometimes it is also protective when an 
ailment or something, a calamity or something is coming into your household or the family, 
these animals will be able to take that thing, that unfortunate thing that is supposed to happen 
to you, the human being. They can see it. Both Pius and Efua agreed to this. Efua added that 
there have been countless occasions where animals kept by her mother have died out of the 
blue without her mother knowing the cause of their death. According to Efua, her mother would 
attribute the sudden death of the animal to the belief that perhaps, something bad was about to 
happen to some of the family members, and the dead animal took it away in death. Thus, she 
believed that if humans keep animals as pets and treat them well with care the animals can 
sacrifice their lives for them.  
Pius, on his part, believed it was okay to have animals as pets, because the animal as a pet can 
be a friend to the owner and provide companionship. In addition, the pet can also provide 
protection to the owner, he added. For Kwame and Osei, who throughout the interview, have 
been against many forms of animal uses, this time, were in support of the use of animals as 
pets. Osei thought animals are more suitable or that it is more acceptable to use animals as pets 
rather than eat them. He advised that people keep as many pets as possible. Kwame also thought 
it was a “fantastic” idea to have animals as pets and would not mind having a zoo at his house 
one day. For Obed, there is nothing wrong in keeping companion animals, but once anyone 
decides to keep them, they should be ready to take responsibility of the animals. Thus, he said:  
You made that commitment to keep a pet, so you have to put everything in check, overseeing to 
its security as well as… That is the commitment that you have made. You don’t feed the pet, you 
don’t take the pet to the veterinary, you leave it scot-free and it is just knocked down by a car, 
you the owner you are not being responsible, so to me you are wronging the pet.  
Shadrack held a similar view with Obed which he expressed saying:  
…but for those we select to domesticate them, we have, once we decide to take the animal to 
your house then you have the obligation to feed the animal. To this view, Edwin also said: I 
think I side with Shadrach because in every instance, the superior class owes the inferior class 
a responsibility of taking care of them. If we are not killing them and we are domesticating them 
in your homes, then why not? Their welfare should be your responsibility. 
The participants did not also consider the keeping of animals as pet as an infringement on the 
freedom of the animals. Opambour, for example, concurred to this because, in his view, the 
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animal tacitly shows consent through the way it shows affection to the owner and response to 
the affections it gets. To this he said:  
The animal comes, keeps on coming to your house and you give it food or something, then it, 
begins to show likeness for the thing you are doing for it that means that in one way or the 
other. He is agreeing to the relationship. Yes, because there is no way to measure or to tell 
whether the animal agrees or not but the way he attaches, the animal attaches itself to you that 
shows.  
Similarly, for Pius, there is no infringement of animals’ freedom in keeping them as pets 
because he believed the animals are better off in terms of care with human owners than by 
themselves. Thus, he believes pet owners are rather helping the animals they keep as pets. For 
Efua, there is no infringement on the animals’ right to freedom because they are allowed to 
roam about during the day and allowed back in the house in the evening. Clara believed no 
harm is done in terms of infringing on the animal’s freedom. Sharing her personal experience 
with her dog she asserted that:  
I think we are not infringing on their rights because my dog expresses herself. When she is 
hungry you see her making noise with her bowl and you will go and feed her, and when she is 
not happy or you beat her when you call her she wouldn’t come, or when she gets close to you 
she won’t lick your feet. When she licks your feet you know she is happy. That is one thing I got 
to know with her. She is free to move around, just that she does not go outside. She wouldn’t 
even go. She expresses herself very well and I don’t think I am infringing on her right. 
Concerning the killing of pets for food as it pertains in some places in Ghana, there were mixed 
reactions from the respondents. Although, majority of the respondents were not inclined to the 
idea of killing and eating their pets as food, a few of the respondents such as Obed and Shadrack 
said they will not mind eating their pet, or saw no wrong in doing so. Aboraa thought that if 
one should kill and eat his or her pet, then it means the initial purpose for keeping the animal 
close was not for petting. As a result, she believes it is wrong to kill and eat a pet because 
people develop some attachment to their pets. She noted that: From my side there would be 
that attachment with the pet. You know you have kept somebody for five years, six years and 
then…even killing it will be problematic.  I wouldn’t do it. Clara agreed with Aboraa on this 
score, and narrated an instance where her security man, who is a lover of dog meat could not 
bring himself to eat the house’s dog (pet) when the dog died, because he felt the dog was family. 
According to Kwame, the definition of a pet does not allow the owner to kill it for food. For 
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him, the only time this may be allowed is when there is famine. Benjamin agreed with Kwame 
on this point. For shadrack, there is nothing wrong in someone killing and eating one’s pet, 
since one decided to make the animal their pet and so can decide to take that right from the 
animal at any time. It’s a pet so long as you are keeping it as a pet, he emphasized.  
 
5.7 Theme 6: The hunting and trapping of animals  
What are the traditional Akan practices in terms of hunting and trapping of animals? What does 
the Akan tradition say concerning hunting? Do young Akan adults see anything morally 
repulsive with the practice of hunting and trapping of animals? These, among others, were 
some of the concerns of this theme.  
Below are the responses gathered from the two groups of participants beginning with the 
traditional respondents. 
 
5.7.1 The traditional respondents’ views 
The traditional respondents pointed out that traditionally, hunting was a serious trade for the 
Akans, and that a hunter may have to undergo certain rituals and purification rites before he 
sets out into the wild for game. Also, the killing of some animals required special rituals before 
the game can be brought home for consumption. Nevertheless, similar conditions were not 
demanded when it comes to trapping of animals.  
According to Traditional Respondent 4’s account, the Akans believed that there were evil 
spirits in the forest, so a hunter needed to equip himself spiritually before venturing on a 
hunting expedition. He posited that:  
…like I was saying earlier on with the belief that some animals, people can transmit to animals 
and so on. There is evil in the forest and so on, you can meet… an animal can transform itself 
into anything. There was the belief that you need to fortify yourself. They had some concoction 
or rites were made or conducted before you even think of becoming a hunter, and continuously 
use as protection. Against evil and all those things in the forest, and also the problem of killing 
a bull before you come back to do the cleansing, a painful cleansing and so on. So they 
prepared, they call it spiritual preparation. Everything was spiritual any way. It is still in the 
villages. 
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Traditional Respondent 6, in relation to this, also confirmed the need for hunters to perform 
some rituals on themselves before embarking on a hunting expedition. He pointed out that there 
is the belief that there are all kinds of spirits hovering around in the forest at night. The people 
also believed that some animals such as the duiker or a species of it can easily turn into a human 
being. Thus, a hunter needs to protect himself from all of these. Traditional Respondent 6 also 
noted that certain rites were performed by the hunter upon killing certain big wild animals 
considered to have souls. He stated that: 
…So the elephant for instance is called ‘sasaboa’.  The ‘ɔtoromo’, the bufflalo, they are called 
‘sasaboa’. So if you kill them and you don’t perform the rite, it is assumed and believed that 
certain predicaments can befall you. If you are hunter and you don’t do that you may go hunting 
the whole night and you will never chance on a single animal… Or you may be attacked by any 
of these wild animals… So there is a proverb that says that wobɛkum ɔtoromo na woadware 
sasaduro deɛ, ɛnneɛ gyae no ma no nkɔ na ɔmfa ne mmerantesɛm nenam kwaeɛ ase (To kill a 
single animal and go through all these rites, you may as well leave it to go. 
Traditional Respondent 4, Traditional Respondent 5 and Traditional Respondent 9 also made 
reference to this same proverb in their independent accounts. Traditional Respondent 6 further 
narrated the manner some of these rituals took as follows:  
There are some that should be done at the spot. Right at the spot, you have to cut the limbs. 
All the four. Yeah, so cut the limbs to disarm it and then you shout around the forest for other 
hunters, if they are around, to come. When they come, you can do a smaller one [rituals] by 
picking some herbs, either you chew them or you put some in the form of libation or something 
like that. Then, if it is an elephant, you have to come home and inform the public. Whilst you 
are on the way home, getting home, you have to fire gunshot about three times for people to 
know that something big has happened. The chief will ask some people to go and accompany 
you to slaughter it there, because you can’t carry the whole thing. Yes, so these are some of 
the things. 
Traditional Respondent 1 in his account also reaffirmed these spiritual beliefs and rites that 
hunters go through. He noted that in ancient times, a hunter protects himself in two-ways. 
Firstly, he is supposed to be clean or sacrosanct or abstain from things that taint his image, such 
as stealing or sleeping with someone's wife or participating in promiscuous and lascivious 
affairs. He must also not do things that do not conduce to the wellbeing of his soul. More so, 
the wife of the hunter must remain faithful to him while he is away to hunt so that nothing evil 
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will endanger him in the forest. If these things are not done, the hunter, it is believed, may bring 
upon himself some bad omen. That is to say, a misfortune will follow him into the wild. So he 
starts protecting himself right from the house. Secondly, when he goes into the wild, he needs 
to know the sort of animal he kills. He needs to know their behaviour, character, countenance, 
among others. For example, if a hunter is going into the wild to hunt, he needs to know the 
behaviour of a lion, how it works, how it roars and the like. If the animal is an elephant, the 
hunter should have the skill required to kill it. The hunter, again, must look for objects and 
ammunition that he will need for hunting. Traditional Respondent 1 added that usually, when 
hunters are going for hunting, they carry a sagging-sack bag, a knife, water, among other things 
to protect themselves from many things.  
According to the account by Traditional Respondent 9, sometimes, before hunters go on their 
expedition, they strip themselves naked. They sometimes do this depending on the history 
about the said forest they venturing into. She said: Some of the animals, like the buffalo, when 
you kill it, you ought to bath the saasa medicine, if not the ghost of the animal, called saasa 
will continually haunt you. So those who know, know. For her, it is for this reason, that hunting 
is considered a special skill and a trade. As a result, one must know the trade and must fortify 
himself as a hunter before he is able to do it, she posited.  
Additionally, Traditional Respondent 4 mentioned that some hunters could spend days or even 
weeks in the forest before they return with their game. Furthermore, he stated that tradition 
required that some part of the killed animal goes to the chief of the land. To this, Traditional 
Respondent 4 stated: And before, earlier on, it was a law, in or common practice in the villages 
when you kill certain animals you have to send part of it to the chief’s house. It was a common 
practice. Either one thigh, or the arm, or including the intestines and the heart, how do we call 
it, or the lungs attached for the chief, Yeah that was the law. But now I don’t know if it works 
anymore. This was also mentioned in Traditional Respondent 6’s account in which he claimed 
that at times a big game caught is for the entire community to share after the chief of the land 
has been given what is traditionally due him as the owner of the land. At other times, the hunter 
sells part of the game to the community Traditional Respondent 6, furthermore, recounted that 
the Akans used to consider the best hunters to be those who have been able to kill the most 
number of elephants. Thus, hunters were classified in an ascending order according to the 
number of elephant kills they have made. He continued that:  
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Because the elephant stands tall you have to be encouraged to move to kill the second one and 
in each of these there would be purification rites. All the friends will gather and they will have 
an orchestra. They meet and sing songs and in these songs some of the songs are insinuating. 
Where they will be telling those who haven’t killed any elephant that you are just small boys. 
They also applaud those who have been able to kill two and three and pour libation. They do 
all these to help them to aspire to the highest point. The highest point is somebody who has 
been able to kill three. When you kill one there is rite, there is purification, there is enjoyment, 
more or less like a party. When you are inspired to kill two and you do, they will elevate you. 
Then the highest is the ‘PhD’, which is the three. So people who kill two and don’t go forward 
to kill three, when they die they think that they were lazy. Yes, so at their burial they have some 
thorns that they will prick into their feet to punish them for not moving forward…  
On trapping animals, Traditional Respondent 4 explained that traps are not set to maim the 
animals but to kill them. He however admitted that sometimes, the animal caught in the trap 
struggle for a while before it dies, and at other times, the hunter comes to meet the animal not 
yet dead in the trap and must strangle it to kill it. Traditional Respondent 6 stated that hunters 
set traps deep in the forest and some closer to home. For those closer to home, it is easier for 
the hunters to check on the trap every morning for a catch. For those traps in the forest, 
however, the hunters may visit them in every three days or so and as such, the hunter cannot 
monitor the catch. This makes it possible for an animal caught in a trap to struggle, die and 
even get rotten before the hunter finds it.   
 
5.7.2 The young adult respondents’ views 
On the whole, the young adult respondents believed that, if it is acceptable by them to kill and 
eat animals, then there should be nothing wrong with hunting and trapping animals for food. 
They, however, did not support indiscriminate or unregulated hunting and trapping of animals.   
According to Opambour, once he believes that animals can be killed for food, it should not 
matter if they are hunted and trapped for that same purpose. What he does not endorse is 
hunting them just for fun or for their horns which is sold for money. Obed shared similar 
sentiments. He posited that:  
Some people go hunting for fun, for antics; like they kill and they make it a milestone, I have 
killed twenty deer, thirty lions, like by self-glorifying and expeditions. Those are some of the 
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things that we have to regulate or in the long run there will be extinction of such animals. 
That’s my problem with that killing…  
He was also of the opinion that it would be better for humans to farm animals than to hunt 
animals as he thought farming animals is more sustainable than hunting. To this he said:  
I think they should replace them. It would be better to farm the animals than just to hunt for 
it. Do you understand? Yes, you have to procreate, of course, if you are making room for 
procreation then you can kill. If not, don’t hunt them at all…they are not plant that their seeds 
will fall and germinate. They have to procreate. So maybe you hunt them down, a male and a 
female, you allow them to procreate then you will kill one. If you want something to keep on 
running you have to be strategic about it. Being strategic means you have to look at it from 
sustainability angle. You can’t continually kill animals without doing something in return and 
expecting them to still be alive. Sustainability is what is keeping us here. 
Related to this, some of the participants were against traditional Ghanaian festivals that require 
the hunting of animals as part of the celebration although, others thought it was okay since it 
was done just once in a year, affording the animals some time to procreate.  
 
5.8 Theme 7: The Rights and Interests of animals 
Despite everything that has been said about the place of animals in Akan ontology and their 
use of animals in various traditional and nontraditional purposes, the study, under this theme, 
aimed to find out if the idea of animals’ rights or animals having interests is accommodated. 
That is, to ask, if Akan traditional ontology, beliefs, practices, and ethics will support the notion 
of animal rights, and what the position of the young adult respondents will be on this matter. 
The study first presents responses from the traditional respondents before presenting that of the 
young adults. 
 
5.8.1 The traditional respondents’ views 
Most of the traditional respondents did not speak directly to the question of animals having 
rights or interests even though many indirect questions had been asked of them towards this 
theme. The few who spoke to this directly were of the opinion that the notion of animal rights 
is foreign in the traditional Akan context. For them, the only right animals have is the right not 
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to be suffered undue harm. To the question of whether the idea of animal rights is conceivable 
in traditional Akan setting, Traditional Respondent 7 responded that:  
No. The animal rights rest with an individual person's perception. Let me explain, like you are 
talking about domestic animals, if I see you are being cruel to a domestic animal, I will tell you 
because I feel what you don't feel. Do you understand? That is the right that I can do… Like in 
our culture, it doesn’t allow the animal to suffer any agony, just kill it once. Don’t go and do 
like something for the animal to suffer. These are the rights… We know the Europeans have 
animal rights but we are not talking about the Europeans here. Traditional Respondent 9 added 
that: The right they [animals] have is that don’t be cruel to them. However, to say they have 
rights and so, rear it and don't kill it, is an indefensible right. 
 
5.8.2 The young adult respondents’ views 
The question posed to the young adult respondents in relation to this theme was: In what ways 
do animals have rights or interests? Views expressed here were divers however, quite a good 
number of the participants agreed that animals have rights albeit, a limited one.  
Osei, for example, strongly believed that animals have rights just as humans, and as such their 
rights should be taken into consideration. He believed animals have rights because they have a 
life span and as a result, they had a right to live out that life span. Efua also agreed animals 
have a right to live. Opambour, on his part, claimed animals have a right not to be molested, 
abused or overused. Claudia responded that animals have rights, but those rights are only what 
humans give them. In other words, humans determine the sort of rights animals should have. 
Pius thought that animals do not enjoy any rights but rather have what he calls ‘privileges’. 
These privileges, for him, are conferred on them by humans. Efua eventually agreed with Pius 
on this. For Obed, when animals are by themselves, they cannot be said to have rights but when 
humans take them as pets, then the animals are due of certain rights. He mentioned that: …if 
you go in for them as pets they have rights. You have to feed them, they have right to take them 
to the veterinary. So you will confer that right on them. But as they are on their own, I don’t 
think they have any constitution. Clara held similar views. She claimed that, if we take animals 
as pets then the animals have a right to be fed and to be taken very good care of. She also held 
that the rights of animals were a little inferior to that of humans. Kwame posited that animals 
have rights, but felt that those rights are not to be equaled to those possessed by humans. He 
stated that: yes, they do have rights, but obviously of course, even among humans some people 
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have higher rights than others so with those things, obviously it is not going to be fair, you 
know. 
Shadrach’s position was that animals cannot be given equal moral rights as humans. For him, 
humans need to benefit from animals because “humans automatically are ahead of animals.” 
Thus, he stated:  
Okay, as I said, earlier we are automatically ahead of animals and once someone is up there, 
you are down there, at least you will not expect to have the same, let’s say, the same right with 
the person… I believe that we humans have rights by virtue of society, but for animals they 
don’t have rights as animals but we humans have rights as just being humans, we have rights, 
but the animals we decide to give them some considerations so they don’t have those rights as 
being animals. But humans, for the virtue of being humans, we have rights. But they don’t have 
rights unless we decide to give them something. 
Benjamin did not think animals have any rights. He held that animals’ rights end where human 
survival is at stake. Abora, similarly, thought animals do not have any rights. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to present the primary data that was gathered on the field through 
the one-on-one interviews and focus group discussions. The data was presented under seven 
different themes as follows: 1, the interconnectedness of nature; 2, the moral status of 
nonhuman animals; 3, vegetarianism and the use of animals as food; 4, vivisection and the use 
of animals in biomedical research; 5, the use of animals as pets/companion animals; 6, the 
hunting and trapping of animals; and 7, on the rights and interests of animals. The study’s 
respondents were divided into two main groups namely, traditional respondents and young 
adult respondents. The traditional respondents group was made of individuals who are 
considered experts of Akan traditions, practices, and ethics. They included Akan Chiefs, a 
traditional linguist, Queen-mothers, Head of Akan Clans and an academic expert on Akan 
language and culture. This group of respondents provided various insights into the traditional 
practices, beliefs and practices of the Akan people on the environment and more especially on 
human-animal relation. The young adult respondents group was made up of younger 
generations of Akans who shared their positions on the above-mentioned themes. Thus, for 
each of these themes, responses from the two groups of respondents were presented under 
separate sub-sections.  
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The next chapter will be a thematic discussion and interpretation of the findings in light of the 
literature review and theoretical framework. This will pave the way for the study to identify 
the place of Akan animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist debates.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to the discussion and interpretation of the findings in respect to the 
literature and the theories guiding the research. Interpretation of findings helps to recognize 
and explain the primary implication of the data gathered on the field through the demonstration 
of how the findings agree or contradict with the existing theories and literature. In chapter five, 
the findings from the field investigations gathered through one-on-one interviews and focus 
group discussions were presented under specified themes. Findings from both the traditional 
respondents and the young adult respondents were presented under important themes in the 
animal ethics debate. Just as it was done with the data presented in the previous chapter, the 
interpretation and discussion of findings in this chapter will be conducted along these themes 
considered salient in the animal ethics debate. These themes are: 
i. The interconnectedness of nature  
ii. The moral status of nonhuman animals 
iii. Vegetarianism and the use of animals for food 
iv. The use of animals as pets/companion animals 
v. The hunting and trapping of animals  
vi. Vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research  
These themes are analyzed with the literature and the theories of animal welfarism, animal right 
theory, and the ethics of interrelatedness. The discussions that will ensue under these themes 
will help the study attain its main objective, which is to locate the place of Akan animal ethics 
within the welfarist and rightist debate.  
 
6.1 The interconnectedness of nature  
The study has shown the theme of the interconnectedness of nature to be an emerging theme 
in the developing African environmental ethics literature. This theme, which this study has 
preferred to call, the theory of ‘the ethics of interrelatedness,’ emerges in the African 
environmental ethics literature by different names. Godfrey Tangwa (2004) expressed it as 
‘eco-bio-communitarianism’ which, for him, meant that the African people acknowledged and 
take into cognisance the interdependence and peaceful coexistence between humans and the 
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rest of the natural environment. This, for Tangwa, leads to an attitude towards the environment 
that can be best described as ‘live and let live. Segun Ogungbemi (1997) referred to this theme 
of the interconnectedness of nature as the ‘ethics of nature relatedness’, an ethic that requires 
humans to pursue a peaceful co-existence with nature, and treat nature with some judicious 
concern for its worth, survival and sustainability. Martin Prozesky (2009) labels his expression 
of this theme as ‘ethic of relationality’, which he deduced from the Shona concept of Ukama, 
applied towards not only human-to-human relations but also in, with and through the natural 
environment. A similar expression of this theme can be found, as indicated in the literature 
review, in the works of Ugwuanyi (2011), Kelbessa (2005), Murove (2009), Ramose (2009), 
and Bujo (2009).  
The findings from the respondents clearly indicate that the traditional Akans hold a similar 
notion of the interrelatedness of nature. Respondents agreed that there exists some form of 
connections between humans and the rest of nature and that it is an important connection that 
needs to be sustained. All the ten participants classified under traditional respondents 
independently agreed that traditionally, Akans believe in the interconnection of nature. 
Traditional Respondent 4, for example, affirmed the interconnection of humans and nature. He 
mentioned that: “Oh definitely, we are interconnected, we are interdependent.” Traditional 
Respondent 7 pointed to the indispensability of the connection between humans and the rest of 
nature because for him, humans, just like the atmosphere, stars, moon, seas, and trees, are all 
part of nature and therefore must be interconnected.  
Similarly, all the fourteen young adult respondents subscribed to the view that nature and 
humans are interrelated. It was also clear from the views of the respondents that they 
understood this existing interconnection of nature to mean the interdependency of the 
constituents of nature on each other for survival. For example, Traditional Respondent 3 
expressed his understanding of the interconnectedness of nature as that which is based on 
nature’s dependence on one another. Thus, to him, humans taking care of the forest will, in 
turn, lead to a good amount of rainfall. Consequently, the rainfall will fill the rivers, and farmers 
will use the water from the rivers to promote plant growth. Furthermore, the animals in the 
forest will also have enough to eat from the plants and then they will multiply for humans to 
kill some for food and use the plants for medicine as well. Their position coincides with much 
of the literature on Akan ontology and ethics. Hagan, for example, had pointed out that the 
existence of what he calls the ‘fabric of interweaving blood relationship’ among the Akans. He 
argued that this interweaving blood relationship also extends to individual entities in the 
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universe in a way that without these relationships the universe would not be as it is (Hagan, 
1964: 50-51). 
With this understanding of the interconnectedness of nature, the traditional respondents 
maintained that traditionally, Akans hold a strong belief in the preservation of nature, and they 
consider it an essential and absolute necessity for humans to do all they can to keep the cycle 
of nature sustained. Traditional Respondent 5 concurred that the protection of the natural 
environment is very dear to the heart of the Akan people. As such, they take many measures to 
ensure this. They do this through norms and taboos observed within the Akan culture and 
tradition. Traditional Respondent 5 pointed out that people are not allowed to clear certain 
forests for farming and that there are some days that no one is permitted to use the rivers. There 
were also taboos that prohibited the people from the use of certain animals for food and that 
hunting was forbidden during certain times of the year. To him, all these were done as a way 
of protecting the natural environment.  
Traditional Respondent 9 explained that the Akans believed that the gods were able to punish 
people who flouted these prohibitions so much that the fear of the gods’ punishment deterred 
people and ensured their compliance. Similar sentiments were expressed by Traditional 
Respondent 7 who added that the notion of nature preservation was also reflected in the way 
of life of the traditional Akan people and in their proverbs. The young adult respondents also 
acknowledged the normative call, to take care of the natural environment based on their 
assessment and acceptance of the interconnectedness of nature. Obed from the Nungua Focus 
group discussion pointed out that the interconnectedness of nature meant that humans and 
nature share a common focus. This common focus is on the fact that humans are able to feed 
on animals and some animals can feed on humans. In his view, based on this common focus, 
humans have been made stewards of the elements of nature.  
Noticeably, this understanding of the interconnectedness of nature and its associated normative 
principle to preserve and sustain the natural environment, agrees with most of the emerging 
literature in African environmental ethics. It is evidently seen in what Tangwa (2004) expresses 
as an ethics of ‘live and let live’ or in Ogungbemi’s (1997) ‘ethics of nature relatedness’. This, 
according to them, is an ethic that places a moral duty and responsibility on humans to ensure 
a peaceful co-existence with nature, and to treat nature with some thoughtful concern for its 
worth, survival and sustainability. Thus, from the findings from the respondents, the study can 
confidently conclude that the theory of interrelatedness, a dominant theory in the emerging 
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literature in African environmental ethics, is applicable in Akan traditional thoughts, beliefs, 
ethics, and practices.  
6.1.1 The anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric debate (intrinsic vs. extrinsic value 
of nature) 
A notable factor about this theme of the interconnectedness of nature in the emerging literature 
in African environmental ethics is that many of its proponents understood it to be a positive 
deviation from what they call, the Western anthropocentric approach in theorizing 
environmental ethics. Tangwa (2004) was very explicit in expressing this; he posited that 
Western environment ethics are anthropocentric and individualistic in nature. Furthermore, he 
thought that their conception of nature is what has driven them to explore, subdue, exploit and 
dominate nature for their profit. Thus, he held his eco-bio-communitarian theory as a non-
anthropocentric ethical approach to nature. As it was noted in the literature review, a non-
anthropocentric approach to the environment implies a belief in the natural environment as 
possessing its own intrinsic value and purpose, whether humans assign it an instrumental value 
or not. However, do the Akans consider nature as having intrinsic value worthy of appreciation 
for its own sake? The findings point to a negative response to the question as will be explained 
below.  
The findings revealed that although both traditional and young Akans uphold the 
interconnectedness of nature to be true, and despite their agreement with the emerging literature 
in the African environmental ethics on the preservation and sustenance of the natural 
environment, the Akans do it for a reason other than for nature’s own sake or for nature’s own 
intrinsic value. From the information gathered from both the traditional and young adult 
respondents, it will be correct to say that the notion of nature having an intrinsic worth or value 
appears to be a foreign notion to the Akan. Such a notion does not exist in their traditional 
expressions or in their thoughts as unmistakably articulated in the responses of the traditional 
respondents. Similarly, the young adult respondents mentioned that such a notion of nature 
ought not to be the case at all. Rather, as the findings revealed, the Akans only see and 
recognize an instrumental value in nature, and this instrumental value of nature inures 
ultimately to the benefit of humans. In other words, the Akan holds the belief that the 
preservation and sustenance of nature are good and desirable because it serves the needs and 
interests of humankind. It is not for any intrinsic worth identified in nature but for humans’ 
continuous survival on earth. This was patently expressed in Traditional Respondent 3’s 
rhetorical question: if we are unable to preserve what our ancestors have bequeathed to us, 
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then what will become of our lives? Traditional Respondent 4 emphasized that even though, 
there is an interconnection in nature the interconnection exists to the benefit of humans such 
that without human beings, rivers and other aspects of nature would play no role. Likewise, 
Traditional Respondent 5 pointed out that human life is not complete without animals and water 
bodies, and everything created, is created to the benefit of humans.  
This renunciation of nature’s intrinsic value by the Akan people is notably in contravention 
with the view expressed by Gyekye. Gyekye (1995), as reported in the literature review, had 
argued that the Akans perceive at least some part of nature or the physical world to be animated. 
The Akans, he again observed, view all created things, that is, natural objects to have or contain 
sunsum (spirit) or power. These observations made Gyekye conclude that Akan thinkers intend 
to attribute to these natural objects, some intrinsic property, namely the ‘property of activity or 
an activating principle’. The study notes that this interpretation does not agree with the 
responses gathered from the traditional Akan respondents, neither was it intimated in the views 
expressed by the young Akan adult respondents. What is however clear from the findings is 
that although the Akans generally agree that nature or some aspect of it, can contain a sunsum 
or a force, they do not consider that to mean that these ‘spirited nature’ are worthy of respect 
for their own sake. This became more apparent, when the direct question was asked to the 
respondents to find out if they will consider nature to be appreciable for its own sake, that is, 
if nature could be useful without the existence of the human species. To this, Traditional 
Respondent 1, for instance, gave a reply that intimated a negative answer. He asserted that they 
[nature] are useful to man. Let us take the fish in the rivers that we consume. We [humans] 
hunt animals in the bush, we use the forest in farming, and we use the timber to build houses… 
so everything that God created is useful to mankind. In a related and more perceptive response, 
Traditional Respondent 4 suggested that nature is not perceived to exist or to be valued for its 
own sake but for humans’ purpose and fulfilment. He admitted that nature is indeed preserved 
for the sake of human beings. He explained that nature can go extinct but it will not affect it. 
When in Sahara areas, real vegetation turns out to be, you know, the encroachment came and 
is still coming. It is, I mean, it is to the detriment of men or of man. So nature has nothing to 
lose, but we [humans] have something to lose. It is therefore evident from the quote that the 
Akans do not consider nature for its intrinsic worth despite the fact that they consider part of 
the environment animated with spirits.   
On the question of whether animals possess soul, the findings revealed that views were not 
homogeneous. Most of the respondents such as Traditional Respondent 5, Traditional 
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Respondent 8, and Traditional Respondent 9 disaffirmed the possibility of animals having a 
soul. Traditional Respondent 5, for example, stated that it is not mentioned anywhere in the 
traditional beliefs of the Akans that animals possess a soul. He was of the view that the death 
of animals is their end, and that their souls do not go anywhere. Traditional Respondent 9 
believed that the lack of a soul in animals was one of the key differences between animals and 
humans. Meanwhile, other respondents including Traditional Respondent 1, Traditional 
Respondent 2, and Traditional Respondent 3 believed that animals, or at least some of them do 
possess a soul. Traditional Respondent 6 and Traditional Respondent 1 explained that not all 
animals are considered by the Akans to possess a soul. According to Traditional Respondent 
6, it is the larger wild animals in the forest that can possess a soul and not the smaller ones. 
Thus, such wild large animals such as the buffalo, the duiker, the lion, and the elephant can be 
said to have a soul and not the smaller animals or domesticated animals.  
The traditional respondents were however in agreement on the question of whether animals 
possess spirit. The position of Traditional Respondent 1 was that animals and humans share 
certain attributes such as growth, procreation, death, and the ability to walk. As a result of these 
similarities, animals, just like humans, have spirits. Traditional Respondent 5 also claimed that 
animals only have some ‘God-given spirit’ but not a soul. He believed that it is this spirit that 
makes it possible for animals to be tamed and trained to follow certain instructions.  
Although the respondents did agree with Gyekye that animals possess a spirit and some a soul, 
there were no other remarks made by the respondents that pointed to the fact that they 
considered animals as having intrinsic worth for the mere fact that they possessed a spirit. All 
indications from the respondents rather pointed to the fact that they considered animals as 
having a good that benefits human needs. Notwithstanding this, the respondents did indicate 
that in some instances, some animals that are considered to have souls (that is, the big wild 
animals) such as the elephant or buffalo are given special treatment after they are killed for 
their game. Traditional Respondent 6 and Traditional Respondent 1 separately explained that 
hunters who kill such animals perform certain rituals to ward off evil spirits that can follow 
and bring upon them some future misfortunes. Thus, it is evident that even for these highly 
respected animals, the Akans are permitted to hunt them for food, and the rituals that are done 
after they are killed are not done out of respect for the intrinsic worthiness of the animal, but 
to protect the human being from spiritual consequences resulting from the killing. Again, this 
notwithstanding, the ritual done after killing these animals presumed to have souls, is also an 
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indication of the respect the Akans have for the soul of the animal. This, as indicated by 
Traditional Respondent 1, is why some animals are buried after they die. 
Arguably, it is possible for the Akans to give some high level of reverence to animals they 
consider as their totems. As was said in the literature review, one way in which the Akans relate 
to nature is through their totems. Totems are believed to have a certain ancestral link with a 
particular tribe, clan or family and can be an animal, a plant or any other natural object. These 
totems serve as protectors, guardians, or patron spirits that protect the group and shield them 
from any harm as well as bring to the group some good fortunes. In return, the group respects 
and refrain from eating, killing or trapping these animals they take to be their totems. At the 
death of a totem animal, the clan associated with it mourns and buries it as they would a human 
being (Lumor, 2009: 19-20). The responses from the traditional respondents on totems cohere 
with much of the literature. As seen in the literature, the Akan word for totem is Akyeneboa or 
Atweneboa, which literally means ‘an animal that one leans upon or rely on for spiritual 
inspiration’ (Eshun, 2011: 34; Lumor, 2009: 21). Each of the eight Akan clans has its own 
designated animal or animals that have been accepted and related to as the clan’s totem. On the 
authority of Traditional Respondent 7, totems are not only used as mere emblem of the Clan 
but they represent “the soul of the Clan.” Traditional Respondent 1 also noted that the Akan 
people regard totems as the soul and guardian spirits of the Clan. As a result, each clan has to 
revere its totem animal as a symbol of the Clan. On the account of Traditional Respondent 9, 
the totem animals are considered by members of the Clan as their brothers or sisters and so, 
they will not do anything to harm it.  
Despite this high regards the Akans give to these totem animals, it is still not accurate to 
describe the relationship they have with the totem animals as one that leads to a recognition of 
the animals’ innate or intrinsic value. If one should consider what the Akans consider as the 
role of the totem animals, (which is to protect, guard, and bring good omen to members of the 
clan) one would note that it is not for nothing that the animals are so much revered. There is 
still the element of instrumental or consequential value placed on these totem animals. 
Additional facts to emphasize this point are observable in the historical accounts given for how 
and why these animals are taken on as totems. According to their accounts, some of these 
animals were perhaps chosen to become the totems of the Akan clans because, their ancestors 
or founding patriarchs, observed the behavior of the animals to reflect the very characteristics 
they wanted to associate their Clans with or how the Clan wanted to be perceived by outsiders. 
According to Traditional Respondent 3, the ancestors of the Akans observed certain lifestyles 
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of some animals, and felt that accepting these animals as their totem will make others associate 
their clan with the character of these animals. Some of the factors they considered were the 
intelligence and behavior of the animals. Traditional Respondent 6 also explained that the 
Asakyiri Clan, for example, has the vulture as one of its totems, which serves as a symbol of 
living carefully to preserve one’s life. This is because the vulture is an animal that is known to 
live very long. Likewise, the Asona Clan has the crow as its totem to symbolize beauty just 
like the beauty of the crow. Even more telling, is the story behind how the parrot became the 
revered totem of the Agona Clan. From the independent accounts of both Traditional 
Respondent 6 and Traditional Respondent 7, the Agona Clan chose the parrot as their totem, 
when in the past a certain parrot helped their great ancestors to escape from the hands of some 
assailants. The story is also told that the parrot had in the pas,t led the ancestors to a pot of 
gold, which became the source of wealth for the clan. In another account given, it was said that 
the parrot was known to help the clan by informing members of the clan on what to say when 
they are faced with a traditional legal case. Similar stories are told of the dog of the Aduana 
Clan, of which it is known to have brought fire in its mouth to the clan back in days when a 
fire had never been seen before. Furthermore, the Buffalo of the Oyoko clan, at one point in 
history, helped the clan to cross a river during a great war. A consideration of all these accounts 
demonstrates that even the reverence and respect given to totem animals are not given to them 
as a recognition of their intrinsic worth as spirit-filled animals, but because of their instrumental 
value and their power to affect the course of human lives.    
The Akans’ denial of intrinsic value of nature concurs with the positions of Bujo, Murove, and 
Horsthemke. The Akans’ denial of intrinsic value of nature is also a rejection of the non-
anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics ambition of the likes Tangwa, Ogungbemi, 
and Behrens. As already indicated, Tangwa (2004), for example, had argued his eco-bio-
communitarian environmental ethics to be a non-anthropocentric approach and as a contrast to 
the Western environmental ethical theories which he accused of being both anthropocentric 
and individualistic. Kevin Behrens (2010) had similarly described his ‘African relational 
environmentalism’ as a rejection of anthropocentrism. However, the Akan position agrees with 
Horsthemke (2015), who had pointed out that the attempt by some African environmental 
ethicists to interpret the ethics of Ubuntu and Ukama as a non-anthropocentric relational 
approach is mistaken. According to Horsthemke, if the language employed by these African 
environmental ethicists is critically observed in their interpretations of the African based 
knowledge, it will be seen that African environmental ethics is undeniably human-centered. 
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Thus, the evidence from the Akan respondents appears to agree with Horsthemke’s position 
and disavows the non-anthropocentric position of Tangwa. It is also notable that the Akan 
position coheres with Murove’s interpretation of Ubuntu and Ukama in his philosophical 
application to the natural environment. Murove claimed that when the two concepts of Ukama 
and Ubuntu are synthesized, they produce an ethical outlook that suggests that human 
wellbeing is indispensable from their dependence on, and interdependence with all that exists 
(Murove, 2009: 315). This interpretation aligns with the claim made by Traditional Respondent 
5, who similarly intimated that the natural environment exists to make human life complete. In 
addition, it appears that the Akan position, by placing value in nature in terms of nature benefits 
humanity as a whole, will be in accordance with non-individualistic claims by the likes of 
Behrens and Tangwa in regards to the nature of the ethics of interrelatedness. Consequently, 
what appears to be true of the Akan environmental ethics is that even though it is 
anthropocentric in approach, it is also not individualistic. Akan environmental ethics does not 
set out to seek the interests or rights of individual human agents or individual natural species 
but, the interests of the human species as a whole.     
It is also apparent that when the Akans speak of preserving nature for the sake of humanity, 
they do not have only the current generation in mind but also the future generations as well. 
Traditional Respondent 4 expressed this view saying: We have dominion, but you could destroy 
everything, to your own disadvantage, so you sustain them. You maintain them, to make sure 
you have something left for the next generation. This view coincides with the position of the 
indirect welfarist, which calls for the preservation of animal species. This is because they 
believe humans owe it to the present and future generations to do what they can to ensure that 
animals continue to exist for future humans to enjoy their benefits as well, through either 
sightseeing or other beneficial uses that particular animal may provide (Regan, 2004).   
It should also be noted that for the Akans, a consideration of the natural environment as having 
only instrumental value that benefits humanity is not regarded as a design put in place by 
humans themselves to usurp authority and control over the rest of nature, but regarded as a 
natural design of things put in place by God himself. This was unequivocally expressed by 
Traditional Respondent 4 that in God’s own creation, human beings are superior to all and as 
such, God has given humans the authority to dominate nature. This is in line with the Judeo-
Christian tradition, which as was highlighted in the literature review, holds an anthropocentric 
view that puts humans at the center of the universe and confers on humans an absolute 
dominion over all things. Similarly, when the Akan position is applied directly to nonhuman 
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animals, the link it bears with those expressed by the softened position of the indirect welfarists 
is clearly made manifest. The softened position of the indirect welfarist is exemplified in the 
views of Kant, who posited that animals are not rational beings and so are properties that exist 
to serve the needs of humans. As a result, Kant held that humans do not owe any direct duty to 
animals except indirect ones. Thus, for Kant, we seek the good of animals, not for their own 
sake but for the sake of humans. However, the Akan position can also clearly be seen to differ 
from the views of, what may be called, the radical indirect welfarist position, which holds that 
humans owe no duty whatsoever to animals. The Akans, instead, hold it as their duty to take 
care of nature, including animals albeit, they do so for their own sustenance. This position 
resonates well with the position of Bujo (2009: 286), who also saw that the interrelationship 
that the African understands to exist between human and nature, is one that makes humans 
consider animals, plants, minerals, and other inanimate beings as the forces that God has made 
available for human use. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that this does not mean that human 
beings are allowed to treat the lesser form of beings arbitrarily. 
In effect, what the findings from the field have shown in regards to the theme of interconnected 
of nature is that Akan environmental ethics supports the theory of ethics of nature-relatedness. 
Akan environmental ethics, as deducible from the findings, is in line with much of the emerging 
literature in African environmental ethics that there is some interrelationship between nature 
and humans. It is also evident that the Akan environmental ethics is anthropocentric in 
approach, through the conferring of instrumental or extrinsic value to nature, an instrumental 
value that goes to benefit human needs. This notwithstanding, Akan environmental ethics is 
not individualistic because it does not seek the interests or rights of individual human agents 
but, the common interest of the community (humanity). That is, it seeks that which ensures the 
continuity of human community and survival. In so doing, Akan environmental ethics calls for 
judicious and sustainable use of the natural environment in such a way that maintains what the 
Akans consider the natural cycle of the interdependency. To this extent, there is a metaphysical 
aspect to the Akan environmental ethics, on the account that the instrumental value they ascribe 
to the natural environment is a natural design established by God himself. Thus, it was mistaken 
for Ogungbemi (1997) to have argued that the ethics of nature-relatedness cannot be given a 
spiritual interpretation. Yet, there is also the non-metaphysical aspect in light of the Akan’s 
belief that taking care of the environment is something needed for the sustenance of humans’ 
mundane needs.      
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 6.2 The moral status of nonhuman animals 
The theme of the moral status of nonhuman animals was noted as a major theme that the many 
arguments and debates in animal ethics rest upon. It was mentioned in the literature review that 
one’s particular position on the moral status of animals is a major determinant of one’s line 
argument, that is, whether one will accept or reject a welfarist or rightist position. As DeGrazia 
(2008) claims, for a being or a thing to be considered to have moral status, is for that being or 
thing to be considered to bear direct or independent moral importance. Identifying or 
acknowledging that a thing or being has a moral status is to identify or acknowledge that thing 
or being as worthy of consideration in moral decision-making or that the thing or being is to be 
considered as part of humans’ moral responsibility.  
The literature revealed various positions on the question of the moral status of animals. There 
are the likes of Aristotle who denied moral status to animals because they considered animals 
as incapable of reasoning. Descartes, on his part, held that animals do not have any moral status 
because they do not possess a soul or consciousness. Thus, for him, animals cannot think, feel, 
perceive or choose for they were simply automatas. The lack of all these distinctive human 
attributes, from the point of view of Descartes, made it impossible to speak of animals as 
possessors of rights. Kant had also argued against animals having a moral status based on his 
claim that animals are not rational thus, denying them a ‘will’ and a moral worth. St. Augustine, 
coming from the Christian perspective, had also failed to grant direct moral status to animals 
on the bases that animals do not have an immortal soul, not rational, and only act on instincts. 
Beyond these scholars who denied any sort of moral status for animals based on what they 
considered to be the distinctive marks that separated animals from humans, there are scholars 
such as Voltaire, Hume, Bentham, Mill, and Darwin who rejected the claims that humans and 
animals are entirely different. Voltaire had argued that animals can feel pain like humans based 
on the resemblance he saw in the organs of humans and animals. Hume, on his part, thought 
that based on observable animal behavior, animals and humans may not be different after all. 
Bentham had directed our attention away from the consideration of animals’ ability to talk or 
reason, to consider instead the question of whether or not they are able to suffer. Darwin had 
also claimed that the difference between humans and animals in terms of mental capacity is 
only one of degree and not of a kind. This is because for him, animals are capable of feeling 
pain, pleasure, happiness, and misery.  
Based on these acknowledgements of some shared similarities and features between humans 
and animals, some scholars either argued for a partial or full moral status of animals. Peter 
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Singer (1976) and Tom Regan (2004) had both argued for the inclusion of animals in the 
definition of a moral community even though, for them, animals are to be treated as moral 
patients and not as moral agents. This notwithstanding, while Singer argued for the inclusion 
of animals based on their sentiency (their ability to feel pain), Regan, on his part, argued for 
the inclusion of animals based on animals having inalienable inherent value. From this 
ascription of inherent value, Regan, as we saw, argued that animals have rights, which can be 
equaled to the rights possessed by humans. Another notable difference between Singer and 
Regan is that Singer’s position led him to argue for the humane treatment of animals while 
Regan, upon granting animals similar rights as humans, called for the total abolition of animal 
use.    
On this theme, a number of conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in chapter five. 
How the participants in the one-on-one interviews and focus group discussions responded to 
this theme is presented under the following subsections.  
 
6.2.1 The place of humans and animals in Akan ontology 
From the first theme, it was shown that the Akan generally holds the view that humans and the 
natural environment are interconnected. As a result, the Akans believe in the judicious use of 
the environment, not for the sake of any intrinsic value possessed by nature or given to nature 
by God, but because it benefits humans themselves. Akans perceive this as a natural order of 
things established by God the creator himself. The reason Akans hold this view perhaps lies in 
their ontological worldview of the place of humans in the natural scheme of things. This is 
important because where the Akans place animals in their ontological conception of nature 
plays a vital role in determining the moral status they place on animals. 
 
6.2.1.1 Humans’ place within Akan hierarchy of beings 
In the literature review, it was established that the Akan ontological worldview pointed to the 
belief in the hierarchy of beings as indicated by Gyekye and Hagan. According to Gyekye 
(1995), the Akan world is perceived as composing of a hierarchy of beings with God, the 
Supreme Being, placed at the apex. This is followed by the smaller gods or the deities, 
ancestors, humans, and the world of natural objects and phenomena, in that descending order.  
Hagan observed that the hierarchical structure of the Akan universe affirms the good of 
humanity as the ultimate goal of nature. Thus, “the whole of nature forms a hierarchical 
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structure according to the extent to which things can influence the life of man” (Hagan, 1964: 
16). This, in the view of the researcher, constitutes a profound statement by Hagan, because, it 
underscores the very humanistic nature of Akan ontology and ethics. The data gathered from 
the traditional respondents reiterated the Akan belief in the hierarchy of beings and the Akans’ 
central placement of humans in the natural scheme of things.  
All the traditional Akan respondents agreed without an exception that the Akans considered 
humans superior to animals. According to Traditional Respondent 7, humans are the most 
ranked in nature. This, for him, is because “human beings are human beings” and cannot be 
replaced. The claim that human beings are human beings is an appreciation of human’s innate 
worth. Something that the sub-chief thought, made humans indispensable and at the same time 
much worthier than nonhuman animals. Traditional Respondent 1, on his part, suggested that 
a close examination of nature reveals that human beings are ranked higher than all other things 
in nature. Furthermore, Traditional Respondent 4 and Traditional Respondent 2 made the 
following more profound assertions: According to Traditional Respondent 4, without human 
beings, rivers and other aspects of the natural environment “would not play any role.” For him, 
human beings, in accordance with God’s own creation, are superior to everything else.  Human 
beings have been “given authority to dominate” hence, making nothing in nature above human 
beings. He stressed that yes, so man, human beings are superior to any other, any other thing 
in the ecosystem. Relatedly, Traditional Respondent 2, stated on authority that if things in 
nature are observed carefully it will be possible to reach the conclusion that human beings are 
highly ranked above all other things in the natural order. Her reason for coming to this 
conclusion was that when God created all things, He created man to be in charge of all other 
things. She maintained that human beings were made the overseers of all of God’s creation 
thus, making humans superior to all the things created by God. As such, all other things are 
beneath human beings.  
Remaining true to their belief that humans are regarded as superior to animals, the Akan uses 
a variety of animals to fulfil different existential needs. As disclosed by the respondents, the 
Akans use animals for food, for sacrifices during festive occasions, and for rituals for 
pacification and warding off bad omen and evil. Skins of some animals are used for clothes 
including sandals. Some of these hides are also placed on the stool of chiefs to sit on. Some 
others are used as foot mat for the chief, and possibly to make some of the paraphernalia won 
by the chiefs. Some animals are kept in households, to ward off evil including impending 
deaths. The horns of some animals are used for musical instruments, while some animals are 
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kept at home as pets or companion animals, for hunting and to ward off mice. Animals used 
for these needs include sheep, fowls (cock, hen, including their eggs), elephants, 
duikers/antelopes/deer, and some types of fish such as the mudfish. Others are lions, buffalos, 
goats, grasscutters (greater cane rat), dogs, woodpigeons, cattle, and cats, among others. 
 
6.2.1.2 Human and animal distinctiveness  
The respondents referred to certain attributes and qualities that in their view, set humans apart 
from animals, and at the same time give to human that special place in nature over and above 
all other physical beings. Some responses such as the claim that humans are able to clothe 
themselves while animals are not able or that humans bath with soap and water while animals 
do not can easily be said to commit what Regan (2004) calls the arbitrariness with regards to 
the reasons given to exclude animals from our moral community.  As such, the study did not 
discuss these responses. However, the study discusses some of the major distinguishing marks 
the respondents gave, as that which sets human and animals apart.  
 
6.2.1.2.1 Humans as created in the image of God 
At least five traditional respondents believed that humans are special because they are created 
in the image of God. As one respondent puts it, human beings, according to our elders, are 
closer to God. They have the resemblance of God. This view aligns with the Judeo-Christian 
perspective wherein it is believed that humans were created by God in His image and given 
dominion over the earth and all that are therein. It is, however, unclear whether the Akans came 
by this position from a Judeo-Christian influence or from their own handed-down belief. 
Scholars such as Lynn White (2000) have argued the Judeo-Christian mindset has led to the 
over-exploitation of nature by humans. However, as it has been shown under the first theme, 
the Akans do not subscribe to an exploitation of the environment. Instead, they believe in the 
prudent use of the environment. This is in accordance with Bernard Rollin’s (1992) claim that 
even if the Judeo-Christian position is accepted, it does not necessarily translate that humans 
are to treat animals in whatsoever ways they see fit. 
 
6.2.1.2.2 Animals’ rational capabilities  
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Another differentiating attribute between humans and animals given by the traditional 
respondents was wisdom or display of intelligence in humans. Animals do not reason before 
they do anything, claimed one respondent. A related response given by, at least two 
respondents, is the belief in the notion that while humans act, based on a rational decision and 
so, are able to control their ‘feelings’, animals act solely on instincts. Also closely linked to 
this view is the response that humans have a purpose for doing what they do while animals do 
not. Furthermore, other respondents chose to express this belief through the claim that humans 
have a higher comprehension level than animals.  
The denial of rational thinking, reason, or consciousness to animals by the respondents relates 
to what the study observed in the literature review as one of the major reasons given by many 
as a basis for denying animals a moral status. Stoic philosophers, as has been pointed out in 
chapter two, had argued that animals could not be included in our understanding of a moral 
community because they lack reason. Armstrong and Botzler (2008), as well as Keith Thomas 
(1983), indicated that the general view of the renaissance period was that animals were different 
from humans (inferior) in terms of many factors including reason. They also held that even if 
animals could reason at all, they could only do so, at a much lower level than humans. One 
notable renaissance figure in the period was Descartes who alluded that animals act 
mechanically (automatas), and are not conscious to think, perceive, choose, or feel (Leahy, 
1991: 84). In connection to this, the denial of rationality and reasoning capabilities to animals 
concurs theoretically with the position of the indirect welfarist. It was the position of Kant, for 
example, that animals are not rational beings, and as a result, have no absolute worth. Animals 
are, therefore, to be considered in the category of things. Thus, Kant considered animals as 
properties that can be used as means to humans’ end. Consequently, Kant argued, as it is 
generally done by indirect welfarists, that humans have only indirect duties towards animals.  
This argument to deny animals a moral status based on rationality has been rejected by many 
scholars. The basis of some of these rejections has been more compelling with the 
advancements made in the science of animal research. Charles Darwin (as cited in Regan and 
Singer 1976), for example, noted from his studies of animal nature that only few people would 
dispute the fact that animals possess some power of reasoning. He held that the more animals 
are studied the more it becomes evident of their capacity to reason. The difference, according 
to Darwin, is only in the reasoning capacities of humans over animals, that is, humans are for 
example, able to engage in abstract thinking and self-consciousness while animals cannot. This 
difference, Darwin believed, is only a matter of degree and not of a kind. Masson and McCarthy 
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(1994) demonstrated in – “When elephants weep: the emotional lives of animals” - that animals 
do express emotions in many different ways: they cry, they vocalise their pain and distress, and 
can even call for help. 
Scholars such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin, and Mary Midgley, including 
nearly all direct welfarists and rightists have argued against the attempt to use rationality (more 
especially Immanuel Kant’s approach to morality through rationality) as the basis for drawing 
a distinction between humans and animals. Singer and Cohen, for example, believed that such 
an attempt is a major inadequacy in any moral theory, since moral concern for people usually 
has nothing to do with their rationality. They, instead, argue that animals be accorded moral 
considerations because animals are capable of pain and suffering, and that humans owe to 
animals the moral duty of ensuring that they do not go through unnecessary suffering 
irrespective of their rationality. 
 
6.2.1.2.3 Animals’ language and communication capabilities 
A third notable difference the respondents observed between humans and animals is the view 
that human beings can talk or, are endowed with the gift of speech while animals are not. At 
least two of the traditional respondents alluded to this claim. The use of language as a 
distinguishing mark between humans and animals is also a commonplace as seen in the 
literature review. It is also, perhaps, linked to the distinction made on the basis of rationality. 
Again, Armstrong and Botzler (2008) had pointed out that one of the reasons given for the 
belief that animals were different from humans during the renaissance period, among others, 
was the lack of speech in animals. Raymond G. Frey (1980) had also argued that animals could 
not have interests mainly because they lacked language. For him, to say that animals have 
interests, is to mean that they have wants that can be satisfied or left unsatisfied. This, to him, 
is not possible because animals do not have wants. For Frey, wants only arise out of desires, 
which animals do not have, because to have a want is to imply having a belief, which he thinks, 
is not compatible with the absence of language and linguistic ability, something which animals 
do not have (Frey 1980). Frey’s position coincides with Davidson’s (1982), who had also 
claimed that a creature could not have thought unless it has a language. Davidson argued that 
for one to be regarded as a thinking or rational being that being should be able to express many 
thoughts, and above all, be able to interpret the speech and thoughts of others. Similarly, 
Warren’s attribution of a weaker type of rights to animals laid mainly in what she considers 
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their lack of a language. She explains that despite the fact that both animals and humans possess 
rational capabilities people are stirred to action or inaction by the force of reasoned argument. 
She further claims that humans’ ability to listen to reason in order to settle conflicts and 
cooperate in shared projects is what sets them apart. This ability, she believes, requires human 
language (Warren, 2012: 93). 
Language remains one of the resolute distinguishing marks identified to separate humans and 
animals. Although it is easily shown scientifically, and through the observation of animals’ 
outward behavior that animals do possess their own way of communication, some of which 
appear to share at least, some properties of language, as language, in its strict sense, for now, 
appears to be exclusively human. Nevertheless, the argument remains whether the inability of 
animals to use language warrants their denial of moral status.  
 
6.2.1.2.4 Sociality and moral capabilities  
Another important dissimilarity between humans and animals, as indicated by the respondents, 
lies in the belief that humans are able to determine what is wrong and right while animals are 
not. In other words, it is believed that only humans have a sense of morality. A minimum of 
three traditional respondents alluded to this claim. According to one respondent, laws guide 
human societies, unlike the animal kingdom that goes by the law of the survival of the fittest. 
Another respondent in one of the young adult focus group thought that what sets animals and 
human apart is animals’ inability to enter into some sort of social or moral contract with 
humans. In this respondent’s view, humans, for the sake of survival, have made laws for 
themselves to keep them living peacefully with each other yet, such laws cannot be made with 
nonhuman animals. A third respondent posited that humans could care for others while animals 
cannot. In regards to sociality, respondents claim that humans, unlike animals have cultures 
and live a social life, including observing marriage ceremonies and ceremonies for the dead. A 
respondent pointed to this saying: That is why we even spend money to perform rites for the 
dead. So we spend money to perform marriages, we spend money on naming ceremonies we 
spend on things in life… on rites of passage.  
Evidently, any argument claiming an absolute lack of sociality in animals is easily falsified, 
with the help of evidence from the many research into animal behavior that has been made 
available to us. Even though Waser (1988: 109) had argued that only small populations of 
mammal species are gregarious, and even fewer live stable cooperative groups. We do know 
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that animals, such as the male Herring gull, ground-dwelling squirrels, some spiders, termites, 
bees, and the naked mole rat, among others, exhibit different levels of sociality and 
cooperation. According to Slobodchikoff and Shields (1988: 3-4), social behavior includes any 
behavioral interactions among members of social groups, which can include a show of selfish, 
spiteful, cooperative or altruistic behaviors, directed at group members. So that even though 
animals may not be social in all the ways humans express themselves socially, such as seen in 
the way humans observe rites of passage, there are observable social behaviors among some 
animals. Animals can form many kinds of groups varying from temporary fish schools to highly 
unified honey bees colonies (Wilson, 1975 as cited by Armitage, 1988: 131). Similarly, 
Tinbergen (1990) has shown the sociality of animals in terms of their family and group life, 
mating behavior, and their relation with other species, among others. For him, the study of 
social behavior is simply the study of cooperation between individuals (Tinbergen, 1990: 2). 
The supposed inability of animals to engage in human’s moral community or their lack of a 
sense of morality when relating among themselves or with humans has been a strong position 
used to reject or deny animal equal moral status with humans. Darwin (as cited in Ayala, 2010), 
had consented that of all the argued differences between humans and animals, it was the 
argument based on the moral sense or conscience that he found to be by far, the most important. 
Many who have argued that animals cannot be moral have done so on the basis that only 
rational beings can be moral, and since animals are not rational, they cannot be moral beings. 
Ayala (2010: 9019) argues that ‘moral sense’, comes about as a necessary implication of 
humans’ high intellectual capability, which gives to them, not only the ability to anticipate the 
effects of their actions, but also helps them to evaluate these possible effects and decide on 
which way to act accordingly. He maintains that the human moral sense is an “exaptation”, not 
an adaptation. That is to say, “the moral sense consists of judging certain actions as either right 
or wrong, not of choosing and carrying out some actions rather than others.” For Ayala, these 
three features which are embedded in, what it means to have a moral sense, makes morality the 
prerogative of only rational human beings.  
 Sapontzis (1980) has argued against this attempt to deny animals a sense of morality based on 
some human conditions of what it means to be moral. For him, in as much as we can recognize 
that animals do sometimes act morally, it should not matter whether animals are able to 
distinguish moral values from other kinds of values or whether animals recognize the moral 
goods and evils of situations they respond to. Thus, the notable, compassionate and courageous 
actions of some animals should be enough to meet the common sense condition for moral 
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action. As such, the justification for linking reason and moral action, to him, is flawed. 
Subsequently, he finds it erroneous the argument that animals are unqualified for moral action 
because some amount of intelligence is required for identifying moral values and motivating 
moral action (Sapontzis, 1980: 49). 
Tom Regan (2004) has also argued that animals, even if they cannot be moral agents because 
of their lack of a sophisticated ability to reason, should at least be regarded as moral patients. 
This is because animals can have beliefs, desires, and preferences in such a similar manner, as 
other human moral patients such as babies. As a result, animals are to be considered part of our 
moral community and must be accorded full moral consideration. This is in line with his rightist 
position. Arguing on a similar line of thought, Mark Rowlands (2011) also argued that animals, 
in order to be regarded as moral agents, should be regarded as moral subjects even though they 
may lack conceptual and cognitive ability to comprehend what moral responsibility means. For 
him, animals do exhibit moral emotions such as compassion, tolerance, sympathy, patience, 
and kindness as well as a display of a sense of fairness.  
One should not be entirely surprised that there is a strong sense of focus on sociality and the 
ability to engage in a moral community among the Akans. The Akans’ use of sociality and 
morality as distinguishing features between humans and animals is rooted within their sense of 
communal life, of which traditional African communitarian societies like theirs are noted for. 
Sociality and living an ethical life that promotes the wellbeing of the community are core values 
of the traditional Akan people, and the impact and implication of this communal life reflect in 
their notion of personhood, belief in ancestors, and their meaning of a fulfilled life.   
 
6.2.1.2.5 Animals’ inhabitation of a soul or a spirit 
Another important distinctive mark between humans and animals pointed to by the respondents 
was in relation to the Akan belief in the inhabitation of spirits and souls in animals. On this 
view, one respondent posited that it is actually the possessing of spirit and soul that makes 
humans superior to animals and all other living and non-living things. 
The Akans perceive the human being to be made up of a body, soul, and spirit. The body, they 
hold, perishes at death, while the soul goes back to God the Creator. The spirit is however 
responsible for the character disposition of the person and can be inherited or given to the 
person by the father like a gene. The existence of a soul or a spirit may not be established 
philosophically or scientifically nevertheless, it remains an entrenched view in the traditional 
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Akan worldview. As already mentioned, the Akan ontology is highly metaphysical in nature, 
and there is a strong belief in the existence of spiritual beings. These spiritual beings are revered 
and even worshipped as a conduit to the Supreme Being. Gyekye (1995) reported that Akan 
ontology is not only pluralistic (the belief in the existence of many beings) but also panpsychist 
(the belief that everything is or contains a spirit) in nature. It, thus, becomes understandable, 
why the Akan would place importance on the possession of a soul or spirits. Based on this 
belief, one is, therefore, justified in questioning what made Ogungbemi to state that the ethics 
of nature-relatedness, as observed from the traditional African experience, does not imply that 
natural resources do have a spiritual nature. (See Ogungbemi, 1997:270). In this regard, 
perhaps Ojomo was right to have said of Ogungbemi’s ethics of nature-relatedness as not being 
a true reflection of traditional African metaphysics (Ojomo, 2011:110). More so, Hagan had 
explained that there are many examples to “show that between man and man, man and animal, 
spirit and matter, and man and plants, there are relations which pass into their beings” (Hagan 
1964:51). Despite this, and as indicated earlier, the respondents did not agree on the question 
of whether animals possess souls or spirits. While some answered in affirmative, others were 
not too quick to admit. However, what became clear is that animals that are perceived by Akans 
to possess a soul are given special treatment in terms of respect, honour, and reverence.   
A notable implication of placing importance on the possession of a soul is that for the Akan, 
merely being a subject-of-a-life is not enough to grant you a moral consideration. Plants, as 
well as animals, have a life but, it is those beings who are perceived to have souls that are likely 
to be given some amount of moral consideration. Regan (2004), on the contrary, will have us 
believe that being a subject-of-a-life alone is enough to make a being the possessor of an 
inherent value, and such a being is not to be treated as mere receptacles. However, by 
considering Regan’s definition or understanding of his subject-of-a-life criterion, some 
similarities may be found with his view and the views of the Akans regarding the granting of 
moral status to an animal based on that animal possession a soul. We learnt from Regan that to 
be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual who has beliefs and desires, perception, memory, 
and a sense of the future, including their own future. They also have an emotional life that 
comes with feelings of pain and pleasure, they have preference and interest in their welfare, 
and they have the ability to initiate action in an attempt to reach their goals and satisfy their 
desires. In addition, a subject-of-a-life has a psychophysical identity over time, among other 
features (Regan, 2004:243). It is perhaps likely that for the Akan all these requirements listed 
by Regan are made possible by the possession of a soul. If this is taken to be the case then it 
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will appear that the only difference between Regan’s subject-of-a-life criterion and the Akan’s 
possession of a soul criterion will be in the kind of animals that get to be given a moral status. 
Obviously, there is the need for more inquiry to be made to either affirm or deny this seemingly 
similarity. This is because, from the data solicited from the Akan respondents, only few animals 
(the large ones such as the elephant or buffalo and perhaps all totem animals) are regarded as 
possessors of a soul. Nevertheless, Regan’s subject-of-a-life criterion will also leave out some 
animals such as insects and others that may not meet his subject-of-a-life requirements.  
 
6.2.2 Animal Pain and the wronging of Animals  
The acknowledgment that animals, or at least some of them, can experience pain or suffer has 
been a compelling factor for almost all direct welfarists in acknowledging the moral status of 
these animals. In the words of Garner, “the mere fact that animals are sentient ought to result 
in animals being accorded a higher moral status” (Garner, 2010: 15). The same can be said of 
some animal rightist advocates such as Francione and Warren, whom both acknowledged that 
animals have some basic moral rights because they are sentient. Thus, the recognition that 
animals can be made to suffer through human action is a compelling force that should make 
anyone reconsider their position on the moral status of animals even though various 
conclusions have been drawn from this acceptance of the sentiency of animals. While for most 
direct welfarists the admission of animal pain does not necessarily translate into a recognition 
of equal moral status for both humans and animals. Animal rightists such as Francione (2010), 
on a similar basis, argued for equal moral status for humans and animals alike. Francione was 
of the view that despite the differences that may exist between the minds of animals and those 
of humans, these differences are not to be taken to mean that the sentient experiences of animals 
are less weighty than those of humans. 
The data from the field suggests that both the traditional and young adult respondents recognize 
that animals can suffer pain and be wronged. They acknowledged this by providing various 
instances and examples of things that are done to animals, which in their view, cause pain in 
animals. These include but not limited to hunting and trapping animals, throwing things at 
animals, starving animals, tethering of animals, and killing animals for no reason at all or the 
mere fun of it. The respondents recognized that animals could go through various types of 
emotions depending on how they are cared for or treated. They used words such as pain, 
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pleasure, sad, moody, grief, excitement, and happiness to describe the various emotions they 
consider animals to have at a given point in time.  
Traditional Respondent 1 observed that humans could cause pains to animals, and even make 
them very sad especially when animals are hit with something. For him, the way animals react 
show that they can feel pain. Traditional Respondent 6 similarly mentioned that by observing 
the behavior and the cry of animals, it is possible to tell that animals go through pain. 
Traditional Respondent 4, Traditional Respondent 5, and Traditional Respondent 9, all 
acknowledged that causing pain to animals could bring negative repercussion on the 
perpetrator, both physically and spiritually. According to Traditional Respondent 4, the Akan 
people hold a belief that spiritually, if one should continuously mistreat animals, the animals 
have a way of getting back at the person. As reported in the previous chapter, the three 
respondents independently gave different stories they have either witnessed or been told, where 
such spiritual consequences befell some individuals who were cruel to some animals. 
Traditional Respondent 5, on his part, averred that if for no just cause you kill an animal or you 
kill it not because you want to use it for food, it means you are subjecting the animal to 
unjustified harm.  
According to Traditional Respondent 7, it is for the acknowledgment of the pains that animals 
go through that the Akan people adopt a kind of mercy killing whenever they have to slaughter 
an animal for food or a ritual. To do this, before the animal is killed, it is first given water; next, 
the throat of the animal is well covered so that the sound of the pain is suppressed. The final 
step is to make sure to use a very sharp knife or cutting material so that the cut goes through 
quickly and completely. This process is done to assuage the pain the animal goes through, as 
he explained.  
For Traditional Respondent 4, making animals happy is to the advantage of both animals and 
humans. This is because when animals are happy they increase in offsprings, and humans 
benefit from their use. The majority of the respondents also pointed out that establishing a close 
relationship with animals can affect how they are treated. Traditional Respondent 5 posited that 
a good and close relationship with animals could establish a strong bond between animals and 
humans like that which exists among siblings. Furthermore, Traditional Respondent 2 held that 
a close relationship with an animal makes it difficult and painful for the owner to kill it. 
Similarly, Traditional Respondent 1 posited that when someone is good to animals, such a 
person can see the animals voluntarily gather around when, he or she brings in their food. 
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According to him, a dog, for example, will come at your beckon, and will outwardly show 
affection towards you when you are good to it. However, if it is hit, it takes to notice and may 
shun your company. Traditional Respondent 2 added that truly, animals could feel happy if 
they are treated well.  
Some respondents were of the view that any harm done to animals is not a direct harm done to 
the animals but, to their human owners yet, others were of the view that these harms were done 
directly to the animals. Traditional Respondent 7, for example, stated that any harm or pain 
inflicted on an animal is done directly to the animal. Traditional Respondent 9, on her part, 
thought it was dependent on the prevailing situation. She stated that sometimes you may hit the 
animal out of spite for the owner but the hurt goes directly to the animal. 
How are we to interpret this acknowledgment of animal sentience by the respondents? Does 
the acknowledgment of sentiency of animals mean the Akans consider animals as having a 
moral status? I should think so, to some extent. Garner (2010) was right to point out that the 
mere fact that animals are sentient ought to result in animals being accorded some form of 
moral status. When issues of good care, kindness, compassion, and various emotions and state 
of mind come to play, there is no doubt that ethics and morality are at play. The mere fact that 
the Akan judges his or her actions or inactions as good or bad based on the possibility of their 
action to cause pain to sentient beings, including animals, suggests therefore, that animals are 
somewhat considered as part of their moral community. Nevertheless, the Akan does not think 
the inclusion of animals in the definition of moral community makes the interests of animals 
at par with humans in a way that gives animals similar moral considerations as humans at all 
times. An evaluation of the view gathered from the respondents seems to suggest that animals 
are considered moral subjects in accordance with Rowlands (2011) view. Rowland had argued 
that animals, in order to be regarded as moral agents, should be regarded as moral subjects even 
though they may lack conceptual and cognitive ability to comprehend what moral 
responsibility means. It is evident from the respondents that even though some acknowledge 
that pain can be caused directly to animals, they do not think that ameliorating this pain is done 
solely to the benefit of the animal but rather to the benefit of their human owners or humans in 
general. Again, from the evidence, it is apparent that the Akan will not support an abolitionist 
or rightist position but rather support a direct welfarist position. This is seen in their attempts 
to reduce the suffering the animals go through when being killed and their disgust towards 
various acts of cruelty to animals. Shadrach, one of the young adult respondents, surmises the 
position of the Akans as follows: 
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I think that with this new information or with we knowing or bearing in mind that animals feel 
pain, the only thing we can do for them… because we have higher rationality we cannot act as 
they will. So, we know what pain is or we can actually understand what pain is, so the only 
thing we can do for them is to try to decrease or reduce the pain we take them through but for 
the eating, we still have to. 
 
6.3 Vegetarianism and the use of animals for food 
The question of whether to continue to use animals for food remains a controversial issue 
within the animal ethics debate. On this issue, the delineating line between the direct welfarist 
and the animal rightist positions is felt. In general terms, animal welfarists accept the humane 
use of animals for food as long as such use does not cause unnecessary pain and suffering to 
the animals. Animal rightists, conversely, deny the permissibility of such use, however 
humanely or painlessly it is done.  
Singer, who generally advocates for animals’ welfare, on the matter of using animals for food 
calls for all to be vegetarians, and will only allow the killing of animals for food only upon 
some strict conditions. Thus, for Singer, it serves a better utilitarian purpose if everyone 
becomes vegetarians. Nevertheless, it appears Singer’s main challenge with killing animals for 
food has to do with how animals are kept and bred on large scale farming. This is mainly 
because of what he perceives to be the undue suffering those animals go through before they 
end up on people’s plate. Singer (1980: 334) stated that “the utilitarian vegetarian is on strong 
ground in arguing that factory farming and the other cruelties involved in large-scale 
commercial animal production should end.” Singer urges meat consumers to instead, consider 
meat from organic or free-range animals and buy from meat producers who can demonstrate 
that the animals were treated humanely and given a less painful or painless death.  
In sharp contrast with Singer’s position is the rightist position of Tom Regan (2004), whose 
position is that humans have a moral obligation to be vegetarians. He held that animals have 
inalienable rights that cannot be traded away irrespective of their utility. He challenges the 
basis for Singer’s advocacy for vegetarianism, claiming that Singer’s theory, devoid of an 
appeal to rights, fails to demonstrate a moral obligation to be vegetarian (Regan, 1980: 308). 
For Regan, it is only when animals have rights that we can have a sufficiently firm theoretical 
basis for vegetarianism.   
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From the findings gathered, the Akan will have nothing to do with any theory that requires an 
absolute elimination of animals from their diet. It can be inferred from what was gathered from 
the respondents that although there are no explicit laws or taboos against vegetarianism, it is 
highly unlikely that a person will opt to be a vegetarian. The few who are vegetarians are more 
likely to be vegetarians based on health or personal taste rather than on the acknowledgment 
of animals’ moral status.  
According to Traditional Respondent 4, not until recently, it was almost impossible to hear of 
an Akan who was a vegetarian. For Traditional Respondent 6, traditionally, one is likely to find 
someone who does not eat any meat at all. In his opinion, it is be possible to find individuals 
who may detest one particular meat or the other for various personal reasons but not one who 
does not eat meat entirely. He mentioned that some hunters, for example, may not eat blooded 
animals because of the experiences of their trade, but may eat fish, crabs, and snails. Others 
naturally were born not liking certain foods. Traditional Respondent 3, however, stated that it 
was possible to find individuals who have made personal decision to consume only fruits and 
vegetables. Traditional Respondent 2 added that such individuals are not considered strange at 
all. She further indicated that there some people who believe that eating meat can cause some 
illness. Such people perceive animals as potential carriers of diseases or germs. Such 
individuals, as a result, avoid meat in their diets and do not eat eggs either. These individuals 
may make it a point to eat only vegetables such as cabbage, carrot, onion, and tomatoes all the 
time, she mentioned. 
The participants in the focus group discussions generally did not have any problem with the 
killing and the use of animals for food. Two, out of the fourteen focus group participants 
identified themselves as vegetarians while one other person identified himself as a partial 
vegetarian. Yet none of these three vegetarians was a vegetarian based on the respect of the 
moral status of animals. One was a vegetarian by choice while the other two were vegetarians 
for health reasons. Osei claimed he became a vegetarian first from a doctor’s advice (health 
reasons) but later developed love for animals. Consequently, he claims to be a vegetarian now 
on moral grounds. When asked whether any of them would consider themselves becoming 
vegetarians in the future or whether becoming a vegetarian is the moral way to go, almost all 
the focus group discussants met the question with doubtfulness. Benjamin, for example, said 
becoming a vegetarian himself is something that will not happen in this lifetime. According to 
him, he could not imagine a life without his pork and beef. 
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From the findings obtained in the responses by the traditional respondents, it turned out that 
the use of animals for meat forms part of the people’s culture. It was gathered from the four 
traditional leaders who participated in a focus group discussion in Cape Coast that even though 
traditionally, no one was prevented from becoming a vegetarian, meat eating formed an 
essential part of the Akan custom. Similarly, Traditional Respondent 5 intimated that although, 
the Akan customs do not have any specific rule when it comes to vegetarianism, for some 
traditional rituals, one has no choice but to use meat to fulfil the demands of culture. 
Furthermore, he indicated that though the Akan customs do not prevent anyone from abstaining 
from meat, it will be difficult for a chief to decide to use only vegetables and fruits for rituals 
in place of the animals that have been used for years. To emphasize this point, Traditional 
Respondent 1 mentioned that he had not come across any chief who has stated that he does not 
eat meat. Meat, he claimed, forms part of the chief’s rituals, and certain portions of the animal 
are reserved only for the chief and others for specific individuals occupying specific traditional 
positions. In addition, there are men called osodofoɔ (male cooks) who cook for the chief and 
treat his meat, as tradition requires. Again, the chief of every town had a particular animal that 
was used for food for him for his spiritual upliftment. As such, if a chief does not eat meat, 
such information may only be known by close members of his household and not publicly.  
The implication of the findings on the topic of vegetarianism and the use of animals for food 
is that even though the Akan culture does not prevent an individual from abstaining from meat, 
meat eating forms an essential part of the people’s culture and customs. The responses from 
the participants demonstrate that a theory that calls for the total abolition of meat eating, as per 
Regan’s animal rightist view, will not be in concordance with the Akan people’s ethics, beliefs, 
and practices. Nevertheless, giving the fact that the Akans recognize animals’ pain, and attempt 
to ameliorate animals’ suffering just before they are slaughtered, it is arguable that the Akans’ 
view will support a direct welfarist position. This is the position that calls for the humane 
treatment of animals during their lifetime and at the point of their killing, as expressed tersely 
in the words of Priscilla, one of the focus group discussants, as follows: Yes, I do not see 
anything wrong with it but it should not be so brutal. Indicatively, given the fact that 
traditionally, animals are generally reared on a free-range, the Akans’ view may escape some 
of the criticism Singer has against commercialized animal farming although, the Akan position 
ought to be guided by Singer’s arguments to ensure that animals live a humane life.  
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6.4 The use of animals as pets/companion animals 
Concerning the use of animals as pets or companion animals, animal rightists, on the one hand, 
take an abolitionist view. Abolitionist, Gary Francione (2010; 2000), for example, argued 
against the use of animals as pets. He claims that the current state whereby animals are 
considered personal legal properties afford their human owners the freedom to use these 
animals as they please in the same manner they do to their inanimate properties. Similarly, 
Spencer et al (2006) were of the view that the use of animals as a pet is wrong, since the practice 
shares similar challenges with the use of animals in factory farming. For them, both practices 
use the animals for instrumental ends to the benefit of humans. Since welfarism, on the other 
hand, is about providing care and humane treatment to animals, pet keeping can present a good 
instance where humans can express this care and humane treatment to animals at a more direct 
level. Thus, welfairsts are not against the use of animals as pets or companion animals, as far 
as, the welfare of the animals is well considered and the animals receive humane treatment 
from their keepers. 
The study discovered from the traditional respondents that the Akans do not have a specific 
name for a pet. Pets are classified under domesticated animals as the Akan uses the same term, 
efie mmoa (household animals) or ayɛnboa (reared animals). These names denote that pets are 
traditionally regarded as part of the animals kept at home, including animals that are reared or 
kept for their meat rather than for their companionship.  
According to Traditional Respondent 1, the ‘Whiteman’ differentiates between pets and reared 
animals but among the Akans, pets are part of the animals generally referred to as reared 
animals. According to him, humans came to meet these animals at home as per God’s creation 
and order of things. Similarly, Traditional Respondent 2 maintained that pets are called by the 
same name Akans use for all domesticated animals. For her, people keep these animals as pets 
simply because they like them or have an interest in them. For Traditional Respondent 6, a pet 
is known as efie aboa (household animal), a term used generally for all domesticated animals. 
He explained that these pets have existed with humans for a long time. 
The respondents did not seem to think there was anything morally wrong with keeping animals 
as pets or as companion animals. Some respondents encouraged the keeping of pets while 
others thought that keeping animals as a pet did not constitute an infringement on the freedom 
of the animals. Opambour, for example, did not think there is any wrong done in having animals 
as a pet. He held that keeping animals as pets can benefit the human owners. One of such 
benefits, he identified, was that animals kept at home could help divert some misfortunes away 
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from their owners due to some animals such as the cat ability to perceive impending 
misfortunes such as death and ailment before they come upon their owners. He also believed 
that animals tacitly show consent to be petted through the way they show affection to their 
human owners and from the response they give to the affections they receive. According to 
Pius, there is no infringement of animals’ freedom in keeping them as pets because he was of 
the view that animals are better off in terms of care with their human owners than on their own. 
Thus, in his opinion, pet owners are rather helping the animals they keep as pets. In addition, 
he felt that these animals could be friends to their owners and provide companionship as well 
as protection to their owners. 
The study noted that in some instances, animals that are kept as pets are later killed by their 
owners for food. When asked about this, Traditional Respondent 5, for example, did not see 
anything wrong in keeping animals as pets and killing them later for food. He thought it was 
up to the individual owner to decide on what to do with the animal. Traditional Respondent 9 
pointed out that animals were initially created to be eaten. As a result, she did not see any 
problem with pet owners killing their animals for food. She, was, however, quick to admit that 
the relationship that is built between the animal and its owner sometimes makes it difficult for 
it to be killed for food. Although the majority of the young adult respondents were not so much 
inclined to the thought of killing and eating their pets, some few respondents such as Obed and 
Shadrack, saw no wrong in doing so. Aboraa and Clara thought that if one should kill and eat 
his or her pet then it means the initial purpose for keeping the animal was not for petting after 
all. As a result, she believes it is wrong to kill and eat pets because people develop some 
attachment to their pets. In contrast, Shadrack believed that there is nothing wrong in eating 
pets. For him, since the individual decided to make the animal his or her pet, he or she can 
decide at any time to take away that right from the animal. Thus, he emphasized that it is a pet 
so long as you are keeping it as a pet.  
Again, the respondents were of the view that even though there is nothing inherently wrong in 
keeping animals as pets, pet keepers or owners take upon themselves the responsibility of 
caring for the animals they keep as pets. Thus, Obed and Shadrack, for instance, posited that 
there is nothing wrong in keeping animals but once anyone decides to keep them they should 
be ready to take up the responsibility for their upkeep. In line with ths standpoint, Edwin 
thought that it was the responsibility of the ‘superior class’ (humans) to take care of the inferior 
class (animals). He posited that if we are not killing them and we are domesticating them in 
our homes, then why not?  Their welfare should be our responsibility. 
201 
 
A first notable point from the findings is about how a pet is accurately defined. As was said in 
the literature review, Bok (2011: 769) defines pet as a nonhuman animal that is taken into a 
home and accepted as a member of the human’s household. This definition does not precisely 
reflect the Akan understanding and practice, although the definition of a companion animal by 
The New Zealand Companion Animal Council Inc. (2016: 4) as any animal that shares a living 
environment and relationship with humans may arguably come close enough. Furthermore, it 
is observable from the findings that the Akans’ perception about the keeping of animals as pets 
or as companion animals is against everything the rightists or abolitionists will stand for. The 
Akans keep animals as pets for instrumental purposes, i.e. for company, protection, fondness 
of the animals, hunting, to fend off evil and death, and in some cases, for food. They also regard 
animals kept as pets as the properties of their human owners who have the powers of discretion 
in deciding what purpose they serve. Despite this, it is also observable that the Akan considers 
it a responsibility of pet owners to provide proper care and maintenance for their pets thus, 
making their position share some affinity with the position of the direct welfarism. 
Consequently, Akans believe they have greater responsibilities to animals kept at home than to 
animals in the wild.  
 
6.5 The hunting and trapping of animals  
Going with the animal rightists’ abolitionist position, will mean that animal right theory will 
call for a total cessation of hunting and trapping of animals. Nevertheless, Regan, who is an 
animal rightist, did not entirely write off the practice of hunting and trapping. He writes, “Since 
animals can pose innocent threats, and because we are sometimes justified in overriding their 
rights when they do, one cannot assume that all hunting or trapping must be wrong” (Regan, 
2004: 353). Regan, however, appears to be against hunting and trapping of animals for 
commercial profits, recreational purposes, and sports. For him, and following his general 
position on the moral standing of animals, hunting and trapping for these purposes, treats 
animals as mere receptacles used merely as means to an end. Animals have moral rights and 
humans must not use them to satisfy their needs and pleasures. In this regard, Regan rejects all 
the common arguments that are used as justifications in support of these practices, including 
the argument that those who practice hunting and trapping get to exercise, enjoy the 
communion with nature, enjoy the companionship of their friends, or the argument that the 
practice is an old age tradition.  
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In likewise manner and in conformity with the welfarist general position, welfarism will 
support the hunting and trapping of animals as long as due diligence is taken to protect the 
welfare of the animals and reduce their suffering. Relying on the main principle of the 
Leopold’s land ethic that states that a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community and wrong when it tends to do otherwise. Callicott 
(1980) argues that regulated and disciplined sport hunting is consistent with Leopold’s land 
ethic. In agreement with the Callicott’s view, The Wildlife Society calls for a properly 
regulated hunting and trapping instead of a blanket abolition of these acts. They state, as part 
of their standing position, that they support a regulated hunting, trapping, and fishing, and the 
right of people to pursue either consumptive or non-consumptive use of wildlife. They also 
claim to support an animal welfare approach when it comes to hunting and trapping rather than 
an animal rightist position. To this, they assert that The Wildlife Society backs an animal 
welfare ideology that holds that humans can study and manage animals through science-based 
methods. They also find the human use of wildlife acceptable, including regulated hunting, 
trapping, and lethal control for the benefit of populations, species, and human society provided 
the practice is sustainable and individual animals are treated ethically and humanely. (The 
Wildlife Society, n.d.) 
Responding to the practice of hunting, the traditional respondents pointed out that traditionally, 
hunting is a serious trade for the Akan, so much that hunters had to undergo certain rituals and 
purification rites before they set out into the wild to hunt. In addition, the killing of some 
animals required special rituals before their meat are brought home for consumption. 
Traditional Respondent 6 recounted that the Akans used to consider the best hunters to be those 
who have been able to kill the most number of elephants. Accordingly, hunters were ranked in 
ascending order according to the number of elephants kills they have made. 
The position of most of the respondents was that since they accept the kill and use of animals 
for food then they see nothing wrong with hunting and trapping animals for food. They, 
however, did not support indiscriminate or unregulated hunting and trapping of animals. For 
instance, Opambour posited that once he believes that animals can be killed for food, it should 
not matter if they are hunted and trapped for that same purpose. What he does not endorse is 
hunting them just for the fun of it or for their horns, which are sold for profit. Obed shared 
similar sentiments. He was generally against unregulated animal sports and trophy hunting. He 
called these acts as ‘hunting for self-glorifying and expeditions’. He feared that if these self-
glorifying acts were not regulated, they would lead to the extinction of those animal species. 
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He was also of the view that it would be better for humans to farm animals rather than hunt 
them, since he believed farming animals is more sustainable than hunting. Concerning this, 
some of the participants were against traditional Ghanaian festivals that require the hunting of 
animals as part of the festivities. Other respondents did not concur with this because they 
believed that since the festivals are held only once a year, the period affords the animals enough 
time to procreate. Traditional Respondent 5 hinted that although hunting is an important 
occupation for the Akans, hunting some types of animals is prohibited during those parts of the 
year that the animals are believed to be procreating. Traditional Respondent 4 also pointed out 
that Akans use taboos primarily to preserve nature and to keep certain animal species alive.  
On trapping of animals, Traditional Respondent 6 stated that hunters set traps deep in the forest 
and some closer to home. For those closer to home, it is easier for the hunters to check on the 
trap every morning for a catch. For those traps in the forest, however, the hunters may visit 
them every few days thus, making it difficult for the hunter to monitor the catch. This makes it 
possible for animals caught in a snare or a trap to die and even get rotten before the hunter finds 
it. Traditional Respondent 4 explained that traps are not set to maim the animals but to kill 
them. He admitted, however, that sometimes the animal caught in the trap struggles for a while 
before it dies and at other times, the hunter comes to meet the animal not yet dead in the trap 
and must strangle it to kill it.  
From the respondents’ claims, it is inferable that the Akan practice and philosophy of hunting 
and trapping lean towards a welfarist position rather than a rightist or abolitionist position. In 
considering the respondents’ call for regulated hunting, the traditional use of taboos to control 
and restrict the hunters, and their abhorring of indiscriminate hunting, it is, perhaps, safe to 
argue that the Akan supports a protectionist view when it comes to hunting. This is gathered 
from the fear expressed by Obed concerning the possibility of the animals becoming extinct if 
hunting and trapping are not controlled, and the views expressed by Traditional Respondent 4 
and Traditional Respondent 6 on the placement of taboos to restrict the hunters during the 
mating seasons of the animals. Despite this, there was no evidence from the respondents that 
point to the fact that animal trapping is done by the Akan in such way that ensures that the 
animals do not go through pain and suffering before their death. The respondents did not also 
give any indication that the Akan hunters practiced their trade in such a manner that was meant 
to reduce animal pain and suffering.  
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6.6 Vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research  
Under this theme, the divergent views of direct welfarism and rightism were observed as 
follows: Animal welfarism accepts the permissibility of the humane use of animals in 
biomedical research provided such use does not cause unnecessary pain and suffering to the 
animals. Rightism, by contrast, denies the permissibility of such use however humanely or 
painlessly it is done. 
Regan (2004: 392) explains that welfarists decide whether the harm done to animals in 
scientific research is justified by applying the utilitarian approach of balancing the overall 
aggregate of positive gains (happiness/pleasure), and negative gains (pain/suffering), for all 
sentient beings affected by the outcome. In effect, if it can be shown that the outcome of the 
use of animals in science for biomedical research or vivisection produces greater positive gains 
than negative gains then the act is considered a justifiable act and is encouraged. In concordance 
with this welfarist position, Cohen (2001) held that there is no moral harm done in the use of 
animals in medical research to advance human knowledge and to find cure and vaccines for 
pertinent human ailments. For him, it is justifiable to use animals in biomedical research in as 
much as the welfare of animals is considered. Cohen postulates that the use of animals in 
medical research is more profound than their other uses because researchers cannot do without 
the use of animal subjects. Humans, however, can be able to survive without animal food 
products, they can survive without companion animals or the use of animal skins for clothes, 
but in the field of medical research, Cohen was of the view that the use of animals cannot be 
avoided. Again, Cohen is against the total abolition of animal use in medical research due to 
the many benefits it provides for the advancement of science and consequently, for humans. 
Cohen believes that should animal experimentation be forbidden, nearly all the opportunities 
of medical research openings would close and most of these researches could not be 
undertaken.  
The animal rightist view presents a contrasting position. Regan (2004: 393) held that using 
animals in scientific experimentation amounts to treating animals as were mere receptacles or, 
as if their value is reducible to their utility.  He notes that because the rights view generally 
finds the practice of harming a human merely because of an aggregate effect unacceptable, it 
makes it equally unacceptable for humans to abuse animals on a similar basis.  
As Regan (2001: 142) correctly noted, while the use of animals for food, clothes, companion 
animals, etc, has been ongoing for thousands of years, the use of animals for scientific purposes 
is relatively a recent development. Accordingly, the study directed queries on this theme only 
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to the young adult respondents, since the use of animals in biomedical research is not a 
traditional act. Nonetheless, given what has been said by the traditional respondents under the 
other themes and sub-themes above, the researcher can extrapolate that the traditional Akan 
view will endorse the use of animals for scientific research, if doing so would further human 
advancement.  This conclusion seems valid due in part to the traditional Akan belief that 
humans are naturally placed higher than animals on their hierarchy of beings. This higher 
position, humans hold, affords them the right to use those beings below them to further their 
needs. Secondly, it also safe to postulate that traditional Akans will advocate for a regulated or 
humane practice of the science of using animals in research due to their acknowledgment of 
animal pain and suffering. 
Except for one, all the young adult respondents held that there was nothing morally appalling 
with the use of animals in biomedical research. The widely held positions were that firstly, 
humans are superior to animals, and secondly, God has given humans the authority to subdue 
and use animals to meet humans’ need. Thirdly, they believed that the use of animals in 
biomedical research serves a greater utilitarian purpose. Efua, for instance, thought that it is 
right to use animals for research for the safety of humans, since it is inconceivable for humans 
to be used. According to Obed, Pius, and Opambour, the use of animals in biomedical research 
is permissible because ‘obviously’ everything was created for humans and because it helps in 
furthering scientific research. Opambour, on his part, thought that the use of animals for 
biomedical research aligns perfectly with God’s purpose of creation. For Priscilla, using 
animals for biomedical research is not to be considered bad, although she thought that the 
practice needed to be regulated so that it is not done indiscriminately. She felt regulation is 
important because of the pains animals go through when they are put through various tests. I 
feel for them as well, she added. For Shadrack, unless it is argued that animals and humans are 
equal, using animals instead of humans for these researches constitutes lesser harm. His claim 
coheres with Cohen’s welfarist position. Cohen (2001: 63) had expressed the view that the 
interests that animals have should not be translated as rights they possess, since rights are 
essentially human. For Cohen, even though animals are sentient and their pain are worthy of 
moral consideration, it does not mean that their experiences are morally equivalent to the 
experiences of humans. Based on this, Cohen supported the use of animals in biomedical 
research albeit, with due consideration for the pain and suffering of the animal.  
In general, one can sense that the Akans’ view on the use of animals in biomedical research 
corresponds immensely with the welfarist position. The responses show that the Akans do not 
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consider the use of animals for scientific research as constituting moral evil. Just as Cohen, 
they encourage the act on the utilitarian ground that it helps advance scientific research of 
which humans stand to benefit. The respondents’ view also show that they reject unregulated 
or indiscriminate research on animals due essentially in the fact that they recognise that the 
practice can cause suffering in animals.     
Osei was the only respondent who thought that it was wrong to use animals for biomedical 
research. He did not agree with any of the reasons and justification provided by the other 
participants. He was convinced that there are other methods to conduct these biomedical tests 
without using animals. This was also the position of Regan, who had argued that the rights 
view is not to be considered as antiscientific, but to be regarded as calling for the development 
and use of other alternatives in scientific research that do not rely on the use of animals, 
alternatives that do not involve animal models or toxicity tests. On this score, The Royal 
Society (2004) notes that some alternative methods that employ the use of computer model 
rather than animas are available to science. These, as they note, may include the use of cell 
cultures when a specific mechanism can be identified. It also includes the use of molecular 
sensors to test the biological activity of certain particular substances. In situations where there 
is enough known about a complex system found in intact animals, computer simulations can 
be used in understanding the intricacies of that system. Nevertheless, even with these available 
options, The Royal Society (2004) notes that these alternative methods, in general, suggest and 
demand further work on whole animals, and do not completely replace experiments on animals. 
The Royal Society thus, asserts that: “Alternatives to whole animals are clearly versatile but 
are as yet, incapable of capturing the complexity of the living mammalian body” (The Royal 
Society, 2004: 16). Similarly, Cohen did not think there could be alternatives available to 
science that can lead to the total abolition of animals in biomedical research, as suggested by 
Regan and other abolitionists. Thus, he claims that: “Animals cannot be adequately replaced. 
Substituting non-animal methods for testing in medical research is possible in a few limited 
contexts, but in most medical research it is wishful fantasy” (Cohen, 2001: 71). He, however, 
encouraged the use of other alternatives besides animals where and when it is applicable.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the findings gathered from the respondents with one-on-one interviews and 
focus group discussions were discussed and analysed. The main arguments or positions of the 
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respondents were compared and juxtaposed with the literature and analysed through the lens 
of the theories of welfarism, rightism, and the ethics of interrelatedness. The discussion was 
done thematically under six main themes. These themes represent the major arguments in the 
animal ethics debate. They are the theme of the interconnectedness of nature, the moral status 
of nonhuman animals, and vegetarianism and the use of animals for food. The others are the 
use of animals as pets or companion animals, the hunting and trapping of animals, and 
vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research.  
The findings gathered through the respondents indicate that the Akans’ view of nature and their 
relationship with nature correspond with the ethics of the interrelatedness of nature. 
Respondents agreed that there exists some form of connections between humans and the rest 
of nature, and that it is an important connection that needs to be sustained. It was also clear 
from the views of the respondents that they understood this existing interconnection of nature 
to mean the interdependency of the constituents of nature on each other for survival, which is 
much in agreement with the emerging literature on African environmental ethics. It is also 
evident that the Akan environmental ethics is anthropocentric in approach, through the 
conferring of instrumental or extrinsic values on nature, instrumental values that go to benefit 
humans. This notwithstanding, the Akan environmental ethics is not to be considered as 
individualistic in nature because it does not seek the interests or rights of individual human 
agents but instead, the common interest of humanity through its goal to ensure the continuity 
and survival of the human community. In so doing, Akan environmental ethics call for 
judicious and sustainable use of the natural environment in such a way that maintains what the 
Akan considers the natural cycle of the interdependency. 
On the moral status of animals, it was shown that the Akans consider humans higher than 
animals on their hierarchy of beings, which forms part of their ontology. This higher position 
of humans, they maintained, made humans superior to animals. As a result, the Akans hold the 
view that animals exist for human use. The Akans, therefore, use animals for various purposes 
including food, clothing, and sacrifices. Furthermore, the Akans believe that animals and 
humans are not the same because humans possess some distinguishing attributes that set 
humans apart from animals. Among these attributes is their belief that humans are rational 
beings while animals are not; their perception that humans are made in the image of God; their 
conviction that animals do not have a language; their observation that animals do not have a 
moral sense and not social beings and the possible lack of a soul or spirit in animals. The study 
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discussed the strength and weaknesses of these attributes in the light of the literature on these 
subjects.  
In the next chapter, the study will use the observations and conclusions reached here to argue 
for the place of the Akan animal ethics and rely on same to propose, what the study will call a 
‘progressive relational anthropocentric’ approach, and the argument for a theory of moral status 
based on community assimilation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
209 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
AKAN ANIMAL ETHICS: A PROGRESSIVE RELATIONAL 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC APPROACH AND THE ARGUMENT FOR 
MORAL STATUS BASED ON COMMUNITY ASSIMILATION  
7.0 Introduction 
The Akans’ position on key areas in the animal ethics debate was explicated under the 
discussion and interpretation of findings in the preceding chapter. The goal of this current 
chapter is to bring together a summary of the main findings under each of the key areas in the 
animal ethics debate, and to use what has been learnt to argue for what the study calls 
‘progressive relational anthropocentric’ approach to environmental ethics, and for a theory of 
moral status based on community assimilation. The connection between these two and why it 
is important to discuss both is that having a sense of the anthropocentric position of the Akan 
people helps to understand and appreciate their position on the moral status of nonhuman 
animals. Thus, as it will soon be shown, the progressive relational anthropocentric worldview 
of the Akans highly inform their ethical attitude towards nonhuman animals.  
 
7.1 Towards a progressive relational anthropocentric approach  
Under the theme of the interconnectedness of nature, the conclusion reached by the study in 
the previous chapter was that Akan environmental ethics support the theory of ethics of 
interrelatedness which, as was shown, is the predominant theory emerging from the African 
environmental ethics literature albeit, it is referred to by different names. To say Akan 
environmental ethics endorses the ethics of interrelatedness is to say that Akan environmental 
ethics recognises the interdependence and peaceful coexistence between humans, and the rest 
of the natural environment. This recognition calls for an attitude towards the environment that 
can be best described as an attitude of ‘live and let live,’ Tangwa (2004). Again, this recognition 
of human interconnectedness with nature obligates humans to treat nature with some judicious 
concern for its worth, survival and sustainability as seen in Ogungbemi (1997).  
 
On the debate on anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approach to nature, the study 
observed that although, Akan environmental ethics identifies with the ethics of interrelatedness 
with its accompanying moral imperative for environmental preservation and sustenance, it does 
not consider nature valuable for its own sake. Instead, following the information gathered from 
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both the traditional and young adult respondents as detailed in chapters 5 and 6, it is reasonable 
to say that Akan environmental ethics imputes instrumental value to nature, an instrumental 
value that ultimately benefits humans. In other words, the Akans hold the belief that the 
preservation and sustenance of nature are good and desirable because they serve the needs and 
interests of humans. It is not for the sake of any intrinsic worth identified in nature, but for 
humans’ continuous survival on earth. Most of the traditional respondents strongly expressed 
this position. Traditional Respondent 3, for example, subtly pointed to this in a rhetorical 
question: if we are unable to preserve what our ancestors have bequeathed to us, then what 
will become of our lives? More evidently, Traditional Respondent 4 affirmed that even though 
human and nature are interconnected, this interconnection exists to the benefit of humans in 
such a way that without human beings, rivers and other aspects of nature would have no role 
to play. Likewise, Traditional Respondent 5 posited that human life is not complete without 
animals and water bodies and that God created everything to benefit humans. The study also 
revealed that the Akan sees this perceived ontological arrangement of nature as divinely 
inspired. The Supreme Being, as the creator of the world and everything in it, placed humans 
higher than nature and animals on the Akan hierarchy of beings. Again, the Akans believe that 
it is in accordance with the design and will of the Supreme Being that everything was made to 
serve the purpose of humanity. Traditional Respondent 4 unreservedly expressed this particular 
view; for him, in accordance with God’s creation, human beings are superior to all beings and 
as such, God has given humans the authority to dominate nature. This position, as the study 
showed in chapter six, echoes the view of Bujo (2009), who similarly recognized that the 
interrelationship that the Africans understand to exist between humans and nature, is one that 
makes humans consider animals, plants, minerals, and other inanimate, as the forces that God 
has made available for human use. He, however, acknowledges that this does not imply that 
humans are allowed to treat the lesser beings arbitrarily. 
Furthermore, we learnt from chapter 6 that even though Akan environmental ethics is 
anthropocentric in approach, it is not to be regarded as individualistic. This is because Akan 
environmental ethics, as the findings showed in chapters six and seven, do not seek to promote 
the interests or rights of individual human agents but the common interest of the collective. In 
other words, Akan environmental ethics seeks to ensure the continuous progress of the human 
community and its survival. Consequently, Akan environmental ethics calls for careful and 
sustainable use of the natural environment in a way that maintains what the Akans consider to 
be the natural cycle of the interdependency of nature.  
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In addition, it was made apparent from the findings that when the Akans speak of preserving 
nature for the sake of humanity, they do not have only the interest of the current generation at 
heart, but that of the future generations as well. As was shown in the previous chapter, this 
position was articulated by Traditional Respondent 4, who mentioned that: We have dominion, 
but you could destroy everything, to your own disadvantage, so you sustain them. You maintain 
them, to make sure you have something left for the next generation.  
 
7.1.1 The progressive relational anthropocentric approach 
These aforementioned points are the defining features of the progressive relational 
anthropocentric approach that the study is proposing. Here, the study explains the choice for 
each of the three nomenclatures that describe the proposed approach. First, the reason for 
choosing ‘anthropocentrism’ is made apparent from the discussion above. Akan environmental 
ethics, as the study has shown, is fundamentally human-centred. It does not acknowledge that 
nature can exist or be valuable for its own sake but instead, considers nature instrumentally 
valuable. That is to say, nature exists to further human needs and survival. Evidence for this 
view has been extensively shown succinctly in the section above and more extensively in the 
previous chapter. This position was made self-evident when the more direct question was posed 
to the respondents, in a bid to determine whether they will consider nature to be beneficial for 
its own good. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, Traditional Respondent 1, for 
instance, responded that: they [nature] are useful to man. Let us take the fish in the rivers that 
we consume. We [humans] hunt animals in the bush, we use the forest in farming, and we use 
the timber to build houses…. so everything that God created is useful to mankind. Traditional 
Respondent 4, likewise, mentioned that nature is indeed preserved for the sake of human 
beings. For him, nature can go extinct but it will not affect it..., it is, I mean, it is to the detriment 
of men. So nature has nothing to lose, but we [humans] have something to lose.  
Still on the anthropocentric attribution, the study showed in section 6.1.1 of the previous 
chapter that the Akans’ rejection of nature’s intrinsic value stands in contrast with the view of 
Gyekye (1995), who thought that the Akans attribute some intrinsic property to nature because 
they perceive, at least, some part of nature to be animated (containing sunsum (spirit)). It is 
also a repudiation of the non-anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics ambition of the 
likes of Tangwa, Ogungbemi, and Behrens. As indicated, Tangwa (2004), for example, had 
argued his eco-bio-communitarian environmental ethics to be a non-anthropocentric approach 
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and as a contrast to the Western environmental ethical theories which he accused of being both 
anthropocentric and individualistic. Kevin Behrens (2010) had similarly described his ‘African 
relational environmentalism’ as a rejection of anthropocentrism. Nonetheless, the Akan 
anthropocentric approach corresponds with the positions of the likes of Bujo, Murove, and 
Horsthemke. Horsthemke (2015) had argued that the attempt by some African environmental 
ethicists to couch out a non-anthropocentric relational approach to environmental ethics based 
on the ethics of Ubuntu and Ukama is unsuccessful. As Horsthemke notes, if one should 
critically observe the language employed by these African environmental ethicists in their 
interpretations of the African based knowledge, it will be perceived that it is undeniably human-
centered. Thus, the evidence from the Akan respondents appears to agree with Horsthemke’s 
position and therefore, renounces the non-anthropocentric interpretations. It is also notable that 
the Akan position coheres with Murove’s philosophical application and interpretation of 
Ubuntu and Ukama to the natural environment. Murove claimed that when the two concepts of 
Ukama and Ubuntu are synthesized, they produce an ethical outlook that suggests that human 
wellbeing is indispensable from their dependence on, and interdependence with all that exists 
(Murove, 2009: 315). This understanding supports the claims made by the Akan respondents. 
Thus, the human-centeredness of the Akan ontological beliefs is made apparent hence the 
study’s employment of anthropocentrism in its proposed approach. 
The second nomenclature in the proposed approach is ‘progressive’. Again, this is made 
evident from what was deduced from the findings in the previous chapter, and briefly presented 
in the section above.  As indicated, information from the respondents clearly showed that the 
Akans subscribe to the ethics of interrelatedness theory, a theory alluded to by most African 
environmental ethicists. This means that Akan environmental ethics recognises the 
interdependence of humans and nature, and that it is an important relationship that needs to be 
sustained. Traditional Respondent 4, for example, undoubtedly affirmed the interconnection of 
humans and nature. He stated that: Oh definitely, we are interconnected, we are interdependent. 
Similarly, Traditional Respondent 7 emphasized the essentiality of the interconnection between 
humans and the rest of nature. For him, humans, just like the atmosphere, stars, moon, seas, 
and trees, are all part of nature and must, therefore, be interconnected. Furthermore, it became 
evident from the views of the respondents that they understood this existing interconnection 
between humans and nature to mean an interdependence which was necessary and 
indispensable for human survival. For example, Traditional Respondent 3 expressed his 
understanding of the interconnectedness of nature as that which is based on nature’s 
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dependence on one another. Thus, to him, humans taking care of the forest will lead to a good 
amount of rainfall in return. Consequently, the rainfall will fill the rivers and water bodies for 
farmers to use. This will promote plant growth. Furthermore, the animals in the forest will also 
have enough to eat from the plants and will multiply for humans to kill some for food and use 
the plants for medicine as well. Thus, we can see the relevance of the studies’ choice of using 
the interconnectedness in its proposed approach.  
Finally, why ‘progressive’ as used in the proposed approach? The study describes its proposed 
relational anthropocentric approach as progressive, based on three observations made from the 
findings: 
1. Akan environmental ethical approach, even though anthropocentric in nature, 
advocates for attitudes and relationships with the natural environment that ensure 
sustainability and preservation of nature; 
2. Akan environmental ethical approach, even though human-centred, is not 
individualistic but communalistic;  
3. Akan environmental ethical approach does not advocate only for the sustainability and 
preservation of nature for the current generation but also for future generation.  
 
Anthropocentrism, as it is generally known, regards only human beings as intrinsically valuable 
while regarding all other things as being only instrumentally valuable; all other things are 
valuable only to the extent that serve human purposes (Callicott, 1984: 299). On this score, the 
Akan environmental ethical perspective is anthropocentric. Nevertheless, the Akans view goes 
beyond this by acknowledging the interconnectedness of humans with nature. Consequently, it 
strongly advocates for the preservation and sustenance of nature although, it does this for the 
interest of human survival rather than for a recognized intrinsic value found in nature.  The 
Akans, therefore, consider it an essential and absolute necessity for humans, to do all they can 
to keep the cycle of nature sustained. The Akans ensure this, as Traditional Respondent 5 noted, 
through the use of taboos and prohibitions that come with dire consequences on those who flout 
them. People, for example, are not permitted to clear certain forests for farming and there are 
some days that they are not permitted to use the rivers. In addition, there were taboos that 
prohibited the people from using certain animals for food as well as the forbidding of hunting 
during certain times of the year. Again, as was mentioned in chapter six, Traditional 
Respondent 9 explained that the Akans believed that the gods were able to punish people who 
flouted these prohibitions, so much that the fear of the gods’ punishment deterred people and 
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ensured their compliance. The Traditional Respondent 7, added that the notion of nature 
preservation was reflective in the way of life of the traditional Akan people and their proverbs. 
Thus, noticeably, the Akan understanding of the interconnectedness of nature comes with a 
normative principle to preserve and sustain the natural environment. This keeps the 
anthropocentric part in check.  
In addition, it appears that the Akan position, by placing an instrumental value on nature based 
on its benefit to humans, is in accordance with the non-individualistic claims by the likes of 
Behrens and Tangwa regarding the characteristics of the African theory of ethics of 
interrelatedness. Behrens, for instance, notes that “unlike many Western moral theories that 
place a strong emphasis on respecting individual autonomy, or promoting utility for 
individuals, Africans place a high value on the group: the family, the clan, the community 
(Behrens, 2010: 472).” This position also remains valid for the Akans, such that Akan 
environmental ethics, despite being anthropocentric in approach, is not to be considered 
individualistic. Akan environmental ethics does not seek the interests or rights of individual 
human agents or individual natural species but the interests of the human species as a whole. 
This, evidently, would be in line with the general communitarian character and ethics of Akan 
societies of which many writers have made reference to.    
Finally, it is also apparent, as mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, that when the Akans 
speak of preserving nature for the sake of humanity, they do not only have in mind the interests 
of the current generation, but also that of the future generations as well. Traditional Respondent 
4 articulated this in his claim that: We [humans] have dominion, but you could destroy 
everything, to your own disadvantage, so you sustain them. You maintain them, to make sure 
you have something left for the next generation. This view coincides with the position of the 
indirect welfarists, who call for the preservation of animal species because they believe humans 
owe it to the present and future generations to do what they can to ensure that animals continue 
to exist. This is to ensure that future humans also get to enjoy the benefits of these animals, 
either through sightseeing or other beneficial uses the particular animal may provide as Regan 
(2004) pointed out.   
In effect, the progressive relational anthropocentric approach is an approach to environmental 
ethics that recognises that human and nature are interconnected and because of this 
interconnectedness, humans have a moral responsibility to take care of the environment by 
ensuring its preservation and sustenance. This normative responsibility, according to this 
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approach, is not because of an identified intrinsic quality or value found in nature but mainly 
for the continuous survival of humans and human communities. The study believes that this 
approach adequately reflects the worldview of the Akans. The progressive relational 
anthropocentric approach agrees with Norton (1984), who thought that it is a mistaken view to 
think that environmental ethics can only thrive if its principles are based solely on a 
nonanthropocentric theories, that is, on principles that presuppose that the natural environment 
has value in themselves independent of its value to humans. Remarking on his proposed weak 
anthropocentrism, Norton held that: 
Weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticizing individual, 
consumptive needs and can provide the basis for adjudicating between these 
levels, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics without 
the questionable ontological commitments made by nonathropocentrists in 
attributing intrinsic value to nature (Norton, 1984: 131).  
Thus, the study strongly agrees with Norton’s position, and believes that the progressive 
relational anthropocentric approach serves similar purpose for the Akans as Norton’s proposed 
weak anthropocentrism. That is to say, the fact that the Akans have an anthropocentric outlook 
towards the environment does not mean they do not have a sense of responsibility towards the 
environment.  
 
7.2 The argument for a theory of moral status based on community assimilation 
From the discussions in the previous chapter, the study noted that the respondents were in 
consensus about the fact that human beings have a higher value to nonhuman animals. The 
claim made by Traditional Respondent 7 that “human beings are human beings and cannot be 
replaced”, leads the study to conclude that the Akans consider human beings as having intrinsic 
value. Meanwhile, animals are only valued instrumentally as shown in the above discussion. 
The Akans, as the study learnt, use a variety of animals to fulfil various existential needs. These, 
as we saw, include the use of animals for food, sacrifices, ritual pacifications and warding off 
bad omen. Other uses of animals are for clothes, foot mat for chiefs, some paraphernalia won 
by the chiefs, musical instruments, companion animals, and hunting. Given the ontological 
position the Akans give to nonhuman animals, where do the Akans place the moral status of 
animals? To answer this, the study considered what the Akans hold to be the important 
distinguishing marks that set humans apart from animals. The most salient of them considered 
were the following: that humans are created in the image of God, whilst animals are not; that 
humans have higher rational capabilities than animals in general, and that only humans can 
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communicate using language. The others are that humans have a sense of morality whilst 
animals do not; that animals are not social beings, at least, not in the sense that humans are; 
and that animals, unlike humans, do not have souls. The discussions in the previous chapter 
considered some of the strengths and weaknesses of these noted distinguishing features.  
Despite these distinguishing features that the Akans observed between humans and animals, 
the Akans acknowledge that animals can suffer pain and can express various emotions based 
on how humans treat or relate to them. The Akans use words such as pain, pleasure, sad, moody, 
grief, excitement, and happiness, to describe the various emotions they consider animals do 
have at a given point in time. Traditional Respondent 1 observed that humans can cause animals 
pain, and even make them very sad especially, when animals are hit with something. For him, 
the way animals react show that they can feel pain. Traditional Respondent 6 similarly 
mentioned that by observing the behavior and the cry of animals, it is possible to tell that 
animals go through pain. Traditional Respondent 5, Traditional Respondent 4, and Traditional 
Respondent 9 independently acknowledged that causing pain to animals could bring negative 
repercussion on the perpetrator, both physically and spiritually. For Traditional Respondent 4, 
making animals happy goes to the advantage of both animals and humans. This is because 
when animals are happy, they increase in offspring and humans get to benefit from their use. 
Does the acknowledgment of animals’ sentiency, mean that the Akans consider animals as 
having a moral status? It appears so, at least to some extent, for as Garner (2010) noted, the 
mere fact that animals are sentient ought to result in animals being accorded some form of 
moral status. When issues of good care, kindness, compassion, and various emotions and state 
of mind come to play, there is no doubt that ethics and morality are at play. The very fact that 
the Akans judge their actions as good or bad based on the possibility of their action causing 
pain or harm to animals should suggest that animals are, to some extent, regarded as part of the 
moral community. However, considering the ontological position of animals on the Akan 
hierarchy of beings and the distinguishing features the Akans identify between humans and 
animals, should suggest that animals are, at best, regarded as moral patients, rather than as 
moral agents. It will also imply that if the Akan should grant moral status to animals at all, it 
will be one that is inferior to the moral status of humans. Hence, it is logical to say that the 
Akan position will not endorse an abolitionist or rightist position, but will instead be closer to 
the direct welfarist position that calls for the amelioration of animal pain in humans’ use of 
animals to further their essential needs. 
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7.2.1 A theory of moral status based on community assimilation 
Among the distinguishing marks that the Akans identified as those that set humans apart from 
animals, the study considers the ones based on the beliefs that animals lack a sense of morality 
and their lack of sociality very profound. Although arguments, as shown in the previous 
chapter, have been made by some to suggest that animals do exhibit certain behaviors that can 
indicate they have a moral sense, this evidence has not been conclusive enough to deal with 
the skepticism about the lack of moral sense in animals. Hence, the perceived lack of a sense 
of morality among animals remains a strong position used in denying them a moral status 
completely, or an equal moral status with humans. In terms of animal sociality, again, the study 
showed in section 6.2.1.2.4 of chapter six that there is indeed evidence to suggest that some 
animals are social and have well-organized social structures. Tinbergen, for instance, has 
shown the sociality of animals in terms of their family and group life, mating behavior, and 
their relation with other species, among others. Nevertheless, he defines animal social behavior 
simply as the study of cooperation between individuals (Tinbergen, 1990: 2). In a way, 
sociality, in the Akan context, is also about cooperation, but also more than that. It is about the 
ability to engage and sustain a meaningful and productive family and social relationships. It is 
also largely participatory, as it requires individuals to share in communal activities. 
One should not be entirely surprised that the Akans put premium on sociality and the ability to 
have a moral engagement. The Akans’ use of sociality and a sense of morality as distinguishing 
features between humans and animals is rooted within their sense of communal life, which 
traditional African communitarian societies like theirs are noted for.  Sociality and living an 
ethical life that promotes the wellbeing of the community are the core values of traditional 
Akan people, and the impact and implication of this communal life influence their notion of 
personhood and their understanding of what it means to live a fulfilled life. As it is common 
knowledge now, traditional Akan societies, just like many other traditional African societies, 
are very communal in character. Wiredu (2011: 3) defines communalism as “a social system 
in which kinship relationships are made the basis for interconnecting the well-being of the 
individual with that of the group.” This leads to a lot of shared social life and shared common 
values. These communal societies prioritize the promotion of this shared social life, and values 
over and above individual goals and personal aspirations, although scholars such as Gyekye 
have argued that the community does not completely eliminate individual expressions. 
Nevertheless, the Akan individual is never an isolated person but instead, perceived as 
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‘inherently’ a communal being, who is deep-rooted in social relationships and interdependency 
(Gyekye, 1997: 41). Thus, the Akans uphold social interactions and ethics that promote such 
communal living. True to this, Akan ethics has been described as a humanistic ethic. That is an 
ethic that considers the moral good as that which promotes human interest or that which can 
advance a common and harmonious social life (Gyekye, 1996; Wiredu, 1992). As Wiredu 
(1992: 195) puts it, Akan ethics is ‘quintessentially social’. 
Relatedly, the connection that the Akans make of individual personhood with the quality of 
one’s social interactions with others, and one’s ability to display humanistic attitudes are 
telling. Gyekye (1992: 109) explains that “the pursuit or practice of moral virtue is held as 
intrinsic to the conception of a person.” Consequently, in the Akan language, should an 
individual fail to live by the expected moral codes of the community, it is usually said of the 
individual that he or she is not a person (onnye nipa). Menkiti thought this moral requirement 
of the self, made achieving personhood a matter of progression in which an individual can 
succeed or fail. He notes that: “One conclusion appears inevitable, and it is to the effect that 
personhood is the sort of thing which has to be achieved, the sort of thing at which individuals 
could fail” (Menkiti, 2004:  326). Gyekye has, of course, spurned Menkiti’s view that 
personhood is something that is conferred on someone by the community. Nevertheless, 
Gyekye concedes that there are some expressions in the Akan language, judgments or 
evaluations, made about the life and conduct of people, which give the impression that it is the 
community that defines and confers personhood. Implied in this judgment, he maintains, is the 
notion that there are certain basic norms and ideals to which the behavior of a person (if he or 
she is to be regarded a person), ought to follow (Gyekye, 1992: 108-109). These norms and 
ideals, by elaboration, are actions that foster and sustain cherished shared values, goals and 
aspirations of the community. Thus, this Akan communal practice with its associated moral 
undertones tend to underscore the importance of human-to-human interrelationship, and can 
explain why the respondents chose sociality and having a moral sense as weighty distinguishing 
marks between humans and animals.  
Evidently, we can see that community participation and living by the ethic of promoting the 
common good of the community are the defining features of traditional Akan communities. As 
such, individuals that exhibit these features are regarded as persons, while those that do not, 
are considered as not persons. Thus, given an Akan community, some individuals, although 
humans, may not be considered persons if, they do not participate in the shared community life 
and seek the common good as supreme and over and above their personal goals. As a result, 
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we can extend this conception of personhood to cover an understanding of moral status in terms 
of nonhuman animals.  The study, therefore, formulates a theory of a moral status based on 
community assimilation following these highly valued features therein in traditional Akan 
communities, that is, the value for community participation (a shared social relationship) and 
the promotion of the common good.  
As shown from the previous chapter, many of the respondents pointed out that establishing a 
close relationship with animals can affect how they treat them. Traditional Respondent 5, for 
example, posited that a good and close relationship with animals can establish a strong bond 
between animals and humans like that which exists among siblings. Traditional Respondent 2 
also held that a close relationship with an animal makes it difficult and heart-rending for the 
owner to kill it. More tellingly, Traditional Respondent 6 mentioned that a close relationship 
with animals changes one’s outlook towards the animal. He stated that:  
Your outlook towards the animal will change; I mean you become so closer to the animal. That 
is why some people have dogs who stay in the house… Any time a dog dies, it is just like a 
funeral. Everybody, especially kids in the house, everybody becomes so gloomy and they are 
of themselves. He continued that the longer you become associated with the animal the more 
friendly the relationship becomes and sometimes some people treat them like human beings. 
For him, this is also the case even for wild animals that have been domesticated. To this, he 
said: …the moment you bring it home. You domesticate it and it becomes like any domestic 
wild one and becomes like a pet.  
The study deduces from the claims by these Akan experts that animals that have been 
assimilated in the lives of the people, receive some higher moral considerations compared to 
those that have not. This makes it possible to argue for a theory of animal moral status, based 
on community assimilation. By community assimilation, the study implies, animals that have 
been taken in by individuals into their homes, considered to be part of the family and establish 
some social-relational connections that go beyond owner and owned. When this happens, such 
animal should be considered as assimilated into the shared social life of the community. They 
are no more to be considered as isolated animals without some sort of social connection with 
humans. By being brought into a home, loved by one or more people of the community and 
sharing in the social life of this person who is part of the community, the animal is to be 
considered part of the larger community whose interest or welfare must be respected because 
whatever happens to it, affects the interest of its human keeper.  
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This argument, by extension, will also include all animals regarded by a given community as 
their totem animal. This is because the community regards totem animals as part of the 
community who are able to bring good or bad fortunes to the community. Totems, as we have 
observed, are understood to have an ancestral link with the tribe, clan or community and are 
the people’s protectors, guardians, or patron spirits that keep and shield the group from any 
harm. They also bring to the group some good omen. In return, the group respects and refrains 
from eating, killing or trapping these animals they take to be their totems. At the death of a 
totem animal, the clan associated with it, mourns and buries it as they would a human being, 
as Lumor (2009) observed. Thus, these totem animals are part of the people’s social life, they 
have been assimilated into the community of the people, and form part of their history, culture 
and metaphysical and spiritual affairs. Now, because animals cannot or do not participate in 
the social lives of the people in the way that humans do, they must be considered moral patients 
rather than moral agents.  
It is easy to see how this placing of moral status on community assimilation mimics the position 
of the indirect welfarist, especially where it is suggested that animals’ interests ought to be 
respected because doing so will translate to seeking the interests of their human owners. 
However, the thesis of the theory of moral status based on community assimilation goes beyond 
the thesis of the indirect welfare approach. It is rather in conformity with the proposed 
progressive relational anthropocentric approach discussed above. As a result, it acknowledges 
animal pain and more importantly, the interconnectedness of animals and humans as well as 
the importance of sustaining and preserving this interconnection. However, because it is 
anthropocentric in nature, it does not advocate for a theory of a moral status that affirms an 
intrinsic value of animals. Thus, the theory of a moral status based on community assimilation 
is admittedly anthropocentric and as a consequence, does not argue for equal moral status for 
humans and animals. For this theory, and following the Akans belief in the hierarchy of beings, 
animals are not equal with humans. In addition, not all nonhuman animals are equal in terms 
of their moral status. Animals who have been assimilated into the human community, will have 
a higher moral status than those who will remain in the wild. Again, admittedly, this theory of 
moral status based on community assimilation is guilty of speciesism in granting animals some 
moral status based on how they are assimilated in a human community. The theory can only 
defend itself against this charge at this moment by alluding to the arguments offered by Cohen 
(2001) presented in chapter three. Cohen, in defence of his version of direct welfarism, argued 
that all things considered, speciesism is not necessarily a bad thing. To him, speciesism ought 
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not to be equalled to racism or sexism because both racism and sexism are acts of 
discrimination against individuals who are humans. To this, he states that “racism is evil, 
because humans really are equal, and the assumption that some races are superior to others is 
false and groundless (Cohen, 2001: 62).” Meanwhile, this is not the case with regard to 
speciesism, since the human species and the animal species are not in the same category. 
Humans, according to Cohen, are morally autonomous and can be part of a moral community 
whilst animals are not. Thus, Cohen maintains that “speciesism may be taken as one way of 
expressing the recognition of these differences (Cohen, 2001: 62).” In that regard, he 
considered speciesism a correct moral perspective, and by no means an error or corruption. 
In addition, the proposed theory of moral status based on community assimilation, cohers, to a 
large extent, with the Metz (2012) proposed theory of moral status in terms of a being’s ability 
to share in community relationship. Following traditional African account of placing 
personhood in an individual’s community participation, and the traditional African conception 
of morality in terms of community, Metz proposes that “a being has moral status roughly 
insofar as  it is capable of being part of a communal relationship of a certain kind” (Metz, 2012 
:393). For Metz this means that “the more a being is capable of being part of a friendly or 
loving relationship with normal humans, the greater its moral status” (Metz, 2012: 394). In 
other words, the greater a being’s capacity for communal relationship, the greater that being’s 
moral status. Such a conception of moral status, according to Metz, leads to two to implications: 
Firstly, it demonstrates that moral status comes in degrees based on a being’s ability to 
participate in shared communal life and secondly, a being, capable of being both subject and 
object of a communal relationship, constitutes a higher status than merely one that is only the 
object. Applying this criterion of moral status to nonhuman animals, Metz asserts that “if by 
virtue of the nature of human beings, dogs and mice, humans were much more able to identify 
with and exhibit solidarity with dogs than with mice (upon full empirical information about 
both), then dogs would have a greater moral status than mice” (Metz, 2012: 394-395).   
Having argued for the theory of a moral status based on community assimilation, the study, in 
the ensuing sections, will consider how this theory, in conjunction with the progressive 
relational anthropocentric approach, will hold in the discussions on vegetarianism, the use of 
animals as pets, hunting and trapping of animals, and the use of animals in biomedical research.  
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7.3 Akan position on vegetarianism and the use of animals for food 
We know from the analyses of the findings in the previous chapter that the Akans do not 
endorse an absolute elimination of animal meat from their diet. It was realized that although 
there are no explicit laws or taboos against vegetarianism in the Akan tradition, it is highly 
unlikely that the Akan will choose to be a vegetarian. It is, however, possible to find some who 
are vegetarians because of reasons related to health or personal taste, rather than based on the 
acknowledgment of the moral status of animals. Furthermore, the findings showed that the use 
of animal meat forms part of the Akan people’s culture. Thus, although the Akan customs do 
not really have any specific rule when it comes to vegetarianism, for some traditional rituals, 
there is certainly no choice but to use meat to fulfil the demands of culture, as hinted by 
Traditional Respondent 5. He mentioned that Meat forms part of the chief’s rituals, and there 
are certain portions of the animal that are reserved only for the chief and other portions for 
specific individuals occupying specific traditional positions. In addition, there are male cooks 
for the chief who are skilled in treating and cooking the meat for the chief exactly, as tradition 
requires. Again, the chief of every town had a particular animal that was used for food for his 
spiritual upliftment.  
How do the study’s proposed moral status theory based on community assimilation and the 
progressive relational anthropocentric approach inform us regarding vegetarianism or the use 
of animals for food? First, the progressive relational anthropocentric approach tells us that 
humans and nature, including animals, are interconnected, an interconnection that goes more 
in the favor of humans. Nevertheless, the approach will strongly be against an unregulated use 
of animals for food. Thus, using animals for food must be done in a way that ensures their 
sustainability and their preservation for the interconnection to be maintained, as well as, for 
future generations to also benefit. Secondly, the application of the moral status theory based on 
community assimilation will, in general sense, allow for the use of animals as food. 
Nevertheless, animals that have been duly assimilated into the community are not to be used 
for food, since they are considered part of the community. Only animals that are reared for the 
purpose of food or those that are hunted for food should be used as such, and not animals that 
have been assimilated into the community. Such assimilated animals belong to a home, are 
loved, and partake in the social life of their keepers. Thirdly, because both the progressive 
relational anthropocentric approach and the moral status theory based on community 
assimilation acknowledge animal pain, there is a need to employ good methods of animal 
rearing and killing that do not cause pain and stress to the animals.  
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7.4 Akan position on the use of animals as pets/companion animals 
As the study has already established under this theme, the Akans do not consider anything 
morally wrong with keeping animals as pets or as companion animals. They do not think the 
keeping of animals as pet, constitutes an infringement on the freedom of the animals and even 
encourage it. What is also known is that the Akans consider it the responsibility of pet keepers 
to provide proper care and maintenance for their pets. In addition, the Akans believe they have 
greater responsibilities to animals kept at home than to animals in the wild. This coincides with 
the position of the proposed moral status theory based on community assimilation. Animals 
kept as pets or companion animals fit the very definition of animals assimilated into the 
community. Companion animals belong to a home, are loved and cared for, and play an 
essential part in their keepers’ social life, which, in turn, affects, in many ways, the shared 
social life of the keepers in the community. As a result, the theory of a moral status based on 
community assimilation endorses the use of animals as pets mainly because it based on the 
progressive relational anthropocentric approach. The theory also considers humans, although 
interconnected with animals, higher beings. The approach permits humans to use animals to 
further their needs, and keeping animals as companion animals, is one of those needs.  
The requirement here is that the animals are kept in a way that is sustainable, and upholds the 
interconnection that exists between them and humans, and for the benefit of future generations. 
Since the approach acknowledges animal pain, pets should be kept in the best of conditions 
that ensure they are not subjected to pain. It is also important to mention here that by this theory 
of moral status, the practice of using companion animals as food is definitely not permitted. 
This is important because responses from the participants showed that some people consume 
animals such as dogs and cats they keep as companion animals and find no wrong in the act. 
As noted above, by being assimilated into the community, pets are considered part of the 
community and cannot be used for food.  
 
7.5 Akan position on hunting and trapping of animals  
What the study gathered under this theme is that the Akan, having regarded the use of animals 
for food, consequently finds nothing wrong with hunting and trapping animals for food. 
However, in line with the progressive relational anthropocentric approach, the Akans do not 
endorse indiscriminate or unregulated hunting and trapping of animals. Obed, for instance, was 
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generally against unregulated animal sports and trophy hunting. He called these acts as ‘hunting 
for self-glorifying and expeditions’. He feared that if these self-glorifying acts are not 
regulated, they would lead to the extinction of those animal species. He was also of the view 
that it would be better for humans to farm animals rather than, hunt them as he thought farming 
animals is more sustainable than hunting. These sentiments comply with the progressive 
relational anthropocentric approach, which as has been mentioned, recommends best practices 
that take into cognizance the human-nature interrelationship and best practices that are 
environmentally sustainable and preserve the animal species for both current and future 
generations. The Akans already acknowledge the latter part of this recommendation through 
their use of some precautionary measures to avoid abuse by hunters. To this, Traditional 
Respondent 5 hinted that although hunting is an important occupation for the Akans, hunting 
for certain types of animals is prohibited during those part of the year, that the animals are 
believed to be procreating. Traditional Respondent 4 also pointed out that the Akan people use 
taboos primarily to preserve nature and to keep certain animal species alive.  
The proposed moral status theory based on community assimilation permits hunting and 
trapping of wild animals. The theory, based on the given definition of what it means to be 
assimilated into the community, will argue that wild animals, by remaining in the wild, are yet 
to be assimilated into the community and as such, have not acquired the moral status that those 
who have been assimilated have. Nevertheless, care must be taken in how these hunting and 
trapping are done to ensure the use of best methods that do not cause the animals any undue 
pain.  
 
7.6 Akan position on vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research  
The study sought the views from the Akan respondents on the practice of vivisection and the 
use of animals in biomedical research even though, these practices are not to found in Akan 
traditional practices. The findings revealed that Akans find nothing morally appalling with the 
use of animals in biomedical research. In keeping with the progressive relational 
anthropocentric approach, Akans consider the use of animals for research purposes to be 
acceptable because they regard humans as superior to animals and because God has given 
humans the authority to subdue and use animals to meet their needs. It is their view, that the 
use of animals in biomedical research serves a greater utilitarian purpose for humans, since it 
leads to scientific breakthroughs in the constant search for cures for human illness and diseases. 
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Furthermore, following the progressive relational anthropocentric approach, the respondents 
rejected unregulated or indiscriminate research on animals due essentially in the fact that they 
recognise that the practice can cause animals to suffer.     
Going by the thesis of the moral status theory based on community assimilation, it will 
naturally be considered unacceptable to use animals that have been assimilated into the 
community for biomedical research mainly because these animals, having been assimilated, 
are now part of the community. Since it is unacceptable to use any member of the society for 
research, it will not be acceptable to use animals that have been assimilated into the community 
as well. This, notwithstanding, because the theory and approach acknowledge that the act can 
bring undue pain to animals, it will back the call for alternative methods that do not include 
animals altogether, if such alternatives are available.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
The chapter has brought together findings from the Akan experience obtained through the Akan 
respondents on the thematic issues in the animal ethics debate to make two proposals; firstly, 
for a progressive relational anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics as an alternative 
to the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches. This progressive relational 
anthropocentric approach essentially acknowledges that human and nature are interconnected 
and due to this interconnectedness, humans have a moral responsibility to take care of the 
environment by ensuring its preservation and sustenance. This normative responsibility, 
according to this theory, is not necessarily due to an identified intrinsic quality or value found 
in nature but mainly for the continuous survival of humans and human communities. Secondly, 
the study proposed a theory of animal moral status based on community assimilation. By this 
theory, the study argues that animals that have been assimilated into the community obtain a 
moral status, which even though is inferior to the one possessed by humans, makes them moral 
agent whose interest ought to be protected. By community assimilation, the study means 
animals that individuals have taken into their homes, made part of the family, and have 
established some social-relational connections with their keepers.  
Finally, the study applied the progressive relational anthropocentric approach and the theory 
of animal moral status, based on community assimilation to themes in the animal ethics debates 
to show how the two proposals will address them. These themes are vegetarianism and the use 
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of animals for food, the use of animals as pets, hunting and trapping of animals, and the use of 
animals in biomedical research.  
The next chapter is the concluding chapter of the study, where the study will demonstrate how 
it has met its objectives and how it has responded to its research questions.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the study’s findings and conclusions. The main goal was 
to identify the place of Akan animal ethics within the global animal ethics debate, based on the 
Akan ontological worldview, beliefs, practices, and ethics. The study essentially used a 
qualitative research method to achieve this goal, through the gathering of firsthand information 
from two groups, namely traditional Akan leaders and young Akan adults. This was after 
reviewing relevant critical works on Western and African environmental and animal ethics in 
chapter two, which brought into perspective, the delineating lines between the animal welfare 
theory and the animal rights theory. Following the study’s objective, the thesis relied on the 
theories of welfarism, rightism, and the ethics of interrelatedness as its theoretical framework. 
In chapter three, the study examined the different positions of these three theories and their 
proponents. The theories were used in describing and evaluating both the primary (information 
gathered from the interviews) and secondary data (articles and book review), and for 
prescribing the study’s proposed progressive relational anthropocentric approach, and the 
argument for a theory of moral status based on community assimilation in chapter seven. In 
chapter four, the study detailed the research design, methods, and methodology of the study, 
while chapter 5 presented the findings from the field based on the one-on-one interviews and 
focus group interviews conducted with the two groups of respondents. The study reported the 
findings thematically under headings chosen to cover the essential arrears of contention in the 
animal ethics debate as follows:  
i. The interconnectedness of nature  
ii. The moral status of nonhuman animals 
iii. Vegetarianism and the use of animals for food 
iv. The use of animals as pets/companion animals 
v. The hunting and trapping of animals  
vi. Vivisection and the use of animals in biomedical research 
 
In chapter six, the study discussed the findings under similar themes above. This chapter 
summarizes the findings for the study’s three research questions as follows: 
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2. What are the main theories in the global animal ethics debate? 
4. What are the trends in the emerging theories in African environmental ethics and 
their relation to animal care and ethics? 
5. How does Akan ontology and ethics help in placing Akan animal ethics within the 
welfarist and rightist debate? 
 
8.1 The main theories in the global animal ethics debate 
The study revealed that there are two major approaches when it comes to the classifications of 
the study of animal ethics, namely animal welfare theory and animal rights theory. (Beauchamp 
2011; Waldau 2011; Regan 2006; Sunstein, 2004). The general position of animal welfarism, 
on the one hand, is that humans have obligations to use animals in such a way that protect basic 
welfare interests of animals. Animal welfarists generally have utilitarian or pragmatic notions 
that acknowledge human obligations not to cause unnecessary or avoidable harm, undue 
suffering, or loss of liberty to all animals (Beauchamp, 2011: 200). More so, animal welfare 
theories accept that animals have interests but would sometimes allow some of these interests 
to be traded away, as long as, some human benefits are thought to justify that sacrifice. Thus, 
animal welfare theory may permit all sort of animal use, as long as, what may be considered as 
‘humane’ guidelines are followed due to their recognition of pain in animals. As a result, animal 
welfare defenders hold that the basic criterion for a being to be morally considerable is 
‘sentiency’ or the capacity to suffer. Animal rights theory, on the other hand, holds that animals 
have certain inherent and robust rights that need to be respected and upheld. Animal rights 
theory essentially endorse rights for animals, such as the right to life, the right to an 
uncontaminated habitat, the right not to be constrained in cages or pens, the right to not be used 
in biomedical research, and many other rights similarly enjoyed by humans. Animal rights 
theories defend the position that animals have interests that cannot be sacrificed or traded away, 
just because it might benefit others. Animal rights mean that animals are not ours to use for 
food, clothing, entertainment, or experimentation. For this theory, ‘subjecthood’ is the 
fundamental requirement for moral consideration. Thus, a subject does not only require 
sentiency, but the ability to have propositional attitudes, emotions, will, and an orientation of 
itself and to its future (Anderson, 2004: 277-278). 
The study further revealed that there are two main types of welfarism, namely, direct welfarism 
and indirect welfarism. Indirect welfarism does not assign moral status to animals since the 
theory holds that animals are not harmed directly. The study presented views expressed by 
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scholars such as St. Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, and Jan Narveson as examples of proponents of 
indirect welfarism. Direct welfarism, on the other hand, admits and accepts that animals are 
morally harmed directly and admits animals into the definition of a moral community. This is 
because they hold animals to be sentient beings, which can experience pain and pleasure. The 
study presented the views of Peter Singer, Carl Cohen, and Robert Garner as proponents of 
direct welfarism. The study also pointed out the similarities and differences shared by these 
proponents of direct welfarism. What became apparent was that despite their minor variances, 
direct welfarists, in general, agree that animals have moral status. Theirs is to seek the welfare 
of animals and to advocate for the humane treatment of animals rather than to demand the total 
elimination of animal use. They, therefore, argue for the better handling of animals, under 
better conditions that will minimize as much pain and suffering as possible.  
Under the animal right theory, the study examined the positions of Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin, 
and Gary Francione. Despite their differences, rightists, broadly speaking, argue that animals 
have moral status and that this moral status is translatable into a right they possess. They 
generally are of the view that the moral status of an animal is at par with the moral status of 
humans and as a result, call for the total abolishment of animal use in any form, and not just 
for the humane treatment of animals to reduce their suffering or pain. Thus, animal rights 
theorists are sometimes referred to as abolitionists. The study further showed that there are 
different levels of strictness to the abolitionist claim, with Gary Francione (2010), considering 
himself as holding the strictest view as compared to that of Regan and Rollin. A fourth rightist 
position was seen in the position of Marry Anne Warren (2012), who calls her position a ‘weak 
rightist position’, claiming that moral status comes in degrees and that the rights of animals are 
not to be equated to the rights of human beings. 
Despite these two being the major theories in the animal ethics debate, there are, what is 
considered, alternative approaches to these two main theories. Palmer and Sandøe (2011) 
generally call these alternative approaches as the contextual approaches. One of such 
contextual approaches is the ethic of care. Mary Midgley (1983), a proponent of the feminist 
theory of ethics of care, suggests that the idea of social-bondedness and the emotions associated 
with it, are as worthy of consideration in human’s moral relationship as with nonhuman 
animals. Feminists, Karen J. Warren states that ecological feminism began to receive a fair 
amount of attention as an alternative feminist approach, and also as an alternative 
environmental ethic, since Francoise d’Eaubonne introduced the term ecofeminism in 1974 
(Warren,  2000: 213). Even though, there are many types of ecofeminism, they commonly 
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emphasize the ethical nature of human relationships to the nonhuman natural world (Warren 
and Cheney, 1991: 180). Warren (2000: 213) considered ecological feminism as the position 
that holds that there are important historical, experiential, symbolical, and theoretical 
connections between the domination of women and the domination of nature. Thus, the 
centrality of ecofeminist theories is first, the commitment to challenge male bias in ethics, and 
second, to develop analyses that are not male-biased (Warren and Cheney, 1991: 180).  
 
8.2 The trends in the emerging theories in African environmental ethics  
After a survey of major works in the evolving field of African environmental ethics, the study 
identified, what it labelled as ‘the ethics of interrelatedness’, as the shared trait within the 
emerging theories of African environmental ethics. The ethics of interrelatedness, as the study 
showed, is the general position that there is an interconnection between humans and nature. 
Thus, humans and nature are dependent on each other for survival. This interrelationship 
between humans and nature, therefore, should move human beings to co-exist peacefully with 
nature, in a manner that leads to the sustainability of humans and nature alike. The study, to 
this effect, presented views from Kevin Behrens (2010), who refers to his theory as African 
relational environmentalism; from Godfrey Tangwa (2004), who calls his ethics eco-bio-
communitarianism; and from Segun Ogungbemi (1997), who labelled his theory as the ethics 
of nature-relatedness. The views of Munyaradzi Murove (2009), Mogobe Ramose (2009), 
Workineh Kelbessa (2205), Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi (2011), Martin Prozesky (2009), and 
Bénézet Bujo (2009), similarly expressed this ethics of interrelatedness.  
Tangwa, for example, describes the traditional African metaphysical outlook as ‘eco-bio-
communitarian’ in character. This, in his view, means a “recognition and acceptance of 
interdependence and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals, and humans 
(Tangwa, 2004: 389).” He further holds that the Western theories on the environment are 
anthropocentric and individualistic. This, he continued, has induced them to subdue, exploit, 
and dominate nature. Tangwa however, believes his eco-bio-communitarian metaphysical 
outlook, borne from features of pre-colonial Africa, as nonanthropocentric in character. 
Tangwa observes that human beings within the African traditional outlook, are more 
cosmically humble, more respectful of other people, and more cautious in their attitude to 
plants, animals, inanimate things, and the various invincible forces in the world. Thus, he 
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believes that traditional Africans are more inclined to “an attitude of live and let live (Tangwa, 
2004: 389).”  
Ogungbemi, on his part, perceives that the current use of environmental resources such as air, 
water, and land stands in contrast with the known traditional practice of environment 
conservation in Africa. A typical traditional African community, Ogungbemi argues, believes 
in the ethics of not taking more than you need from nature. He called this attitude as the ‘ethics 
of care’. To make the ethics of care appropriate to the current African situation, Ogungbemi 
formulates his ethics of nature-relatedness using the principles found in the ethics of care 
(Ogungbemi, 1997: 270). He defines the ethics of nature-relatedness as “an ethics that leads 
human beings to seek to co-exist peacefully with nature and treat it with some reasonable 
concern for its worth, survival and sustainability”. To him, there is no need to attribute any 
spiritual undertone to either the ethics of care or the ethics of nature-relatedness since there are 
natural explanations for both of them.  
The study further revealed that the environmental ethics of Murove, Prozesky, and Ramose, 
independently incorporated the Southern African ethical principle of Ubuntu/Boto/Ukama, to 
argue for environmental ethics of care and virtue of interrelatedness of humans with the entire 
ecosystem (Murove 2009; Prozesky 2009; Ramose 2009). Bujo, similarly, appeals to the value 
of human peaceful coexistence or interrelationship with nature. This interrelationship, Bujo 
affirms, is a network made up by the entire cosmos and God himself. He believes that living in 
mutual coexistence is how humans can reach a total realization of the self (Bujo, 2009: 283). 
In addition, Bujo maintains that animals, plants, minerals, and other inanimate objects are the 
forces that God has made available for human use. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
humans treat lesser beings arbitrarily (Bujo, 2009: 286). For Prozesky, the ethic of relationality, 
as he calls it, is facilely derivable from the Shona concept of Ukama, which asserts that ‘a 
person can only be a person in, with and through not just other people, but also in, with and 
through the natural environment’ (2009: 302). Prozesky, therefore, holds that this will 
practically involve a recognition that “all things have both some element of intrinsic value, 
because all things possess some spark at least of experience and creativity, and some element 
of instrumental value, by virtue of the interrelatedness of all things whereby each serves all, 
and all serve each” (Prozesky, 2009: 303). For Murove, integrating the two concepts of Ukama 
and Ubuntu will bring about an ethical outlook that suggests that human wellbeing is 
indispensable from their dependence on, and interdependence with all that exists (Murove, 
2009: 315). Finally, Ramose suggests that the best translation of the concept of Botho or 
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Ubuntu is ‘humanness’ instead of ‘humanism’. In his view, the word humanness best describes 
the African condition. He further declares, “The dignity and importance of the individual 
human being can best be understood in terms of relations with other human beings, as well as, 
relations with physical nature (Ramose, 2009: 312).”  
The above accounts demonstrate the centrality of the ethics of interrelatedness in the emerging 
theories of African environmental ethics. This ethics of interrelatedness is generally an ethic 
that underscores the interdependency of humans and the natural environment and as a result, 
calls for a normative approach to the environment that ensures mutual coexistence and respect. 
  
8.3 The place of Akan animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist debate 
To answer this question, the study relied principally on the primary data received from the 
Akan respondents, in addition to the literature reviewed in chapter two. Using the theories of 
welfarism and rightism, the study assessed the evidence from the respondents and knowledge 
gained from the literature, to identify where to place Akan animal ethics within the welfarist 
and rightist debate. The study used the ethics of interrelatedness, the identified dominant ethics 
in the emerging literature in African environmental ethics, to assess the findings in order to 
understand the parallelism between the Akan view and the dominant views in the African 
environmental ethics literature.  
The discussion of the study findings in relation to the accessed and applied literature, and the 
three theories, revealed that Akan animal ethics shares closer affinities with welfarism (direct), 
than it does with rightism. For instance, both Akan animal ethics and animal welfare theory, 
acknowledge that some animals have moral status even though, they have lesser moral status 
compared to humans. In contrast, animal rights theories mainly argue for an animal moral status 
that is at par with humans. In addition, while animal rights theories argue for animal moral 
status mainly based on the belief that (some) animals have inherent values, both welfarism and 
the Akan position defend animal moral status based on animal sentiency (their capacity to feel 
pain). Thirdly, both the Akan and welfarist positions advocate strongly for a protective and 
humane use of animals, rather than a ubiquitous abolishment of all animal use, which is rather 
the stance of the rightist positions. This said, the table below presents a tabulated representation 
of where the Akan view agrees or disagrees with welfarism and rightism, considering the 
different aspects of contention in the animal ethics debate. The positions of contention 
presented in the table may not be exhaustive. The table is based on the general views of 
233 
 
welfarism and rightism. The study is not oblivious of the fact that the different existing views 
of welfarism and rightism are not those that nicely fall into an agree-or-disagree demarcation. 
Yet, the study is convinced that the table is a fair representation, if viewed in line with the 
general abolitionist position of animal rights theories, and the general protectionist position of 
animal welfare theories. 
 
Table 8.1 Similarities between the Akan view and the theories of welfarism and rightism 
Position of contention Welfarism 
(direct) 
Rightism   Akan view 
Recognition of animal 
pain/sentiency  
X  X 
Animals (some) have 
intrinsic value 
   
Recognizes the 
interconnectedness of 
humans and nature 
X X  
Abolish all animal use X  X 
Humane use of animals  X  
Animals (some) have moral 
status 
   
Animals (some) have equal 
moral status with humans 
X  X 
Animals (some) have lower 
moral status 
 X  
Animals (some) are moral 
patients 
   
Laws to protect and preserve 
animals 
   
Advocates for vegetarianism X  X 
Abolish the use of animals in 
science 
X  X 
Abolish hunting and trapping X  X 
Abolish the use of animals as 
pet 
X  X 
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       KEY 
   Means Agree 
  X Means Disagree 
 
As evident from the table above, the Akan view aligns more with the welfarist position than it 
does with the rightist position. The Akan view shares similar ticks and crosses with welfarism, 
except for the recognition of the interconnection of humans and animals. This is the point of 
divergent between the welfarist position and the Akan position. The Akan position shares this 
attribute of the recognition of the interconnection of humans and animals, only with the 
dominant position in the African environmental ethics, that is, the ethics of interrelatedness. 
The Akan position point of divergence with the dominant position in African environmental 
ethics, is the fact that the Akan position is anthropocentric in approach. Nevertheless, Akan 
anthropocentrism and the anthropocentrism of the West, are not equal. The Akan 
anthropocentric approach is progressive in character. This implies that despite its recognition 
of instrumental value in animals or nature as a whole, Akan anthropocentrism is not 
individualistic but rather recognizes the interrelationship that animals and humans share. By 
this, it seeks the community’s good and advocates for the judicious and humane use of animals 
and nature as a whole for both current and future generations.  
 
8.4 Proposed animal ethics approach and theory of moral status  
In chapter seven, hinging on the expositions from the discussion and interpretation of the data, 
and the findings that emerged, the study recommends the progressive relational anthropocentric 
approach to animal ethics. The study argues that the progressive relational anthropocentric 
approach to animal ethics is an approach that, though imputes an instrumental value to nature 
(anthropocentric), it is not individualistic in nature. Rather, it acknowledges the interconnection 
that exists between humans, and the rest of nature (relational) and through this, defends a 
human and nature relationship that sustains this interconnection for the good of the current and 
future human community.  
Similarly, relying on the accounts from the discussion and interpretation of the data, the study 
proposed a theory of moral status based on community assimilation. The study notes that 
though the Akans give regards to animal pain, sentiency of animals is not enough to warrant 
moral consideration. Based on claims made by some Akan experts (who were part of the study 
as participants) that animals that have been integrated into the lives of the people receive some 
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higher moral considerations compared to those that have not, the study proposed a moral theory 
based on community assimilation. By community assimilation, the study has in mind, animals 
that individuals have taken into their homes, considered to be part of the family, and have 
established some social-relational connections with them that go beyond owner and the owned 
relationship. The study argues that when this happens, such animals are no more to be regarded 
as isolated animals without some social connections with humans. In other words, bringing 
such animal into a home, loved by one or more people of the community, and sharing in the 
social life of this person who is part of the community, the animal becomes part of the larger 
community, whose interest or welfare ought to be respected. Such an animal is a moral patient 
that is to be duly regarded as part of the moral community. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The chapter provided a summary of all the major findings of the research. It has shown how 
the study was successful in responding to its three research questions, namely: 
1. What are the main theories in the global animal ethics debate? 
2. What are the trends in the emerging theories in African environmental ethics and their 
relation to animal care and ethics? 
3. How does Akan ontology and ethics help in placing Akan animal ethics within the 
welfarist and rightist debate? 
Concerning the main theories in the global animal ethics debate, the study found animal welfare 
theory and animal rights theory, as the two major competing theories. Whereas animal welfare 
theory advocates for the humane use of animals, animal rights theory argues for the total 
discontinuation of all animal use. Whereas animal welfarism argues for a minimal animal moral 
status based on its recognition of animal pain, animal rights theory argues for a full moral status 
for animals based on an intrinsic or inherent value it ascribes to animals. The study considered 
the welfarist views of Peter Singer (1975), Carl Cohen (2001), and Robert Garner (2010). 
Likewise, the study discussed the rightist views of Tom Regan (1983; 2004), Bernard Rollin 
(1992), Mary Anne Warren (2012), and Gary Francione (2010). 
Concerning the emerging theories in African environmental ethics, the study discovered what 
it termed as the ethics of interrelatedness, as the dominant ethical principle found in the 
emerging literature in African environmental ethics. Many writers, as the study revealed, refer 
to this ethics of interrelatedness by different names such as the ethics of nature-relatedness of 
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Ogungbemi; the eco-bio-communitarianism of Tangwa; African relational anthropocentrism 
of Behrens; and the ethic of relationality of Prozesky. This identified ethics of interrelatedness 
states that traditional African metaphysics and practices towards the environment recognize the 
interconnections that exist between humans and nature. As such, humans are to show mutual 
respect, coexist peacefully, and care for nature. Similar expressions of this ethics of 
interrelatedness were seen in the works of Murove (2009), Ramose (2009), Kelbessa (2005), 
and Bujo (2009), among others.  
Regarding the place of Akan animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist debate, the study 
established that the Akan view shares more similar features with the welfarist position than it 
does with the rightist position. However, the study discovered that the acknowledgement of the 
interconnectedness between humans and animals by the Akans, distinguishes their view from 
the welfarist position. The Akan position shares this attribute of the recognition of the 
interconnection of humans and animals, only with the dominant position in the African 
environmental ethics, that is, the ethics of interrelatedness. In addition, the Akan position has 
some anthropocentric features although, not in a similar manner the West understands 
anthropocentrism. The Akan anthropocentric approach is progressive in character in a way that, 
although it values animals instrumentally, it does not primarily set out to seek the individual 
good, but instead seeks the overall good of the community.  More so, the Akan anthropocentric 
approach progressiveness is seen in it advocates for the judicious and humane use of animals 
and nature as a whole, for both current and future generations.  
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE TRADITIONAL 
RESPONDENTS 
1. Do the Akans believe in the preservation of nature and what are their reasons or 
motivation? 
2. Which aspects of nature are considered more important and are given more reverence 
and why? 
3. Where would you place the position of human beings and animals in nature? 
4. What makes an animal different from a human being? 
5. In what ways are humans, animals, and the rest of nature connected or related? 
6. What are some of the traditional customs and practices that include the use of 
animals? 
7. What are some of the animals used as food (delicacies) and for sacrifices and rituals? 
8. What is the general purpose of taboos in the Akan tradition? 
9. What is the history behind the totems of the eight Akan clans? 
10. What are the religious and non-religious rules duties and taboos associated with 
animals that are considered totems or sacred?  
11. What is the history behind Akan ntoro? 
12. What are some of the taboos associated with the ntoro? 
13. What happens should someone kill, eat or hurt an animal considered as a totem or 
forbidden for his ntoro? 
14. Do the Akans believe that animals can be wronged, why or why not? 
15. Do the Akans believe animals can have pain and pleasure? 
16. Do the Akans believe animals have souls or spirit and what happens to them when 
they die? 
17. To what extent does personal relationship with animals affect how Akans treat them? 
18. Is it permitted or conceivable that an Akan should become a vegetarian? 
19. At what point in Akan’s history did the keeping of domestic animals start and why? 
20. What are some of the animals that are kept as domestic animals? 
21. Are there any special beliefs towards domesticated animals that is different from those 
in the wild? 
22. Are they any rituals or rules that hunters must observe in hunting, killing and trapping 
animals?   
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE YOUNG AKAN 
RESPONDENTS 
 
1. What is the relationship shared by the constituent of nature?  
2. Do you find anything wrong with the eating of animals and why? 
3. What is your take on keeping animals as pets?  
4. What is your take on the use of animals for biomedical research? 
5. Is it right for animals to be hunted or trapped for entertainment or for food, why or 
why not? 
6. What is your view on the use of animals for other human benefits apart from food, 
like using their skin for leather and clothes, selling their body parts for profit, riding 
them, and using them for labour, keeping them in a zoo? (Is there any use of animals 
that you dislike or abhor?) 
7.  What Clan do you belong to and what are their animal totem and taboos? 
8. Explain why you may or may not believe that some aspects of nature including 
animals can be or have spirits? 
9. Do you thinks animals have souls, why or why not? 
10. In what ways do you think animals can be wronged?  
11. Do you thin animals can feel pain and pleasure, why or why not? 
12. How are animals treated or not treated well in Ghana?  
13. In what ways do animals have or do not have interests or rights? 
14. Based on all that we have said, would you agree that becoming a vegetarian is the 
ethical thing to do, why or why not? 
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APPENDIX 3: ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
 
 
9 July 2018 
 
Mr Stephen Nkansah Morgan 
217055150 School of Religion, 
Philosophy and Classic 
Pietermaritzburg Campus 
 
Dear Mr Morgan 
Protocol Reference Number: HSS/1318/017D 
Project title: The place of African animal ethics within the welfarist and rightist debate: An interrogation of 
Akan ontological and ethical beliefs towards animals and the environment 
 
Full Approval - Expedited Application 
 
 In response to your application received 2 August 2017, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee 
has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted FULL APPROVAL. 
 
Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent 
Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and 
approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further 
queries, please quote the above reference number. 
 
PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years. 
 
The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter 
Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis. 
 
I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Dr Shamila Naidoo (Deputy Chair) 
Humanities & Social Scinces Research Ethics Committee 
 
/pm 
 
cc Supervisor: Dr Beatrice Okyere-Manu 
cc. Academic Leader Research: Professor P Denis  
cc. School Administrator: Mr Alleyne Coleman 
 
 
 
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair) 
Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building 
Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000 
Telephone: +27 (0) 31 260 3587/8350/4557 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 260 4609 Email: ximbap@ukzn .ac.za / snymanm@ukzn.ac.za I mohunp@ukzn.ac.za 
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APPENDIX 4: LETTER REQUESTING CONSENT IN ENGLISH 
 
 
 
January 3, 2017 
Dear Sir, 
My name is Stephen Nkansah Morgan. I am a Ghanaian doctoral student at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal in South Africa. The title of my research is ‘The place of African animal ethics within the 
welfarist and rightist debate: an interrogation of Akan ontological and ethical beliefs towards 
animals and the environment’. The research looks into Akan traditional beliefs, practices, and values 
towards the environment in general and their relation with animals specifically, as such, I require 
information on practices and customs of the Akan people that involve the natural environment generally 
and animals specifically.  
I am hereby seeking your consent to meet with you at your own convenience to discuss issues on the 
above mentioned areas. I have attached a copy of the interview questions that is meant to guide our 
conversation. Further follow-up questions may arise from the responses you will provide. Our 
interaction is estimated to last for one hour.  I look forward in hearing a favourable response from you 
soon.    
If you would like further information, please do not hesitate to contact me on my number below: 
Cell phone number: 020 822 5193. 
 
You can also confirm my credentials with my project supervisor as well as my school’s research office. 
See their details below: 
 
Supervisor:                                                                             HSSREC Research Office:                                                                      
Dr Beatrice Okyere-Manu                                                     Ms Phumelele Ximba                                   
Telephone number: +27 (033) 260 5582                               Telephone Number: 031 260 3587                                
Email: okyere-manu@ukzn.ac.za.                                     Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za                                 
 
Thank you for your cooperation.  
Yours sincerely, 
Stephen Nkansah Morgan 
 
School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics   
Postal Address: Private Bag X01, Scottsville 3209, South Africa 
 Telephone: +27 (0) 33 260 5540 Facsimile: +27 (0) 33 260 5858 Email:Mchunua@ukzn.ac.za  Website:www.ukzn.ac.za 
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APPENDIX 5: INFORMED CONSENT IN ENGLISH  
School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, 
College of Humanities, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus. 
 
Dear Participant, 
INFORMED CONSENT LETTER 
 
My name is Stephen Nkansah Morgan. I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, Pietermaritzburg campus, South Africa. 
I am interested in Akan traditional beliefs, practices, and values towards the environment and 
animals. I will need information on practices and customs that involve the natural environment 
generally and animals specifically. I am studying cases from Akan communities. To gather the 
information, I am interested in asking you some questions. 
Please note that:  
 Your confidentiality is guaranteed as your inputs will not be attributed to you in person, but 
reported only as a population member opinion. 
 The interview may last for about 1 hour and may be split depending on your preference. 
 Any information given by you cannot be used against you, and the collected data will be 
used for purposes of this research only. 
 Data will be stored in secure storage and destroyed after 5 years. 
 You have a choice to participate, not participate or stop participating in the research. You 
will not be penalized for taking such an action. 
 The research aims at knowing principles in Akan ethics and beliefs that can inform what 
Akans perceive ought to be human relationship with the environment as well as the with 
animals. 
 Your involvement is purely for academic purposes only, and there are no financial benefits 
involved. 
 If you are willing to be interviewed, please indicate (by ticking as applicable) whether or 
not you are willing to allow the interview to be recorded by the following equipment: 
 
 willing Not willing 
Audio equipment   
 
I can be contacted at: 
Email: greatmorgan2003@yahoo.com  
Cell: +233 020 822 5193 
 
My supervisor is Dr. Beatrice Okyere-Manu who is located at the School of Philosophy, Religion 
and Classics, Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
Contact details: email: okyere-manu@ukzn.ac.za.     Phone number: +27 (033) 260 5582                                                   
 
You may also contact the Research Office through: 
Ms Phumelele Ximba 
HSSREC Research Office, 
Tel: 031 260 3587 E-mail: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za 
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Thank you for your contribution to this research.  
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
I………………………………………………………………………… (Full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the 
nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire. 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                                                     DATE 
 
 
………………………………………          ………………………………… 
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APPENDIX 6: INFORMED CONSENT IN AKAN 
Ͻsom, Nyansapԑ ne Atetesԑm Mapa Sukuu 
Adasa Kↄlegyi 
KwaZulu Natal Sukuupↄn 
Pietermaritzburg, Suapↄn Peteem 
 
Owurapa, 
AKWANSRԐ HO ASUTRE NWOMA 
Me din de Stephen Nkansah Morgan. Me yԑ PhD osuani a ԑwↄ KwaZulu Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg Sukuupↄn a ԑwↄ South Africa ↄman mu. Me pԑ sԑ menya suahunu wↄ Akan 
amammrԑ ne amannea a ԑfa abodea ne mboa ho. Mehia nsԑm ԑfa Akanfo amammerε ԑni 
abakosem a ԑfa abodea ho ne mboa ho titirew. Mere sua adeԑ fa Akanfoↄ man mu ho. Sԑ dea 
ԑbԑyԑ na metumi aboaboa nsԑm a ԑfa dea mehwehwԑ no ho nti, mebisa wo nsԑm kakra. 
Mesrԑ, hunu sԑ: 
 Yԑbↄ wo nipaban ne nsԑm a wobeda no edi akyerԑ yԑn no ho ban sԑ obiaa ntumi mfa 
nsԑm no mbata wo ho. Mmom ԑbԑ da edi sԑ ↄmanba adwenkyerԑ. 
 Nsԑmbisa no bedi dↄnhwere baako nanso yebetumi akyԑ mu sԑdea wopԑ no. 
 Nsԑm a wobԑda no edi no, obiara ԑntumi ԑnfa ntia wo dabiarada. Nsԑm a yԑbԑ boaboa 
ano no yԑde bedi nhwehwԑmu yi nkoaa ho dwuma. 
 Yԑdi nsԑm a y’atwerԑ no besie beebi yie na nfi anum akyiri no y’asԑi no. 
 Wo wↄ ho kwan sԑ wo de wo ho hyԑ dwumadie yi mu, wo po, anaa sԑ wo gyae ԑwↄ 
mpԑnpԑnsoↄ biara a asotwe biara enni hↄ ma wo sԑ wobetu saa anamↄn. 
 Nhwehwԑmu yi botae ne sԑ ebehu sԑdea Akanfoↄ amannyԑ ne wↄn gyedie ma wↄ susu 
sԑdea nipa atenaeԑ ne mboa nkitahodie ԑteԑ. 
 Wo ho a wo de hyԑ dwumadie yi mu yi ԑkↄ ma adesua botae nkoaa. Wonnya Sikafam 
nfasoↄ biara. 
 Sԑ wo pene so ma yԑn nsԑmbisa yi a. Ti yei mu baako aseԑ sԑdea wo pԑ no, sԑ wo pԑ 
sԑ yԑde nsԑmbisa no ne wanoyie go efidie yi so. 
 Me pene so Menpene so 
Akasamu fidie   
 
Wonsa bԑka me wↄ: 
Email: greatmorgan2003@yahoo.com 
Tԑlԑfon: +2330208225193 
 
Me Hwԑfoↄ yԑ Dr. Beatrice Okyere-Manu a ↄwↄ Nyansapԑ, ↄsom ne Atetesԑm mapa Sukuu a 
ԑwↄ Pietermaritzburg suapↄn petee mu wↄ KwaZulu Natal Sukuupↄn. 
Wonsa bԑka no wↄ 
Email: okyere-manu@ukzn.ac.za 
Tԑlԑfon: +27 (033) 2605582 
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Wonsa betumi nso aka yԑ wↄ Nhwehwԑmu ↄfese ԑnam: 
Phumelele Ximba 
HSSREC Nhwehwԑmu ↄfese 
Tԑlԑfon: 0312603587 
Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za 
 
Yԑdawoase wↄ wo ntoboa wↄ Nhwehwԑmu yi mu. 
 
 
 
MPAEMUKA 
 
Me………………………………………………………………………………… (twerԑ wo 
din nyinaa) si so dua sԑ mete nwoma yi ne Nhwehwԑmu Dwumadie yi mu nsԑm ase, na me ti 
de boa sԑ me de meho behyem. 
Me te aseԑ sԑ mewↄ ho kwan sԑ metwesan ԑwↄ Dwumadie mu ԑberԑ biaa me pԑ. 
 
Kratahyԑaseԑ       Deeti 
 
……………………………………   …………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
